Cabell v. John H.

577 P.2d 177, 21 Cal. 3d 18, 145 Cal. Rptr. 357, 1978 Cal. LEXIS 230

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Decided: April 19, 1978
• Docket: Crim. 19946
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion

RICHARDSON, J.

John H., a minor, appeals from an order of the superior court declaring him to be a ward of the juvenile court and committing him to the Youth Authority. Among other contentions, appellant asserts that the superior court erred in failing to make and enter express findings which indicate the reasons for the order of commitment. We will conclude that, since neither the Constitution nor statutes require such findings, and since the record in such cases ordinarily is sufficient to permit adequate appellate review, we should not impose such an obligation as a judicial rule of procedure.

Appellant was found to have committed a robbery and to have inflicted great bodily harm upon the victim; he was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (all further statutory references are to that code unless otherwise specified); and a disposition hearing was held to determine a suitable placement (§§ 727-731). Appellant’s probation officer recommended that appellant be sent to a county-maintained camp for delinquent youths. The referee disagreed, stating, on the record, that “this minor has and had for sometime been involved seriously and actively in gang activities. He was given a home on probation ... and ordered to stay away from those gang activities. [11] This is not the first serious offense involving violence in which he has been involved, and with this extensive history, the court. .. finds that the mental and physical condition ... of the ward is such as to render it probable that he will be benefited by .. . treatment provided by [the Youth Authority].” (See § 734, requiring such a determination of probable benefit from a Youth Authority commitment; see also In re Aline D. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 557 [121 Cal.Rptr. 816, 536 P.2d 65].)

Because it would result in removing appellant from his home the referee’s order was not effective until approved by a juvenile court judge. (§ 249 (former § 555); see In re Edgar M. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 727, 731, 737-738 [122 Cal.Rptr. 574, 537 P.2d 406].) In the present case such approval was given by an order made by the juvenile court judge on a printed form which recited that the court had found (in the language of § 734) that appellant would probably benefit from the treatment provided by the Youth Authority. The order did not repeat, however, the referee’s declared reasons for recommending such a commitment. Appellant neither objected to the absence of findings nor requested a rehearing of the disposition order in the juvenile court. (See § 252 (former § 558).)

We observe, initially, that there presently exists no due process necessity that express findings be made in cases of this kind. Thus far, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional requirement only in the “critical” situation in which a juvenile court has waived its own jurisdiction over the minor in favor of adult criminal proceedings. In such a case, the high court has required that the juvenile courts furnish a statement of the reasons supporting the waiver in order to assure an appellate review that has meaning. (Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541, 561 [16 L.Ed.2d 84, 97, 86 S.Ct. 1045]; see In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258, 269, fn. 13 [113 Cal.Rptr. 361, 521 P.2d 97].) In contrast, the minor in the present case is retained within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. As we shall note, the decision to retain and commit a minor to the Youth Authority ordinarily is accompanied by a record which amply discloses the reasons supporting the commitment.

Furthermore, there is no statutory requirement that either the juvenile court or referee express the reasons which support a minor’s commitment to the Youth Authority. Section 726 states that “... no ward or dependent child shall be taken from the physical custody of a parent or guardian unless upon the hearing the court finds ... that the parent or guardian is incapable of providing ... for the minor” (subd. (a)), that the minor has failed to reform while on probation (subd. (b)), or that “the welfare of the minor requires that his custody be taken from his parent or guardian” (subd. (c)). In addition, as previously noted, section 734 requires a determination of probable benefit to the minor from a Youth Authority placement. Apart from these two sections, the Legislature has not imposed any requirement that particular findings be entered in support of a commitment order.

Appellant, while acknowledging the absence of any constitutional or statutory requirement of express findings, nonetheless urges that, as a policy matter, we should compel such findings pursuant to “our supervisory authority over state criminal procedure.” (See In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 921, 938 [127 Cal.Rptr. 97, 544 P.2d 1297].) In Podesto we imposed a requirement that trial courts render a brief statement of reasons in support of an order denying a motion for bail on appeal, to insure significant appellate review. It should be noted, in passing, that denials of bail occur in the absence of any previous formal hearing on the matter, and generate no substantial reviewable record. We explained in Podesto that findings serve several worthy purposes: They help to assure a realistic review by providing a method of evaluating a judge’s decision or order; they guard against careless decision making by encouraging the trial judge to express the grounds for his decision; and they preserve public confidence in the fairness of the judicial process. (Id., at p. 937; see also In re Bye (1974) 12 Cal.3d 96, 110 [115 Cal.Rptr. 382, 524 P.2d 854] [statement of reasons supporting revocation of outpatient status for narcotics addict]; In re Sturm, supra, 11 Cal.3d 258, 269-272 [statement of reasons for denying parole].)

Courts, however, have not required findings, or a statement of reasons, in every type of proceeding. (E.g., People v. Edwards (1976) 18 Cal.3d [135 Cal.Rptr. 411, 557 P.2d 995] [denial of probation]; Kawaichi v. Madigan (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 461, 466 [126 Cal.Rptr. 63] [denial of release on one’s own recognizance pending trial]; People v. Ruiz (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 715, 717-718 [125 Cal.Rptr. 886] [revocation of probation].) In declining to impose a requirement that trial courts state their reasons for denying probation in a criminal case, we explained in Edwards that, unlike the Podesto situation, such a requirement was unnecessary to insure a proper appellate review, for the record on appeal from a judgment denying probation is usually sufficient for that purpose, containing “a full record of all proceedings including the probation and sentencing hearing itself; there is thus a solid basis for review ....” (18 Cal.3d at p. 804.) Furthermore, we pointed out that a judge who is aware that his judicial conduct is subject to review on a full record “is not likely to make a hasty or careless decision. Thus an element of compulsion to exercise care and sound judgment is present without the requirement of an articulated statement of reasons .. ..” (P. 805.)

Similar considerations move us herein. The record of a disposition hearing in juvenile court ordinarily will provide an adequate appellate record from which to determine the reasons supporting any Youth Authority commitment. The probation report, together with a transcription of the hearing and the referee’s remarks and conclusions usually will accompany every record on appeal. As noted above, the record herein does contain the various reasons given by the referee in support of his order, and we discern no valid purpose which would be served by requiring the juvenile court judge to repeat those or other reasons in his commitment order. In the absence of any contrary indication in the record, we think it fair to presume from the judge’s approval of the order that the judge relied upon the same or similar reasons as those stated by the referee.

Appellant relies on In re Lawrence B. (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 671, 673 [132 Cal.Rptr. 599], wherein the court held that an order couched only in the conclusionaiy terms of section 726 is insufficient to support a Youth Authority commitment. We are more persuaded, however, by the force of the dissenting opinion of Justice Jefferson who observed in Lawrence B., “By its express terms. Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 requires a finding only in the language of the statute. [If]. .. Additional, express findings are neither mandated by any provision of the State of California Constitution, nor the United States Constitution, nor by any section of the Welfare and Institutions Code, nor by the decisional law of this state. An appellate court ought not, by judicial fiat, [to] interpret the plain and unambiguous language of Welfare and Institutions Code section 726 as requiring anything additional to what the statute itself explicitly requires.” (P. 676, italics in original.) The dissent further found significance in the fact that in 1975 the Legislature amended section 707 to require a recital in the court’s order of the various factors which led the court to conclude that a minor was not a fit and proper subject for juvenile court; no similar amendment was made to section 726. In this connection, and in a similar vein, we observe that in adult criminal proceedings the Legislature has expressly required the sentencing court to “state the reasons for its sentence choice on the record at the time of sentencing.” (Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (c).) The Legislature has the means by which to require such a statement when it elects to do so. To the extent that Lawrence B. is contrary to the views expressed herein, we disapprove it.

In the present case, as appellant points out, the record fails to indicate, affirmatively, whether the juvenile court judge had reviewed either the transcript of the proceedings before the referee, or the referee’s informal findings, prior to the judge’s approval of the commitment order. Apparently the action of the referee and juvenile court judge occurred on the same day, suggesting that the latter could not have had available the transcript of proceedings conducted before the referee. Appellant contends that, under such circumstances, the judge’s approval must be considered “perfunctory” and inadequate. In appellant’s view, the referee’s order properly could not become operative until the full transcript of the proceedings before the referee had been prepared and reviewed by the approving judge.

The juvenile court judge, however, did have the benefit of an 11-page probation officer’s report containing a behavioral evaluation, reason for the hearing, statements of minor, parents, interested parties, a detailed “Previous History” and a “Progress Under Supervision” report.

Appellant’s contention, moreover, fails to distinguish between the approval procedure (§ 249 (former § 555)) and the rehearing procedure (§ 252 (former § 558)) which appellant waived in this case. An application for rehearing requires a reexamination of the entire record by the juvenile court judge; it is necessary that the judge examine the complete transcript of the proceedings before the referee in order to exercise an informed independent judgment. (See In re Edgar M., supra, 14 Cal.3d 727, 737; In re Damon C. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 493, 497-498 [128 Cal.Rptr. , 546 P.2d 676].) On the other hand, an approval of a referee’s order removing a minor from his parents’ custody must occur within two judicial days. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1318(b).) This rule, enacted to insure that such orders become operative without undue delay, further provides that “The approval of a referee’s order by a judge in these circumstances is not a rehearing on the merits.” (Ibid., italics added.)

As the advisory committee comment to rule 1318 explains, the approval provision of former section 555 (now § 249) was intended only as a requirement that the referee’s order be “countersigned” by a juvenile court judge, thereby attesting to the authenticity of the order. (Judicial Council of Cal., Annual Rep. (1977) p. 41.) According to the comment, “. .. the approval procedures are, in effect, a requirement for a second signature, by a judge, before the referee’s order becomes ‘effective,’ i.e., operative.” (Ibid.; see also In re Edgar M., supra, 14 Cal.3d 727, 737-738; In re Dale S. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 952, 956 [89 Cal.Rptr. 499].)

It is true that the requirement of approval by a juvenile court judge derives from the constitutional mandate that referees are restricted to performing “subordinate judicial duties.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 22; see In re Edgar M., supra, 14 Cal.3d at p. 732.) Yet, as the framers of rule 1318 recognized, that constitutional requirement is fully satisfied by obtaining the countersignature of a juvenile court judge, so long as opportunity to seek a full rehearing remains available on request. Given the availability of the rehearing procedure, no reason appears why the initial approval of the referee’s order may not be based solely on the probation report, any other documentaiy evidence in the case, and any summaries of testimony which may accompany the record, without requiring the preparation and review of the entire transcript, necessitating a lengthy delay and precluding compliance with the two-day-approval provision of rule 1318(b). Indeed, were appellant’s contention to be accepted, a minor would be entitled, in effect, to seek" two rehearings of the referee’s decision, surely, an uneconomical use of judicial resources.

Appellant next asserts that a specific-findings requirement is necessary in order to implement our decision in In re Aline D., supra, 14 Cal.3d 557, wherein we held that a Youth Authority commitment “must be supported by a determination, based upon substantial evidence in the record, of probable benefit to the minor.” (P. 567.) In Aline D., the juvenile court ordered such a commitment despite its express doubts that the ward would benefit from such treatment. We observed that a “ \ .. commitment to the Youth Authority is generally viewed as the final treatment resource available to the juvenile court....’” (P. 564, italics in original.) Nothing we stated in A line D., however, would support the argument that the juvenile court must enter express findings which explain the reasons in favor of a Youth Authority commitment. As we have previously noted, ordinarily the appellate record, including the remarks of the referee at the dispositional hearing, form an adequate basis for determining the propriety of the commitment.

A recent case by the Court of Appeal analyzes the relevant cases and reaches a conclusion fully in accord with our holding herein and our earlier expressions in People v. Edwards, supra, 18 Cal.3d 796. In In re Robert D. (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 180, 188 [139 Cal.Rptr. 840], the court rejected the argument that a statement of reasons must be given to support the denial of a rehearing by a juvenile court judge of a referee’s decision declaring the petitioner a ward of the juvenile court and committing him to a placement facility. On the basis of its study of the pertinent cases, the court concluded that “No statement of reasons for decision is required where: (1) the action is judicial in nature; (2) involves a discretion exercised upon totality of circumstances rather than specific criteria; (3) the interplay of the circumstances is set forth in a record; and (4) judicial review on the record is a matter of right and not appellate discretion. [Citations.]” (P. 188; see also In re Willy L. (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 256, 265 [128 Cal.Rptr. 592].)

Appellant further contends that, under A line D. a commitment to the Youth Authority should never be ordered until “less restrictive” placements have been attempted. To the contrary, the circumstances in a particular case may well suggest the desirability of a Youth Authority commitment despite the availability of such alternative dispositions as placement in a county camp or ranch. (See In re Willy L., supra, at p. 265; In re Lawrence B., supra, 61 Cal.App.3d 671, 677 (dis. opn.).) Aline D. stressed the importance of finding a probable benefit to the minor before a Youth Authority commitment can be upheld. In the present case, such a finding was made and was included in the court’s order. Evidence appearing in the probation report that the minor had a lengthy history of gang involvement and several prior violent ofienses amply supported that finding.

Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the referee’s finding that he had participated in the robbery and assault. However, the victim made a positive identification of appellant at the field lineup conducted shortly after the offense occurred. Appellant also contends that his trial counsel was incompetent because of counsel’s failure to recall one witness and to explore other possible defenses. The matters of which appellant complains were each matters involving possible tactical decisions by counsel “as to which we will not ordinarily exercise judicial hindsight. [Citations.]” (People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 458 [99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1]; see People v. Najera (1972) 8 Cal.3d 504, 516 [105 Cal.Rptr. 345, 503 P.2d 1353].)

The order committing appellant to the Youth Authority is affirmed.

Mosk, J., Clark, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.