Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Austin

225 F. 983, 141 C.C.A. 105, 1915 U.S. App. LEXIS 2164
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedJune 30, 1915
DocketNo. 2766
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 225 F. 983 (Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Austin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Austin, 225 F. 983, 141 C.C.A. 105, 1915 U.S. App. LEXIS 2164 (6th Cir. 1915).

Opinion

DENISON, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above). [1J 1. Defendant insists that whatever invention Austin made extended only to the relative arrangement of his clutched and fixed gear members, arid hence that liis patent must be confined to a device carrying one clutched driving pinion and one clutched driven gear, with connections whereby the two dutches have an in and out automatic action. We. cannot so interpret claim 10. Its language is not incapable of such a limitation, when it is read in connection with the specification; but when we compare the various claims, including those not in suit, we find that this particular dutch construction and arrangement are expressly specified in, and seem to be the dominant thought of, another group of claims, while not mentioned in the group of claims in suit. This comparison clearly shows that tiie latter were intended to be distinguished and ciiaracterized by the provision that the outer gear and pinion were of higher ratio than the inner gear and pinion. [986]*986It follows that, under the familiar rule which we have several times followed and applied (Scaife v. Falls City Co., 209 Fed. 210, 214, 126 C. C. A. 304; National Co. v. Mark, 216 Fed. 507, 521, 133 C. C. A. 13), we will not read into one claim elements which expressly characterize another, by which alone the two substantially differ and which are not necessary to make the former operative; and that if Austin’s only real invention resided in his peculiar clutch mechanism, claim 10 would be void, because broader than the invention.

2.. If the words of claim 10 are given quite ordinary and normal. meanings, the claim clearly reads upon defendant’s device, which has all the parts named, and in their specified, mutual relationship. Its sliding clutch, engaging one or the other of the pinions and so driving one or the other of the fixed gears, fully responds to the phrase—

“means for coupling either the outer beveled gear and pinion .or the inner beveled gear and pinion to the said propeller shaft to drive the said axle.”

Aside from the contention that the special clutch arrangement should be read in, only two questions of failure to respond to the terms of the claim are raised. One is whether the defendant’s inner driven beveled gear is “nested” with the outer beveled gear. This word “nest-. ed” is not of very precise meaning. In Austin, the outer surface of the inner gear ring rests, in part, against the inner surface of the outer ring; in the Cadillac, both rings are supported upon and carried by the same back frame, though the two are not in actual contact; but in each case, looked at from the face side, there is no appreciable annular space between the two gears, and the face plane of the inner gear projects beyond the outer just about half of the thickness of the ring. From the face side, the difference between the two devices is not noticeable; and the word “nested” is not inapt to describe the relations between the two gears and their respective supports, as found in the Cadillac structure. The other suggestion is that in the Cadillac, the inner driving pinion is not “on” the shaft (“an inner pinion thereon”) because it is not integral with the shaft, as in Austin, or carried solely thereby. It surrounds the shaft, revolves with or upon the shaft, and would be carried thereby and would operate if it had no other support, but through its surrounding outer pinion and frame bearings external thereto, it would be kept in place if the shaft were removed. We find no reason for giving to “thereon” so limited a meaning as defendant’s contention requires, and we must think'that the mechanism of the claim is used by defendant.

[2] 3. These considerations lead us to conclude that the vital question is whether, construing the claim as we do and considering what others had already done, there was invention in the combination claimed. In deciding this question, one fact stands out as important, and, we think, controlling. This fact is that, although it was common mechanical knowledge that with constant speed in a driving shaft, the speed of a righNangled driven shaft could be changed by providing two pairs of driving pinions and driven gears and clutching one or the other pair to the shaft, and although certain advantages to be de[987]*987rived from employing this principle upon an automobile were very apparent, and although numerous skilled engineers and inventors had tried Cor many years to accomplish this result in a commercially useful way, Austin was the first man who practically succeeded and who built a marketable automobile with a two-speed axle.1 The strongest evidence of the lack of any prior practically operative device and of Austin's success is furnished by the defendant’s conduct. There are, iu ilte record, a number of earlier patents illustrating various conceptions of an automobile axle having two or more speeds; there is no affirmative evidence that any of them ever came upon the market. The Cadillac Company had long been among the leaders in the indusiry; its skilled engineers, who testified as witnesses in this case, doubtless thoroughly knew the practical art and its history the world over, and their admission that Austin’s two-speed axle was the first one‘they had ever seen practical enough to impress them favorably, and their failure lo say they ever heard of any other on the market, are evidence enough that there was no such predecessor. Of course, if any one of ¿fie.se earlier patents disclosed Austin’s complete combination, it would be. of little or no importance that they never came into use; but I he rule is quite different when the issue is whether modifications and rmuTaugcmeiits amount to invention.

;:Vn;e apparent instances of earlier adoption of this idea in practice inca out to be exceptions that emphasize Austin’s real priority. Defc.idnnl’s chief engineer testifies that two or three “two-speed axles” huilr into automobiles had been demonstrated to him by other inventors in an effort to interest him and his company, and that he had been taken lo ride in automobiles so equipped; and while his testimony implies that they worked well enough, neither he nor his company was attracted by these devices, or paid any further attention to them, and the devices dropped out of sight. On the contrary, after the Cadillac Company had thus “turned down” such devices and had considered and discarded various designs and plans for a two-speed axle, and after Austin had kept one or more of his in use for a year or so, he exhibited it at the Chicago show, in January, 1913. Defendant’s chief engineer saw it there, was attracted by it, and at once procured Austin lo «hie him an axle for trial. This was built into a Cadillac car and used ¿or a lime. The company negotiated with Austin for the right lo use Ids invention, but apparently became satisfied both that his royalty demands were exorbitant, and that he would not, upon his pending applknikiu. secure a patent broad enough to he of very much value. It iivivupon returned his axle and declined further to consider a com In rr with him. However, it immediately modified some theretofore disc)nled two-speed axle designs so as to put the device in the form w hk'h we have described as “defendant’s device,” put this upon all its cars for the annual season then beginning, and extensively advertised its iwu-speed axle as the greatest advance in the automobile art made by any manufacturer in any country. Indeed, it exploited an inter[988]*988national award made fo it as depending partly upon this ground.2

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Bluebook (online)
225 F. 983, 141 C.C.A. 105, 1915 U.S. App. LEXIS 2164, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cadillac-motor-car-co-v-austin-ca6-1915.