Opinion for the court by Associate Judge REID.
Concurring opinion by Associate Justice FERREN at 389.
Concurring opinion by Senior Judge NEWMAN at 398.
REID, Associate Judge:
Appellant Roosevelt Butler was charged with assaulting a police officer while armed, in violation of D.C.Code § 22-505(b) (1996 Repl.), and assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of D.C.Code § 22-502 (1996 Repl.). Before trial, Butler contemplated one of two possible defenses, (a) bias, harassment and fabrication on the part of the arresting police officers; or (b) misiden-tification. Defense counsel orally sought an in limine ruling on the permissible extent [382]*382of the government’s response to its bias, harassment and fabrication defense. When the trial court preliminarily ruled, inter alia, that if the defense relied on that theory, the government could introduce evidence of the officers’ prior contacts 'with Butler, including the “reasons, times and dates” of the contacts, Butler decided to use the mis-identifieation theory. With regard to mis-identification, the trial court permitted the police officers to testify as to their prior contacts with Butler, but precluded any reference to their prior arrests of him. Butler was convicted on both charges and sentenced under the Youth Rehabilitation Act, D.C.Code § 24-803(b) (1996 Repl.).1
Butler appeals on two grounds: (1) the trial court’s ruling that his reliance on a police bias, harassment and fabrication theory would open the door to detailed impeachment testimony by the two arresting police officers regarding their prior contacts with him, constituted reversible error, because the ruling severely prejudiced his case; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the two arresting police officers to testify at trial concerning their “official contacts” with Butler. We affirm because we conclude that (1) on the specific record before us, Butler failed to preserve the impeachment issue for appellate review, and hence, there is no record on which this court could reach a decision without conjecture; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the police officers to testify about their official contacts with Butler in response to his misidentification theory, and there was no unfair prejudice to Butler.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
On September 11, 1994, at approximately 3:53 a.m., police officer Dennis Spalding and his partner Michael Baker, both four and one-half year veterans of the Metropolitan Police Department, were on duty in a police cruiser in the 2500 block of Elvans Road, S.E. When the officers approached a four-way stop sign at Elvans and Stanton Roads, they stopped and watched as a green Ford Explorer waited at its stop sign. Officer Spalding recognized the driver of the Explorer as appellant Roosevelt Butler, “someone [whom he] knew from the area.” The officer recalled that Butler’s driving permit had been suspended.
When the Explorer made a right turn onto Elvans Road and picked up speed, Officers Spalding and Baker followed. Soon the Explorer turned into a dead end parking lot used by the residents of apartments located at 2500 Elvans Road. The officers continued to follow the Explorer, turned into the parking lot and saw a man approach the driver’s side of the Explorer. At this point, Officer Spalding illuminated the police cruiser’s emergency, rotating and take down lights. He then exited the police cruiser with Officer Baker and locked the door. As Officer Spalding walked toward the Explorer, it took off and began to make a U-tum. Officer Spalding retreated toward the police cruiser. He fumbled around trying to find the right key on the chain because he was not driving his regular cruiser. Periodically, he looked at the Explorer. When it moved towards him, Officer Spalding “walked fast or ran” to the rear of the police cruiser. The car hit the officer and “knocked [him] behind the trunk of the ... cruiser” where he “hit the ground.” He estimated that the Explorer pushed him about six or seven féet. He was not injured. As he was hit, he looked the driver “right in the face” and recognized him as Butler.
Officer Spalding returned to his cruiser with Officer Baker, and the two officers tried to pursue the Explorer. They also radioed a description of the Explorer, identified the driver as Butler, and stated that Butler was nineteen years old. Based upon his familiarity with Butler, Officer Spalding told the dispatcher the area in which Butler lived and might be found. Officer Spalding received a return report that Butler did not have a driver’s permit, and the license tags on the Explorer were not listed. The dispatcher reported that Butler lived on Ridge Crest [383]*383Court, S.E. However, the police officers first looked for Butler in the area they thought he frequented. When the officers did not see Butler, they drove to the Ridge Crest Court address. There they saw a car and recognized the driver as the person who had approached the Explorer in the Elvans Road parking lot. Squinched down in the front passenger seat of the ear was Butler. He was arrested for assaulting Officer Spalding with the Explorer. At trial, Officer Baker confirmed Officer Spalding’s account of the events.
Various defense witnesses, including Butler, testified as to Butler’s whereabouts on the night and the early morning hours in which Officer Spalding was hit with the Explorer. The mother of Butler’s infant child said he was with her in his parents’ home until he went out around 8:45 a.m. to buy some Pampers for the baby.2 One of Butler’s sisters initially stated that he did not leave the house while she was there on the night of September 11, 1994. On cross-examination, however, she acknowledged that Butler left the house and admitted uncertainty as to whether it was around 2:30 a.m. or some other time. She insisted that only approximately two minutes elapsed between the time Butler left the house with his cousin and the arrival of the police.
Butler’s cousin testified that Butler called him to request a ride to the store to purchase milk and Pampers for the baby. Prior to picking Butler up, the cousin said he went to a party in the 2500 block of Elvans Road. There he saw a green truck get close to a police officer. The police officer pushed off from the truck but did not fall to the ground. The cousin stated that the driver of the green truck was not Butler. In his own testimony, Butler denied being in the Explorer that hit Officer Spalding.
Pretrial Discussion of the Bias, Harassment and Fabrication Issue
Dining a pretrial conference on January 25,1995, and continuing to January 26, counsel for the government raised an issue Regarding what he anticipated as the defense theory, and the probable government response to that theory. In essence, he expected a harassment and fabrication defense, and indicated that the government would respond .by denying the allegations and by presenting evidence of police contact with Butler. Defense counsel said part of Butler’s defense would be harassment “in a number of unofficial ways,” and stated that defense would not “[open] the door to every single arrest or every single official contact” police officers had with Butler. Butler’s counsel added that another defense theory would center on “a grudge” that the arresting officers had against Butler who had been a defense witness in a 1992 drug case in which Officer Spalding and Officer Baker testified as government witnesses. The defendant was acquitted and, subsequently, according to defense counsel, the officers threatened to get Butler and harassed his family.3 The government should not be permitted to get into the prior arrests of Butler, defense counsel asserted, because disclosure of the prior arrests would be “extremely prejudicial.”
The government argued that it should be allowed to rebut the defense case by presenting evidence of prior arrests and contacts by Officers Spalding and Baker because the .defense evidence would be “prejudicial to the Government’s case.” Specifically, the government identified at least six contacts it was prepared to introduce through the testimony of the police officers: (1) two stops of Butler on August 24, 1992, one for driving a Ford pick-up truck without a license, and the other relating to a drug sale;4 (2) an arrest on [384]*384August 28, 1992 for receiving stolen property; the case was later dismissed; (8) a juvenile adjudication after an arrest on September 4, 1992 for possession of twenty-four rocks of cocaine with intent to distribute; Butler entered a guilty plea as a juvenile; (4) observation of Butler on March 9,1993 while he was with others — four weapons were found; no arrest was made; (5) another observation of Butler distributing drugs in February or March 1993; no arrest was made; and (6) a robbery-related arrest in September 1994; Butler was acquitted.
In a ruling on the bias, harassment and fabrication issue, which the trial court referred to as preliminary, the trial judge stated:
I’m inclined to agree with [government counsel] that once raised, especially in light of the — proffer here where they’re saying that didn’t happen, that’s a prevarication, and we did stop him, and they can list reasons, times and dates and — and— I’m inclined to say that that’s — that would be proper for the Government to — to assert that.
Furthermore, in again stressing the preliminary nature of its ruling, the trial court stated that if the defense theory were bias and fabrication, the government would be allowed “to bring those ... contacts in full context” because “it’s just fundamentally fair for the police to be able to respond to such serious allegations and to put the whole matter in its completeness before the jury.” The trial court expressed the view that “full disclosure would be in the best interest with a limiting instruction.” That is, evidence of Butler’s arrests and the disposition in each case would be permitted with a proper instruction. As the trial court put it, the instruction would say, in essence, “these arrests and/or convictions and/or acquittals are only being admitted to show the relationship of the parties and to allow the jury to explore the nature of the relationship of the parties.” No inference of propensity to commit the crime charged could be made. The trial judge emphasized that his ruling was preliminary when he said, “I understand that we’re all sort of thinking these things through at the same time, but we can address that [nature of the allowable disclosure and the limiting instruction] tomorrow. But I think everyone should be prepared to move on that ruling [regarding full disclosure with a limiting instruction].” In addition, the trial judge said: “I think bias cross examination of any witness always opens the door, to some extent, to the full nature and context of that in order to allow any witness, in order to be fair to that witness, the defense or the Govemment[,] to explain what ... bias, if any, exists.” Finally, the trial judge appeared to indicate that he had resolved most issues, but that at least two remained: “And in my mind right now the only open point is whether or not the ... final resolution of the adjudication in the juvenile and the acquittal in the adult case come in, I’m leaning to allowing them to come in. But I’ll hear from the parties tomorrow on that point.”
Pretrial Discussion of the Misidentification Issue
Just before trial on January 26, 1995, defense counsel announced that Butler would proceed on misidentification theory, “I’m not going to open on ... and I do not anticipate crossing either officer on any bias.” The discussion between counsel and the trial judge then shifted to the permissible limits of the government’s response to a misidentification theory. Initially the trial court indicated that the officers could recount their past arrests of Butler. When the defense expressed disagreement, the trial court considered sanitizing the officers’ testimony. After reviewing cases cited by Butler’s counsel, the trial court made a “preliminary ruling ... that the government is not allowed to use the introduction of [Butler’s] prior arrests in opening statements or in its direct examination.” When the government insisted that if the defense “opened the door,” it should be allowed “to establish why [Butler’s] known so well,” the trial judge decided “to defer ruling on this issue until I know what we’re talking about....”
The trial judge also said, “I’m sensitive to the fact that prior arrests, can be very prejudicial....” Just before the jury was [385]*385brought in, the trial judge stated, “[the government could] go through the individual dates [of contact with Butler], ... and that they met him and they talked with him, they saw him, they know his name, they know where he lives, whatever to indicate that they know who this individual is.”
Trial Issues Regarding the Misidentiñcation Issue
While Butler’s trial was in progress, the issue of how much the police officers could say about their prior contacts with him came up several times. Near the end of Officer Spalding’s direct examination, the government attorney asked, “And how well do you know Mr. Butler”? The Officer responded, “I’ve had numerous contacts with him over the last three or four years.” There was no objection. Government counsel then asked, “How many contacts ... ?” He responded, “I’d say between six and eight.” Officer Spalding went on to say, in response to two other questions, that he had no doubt that Butler was the person he had seen on the evening of September 11, 1994, and that he “looked [Butler] right in the face ... from the stoplight at the intersection until the parking lot, until the vehicle hit me.” At this point the government attorney terminated his direct examination.
Defense counsel requested a bench conference to inquire about the schedule for the day. During this bench conference government counsel stated that, despite his instructions, Officer Spalding used the word “numerous [contacts].” However, government counsel argued that the matter had been corrected because Officer Spalding specified the number of contacts as six to seven. Defense counsel still raised no objection to the use of the term “numerous contacts.” The next day of trial, however, defense counsel raised a continuing objection to the phrase “official contact in my line of duty.” Defense counsel thought the jury would understand this phrase to mean that Officer Spalding had arrested Butler six or seven times.
During cross-examination defense counsel was careful to avoid any discussion of prior contacts between Butler and Officer Spald-ing. On redirect examination, Officer Spald-ing asserted, inter alia, “I have had ... contact with Mr. Butler in an official police manner six or seven times....” The trial court overruled the defense objection. Officer Spalding went on to state, “I have had contact with Mr. Butler approximately, I would say, 10-13 times total, some of which were not in a police capacity.” When government counsel sought the specific dates of “official contacts” with Butler, the trial judge interrupted to give the following limiting instruction:
You’re explicitly instructed that ... the police have contacts with many individuals for many reasons. And the fact that the officer had contact with Mr. Butler in the past prior to this incident is not in any way, shape, or form to be construed by you because of law violations on the part of Mr. Butler. And you are explicitly instructed that you are not to assume that Mr. Butler had law violations in the past. This evidence is only being admitted to show that the officer had an opportunity to know who Mr. Butler was. And that’s the government’s theory that the officer knew who Mr. Butler was and was able to make an identification.
Officer Spalding then provided six dates of contact with Butler from August 28, 1992 to July 1998.5 He stated that on each of these dates he had an opportunity to observe Butler and to speak with him. When asked what physical features distinguished Butler from others Officer Spalding knew in the area of his beat, Officer Spalding mentioned, inter alia, Butler’s “long angular face,” his “high cheek bones,” and his “deep set eyes.” He indicated that he has never mistaken someone else for Butler, and that he was able to see Butler clearly in the parking lot because of the take down and rotating lights on the [386]*386police cruiser. When Officer Baker testified that he knew Butler “from official contacts,” the trial judge overruled defense counsel’s objection and reiterated its limiting instruction. Officer Baker identified Butler as the person who struck Officer Spalding on September 11,1994.
At the conclusion of all testimony and prior to closing arguments, the trial court offered to give its “official contacts” limiting instruction again during final instructions to the jury. Defense counsel responded, “Actually, no, Your Honor, I don’t wish that.... I have heard it twice.” The trial court then cautioned both counsel regarding what could be said about the police officers’ prior knowledge of Butler.
During its closing argument, the government made reference to “official contacts” or “numerous contacts” by the police officers with Butler, but went on to say that there is “no evidence ... that these officers have any reason to get Mr. Butler,” and “[the officers] did not make this up. They are not going to throw their careers away to get Roosevelt Butler.” Government counsel also implied that, unlike one defense witness who was related to Butler, the officers did not have a motive to fabricate, “because they were just doing tiieir job.” The trial court overruled the defense objection. During its rebuttal argument, government counsel sought to “go over the dates when Officer Spalding had seen [Butler] face to face, official contact.” The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection and said: “I don’t think it’s proper rebuttal. The defense did not contest that in any fashion[,] that the police officer did not know this defendant. It seems to me at this point it would just be highlighting something.” Government counsel asked, “I can’t comment as to the extensive contacts”? The trial court responded by allowing the government to comment “as to the extensive contacts” with Butler. Government counsel closed his argument, however, by saying only that “Officer Spalding knows Roosevelt Butler. There was no mistake. Officer Baker knows Roosevelt Butler. There was no mistake that night.”
ANALYSIS
The Bias, Harassment and Fabrication Issue
We turn first to Butler’s contention concerning the trial court’s alleged reversible error “in ruling that cross-examination of the arresting officers on bias ‘opened the door’ to evidence of appellant’s prior arrests by the same officers.” According to Butler, this ruling severely prejudiced his defense. He points out that a witness’ bias is relevant to witness credibility, and asserts that prejudice to his case stemmed from the trial court’s ruling that he could not discuss his role as a defense witness in a case in which Officers Spalding and Baker were government witnesses, and in which the defendant was acquitted, because the trial court ruled that the police officers in response could tell about their prior arrests of Butler. The introduction of prior arrest testimony would have been akin to prior bad acts introduced to show propensity to commit the crime charged, Butler argues. He further asserts that the government could have rebutted his bias evidence without reference to his prior arrests. According to Butler, this approach would have been consistent with the doctrine of “evidentiary parity” discussed in Johns v. United States, 434 A.2d 463 (D.C.1981). In Butler’s view, the offer of a limiting instruction could not overcome the prejudice of the officers’ testimony about their arrests of Butler, and the disposition of cases in which he was charged with criminal acts. In the end, says Butler, the government was able to exploit the absence of a bias, harassment and fabrication defense by commenting in its closing argument on the absence of any evidence showing the officers had “any reason to get Mr. Butler” or to fabricate the charges against him.
In response, the government first maintains that under Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984), Butler did not preserve this issue for appellate review. Because of our conclusion on this issue, we do not reach the merits of Butler’s argument regarding the contemplated bias, harassment and impeachment defense. In Luce, the Supreme Court held that “to raise and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a defendant must testify.” 469 U.S. at [387]*38743, 105 S.Ct. at 464.6 The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee had ruled that use of the prior conviction to impeach was consistent with Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,7 but that “the nature and scope of petitioner’s trial testimony could affect the court’s specific evidentiary rulings.” 469 U.S. at 40, 105 S.Ct. at 462. The Supreme Court questioned an appellate court’s ability “to rule on subtle evidentiary questions outside a factual context.” Id. at 41, 105 S.Ct. at 463. Furthermore, the court said, “[b]e-cause an accused’s decision whether to testify ‘seldom turns on the resolution of one factor,’ (citations omitted), a reviewing court cannot assume that the adverse ruling motivated a defendant’s decision not to testify.” Id. at 42, 105 S.Ct. at 463. With regard to the issue of harmless error, the Luce court pointed out that “[w]ere in limine rulings under Rule 609(a) reviewable on appeal, almost any error would result in the windfall of automatic reversal; the appellate court would not logically term ‘harmless’ an error that presumptively kept the defendant from testifying.” Id. at 42, 105 S.Ct. at 463. In their concurring opinion in Luce, Justices Brennan and Marshall stressed the need for an appellate court to know “the specific factual context of a trial as it has unfolded” in order to conduct a “careful weighing of probative value and prejudicial effect” of the challenged testimony.8
Butler argues that Luce is inapplicable because “the disputed issue [in Butler’s case] was fully litigated pretrial” and covers thirty-eight pages of the transcripts. Moreover, argues Butler, the trial court’s in limine ruling was final.
While the Lace issue has been raised in prior cases, generally we have either not reached it, or not embraced or adopted its holding. See Marshall v. United States, 623 A.2d 551, 556 (D.C.1992) (Luce issue not reached because “the ruling allowing the question to be put to the character witness was proper”); Allen v. United States, 622 A.2d 1103, 1104 (D.C.1993) (Luce issue not reached because “the record [failed] to support appellant’s argument that the added factor of likely impeachment with a rape ... conviction materially influenced his decision not to testify”); Askew v. United States, 540 A.2d 760, 761 n. 1 (D.C.1988) (because of the disposition of appellant’s arguments, “we need decide neither the question whether to adopt the principle of Luce, nor the question whether, if we adopt it, to apply Luce prospectively from the date it was decided or prospectively from the date of the adopting opinion”); Devore v. United States, 530 A.2d 1173, 1174 n. 3 (D.C.1987) (case could be “[decided] on the merits without reference to Luce ”); and Ross v. United States, 520 A.2d 1064, 1065 n. 2 (D.C.1987) (appellant was tried before Luce and in Langley v. United States, 515 A.2d 729, 733 (D.C.1986) this court decided not to apply Luce retroactively).
Lace involved a defendant who did not testify after an in limine ruling that the government could impeach him with a prior conviction. In contrast, Butler decided not to rely on or testify regarding a bias, harassment and fabrication defense after a preliminary in limine ruling that the government could impeach him by focusing on “the reasons, times and dates” of Butler’s prior arrests, convictions and acquittals. Nonetheless, the principles enunciated in Lace are applicable to the specific record before us.
Our review of the record on appeal reveals that the trial judge signaled throughout his [388]*388pretrial discussion vrith the prosecution and defense counsel that he had not come to a final conclusion concerning his ruling. He used words such as “preliminarily,” or “I am inclined” or “we’re all sort of thinking these things through” or “we can address that tomorrow.” Even when he uttered the words, “in my mind right now the only open point,” the trial court went on to say that two issues had not been resolved: “the final resolution of [whether to allow testimony concerning] the adjudication in the juvenile and the acquittal in the adult case- I’m leaning to allowing them to come in. But I’ll hear from the parties tomorrow on that point.”
Luce’s concern about an appellate court’s ability “to rule on subtle evidentiary questions outside a factual context,” 469 U.S. at 41, 105 S.Ct. at 463, is directly applicable here. Final trial court rulings on key issues of admissibility were not made. Moreover, the defense never proceeded on the bias, harassment and fabrication theory. Hence, there was no occasion for Butler to testify as to the alleged bias and harassment of Officers Spalding and Baker, nor any reason for Butler to cross-examine the officers regarding their supposed anger and retaliatory mentality flowing from Butler’s testimony as a defense witness in a case in which the two officers testified as government witnesses, and in which the defendant was acquitted. Nor was there any occasion for the government to redirect questions to the officers concerning their prior arrests of Butler and the disposition of those eases. Significantly, we do not know whether the trial court would have permitted evidence as to Butler’s juvenile adjudication or his ^acquittal as an adult. Had the trial judge permitted only testimony regarding contacts with Butler that did not result in arrests, the ease would be in a different posture before us. Simply put, we have no factual or record context to resolve Butler’s contention on appeal. As the Court said in Luce, “it would be a matter of conjecture whether the [trial court] would have allowed the [g]ovemment to attack [appellant’s] credibility at trial by means of the prior conviction.”
We cannot “assume that any adverse [in limine] ruling motivated [Butler’s] decision not to ... [rely on a bias, harassment and fabrication theory].” Id. at 42,105 S.Ct. at 463. More than one defense theory was available, and Butler had to weigh the risks and advantages of each theory. In addition, as the court asserted in Luce, if discretionary in limine rulings are “reviewable on appeal, almost any error would result in the windfall of automatic reversal; the appellate court could not logically term ‘harmless’ an error that presumptively kept the defendant from testifying,” or as in this case, from testifying about the bias, harassment and fabrication of key government witnesses. Without Butler’s testimony, as opposed to a proffer which provided only a skeletal outline of Butler’s proposed testimony on the bias, harassment and fabrication theory, we cannot “determine the impact any erroneous impeachment may have had in light of the record as a whole,” and, if we require the defendant to testify and to make his or her record, “it will also tend to discourage making [in limine] motions solely to ‘plant’ reversible error in the event of conviction.” Id. Accordingly, we hold that where (1) there is an in limine ruling that does not represent the trial court’s complete and final decision regarding the use of prior arrests to impeach a defendant who contemplates relying on a bias, harassment and fabrication theory; (2) the defendant does not testify regarding his or her skeletal outline of that proffered but later abandoned defense theory; and (3) the trial court cannot reasonably rule on the in limine motion on the basis of the proffered testimony, the principles enunciated in Luce are applicable. Based on the record in this case, Butler may not challenge the trial court’s discretionary in limine ruling because it did not constitute a final ruling on the impeachment issue; because Butler provided no testimony to the trial court regarding his bias, harassment and fabrication theory; and because, based on Butler’s general proffer of his testimony, the trial court could not reasonably provide a ruling on the in limine request. Therefore, Butler did not preserve the impeachment issue for appellate review, and there is no record on which this [389]*389court could reach a decision without conjecture.
The Misidentification Issue
Second, Butler contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing “the government to elicit that [Butler] had numerous contacts with Officer Spalding ‘in an official police manner.’ ” In Bean v. United States, 576 A.2d 187, 188 n. 2 (D.C.1990), we found no merit to appellant’s argument that his conviction should be reversed because of a police officer’s testimony that “he was able to identify [the defendant] due to a previous ‘official’ encounter.” Similarly we see no merit in Butler’s argument that the phrases “numerous contacts” or “in an official police manner” translate into “police arrests.” Indeed, Butler never moved for a mistrial based on the use of these phrases. Furthermore, the trial court gave a limiting instruction during the trial testimony of both Officer Spalding and Officer Baker which “explicitly instructed” the jury “not to assume that Mr. Butler had law violations in the past.” The trial court further instructed the jury that “[t]his evidence is only being admitted to show that the officer had an opportunity to know who Mr. Butler was.”
The trial judge offered to include its limiting instruction in the final instructions to the jury. Defense counsel refused the offer, however, and said: “Actually, no, Your Hon- or, I don’t wish that.... I have heard it twice.” In view of the limiting instruction and in the absence of a motion for a mistrial, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion, or that Butler suffered any unfair prejudice as a result of the trial court’s rulings. See Harris v. United States, 366 A.2d 461 (D.C.1976); Clark v. United States, 639 A.2d 76 (D.C.1993). We have no reason to believe that “the jury’s verdicts would have been different in the absence of the challenged remark[s]” because the identification of Butler by both Officer Spalding and Officer Baker was clear and unequivocal, and “overpoweringly [established Butler] as the perpetrator” of the crime against Officer Spalding. Harris, supra, 866 A.2d at 464 (citation omitted).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.