UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STEPHANIE V. BUTRON,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 24 - 2735 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
HOWARD LUTNICK,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Stephanie Butron, a former employee of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, filed this
lawsuit pro se against the Secretary of Commerce1 alleging discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1964. The Defendant
has moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). The Court
grants the motion under Rule 12(b)(6).
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and
attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023).
Since the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will consider her Complaint “in light of all
filings, including filings responsive to [the] motion to dismiss.” Moini v. LeBlanc, 456 F. Supp. 3d
34, 40 (D.D.C. 2020) (citations omitted).
1 Although the Plaintiff named former Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo as the Defendant in the Complaint, current Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick is “automatically substituted as a party” in her place pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). Ms. Butron was employed as a Patent Examiner at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
until her resignation. From December 2021 to March 2022, she “faced significant pressure and
challenges during [her] telework employment,” which led to her resignation on March 9, 2022.
Compl. at 7, 8, ECF No. 1. The pressure came from Ms. Butron’s “interactions with a background
investigator and the demands” of her supervisors. Id. Following “a 2.5 hour-interview” with the
investigator on December 27, 2021, and “a 4-hour follow-up outside work hours,” Ms. Butron
“requested sick leave due to the mental health impact of discussing traumatic events.” Id. On
December 28, 2021, “Supervisor No. 1” wished Ms. Butron well and asked that she “submit a sick
leave request when able.” Id. The next day, “while on sick leave,” Ms. Butron “validated her time
in WebTA and requested additional sick leave for mental health reasons, seeking guidance from
Supervisor No. 2 on proper documentation.” Id.
On December 30, 2021, Supervisor No. 2 informed Ms. Butron that she “needed a specific
security time code for the interview and suggest[ed] that document exchanges with the investigator
should occur during [her] personal time,” which “contradicted Supervisor No. 1’s earlier
confirmation that no additional approval was needed.” Id. Later that same day, Ms. Butron
“provided both supervisors with detailed information about [her] interview, reiterating that [her]
sick leave was due to mental health reasons.” Id. At unspecified times, Ms. Butron “requested
additional sick leave as interviews with the background investigator continued during work hours”
and while she “was in training and examining” her first patent applications. Id. Ms. Butron also
“informed the security specialist, Teresa Heller, about [her] discomfort with the investigator’s
behavior” of continuing “to demand urgent interviews.” Ms. Heller “assured” Ms. Butron “that
necessary employment information was available[.]” Id.
2 From March 7 to 8, 2022, Ms. Butron “sought help from Supervisor No. 3, who offered a
90-day personal leave without pay via email.” Id. Ms. Butron “expressed” her “desire to remain
employed and [to] seek reasonable accommodations instead.” Id. From March 8 to 9, Ms. Butron
requested that her “personal therapist be present during the interviews” with the investigator “for
support,” but the investigator declined the request “and threatened termination” if Ms. Butron
failed to “fully cooperate.” Id. And on March 9, 2022, “under pressure from [her] supervisor’s
threat,” Ms. Butron “complied with the investigator’s demands and subsequently submitted [her]
resignation,” explaining that she “could no longer endure the hostile work environment.” Id. at 8.
Ms. Butron contacted an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Counselor on January 31,
2023, and filed a formal complaint with the agency on February 27, 2023. See EEOC Decision on
Req. for Reconsideration (EEOC Dec.) at 21, 22, ECF No. 1. In that complaint, Ms. Butron
claimed that she was discriminated against “in reprisal for prior protected activity when, on March
9, 2022,” she “was constructively discharged from her position during her probationary period.”
See EEOC Dec. at 21, see also id. at 20–23. The agency determined that Ms. Butron’s initial
contact with the EEO Counselor occurred more than 45 days after the alleged discriminatory event
and dismissed her complaint as untimely. See id. at 21. In an appeal to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Ms. Butron claimed “she was so incapacitated during the
applicable 45-day period that she could not contact an EEO Counselor.” The EEOC found no
supporting medical documentation of Ms. Butron’s incapacitation during the relevant time period
and thus affirmed the agency’s decision. See id.
On a motion for reconsideration, the EEOC maintained its position that Ms. Butron “failed
to show that she was so physically or emotionally incapacitated that she was unable to contact an
EEO Counselor” within the applicable 45-day period. EEOC Dec. at 22. It informed Ms. Butron
3 of her right to file a civil action “within ninety (90) calendar days from the date” of receipt. Id.
Ms. Butron received the decision on “March 25th, 2024.” Compl. at 5.
B. Procedural Background
Ms. Butron filed her Complaint in this Court on September 24, 2024, seeking relief under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1964.
See Compl. On February 14, 2025, the Defendant moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (Def.’s Mot.), ECF No. 11. In its
motion, the Defendant construed the Complaint as raising a claim under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 because it “does not include allegations of race, nationality, sex, or religious discrimination”
to plausibly allege a Title VII claim. Id. at 4. On March 15, 2025, Ms. Butron opposed dismissal
with a 148-page Opposition. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 14. The Defendant’s motion is fully briefed.
See Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 15; Pl.’s Surreply, ECF No. 19.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Courts “must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of
all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471,
476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). But courts need not accept as true “a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation,” nor an “inference[ ] . . . unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.”
Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (cleaned up).
Courts must hold pro se pleadings to a “less stringent standard than formal pleadings”
drafted by lawyers, but “need not assume the role of [their] advocate.” Mehrbach v. Citibank, N.A.,
316 F. Supp. 3d 264, 268 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal citations omitted). In other words, no matter how
4 “inartfully pleaded” a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, a court must grant her the benefit of all
inferences that can flow from the facts she alleges. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
DISCUSSION
The Defendant construed Ms. Butron’s Complaint as raising a Rehabilitation Act claim.
But she clarified in her Opposition that she does not seek relief “based on disability discrimination
under the Rehabilitation Act” or a request for “workplace accommodations” because she “never
disclosed a disability in [her] application” and does not “have one that interfered with normal
working conditions.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 10, 11. Instead, Ms. Butron’s “legal claim is solely based on
Title VII retaliation and coercion,” issues that she claims were “thoroughly addressed during the
EEO process[.]” Id. at 15. More specifically, she alleges “retaliation, coercion, and wrongful
actions” because of “the misuse of [her] psychiatric hospitalization history during [her] security
clearance process, as well as the support [she] requested from HR and [her] managers.” Id. at 10.
Even with those clarifications, the Defendant urges dismissal on the grounds that Ms. Butron failed
to properly exhaust her administrative remedies, failed to file a timely lawsuit, and has asserted no
grounds for equitable tolling. See Def.’s Reply at 4–5. The Court agrees.
A. Exhaustion
The Defendant first argues that Ms. Burton failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
See Def.’s Mot. at 4. “It is well-established that a federal employee must exhaust [her]
administrative remedies before filing suit in a federal court.” Jones v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 15-
5246, 2017 WL 3895064, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2017) (per curiam). Before seeking judicial
review under the federal anti-discrimination laws, federal employees must comply with
administrative procedures, and an employee’s failure to meet the prescribed “statutory or
regulatory deadlines” may be grounds for dismissal of the “federal court action . . . for failure to
administratively exhaust the claim.” Niskey v. Kelly, 859 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Because
5 exhaustion is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review, “an employee who missteps in the
process may avoid dismissal if [s]he qualifies for equitable relief from the deadline by
demonstrating good cause for the procedural failure.” Id.
A federal employee who believes she has “been the victim of unlawful discrimination
under the relevant laws” must “consult” with an EEO counselor at her agency “‘prior to filing a
complaint in order to try to informally resolve the matter.’” Doak v. Johnson, 798 F.3d 1096, 1099
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)). The exhaustion requirement applies equally
to claims of retaliation. See Niskey, 859 F.3d at 10–11 (holding that the district court “properly
dismissed” complaint “for failure to administratively exhaust his racial discrimination and
retaliation claims”); Boyd v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 22-cv-3741, 2024 WL 324109, at *4–5
(D.D.C. Jan. 29, 2024) (dismissing unexhausted Title VII retaliation claim). The employee “must
initiate contact with [an EEO] Counselor within 45 days of the date of the matter alleged to be
discriminatory or, in the case of personnel action, within 45 days of the effective date of the
action[.]” Doak, 798 F.3d at 1099 (citations omitted). The agency or the EEOC “shall extend the
45-day time limit” (1) if the employee “was not notified of the time limits and was not otherwise
aware of them,” (2) if she “did not know and reasonably should not have [] known that the
discriminatory matter or personnel action occurred,” (3) if “despite due diligence she was
prevented by circumstances beyond her control from contacting the counselor within the time
limits,” or (4) “for other reasons considered sufficient by the agency or the Commission.”
29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(2) (cleaned up). If the matter is not resolved through informal counseling,
the employee “may then file a complaint with the agency that allegedly discriminated against her,”
which “begins the formal administrative grievance process, through which the agency investigates,
considers, and decides the merits of the complaint.” Doak, 798 F.3d at 1099–1100.
6 Here, Ms. Butron’s initial contact with the EEO counselor at her agency exceeded the 45-
day regulatory time limit. She alleges unlawful conduct between December 2021 to March 2022
that resulted in her “constructive discharge” on March 9, 2022, see Compl. at 7–8, but she did not
initiate contact with an EEO counselor until approximately 310 days later, on January 31, 2023,
see EEOC Dec. at 21. And the EEOC rejected her claim that a “medical condition . . . rendered
her incapacitated during the 45-day time period,” finding no supporting medical documentation to
substantiate her claim. Fredda J. v. Gina M. Raimondo, Sec’y, Dep’t of Commerce (Patent and
Trademark Office), Agency No. 23-56-21, 2023 WL 6194391, at *1 (E.E.O.C. Sept. 6, 2023).
Ms. Burton thus failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, which is fatal.
B. Timeliness
In the alternative, the Defendant points out that this lawsuit is untimely. If an employee is
dissatisfied with the outcome of the administrative process, she may file a lawsuit “[w]ithin 90
days of receipt of notice of final action taken” by the agency or, if appealed, by the EEOC.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). A lawsuit following a charge is limited “to claims that are like or
reasonably related to the allegations of the charge and growing out of such allegations.” Park v.
Howard University, 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (cleaned up). And “[s]trict adherence to
this type of procedural framework is required, such that a suit brought even a few days late will be
dismissed.” Gill v. Dist. of Columbia, 872 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2012) (cleaned up).
Ms. Burton brought this lawsuit on September 24, 2024, see Compl., approximately 183
days after the EEOC’s final order disposing of her claim on March 25, 2024, see Compl. at 5
(advising Ms. Burton of her right to file a civil action “within ninety (90) calendar days from the
date” of receipt, EEOC Dec. at 22). Her lawsuit is thus untimely under the statutory deadline.
7 C. Equitable Tolling and Equitable Estoppel
Ms. Burton asks the Court to excuse her untimely filing under the doctrine of equitable
tolling. Adherence to Title VII’s deadlines “is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal
court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and
equitable tolling.” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982). But these
doctrines apply “only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances.” Smith-Haynie v.
Dist. Of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 580 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (cleaned up). Equitable tolling “is based
on the plaintiff’s inability to obtain ‘vital information bearing on the existence of his claim’ despite
‘all due diligence’” and equitable estoppel “‘precludes a defendant, because of his own inequitable
conduct . . . from invoking [a] statute of limitations.’” Hall v. Dep’t of Commerce, No. 16-cv-
1619, 2017 WL 9615889, at *9 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 2017) (quoting Chung v. Dep’t of Justice, 333
F.3d 273, 278 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). “Thus, while the appropriateness of estoppel depends on the
actions of the defendant, the appropriateness of tolling is determined by the actions of the
plaintiff.” Id. Ms. Butron’s circumstances, unfortunate as they may be, do not entitle her to
equitable tolling or equitable estoppel.2
Equitable tolling should be “exercised only in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed
instances.” Mondy v. Sec’y of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The burden of
pleading and proving equitable reasons to toll rests with the plaintiff, Saltz v. Lehman, 672 F.2d
207, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1982), who must show “(1) that she has been pursuing her rights diligently,
and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in her way and prevented timely filing,” Dyson
v. Dist. of Columbia, 710 F.3d 415, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (cleaned up). Equitable tolling is
2 Although Ms. Burton makes only equitable tolling arguments in her briefing, the Court considers both equitable tolling and equitable estoppel given her pro se status.
8 “appropriate only in ‘rare instances where—due to circumstances external to the party’s own
conduct—it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation period against the party and gross
injustice would result.’” Jackson v. Modly, 949 F.3d 763, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Head v.
Wilson, 792 F.3d 102, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). The Court’s equitable power to toll a statute of
limitations does “not extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect,” Irwin
v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990), or a plaintiff’s “own misunderstanding of the
law or tactical mistakes,” Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisconsin v. United States, 764 F.3d 51, 58
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (collecting cases).
Equitable estoppel requires “active steps” that the defendant took to prevent the plaintiff
from timely filing her complaint. Currier v. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d 1363,
1367 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d at 579–81. Put differently, a plaintiff must
point to some type of “affirmative misconduct” or misleading information regarding the filing
deadline on the part of the defendant. Washington v. WMATA, 160 F.3d 750, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999).
Ms. Burton explains that her “delay” in submitting her “initial EEO complaint . . . was not
due to inaction but to financial hardship, unemployment, emotional distress, and psychological
trauma that made it impossible for me to file sooner.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. And she claims that she
“initially did not understand” she “needed to file a separate lawsuit in District Court to continue
[her] case.” Id. at 7. These allegations do not meet the high bar for equitable tolling. See Jackson,
949 F.3d at 778–79 (rejecting tolling argument premised on “debilitating mental anguish as a result
of the government’s misconduct” and allegations of, inter alia, “distrust,” “anxiety,” and “financial
hardship”); Dahlman v. American Ass’n of Retired Persons (AARP), 791 F. Supp. 2d 68, 77
(D.D.C. 2011) (“Impaired judgment or general claims of mental illness is not enough to justify
9 equitable relief from procedural requirements.” (cleaned up)); Speiser v. Dep’t of Health and
Human Servs., 670 F. Supp. 380, 383 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d, 818 F.2d 95 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (declining
to toll EEOC deadlines where plaintiff claimed “she was mentally incapacitated from the date of
her resignation until shortly before she contacted an EEO counselor” and her incapacitation
constituted “circumstances beyond her control” which prevented her from filing her EEO
complaint timely).
Ms. Burton fares no better with equitable estoppel. She blames the “agency’s own actions,”
Pl.’s Opp’n at 31, asserting that her delay “was caused by USPTO’s retaliation, financial and
emotional devastation, and legal uncertainty created by their actions,” id. at 7. But she does not
allege that the agency misled her about the relevant deadlines or took steps to prevent her from
filing this lawsuit. See Currier, 159 F.3d at 1367.
Indeed, Ms. Butron’s excuses mirror those found wanting in Smith-Haynie, 155 F.3d 575.
There, the plaintiff “swore in her affidavit that she was confused by her right-to-sue letter,” “did
not understand it,” and “was further traumatized and simply unable to psychologically deal with
it.” Id. at 580. The D.C. Circuit nonetheless found the plaintiff’s “statement that she did not
understand the letter” as “general and conclusory,” noting that she “does not contest that she was
informed in the letter of the 90-day limitations period or aver that the meaning of the time limit
was unclear to her.” Id. And it observed that while her “supplementary affidavit does describe
emotional difficulty,” it is “of a kind that was basically related to the work environment” rather
than her inability “to engage in rational thought and deliberate decision making.” Id. (cleaned up).
The court ultimately found that the plaintiff had not overcome the “high” hurdle for equitable
tolling based on her claim of mental incompetence, id. at 579, nor asserted grounds for equitable
10 estoppel since “nowhere” did “she claim that anything the defendants did or said misled her as to
the effect of the 90-day limitation period on her right to seek judicial relief,” id. at 581.
Because equitable tolling and equitable estoppel do not excuse Ms. Burton’s untimely
filing, the Court must grant the Defendant’s motion and dismiss this case. On this record, she
simply has not met her burden to avoid dismissal. See Dahlman, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (“Once a
defendant has pleaded a failure either to exhaust administrative remedies or to comply with
statutory time limits, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make the case that dismissal is not
warranted.” (citations omitted)).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 11.
A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge
Date: August 1, 2025