Anderson v. United States

136 Ct. Cl. 365, 1956 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 124, 1956 WL 8341
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 12, 1956
DocketNo. 50303; No. 50367; No. 50471
StatusPublished
Cited by41 cases

This text of 136 Ct. Cl. 365 (Anderson v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Anderson v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 365, 1956 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 124, 1956 WL 8341 (cc 1956).

Opinion

Opinion

per curiam:

These cases were referred by the court pursuant to Rule 45 (c) to the Honorable W. Ney Evans, a commissioner of the court, with directions to make findings of fact bearing only on the issue of liability, and to make recommendations as to the legal conclusions which the court should arrive at, as a result of the findings and the applicable statutes and legal principles. Commissioner Evans has done what he was di[367]*367rected to do, and we approve and adopt as onr own his findings and opinion.

The evidence indicates that the work of the Customs Patrol was not the kind of work which could be easily accommodated to a 5-clay, 40-hour week. The detection and pursuit of smugglers could not be stopped at 5:00 o’clock and resumed at 8:00 the next morning. It may be that Congress would have been well advised to omit such employees from the Overtime Pay Act of 1945, or to make some different arrangement for their compensation. But Congress did not omit them, and their superiors were not authorized to deny to them the benefits of the act, on the ground that the administration of the act would be difficult, almost to the point of impossibility, or that money had not been provided to pay the employees what they were entitled to under the law.

If the superiors of the Customs Patrol officers had recognized, as they should have, that the Overtime Pay Act was applicable to them, they might well have scrutinized more carefully the reports of their activities and the time spent in those activities. Instead, they merely put the officers down for an 8-hour day, no matter how many hours they reported having worked. Any police officer whose job it is to patrol roads or streets to detect violators of the law does not, happily, very often encounter violators. His activities might seem to others, and perhaps to himself, largely futile, but that is his assigned job and it is, in fact, a useful job. However, when he is acting outside his formally assigned hours, and is claiming pay for so acting, he has the burden of showing that what he does is worth doing, and is reasonably calculated to promote the end for which he is employed.

With particular reference to the instant case, we do not, at present, see how attendance for several hours at a basketball game or a dance would be likely to have any relation to detecting smugglers. In further proceedings under Rule 38 (c) to determine the amount of compensable overtime of each plaintiff, his activities during the alleged overtime period will have to be looked at with care.

[368]*368OPINION OF COMMISSIONER EVANS

In these three cases 42 former patrol inspectors of the Customs Border Patrol seek to recover payment under the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945 for overtime services. That each of the plaintiffs worked some hours in excess of 40 during some of the administrative workweeks within the periods of their claims is not disputed. The only question presented is whether or not these services were officially ordered or approved within the meaning of the statute.

The statute and the regulations issued under it have been considered by this court in Post v. United States, 121 C. Cls. 94 (1951), Tabbutt v. United States, 121 C. Cls. 495 (1952), Goldstein v. United States, 121 C. Cls. 495 (1952), Matlack v. United States, 121 C. Cls. 495 (1952), Farley v. United States, 131 C. Cls. 776 (1955), and Gaines v. United States, 132 C. Cls. 408 (1955).

The plaintiff in the Post case, sufra, failed to prove that he had in fact performed any overtime work, and was denied recovery for that reason in a per curiam opinion.

Tabbutt, Goldstein, and Matlack, supra, were decided together. The plaintiffs were denied recovery for overtime which they had worked, as shown by their daily reports, because the overtime had not been authorized or approved by any official who had authority to do so.

The extra hours which the plaintiff in Farley, supra, spent in duty status were held to constitute overtime work, which was .further held to be compensable under the statute, notwithstanding plaintiff’s agreement to perform the extra duty as a condition of her employment. An order directing the plaintiff to “remain on duty” satisfied the requirements of the statute and the regulations that the overtime should be officially ordered or approved, in writing, although the directive neither ordered nor approved the extra duty as compensable overtime.

Gaines, supra, was presented on cross motions for summary judgment. The claim for overtime compensation failed because, as the opinion points out, “the affidavits and exhibits in evidence here fail to show that any overtime was ordered [369]*369or approved, either orally or in writing, or that plaintiff requested such authorization or approval.”

The statute explicitly provided for the payment of extra compensation for overtime hours “officially ordered or approved,” and authorized the issuance of “such regulations * * * as may be necessary for the administration of * * * this Act.” The regulations provided that “no overtime * * * shall be ordered or approved except in writing by an officer or employee to whom * * * authority has been specifically delegated by the head of the department * * *.”

In the cases now under consideration plaintiffs maintain that the overtime work was “required” of the men by their supervisors, and was therefore “ordered”. Defendant replies (1) that the supervisors lacked the authority either to “require” or to “order” the overtime, (2) that, at most, the supervisors did no more than to “encourage” the men to work the overtime, and (3) that the overtime was in fact voluntarily performed.

Some of the conflicting interpretations of fact, as between plaintiffs and defendant, have been resolved if not eliminated by the findings herein, which describe the overtime as having been “induced” rather than “required” or “encouraged”. Moreover, the inducement began with the Commissioner of Customs and applied to the supervisory officers as well as the men. The patrol inspectors were not volunteers, in the unfettered sense of the term, nor were they responding to the spontaneous zeal of their immediate supervisors.

If, under the facts, the services could be said to have been performed voluntarily within the full meaning of the word, the decision in Farley, supra, is authority for the services being compensable notwithstanding. The analysis in the Handh/, Schaible, and Sanderson cases, filed January 16, 1956, is to the same effect.

The overtime services were not voluntarily performed, however, because the patrol inspectors were never given a free choice. The plain fact of the matter is that the 40-hour week, established by the 1945 Pay Act, was never translated by the Customs Service into an effective, administrative reality for the patrol inspectors. Before the war they worked [370]*370unlimited hours for which each received an annual salary, divided into segments by pay periods. During the Avar they worked unlimited hours, although the pay was restricted to a 40-hour base plus 8 hours of overtime each week.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
136 Ct. Cl. 365, 1956 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 124, 1956 WL 8341, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/anderson-v-united-states-cc-1956.