Byam v. . Collins

19 N.E. 75, 111 N.Y. 143, 19 N.Y. St. Rep. 581, 66 Sickels 143, 1888 N.Y. LEXIS 1000

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 27, 1888
• Status: Published

Opinions

Earl, J.

The general rule is that in the case of a libelous publication tile law implies malice and infers some damage. What are called privileged communications are exceptions to this rule. Such communications are divided into several classes, with one only of which we are concerned in this case, and that is generally formulated thus: “ A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference .to which he has a (duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminating matter which, without this privilege, would be slanderous and actionable; and this though the duty be not a legal one, but only a moral or social duty of imperfect obligation.” The rule was thus stated in Harrison v. Bush (5 Ellis & Black. [Q. B.] 344), and has been generally approved by judges and text writers since. In Toogood v. Spyring (1 Cr. M. & R., [Ex.] 181), an earlier case, it was said that the law considered a libelous “ publication as malicious unless it is fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs in matters where his interest is concerned ” ; and that statement of the rule was approved by Folgkeb, J., in Klench v. Colby (46 N. Y. 427), and in Hamilton v. Eno (81 N. Y. 116). In White v. Nicholls (3 How. [U. S.] 266, 291), it was said that the description of eases recognized as privileged communications must be understood as exceptions to the general rule, and “as being founded upon some apparently recognized obligation or motive, legal, moral or social, which may fairly be presumed to have led to the publication, and, therefore, prima facie reheves it from that just implication from which the general law is deduced.”

Whether within the rule as defined in these cases a libelous communication is privileged, is a question of law; and when upon any trial it has been held as matter of law to be privileged, then the burden rests upon the plaintiff to establish as matter of fact that it was maliciously made, and this matter of fact is for the determination of the jury.

It has been found difficult to frame this rule in any language that will furnish a plain guide in all casesi It is easy enough to apply the rule in cases where both parties, the one making and the one receiving the communication, are interested in it, or where the parties are related, or where it is made upon request to a party who has an interest in receiving it, or where the party making it has an interest to subserve, or where the party making it is under a legal duty to make it. But when the privilege rests simply upon the moral duty to make the communication, there has been much uncertainty and difficulty in applying the rule. The difficulty is to determine what is meant by the term “ moral duty,” and whether in any given case there is such a duty. In Whiteley v. Adams (15 C. B. [N. S.] 392), Erle, Ch. J., said: “ Judges who have had, from time to time, to deal with questions as to whether the occasion justified the speaking or the writing of defamatory matter, have all felt great difficulty in defining what kind of social or moral duty, or what amount of interest will afford a justification; ” and in the same case, Byles, J., said the application of the rule “ to particular cases has always been attended with the greatest difficulty; the combinations of circumstances are so infinitely various.”

The rule as to privileged communications should not be so extended as to open wide the flood-gates of injurious gossip and defamation by which private character may be overwhelmed and irreparable mischief done, and yet it should be so administered as to give reasonable protection to those who make and receive communications in which they are interested, or in reference to which they have a real, not imaginary, duty. Every one owes a moral duty, not, as a volunteer in a matter in which he has no legal duty or personal interest, to defame another unless he can find a justification in some pressing emergency. In Coxhead v. Richards (2 Mann., G. & S. 569, 602), Coltman, J., said: “ The duty of not slandering . your neighbor on insufficient grounds is so clear that a violation of that duty ought not to be sanctioned in the case of voluntary communications except under circumstances of great urgency and gravity. It may be said that it is very hard on a defendant to be subject to heavy damages when he has acted honestly and when nothing more can be imputed to him than an error in judgment. It may be hard, but it is very hard on the other hand to' be falsely accused. It is to be borne in mind that people are but too apt rashly to think ill of others; the propensity to tale bearing and slander is so strong amongst mankind, and when suspicions are aroused, men are so apt to entertain them without due examination, in cases where their interests are concerned, that it is necessary to hold the rule strictly as to any officious intermeddling by which the character of others is affected; ” and in the same case Cbesswell, J., said: .“If the property of the ship-owner on the one hand was at stake, the character of the captain was at stake on the other; and I cannot but think that the moral duty not to publish of the latter defamatory matter which he did not hnow to be true, was quite as strong as the duty to communicate to the ship-owner that which he believed to be true.”

One may not go about in the community and, acting upon mere rumors, proclaim to everybody the supposed frailties or bad character of his neighbor, however firmly he may believe such rumors, and be convinced that he owes a social duty to give them currency that the victim of them may be avoided; and, ordinarily, One cannot with safety, however free he may be from actual malice, as a volunteer, pour the' poison of such rumors into the ears of one who might be affected if the rumors were true. I cite a few cases by way of illustration. In Godson v. Home (1 B. & B. 7), one Noah solicited the plaintiff to be his attorney in an action. The defendant, apparently a total stranger, wrote to Noah to deprecate his so employing the plaintiff, and this was held to be clearly not a confidential or privileged communication. In Storey v. Challands (8 C. & P. 234), one Hersford was about to deal with the plaintiff when he met the defendant who said at once, without his opinion being asked at all, “ if you have anything to do with Storey you will live to repent it, he is a most unprincipled man,” etc., and Lord JDenman directed a verdict for the plaintiff because the defendant began by making the statement without waiting to be asked. In York v. Johnson (116 Mass. 482), the defendant, a member of a church, was appointed with the plaintiff and other members of the church on a committee to prepare a Christmas festival for the Sunday school. He declined to serve, and being asked his reason by Mrs. Newton, a member of the committee, said that a third member of the committee, a married man, had the venereal disease, and being asked where he got it said he did not knoiv, but that “ he had been with the plaintiff,” who was a woman, and it was held that this was not a privileged communication. There was no question of the defendant’s good faith and reasonable grounds of belief in making the communication, and yet Devens, J., in the opinion said: “ The ruling requested by the defendant that the communication made by him to Mrs. Newton was a privileged one and not actionable except with proof of express malice, was properly refused. There was no duty which he owed to Mrs. Newton that authorized him to inform her of the defamatory charges against the plaintiff, and no interest of his own which required protection justified it. He had declined to serve upon the same committee with Mrs. York; but h'e was under no obligation to give any reason therefor, however persistently called upon to do so; and even if Mrs. Newton had an interest in knowing the character of Mrs. York, as a member of the same church, it was an interest of the same description which every member of the community has in knowing the character of other members of the same community with whom they are necessarily brought in contact, and would not shield a person who uttered words otherwise slanderous.”

Having thus stated the general principles of law applicable to a case like this, I will now bring to mind the facts of this-case so far as they pertain to the defamatory letter. The plaintiff was a lawyer and had been engaged in the practice of his profession at Caledonia for several months and resided there at the date of the letter. ' Miss Dora McNanghton and the defendant also resided there. The plaintiff was on terms of social intimacy with Dora and was paying her attention with a view to matrimony, and some time subsequently married her. Mrs. Collins was about twenty-five years old, two years and a half younger than Dora, and was married November 2, 1875; and prior to that she had always resided within a mile and a half from the residence of Dora and they had been very intimate friends. Dora had a father and no brother, and Mrs. Collins had a brother. During the time of this-intimacy and at some time before the marriage of Mrs. Collins, Dora repeatedly requested of her that if she “ knew anything about any young man she went with, or in fact any young man in the place, to tell her because her father did not go out a great deal and had no means of knowing, and people would not be apt to tell him,” that she, Mrs. Collins, had a. brother and would be more apt to hear what was said about young men, and Dora wished her to tell what she knew.. Their intimacy continued after the marriage of Mrs. Collins-until January before the letter was written, when a coldness-sprang up between them. They became somewhat estranged and their intimacy ceased. Mrs. Collins testified that when she wrote the letter she thought just as much of Dora as if she had belonged to her family ; that she had heard the defamatory rumors and believed them, and, therefore, did not wish her to marry the plaintiff. It must be observed that the> request of Dora to Mrs. Collins for information about young-men was not made when she was contemplating marriage to-any young man, and that the request was not for information about any particular young man or about any young man in whom she had any interest; but it was for information about the young men generally with whom she . ;sociated. Nor-literally construing the language, did Dora wish for informa tion as to tlie gossip and rumors afloat about young men. What she asked for was such facts as Mrs. Collins knew and not for her opinion about young men or her estimation of them. But if we assume that the request was for information as to all the rumors about young men which came to the knowledge of Mrs. Collins, the case of the defendant is not improved. At that time the plaintiff was not within Dora’s contemplation, as she did not know him until long after. The request was not for information as to any young man who might pay her attention with a view to matrimony; it was for information about all the young men in her circle. Mrs.. Collins was not related to her and was under no duty to give the information, and Dora had no sufficient interest to receive the information. Mrs. Collins was under no greater duty to give the information to Dora than to any of the other young ladies of her acquaintance in the same circle. She could properly tell what she knew about young men, but could not defame them, even upon request, by telling what she did not know, what nobody knew, but what she believed upon mere rumors and hearsay to be true. The mere fact that she was requested or even urged to give the information, did not make the defamatory communication privileged. (York v. Johnson, supra.)

But there is no proof that this letter was written to Dora in pursuance of any request made by her four years before its date, and there was no evidence which authorized the jury to find so if they did so find. On the contrary, it is, clear that Dora would not, at the time, have gone to Mrs. Collins for any information as to the plaintiff if she had desired any, and that she did not wish for the information from her; and that this was known to .Mrs. Collins the language of the letter clearly shows. In the defendant’s answer it is alleged that Mrs. Collin’s letter was prompted by her friendship for Dora and by the solicitation of “ mutual friends to interfere in the matter and break off the relations which seemed to exist between the plaintiff and Dora,” and there is no averment that it was written'in pursuance of any request coming from Dora. The letter itself as well as the evidence of Mrs. Collins shows unmistakably that it was thus prompted. Mrs. Collins did not testify that she wrote the letter in pursuance of any request of Dora, and the action was not tried upon that theory, and no question as to the request was submitted to the jury. The trial judge charged the jury broadly that if the relations óf Dora and Mrs. Collins were of such an intimate character as to warrant the latter in warning the former “ against a person whom she had reason to believe was not a fit person, and if Mrs. Collins acted fairly, in good faith, conscientiously, .although mistakenly, there can be no recovery against her',” upon the count in the complaint for libel; and then the court said: “ Did Mrs. Collins in writing that letter act fairly, act judiciously, not in the matter of good taste, but did she with .the facts which had been brought to her mind act in a conscientious and proper manner ? If she did, if she acted as an ordinarily prudent person would act under the same circumstances, if she had probable ground for her belief, she was justified in writing the letter.” Mrs. Collins then appears as a mere volunteer, writing the letter to break up relations which she feared might lead to the marriage of the plaintiff to Dora. If she had not been the mother of Dora, or other near relative, or if she had been asked by Dora for information as to the plaintiff’s character and standing, she could with propriety have given any information she possessed affecting his character, provided she acted in good faith and without malice. But a mere volunteer having no duty to perform, no interest to subserve, interferes with the relations between two such people at her peril. The rules of law should not be so administered as to encourage such intermeddling, which may not only blast reputation but possibly wreck lives. In such a case the duty not to defame is more pressing than the duty to communicate mere defamatory rumors not known to be true.

Some loose expressions may doubtless be found in text „ books and judicial • opinions supporting the contention of the defendant that this letter was, in some sense, a privileged communication. But, after a very careful research, I believe there is absolutely no reported decision to that effect. The case which is as favorable to the defendant as any, if not more favorable than that of any other, is that of Todd v. Hawkins (8 Car. & P. 88). In that case, a widow being about to marry the plaintiff, the defendant, who had married her daughter, wrote her a letter containing imputations on the plaintiff’s character, and advising a diligent and extensive inquiry into his character, and it was held that the letter was written on a justifiable occasion, and that the defendant was justified in writing it, provided the jury was satisfied that, in writing it, he acted bona fide, although-the imputations contained'in the letter were false or based upon the most erroneous information ; and if. he used expressions, however harsh, hasty or untrue, yet bona fide, and believing them to be true, he was justified in so doing. The letter was held privileged solely upon the ground of the near relationship existing between the widow and the defendant, her son-in-law, which- justified his voluntary interference. But the judge expressly stated that if the widow and defendant had been strangers to each other, there would have been a mere question of damage. A case nearer in point is that of “ The Count Joannes ” v. Bennett (5 Allen, 169). There it was held that a letter to a woman containing lihelous matter concerning her suitor, cannot be justified on the ground that the writer was her friend and former pastor, and that the letter was written at the request of her parents, who assented to all its contents. The decision was put upon the ground that, in writing the letter, the defendant had no interest of his own to serve or protect; that he was not in the exercise of any legal or moral duty'; that the proposed marriage did not even involve any sacrifice of his feelings or injury to his affections, and did not, In any way, interfere with or disturb his personal or social relations-; that the person to whom the letter was addressed was not connected with him by the ties of consanguinity or kindred, and that he had no peculiar interest in her. Some years before the same learned court decided the case of Krebs v. Oliver (12 Gray, 239), wherein it was held that statements that a man has been imprisoned for larceny, made to the family of a woman whom he is about to marry, by one who is no relation of either, and not in answer to an inquiry, are not privileged communications. In the opinion, it is said : “ A mere friendly acquaintance or regard does not impose a duty of communicating •charges of a defamatory character concerning a third person, although they may be told to one who has a strong interest in knowing them. The duty of refraining from the utterance of slanderous words, without knowing or ascertaining their truth, far outweighs any claim of mere friendship.”

I am, therefore, of opinion that the letter was in no sense, upon the facts as they appear in the record, a privileged communication.

There was, also, error in the court below as to the verbal •slanders alleged in the second cause of action; and what I have already said applies, in part, to these slanders. There was no substantial denial of these slanders in the answer, and' there is no dispute in the evidence that they were uttered, and there can be no claim upon the evidence that they were justified. The trial judge charged the jury that the words were slanderous. But he said to them that “ there is not that presumption of malice in the case of oral slanders that there is in the case of a deliberate writing.” This was excepted to by plaintiff’s counsel, and was clearly erroneous. In the case of oral defamation, as in the case of written, if the words uttered were not privileged, the law implies malice.

The judge further charged the jury, in substance, that the words, if uttered under the circumstances testified to by Mrs. Collins, were privileged. She testified, in substance, that she uttered the words to Mr. Cameron in confidence, after the most, urgent solicitation on his part that she should tell him what she knew about the plaintiff. But defamatory words do not become privileged merely because uttered in the strictest confidence by one friend to another, nor because uttered upon the most urgent solicitation. She was under no duty to utter them to him, and she had no interest to subserve by uttering them. He had no interest or duty to hear the defamatory words, and had no right to demand that he might hear them; and under such circumstances there is no authority holding that any privilege attaches to such communications.

There was no evidence that would authorize a jury to find that Cameron sought the interview with Mrs. Collins, as an emissary from or agent of the plaintiff, or that at the plaintiff’s solicitation or instigation he obtained the slanderous communications from her, and he did not profess or assume to act for him on that occasion. He was the mutual friend of the parties, and seems to have sought the interview with her either to gratify his curiosity, or to prevent the impending litigation between the parties. But even if he obtained the interview with her at the solicitation of the plaintiff, and .as his friend, she could not claim that her slanderous words uttered at such interview were privileged.

The trial judge, therefore, erred in refusing to charge the jury that there was no question for them as to the second cause of action but one of damages.

Therefore, without noticing other exceptions to rulings upon the trial, for the fundamental errors herein pointed out, the judgment should be. reversed and a new trial granted.