Opinion
SULLIVAN, J.
In these consolidated proceedings, presented by separate petitions upon a single record, petitioner Ruth Marie Busick (hereafter petitioner) seeks review and annulment of the opinion and decision after reconsideration, and petitioner Allstate Insurance Company (hereafter Allstate) seeks review and annulment of the order denying reconsideration of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board (hereafter Board).1
We first set forth the facts giving rise to the claim. In February 1967 petitioner was hired as a bookkeeper by Albright Express, owned by A. Chase Albright as a sole proprietor.2 Mrs. Albright kept the company’s books and sometimes signed the payroll checks. In. May 1967, Joseph Rasbidoski began working for the company as a salesman and dispatcher. The company also employed drivers and other office personnel.
In the spring of 1968, petitioner and Rasbidoski began to have personal difficulties with the Albrights, and by the following July were making plans to form a partnership and start their own trucking business.
On Friday, August 9, 1968, petitioner informed Mrs. Albright that she wanted to leave the company because of the tensions of her job. In response, Mrs. Albright suggested that petitioner take a week or two of vacation to reconsider her decision. Petitioner agreed. However, she and Ras[971]*971bidoski proceeded to carry out their plans for a new business. Within a few days they established the J.R.L. Trucking Company and purchased three trucks for it. Immediately thereafter Rasbidoski quit his job with Albright Express and about the same time two of Albright’s truck drivers also quit to work for petitioner’s new business. The J.R.L. Trucking Company then commenced hauling operations, acquiring some of Albright’s customers who transferred their business to the new firm.
Petitioner, Rasbidoski and the truck drivers were owed wages by Al-bright Express and upon inquiry were told that Mr. Albright required them to pick up their final payroll checks in person at his office. On August 23, 1968, petitioner and Rasbidoski went there together. As they walked up to the establishment, they were confronted by Mr. Albright, who asked, “Are you all prayed up?” He then shot petitioner and Rasbidoski and killed himself. Each of the two former employees was seriously injured.
Petitioner sought benefits under the workmen’s compensation laws upon the theory that she had sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment by Albright Express when she went to be paid for her past services. She also brought a civil action against Mr. Albright’s executrix to recover damages for assault and battery. We proceed to set forth the pertinent chronology of all of these proceedings upon which, as we shall explain, the main issue before us turns.
On September 17, 1968, petitioner filed with the Board an application for adjudication of claim. On April 11, 1969, she commenced a civil action for damages against Mr. Albright’s executrix.3 On October 3, 1969, a trial referee of the Board issued findings and award, finding that petitioner’s injury did not arise out of and occur in the course of the employment with Albright Express, awarding petitioner reimbursement for certain medical-legal costs against Allstate, and ordering that petitioner take nothing further against the express company or Allstate. On November 18, 1969, the Board granted petitioner’s petition for reconsideration. On April 14, 1970, in the civil actions for damages brought against Mr. Albright’s estate by petitioner and Rasbidoski and consolidated for trial, the court, sitting without a jury, entered a judgment4 in favor of “plaintiffs jointly” in the amount of $500,000 general damages and $150,000 punitive damages.5 Notice of entry of judgment was mailed to the parties by the clerk [972]*972of the court on the same day. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 664.5.) No appeal was taken and on June 15, 1970, said judgment became final. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2(a), 45(a); Code Civ. Proc., § 12a.) Meanwhile, in the workmen’s compensation proceeding, on May 6, 1970, the Board issued its opinion and decision after reconsideration which in effect affirmed the findings and award of the trial referee.6 The instant petitions for a writ of review followed.
The Busick Petition
The positions of the parties in respect to this petition may be summarized as follows. Petitioner contends that the Board’s decision that her injury did not arise out of and occur in the course of her employment is without any support in the evidence. She argues that the act of receiving compensation for services is one within the course of employment, particularly when, as here, it is done pursuant to- the direction of the employer. Allstate, on the other hand, contends that the shooting was the result of personal grievances and, therefore, not employment related; that, assuming petitioner returned to her former employer’s place of business merely to obtain her paycheck, such act was not one within the course of her former employment; and that, in any event, the judgment of the superior court is res judicata on the issue of whether the assault by Albright on petitioner arose out of and occurred in the course of the employment. We have concluded that, as Allstate claims, the superior court judgment should be given res judicata effect precluding recovery before the Board and that, therefore, the decision of the Board should be affirmed. In view of this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to reach the remaining issues.
“The doctrine of res judicata precludes parties or their privies from relitigating a cause of action that has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 810 [122 P.2d 892]; see Martin v. Martin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 752, 758 [87 Cal.Rptr. 526, 470 P.2d 662].) We have said that the doctrine “rests upon the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated, or had an opportunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and vexation of his opponent. Public policy and the interest of litigants alike require that there be an end to litigation.” (Panos v. Great Western Packing Co. (1943) 21 Cal.2d 636, 637 [134 P.2d 242]; see generally Note, [973]*973Developments in the Law—Res Judicata (1952) 65 Harv.L.Rev. 818.) As Witkin puts it, “The doctrine of res judicata gives certain conclusive effect to a former judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy.” (Original italics.) (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Judgment, § 147, p. 3292.)
Generally speaking, under the above doctrine a valid final judgment, if in favor of the plaintiff, merges the cause of action in the judgment. (Edmonds v. Glenn-Colusa Irr. Dist. (1933) 217 Cal. 436, 445-446 [19 P.2d 502]; Hatch v. Bank of America (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 206, 210 [5 Cal.Rptr. 875]; California Nat. Supply Co. v. Porter (1927) 83 Cal.App. 758, 761-763 [257 P. 161]; 4 Witkin, supra, Judgment, § 189, p. 3329; Rest., Judgments (1942) § 47),7 and, if in favor of the defendant, constitutes a bar to any further suit on the same cause of action (Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., supra, 21 Cal.2d 636, 639; 4 Witkin, supra, Judgment, § 192, p. 3332; Rest, Judgments, supra, § 48).8
We proceed to analyze the effect of res judicata as a merger in the context of situations where the plaintiff has one of two mutually exclusive remedies for the enforcement of a single cause of action. We begin with section 64 of the Restatement of Judgments which states: “Where the plaintiff obtains judgment for the payment of money against the defendant in an action to enforce one of two or more alternative remedies, he cannot thereafter maintain an action to enforce another of the remedies.” (See Slater v. Shell Oil Co. (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d 864, 869 [137 P.2d 713]; United States v. Temple (7th Cir. 1962) 299 F.2d 30, 32.) This rule implements the general principles of res judicata and prevents multiple recoveries by a plaintiff. In contradistinction to the doctrine of election of remedies, it gives conclusive effect to the judgment in plaintiff’s favor, and does not consider plaintiff’s conduct in choosing a remedy (Rest., Judgments, supra, § 64, com. a; § 65, com. f). More specifically, when a plaintiff has two mutually exclusive remedies, and judgment is rendered in his favor giving him one of the remedies, he cannot thereafter maintain an action for the other. For example, if a plaintiff is entitled to damages for personal injuries either under a federal statute, if the injury arose out of employment in interstate commerce, or under a state statute, if it arose out of employment in intrastate commerce, a judgment for the plaintiff [974]*974under the federal statute would preclude a later action under the state statute and vice versa. (Id., § 64, com. g.)
We point out, however, that this rule is not applicable where judgment is rendered for the defendant because the plaintiff has sought a remedy not available to him. In such cases, the plaintiff is not necessarily precluded from bringing another proceeding to obtain a recovery which is available.9 For example, “[wjhere the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for personal injuries or for causing death in an action based upon a federal statute if, but only if, it arose out of an employment in interstate commerce, and he is entitled to recover such damages in an action based upon a State statute if, but only if, it arose out of an employment in intrastate commerce, and the plaintiff brought an action based upon the State statute, and judgment was given for the defendant on the ground that the employment was in interstate commerce, the plaintiff is not precluded from thereafter maintaining an action for the same injury based upon the federal statute. Conversely, a judgment for the defendant in an action based upon the federal statute on the ground that the employment was in intrastate commerce does not preclude the plaintiff from maintaining an action based upon the State statute.”10 (Rest., Judgments, supra, § 65, com. k; cf. Kipbea Baking Co. v. Strauss (E.D.N.Y. 1963) 218 F.Supp. 696, 699.) The rationale supporting the rule precluding a successful plaintiff’s second action obviously does not apply when the first judgment is for the defendant.
We now consider Allstate’s contention that the do'ctrine of res judicata precludes petitioner from recovering in the instant proceeding before the' Board. Only a final judgment on the merits between the same parties or their privies and upon the same cause of action is entitled to the res judicata effect of bar or merger, (Olwell v. Hopkins (1946) 28 Cal.2d 147, 152 [168 P.2d 972].)
The finality of the judgment in which petitioner’s cause of action has allegedly merged and its status as an adjudication on the merits are indisputable. The superior court judgment became final on June 15, 1970, when the time to appeal elapsed. Petitioner and Rasbidoski were awarded [975]*975money damages for defendant Albright’s tortious behavior; the judgment determined the merits of all the issues in the case.
The requirement that the same parties or their privies be involved in both actions, which assures that every party has one day, but no party two days, in court, also is satisfied herein. In the instant proceedings before the Board, as in those brought in the superior court, petitioner seeks recovery from the estate of her former employer, A. Chase Albright. The fact that under Board procedure the compensation insurance carrier for the employer is also a named defendant has no effect on the executrix’s role as a defendant in both proceedings.
It is also clear that the Board proceeding is brought on the same cause of action as that brought in the superior court. Although several different concepts have been advanced (see generally Note, Developments in the Law — Res Judicata, supra, 65 Harv.L.Rev. at pp. 824-831), we have defined a cause of action as “the obligation sought to be enforced” (Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., supra, 21 Cal.2d at p. 638) and we have indicated that there is but one cause of action for one personal injury by reason of one wrongful act. (Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., supra, 21 Cal.2d at p. 638; 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Pleading, §34, p. 1717.) In the instant case, petitioner seeks redress for injuries suffered from, one tortious act, the shooting incident. (See Rest., Judgments, supra, § 63, com. b.) Violation of one primary right in the instant case constitutes a single cause of action even though two mutually exclusive remedies are available. (Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 891, 895-896 [151 P.2d 846]; Hatch v. Bank of America, supra, 182 Cal.App.2d at p . 211.)
There is no doubt that petitioner’s cause of action is extinguished and “the prior judgment is res judicata on matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated or litigable.” (Original italics.) (Sutphin v. Speik (1940) 15 Cal.2d 195, 202 [99 P.2d 652, 101 P.2d 497]; Rest, Judgments, supra, §§ 47, 48.) Therefore, it is irrelevant whether or not the issue of the injury arising out of and in the course of employment was specifically resolved by the .superior court. Even if we assume that the injury were employment-related and the superior court’s judgment incorrect on that issue, “[a]n erroneous judgment is as conclusive as a correct one.”11 (See Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., supra, 21 Cal.2d at p. 640; Rest., Judgments, supra, § 47, com. b.)
[976]*976We conclude, therefore, that in the light of the foregoing principles the superior court judgment satisfies the criteria for the application of the doctrine of res judicata. Because petitioner was faced with two mutually exclusive remedies and received a money judgment by pursuing one of them, her claim merged in that judgment and she cannot seek the alternative remedy. Her situation in the instant case falls within the reach of Restatement of Judgments, section 64, which in our view sets forth the correct rule.
Petitioner challenges the application of these principles on the ground that the superior court judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction. She argues that since she filed her claim with the Board before she brought her civil action for damages the superior court should have stayed the action on its own motion pending determination by the Board of the jurisdictional question whether the injury was employment-related. We recognize that the two tribunals in which petitioner sought relief have concurrent jurisdiction only to determine jurisdiction. In such a case, “[T]he tribunal first assuming jurisdiction retains it to the exclusion of all other tribunals in which the action might have been initiated.” (Scott v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 76, 81 [293 P.2d 18]; Jones v. Brown (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 513, 521 [89 Cal.Rptr. 651].) Once that decision has been made, jurisdiction becomes exclusive, and the final determination' as to jurisdiction is res judicata before the other tribunal between the same parties and those privy to them. (Scott v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 83; Jones v. Brown, supra, 13 Cal.App.3d at p. 521.)
A party may obtain an order preventing the second tribunal from acting pending determination by the first tribunal of the jurisdictional question.12 But the court need not on its own motion await the first tribunal’s action. In Taylor v. Superior Court (1956) 47 Cal.2d 148 [301 P.2d 866], which petitioner suggests as authority for her position, we issued a writ of prohibition requiring the superior court to grant such a stay where the facts [977]*977were similar to those in the instant case. In Taylor, however, the plaintiff took affirmative action to obtain the writ prohibiting further superior court proceedings. Here neither party made any objection to bringing the superior court action to trial, and petitioner prosecuted that action to final judgment fully aware that the Board action had been commenced some seven months befóte the complaint was filed in the superior court. As Witkin makes clear, “In such event the priority of jurisdiction loses its significance; the first final judgment becomes conclusive, even though it is rendered in the action which was filed later in time. ‘Where two actions involving the same issue are pending at the same time, it is not the final judgment in the first suit, but the first final judgment, although it may be rendered in the second suit, that renders the issue res judicata in the other court. . . .’ (Domestic & Foreign Pet. Co. v. Long (1935) 4 C.2d 547, 562 . . . .)” (Original italics.) (4 Witkin, supra, Judgment, § 166, p. 3309.)
Petitioner contends that Allstate has waived the defense of res judicata. Since res judicata is not a jurisdictional.defense, it may be waived if not timely raised. (Domestic & Foreign Pet. Co., Ltd. v. Long (1935) 4 Cal.2d 547, 562 [51 P.2d 73]; 4 Witkin, supra, Judgment, § 148, p. 3293.) However, the facts of the instant case do not support petitioner’s contention. The defense was raised by Allstate before the Court of Appeal when it first became available. It could not have been raised earlier because the superior court judgment did not become final until June 15, 1970, which was after the Board had issued, on May 6, 1970, its opinion and decision after reconsideration.
My esteemed colleague in dissent speculates that petitioner’s civil action for damages might have been one brought against Mr. Albright as her co-employee, who was a working member of a partnership. (Lab. Code, §§ 3359, 3601.) As previously mentioned (see fn. 2, ante) there is no evidence in the record indicating that Albright Express was a partnership. Nor was the contention now advanced by the dissenting opinion ever urged by petitioner in this court, or the Court of Appeal, or before the Board.
To recapitulate, petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of the Board to determine jurisdiction by filing her application for adjudication of claim in that proceeding prior to filing her complaint in her civil action in the superior court. But by prosecuting the superior court action to final judgment before the Board action was final, she allowed her cause of action to merge in that judgment. Whether or not the judgment of the superior court is based upon an erroneous conclusion on the question of “course of employment” is irrelevant. (Panos v. Great Western Packing Co., supra, [978]*97821 Cal.2d 636, 640.) That judgment clearly satisfies all criteria for the application of the doctrine of res judicata. Petitioner’s cause of action merged therein and she is thereby precluded from seeking an additional remedy before the Board.
The Allstate Petition
Allstate admits its coverage of Albright Express, but contends that Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin (hereafter Employers Mutual) was also Albright’s compensation carrier on the date of the shooting, August 23, 1968, and should be jointly responsible for any recovery. Allstate urges that no effect should be given to the retroactive cancellation of the Employers Mutual policy issued to' Albright. In light of our decision denying petitioner recovery in L.A. 29862, the question of coverage pertains only to the medical-legal costs awarded by the referee and affirmed by the Board.13
The Employers Mutual policy covering Albright Express was valid for the period from June 11, 1968, to June 11, 1969. However, Allstate issued a policy to Albright covering the same risks effective August 15, 1968, and, according to Mrs, Albright, Allstate’s agent told her he would cancel the Employers Mutual policy. The Allstate agent never gave written notice of cancellation to Employers Mutual as the policy required. Soon thereafter, Employers Mutual learned of the new policy from the California Inspection Rating Bureau. On September 10, 1968, Employers Mutual cancelled its policy effective August 15, 1968, in accordance with the practice of cancellation by replacement. According to the testimony of experts, this practice is based on the first carrier’s belief that it would be unsuccessful in collecting premiums for any period of dual coverage.
As heretofore noted, the referee awarded petitioner Busick medical-legal expenses, “[t]he amounts ... tot be adjusted between Busick and Allstate Insurance Company, failing which to' be adjudicated herein upon petition and supporting documents.” In his order dated October 3, 1969, the referee concluded, “It is found that the liability [for medical-legal costs] attaches to Allstate Insurance Company.” Only petitioner Busick sought reconsideration of the referee’s order. In its opinion and decision after reconsideration issued May 6, 1970, the Board expressly found Allstate [979]*979to be Albright Express’s insurance carrier on the date of the incident, affirmed the award of medical-legal costs, and ordered the dismissal of Employers Mutual.
On May 25, 1970, within 20 days of the decision after reconsideration by the Board, Allstate petitioned for reconsideration of that decision, urging that the Board erred in not finding Employers Mutual jointly liable as compensation carrier. On June 11, 1970, the Board, sitting en banc, issued its opinion and order denying reconsideration. The Board observed that the petition was not timely filed because Allstate had not sought reconsideration of the referee’s award of October 3, 1969, which granted medical-legal costs against Allstate. In said opinion and order denying reconsideration, the Board agreed with the referee’s implied finding that, on the merits, Employers Mutual was not liable, having cancelled its policy effective August 15, 1968, several days before the shooting.
Allstate contends that its petition for reconsideration filed with the Board on May 25, 1970, was timely. The Board disagreed, indicating that Allstate should have sought reconsideration of the referee’s award of medical-legal costs. Allstate claims such action was unnecessary because the referee did not specifically determine the issue of coverage, whereas the Board in its decision after reconsideration issued May 6, 1970, did expressly dismiss Employers Mutual as a party defendant.
We agree with the Board’s and Employers Mutual’s analysis that Allstate did not timely seek reconsideration. Although the referee’s award did not specifically dismiss Employers Mutual, that award implied Allstate’s sole responsibility at least for the medical-legal costs. The issue of coverage was before the referee, and “Any issue not . . . determined will be deemed decided adversely as to the party in whose interest such issue was raised.” (Lab. Code, § 5815.) Furthermore, the referee specifically awarded the medical-legal costs against Allstate, putting Allstate on notice that it should have challenged that aspect of the award at once. We need not decide whether such a failure to seek timely reconsideration of the referee’s award would have precluded Allstate’s challenge to the broader issue of its sole responsibility for a general award, as. that issue is now moot. Nor need we decide, on the merits, whether Employers Mutual remained Albright’s insurer on the date of the incident even though it thereafter issued a post-dated cancellation of its policy.
We, therefore, reach these final conclusions. Since petitioner’s cause of action arising out of the shooting incident merged in the judgment entered in her favor in the superior court, such final judgment upon [980]*980principles of res judicata precludes any recovery in the instant proceedings before the Board. Under the circumstances it is unnecessary for us to determine the question whether petitioner’s injury was one arising out of and. in the course of her employment by Albright Express. Although the Board denied recovery for another reason, namely that the petitioner’s injury did not arise out of her employment, the result it reached was a correct one and must be affirmed. As to Allstate, the order determining it to be solely responsible for petitioner’s medical-legal costs became final because of Allstate’s failure to file a timely petition for reconsideration.
In L.A. 29862, the decision of the Board following reconsideration is affirmed. In L.A. 29863, the order denying reconsideration is affirmed.
Wright, C. J., McComb, J., and Burke, J., concurred.