Byrnes v. United States

330 F.2d 986, 163 Ct. Cl. 167, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 143
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedNovember 15, 1963
DocketNos. 55-60, 97-60, 171-60, 323-60, 496-59
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 330 F.2d 986 (Byrnes v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Byrnes v. United States, 330 F.2d 986, 163 Ct. Cl. 167, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 143 (cc 1963).

Opinions

DURFEE, Judge.

These five cases, consolidated for trial, present the claims of 65 investigators of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, Internal Revenue Service, for overtime compensation under the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 295 (1945), as amended. The actual performance by a number of plaintiffs of work outside or, in addition to, the normal workweek of five eight-hour days, is not in dispute. The principal issue is whether the extra hours actually worked were officially ordered or approved within the meaning of the statute and pertinent regulations.

Section 201 of the Act provides in part as follows:

“Officers and employees to whom this title applies shall, in addition to their basic compensation, be compensated for all hours of employment, officially ordered or approved, in excess of forty hours in any administrative workweek, at overtime rates as follows: * * *” (59 Stat. 296) Section 605 of the Act provides:
“The Civil Service Commission is hereby authorized to issue such regulations, subject to the approval of the President, as may be necessary for the administration of the foregoing provisions of this Act insofar as this Act affects officers and employees in or under the executive branch of the Government.” (59 Stat. 304)

A later 1954 amendment authorized department heads with Civil Service Commission approval to provide that:

“(2) any officer or employee in a position in which the hours of duty cannot be controlled administratively, and which requires substantial amounts of irregular, unscheduled, overtime duty and duty at night and on holidays with the officer or [988]*988employee generally being responsible for recognizing, without supervision, circumstances which require him to remain on duty, shall receive premium compensation for such duty on an annual basis in lieu of premium compensation provided by any other provisions of this Act, except for regularly scheduled overtime duty. Premium compensation under this paragraph shall be determined as an appropriate percentage (not in excess of 15 per centum) of such part of the rate of basic compensation for any such position as does not exceed the minimum scheduled rate of basic compensation provided for grade GS-9 in the Classification Act of 1949, as amended, by taking into consideration the frequency and duration of night, holiday, and unscheduled overtime duty required in such position.” (Sec. 401(2), 68 Stat. 1111 (1954)

Under the authority of this statute and pertinent Civil Service Regulations, the Treasury Department delegated authority to the Internal Revenue Service for application of the 15 percent premium pay provisions, with appropriate rules for entitlement thereto.

These Regulations provided that:

“No overtime * * * shall be ordered or approved except in writing by an officer or employee to whom * * * authority has been specifically delegated by the head of the department. * * *” [Emphasis supplied.] (Exec. Order No. 9578, 10 Fed.Reg. 8194 (1945), U.S. Code Congressional Service 1945, p. 1267)

In all of its nine Federal Regions, the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service authorized and paid the 15 percent annual premium pay allowed by statute in lieu of regular overtime to all of its investigators who were entitled thereto under the rules, beginning June 28, 1955. After three months, however, these payments were discontinued in the San Francisco and Omaha Regions, upon the insistence of the national office that these two regions were not faced with a critical liquor enforcement problem. The regional officers in these two regions thereafter refused to authorize premium pay or regular overtime to their investigators, including plaintiffs.

On September 23, 1955, the San Francisco Regional Chief of Enforcement, pursuant to instruction from the national office, which he later protested, notified the investigators of the termination of their 15 percent annual premium pay in lieu of overtime, but nevertheless added in the notice this statement:

“ * * * and it is expected that you will perform without extra compensation any overtime that may be necessary to make good cases and achieve effective results in our enforcement work.”

This directive remained in effect. On June 13, 1958, the San Francisco Region instructed its supervisors that: “Most investigators by the very nature of their responsibilities must work irregular hours and perform many hours of overtime duty.”

The Civil Service Commission in December, 1955, described the position of these investigators as follows:

“ * * * An agent may be frequently called upon to serve in an undercover capacity requiring that he live and associate with criminals for lengthy periods. * * * Performance of these duties may require work at irregular hours, involve personal risks, exposure to all kinds of weather, arduous physical exertion under rigorous and unusual environmental conditions, and considerable travel. * * *” [Emphasis supplied.]

The record here is replete with evidence that these plaintiffs were called upon to “work at irregular hours” and “for lengthy periods” under the same arduous conditions described above by the Civil Service Commission in prescribing the required conditions for granting pre[989]*989mium pay. When premium pay of 15 percent was discontinued, the workweek requirements for plaintiffs remained the same throughout the period in litigation. They were, by express directive, subject to duty twenty-four hours a day. They were obliged to exercise independent judgment with respect to overtime in order to complete an investigation, or when the occasion demanded. Their overtime duty could not be administratively controlled, and it was impractical, if not impossible to secure specific advance authorization for overtime in view of the nature of the work involved.

At a meeting of officials of the Omaha Region, a statement was made that investigators could not be compelled to work overtime without additional compensation, but they could he made to wish they had done so. In a statement circulated to its investigators, the Omaha Division, after outlining the onerous and difficult nature of the duties involved, added this admonition:

“Investigators are subject to duty twenty-four hours per day, and are often on duty as much as eighteen hours.” [Emphasis supplied.]

These directives in both regions were in clear violation of the statutes and regulations, and particularly the following Treasury Department Regulation, IR-Circular No. 57-4:

“Section 7. Ordering or Approving Overtime Duty
“.05 A supervisor’s non-compliance with the requirement that authorization or approval of overtime be in writing while at the same time either ordering overtime duty orally or requesting the performance of work outside of regular tours of duty on a voluntary basis directly or indirectly by implying that employees not ‘volunteering’ will be in disfavor, cannot and shall not be condoned. Practices of this kind, which may he justified in the mind of the supervisor as being in the interest of the Service, are in direct conflict with Service policy and the intent of law.

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Bluebook (online)
330 F.2d 986, 163 Ct. Cl. 167, 1963 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 143, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/byrnes-v-united-states-cc-1963.