UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DUANE BURTON,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 19-2769 (TSC) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Duane Burton sued the District of Columbia Department of Corrections
(“DOC”) under the Eighth Amendment and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“HRA”). Am. Compl.
at 5, ECF No. 56. Defendant now moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to
dismiss the suit with prejudice, arguing that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. Mot. to Dismiss at 4, ECF No. 64. The court agrees that Plaintiff has not plausibly
pled his claims, but will dismiss his Amended Complaint without prejudice to allow him the
opportunity to remedy its defects.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 13, 2019, forty-eight Plaintiffs jointly filed a complaint against DOC and
submitted a single application to proceed in forma pauperis, demanding monetary damages on
claims arising from the conditions of their confinement. See Order at 1, ECF No. 55; Compl.,
ECF No. 1. To evaluate that application, the court directed Plaintiffs to submit a certified copy
of their trust fund account statements for the six-month period preceding the complaint’s filing,
Page 1 of 5 as 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) requires. Order at 1. Ultimately, however, only Duane Burton
submitted the statement, and all other plaintiffs were dismissed. Id. at 1–2.
Burton’s Amended Complaint alleges that, when he was a pre-trial detainee at DOC, the
temperatures in the D.C. Jail were “high” and there was “no working air conditioning that would
help to circulate any air” in his unit—causing him physical “pain and suffering,” as well as
“emotional and mental distress.” Am. Compl. at 5. Plaintiff asserts that those conditions
violated the Eighth Amendment and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“HRA”). Id. He also refers to
a contract between the U.S. Marshals Service and DOC that prevents pre-trial detainees from
being housed “in any space smaller than 48 square feet where the inmate [is] waiting for a court
date,” Am. Compl. at 5, and states that his case implicates the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Opp’n. to Mot. to Dismiss at 2.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In Iqbal,
the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly: “First, the
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and “[s]econd, only a complaint that states a plausible claim
for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 678–79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56). A
claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“The Court is mindful that a pro se litigant’s complaint is held to a less stringent standard
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. Page 2 of 5 1987) (citing Redwood v. Council of the District of Columbia, 679 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)). The court must grant the plaintiff “the benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216
F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 61 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir.
1979)), and “consider [their] filings as a whole before dismissing a complaint,” Schnitzler v.
United States, 761 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d
545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). However, this standard “does not constitute a license for a plaintiff
filing pro se to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or expect the Court to decide what
claims a plaintiff may or may not want to assert.” Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239.
III. ANALYSIS
As currently pled, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint suffers from several fatal defects. To
begin, it names DOC as Defendant, but “[g]overnmental agencies of the District of Columbia are
not suable entities.” Arnold v. Moore, 980 F. Supp. 28, 33 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Fields v. D.C.
Dep’t of Corr., 789 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating that the court “lacks jurisdiction over
[Defendant DOC]”). Plaintiff’s claims against DOC must, therefore, be dismissed. Arnold, 980
F. Supp. at 33. “When a plaintiff erroneously names as a defendant a District of Columbia
agency instead of the District of Columbia itself, a court may substitute the District as a
defendant for its agency.” Sampson v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 20 F. Supp. 3d 282, 285 (D.D.C.
2014). But even if the court did so here, Plaintiff does not state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The two legal bases he most clearly invokes for his claims are either inapplicable in this
context or unsupported by his allegations, and his references to a few other potential sources of
law—even liberally construed—do not plausibly plead a claim.
First, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim fails in this context because that Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments only applies to “persons against whom the Page 3 of 5 government ‘has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.’”
Powers-Bunce v. D.C., 479 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 536 n.16 (1979)). Plaintiff’s allegations appear to relate to his experience as a pre-trial
detainee. See Am. Compl. at 5 (referring to DOC agreements regarding “pre-trial detainees”
who “are waiting for a court date”). Rather than suing under the Eighth Amendment to protest
the conditions of his confinement, therefore, Plaintiff must instead “rely upon the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process.” Brogsdale v. Barry, 926 F.2d 1184, 1187 (D.C. Cir.
1991). Accordingly, the court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim without
prejudice; he may amend his Complaint to seek relief under the Fifth Amendment.
Second, Plaintiff’s claim that he should be reimbursed for Defendant’s HRA violation
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DUANE BURTON,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 19-2769 (TSC) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff Duane Burton sued the District of Columbia Department of Corrections
(“DOC”) under the Eighth Amendment and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“HRA”). Am. Compl.
at 5, ECF No. 56. Defendant now moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to
dismiss the suit with prejudice, arguing that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. Mot. to Dismiss at 4, ECF No. 64. The court agrees that Plaintiff has not plausibly
pled his claims, but will dismiss his Amended Complaint without prejudice to allow him the
opportunity to remedy its defects.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 13, 2019, forty-eight Plaintiffs jointly filed a complaint against DOC and
submitted a single application to proceed in forma pauperis, demanding monetary damages on
claims arising from the conditions of their confinement. See Order at 1, ECF No. 55; Compl.,
ECF No. 1. To evaluate that application, the court directed Plaintiffs to submit a certified copy
of their trust fund account statements for the six-month period preceding the complaint’s filing,
Page 1 of 5 as 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) requires. Order at 1. Ultimately, however, only Duane Burton
submitted the statement, and all other plaintiffs were dismissed. Id. at 1–2.
Burton’s Amended Complaint alleges that, when he was a pre-trial detainee at DOC, the
temperatures in the D.C. Jail were “high” and there was “no working air conditioning that would
help to circulate any air” in his unit—causing him physical “pain and suffering,” as well as
“emotional and mental distress.” Am. Compl. at 5. Plaintiff asserts that those conditions
violated the Eighth Amendment and the D.C. Human Rights Act (“HRA”). Id. He also refers to
a contract between the U.S. Marshals Service and DOC that prevents pre-trial detainees from
being housed “in any space smaller than 48 square feet where the inmate [is] waiting for a court
date,” Am. Compl. at 5, and states that his case implicates the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Opp’n. to Mot. to Dismiss at 2.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In Iqbal,
the Supreme Court reiterated the two principles underlying its decision in Twombly: “First, the
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and “[s]econd, only a complaint that states a plausible claim
for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 678–79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56). A
claim is facially plausible when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“The Court is mindful that a pro se litigant’s complaint is held to a less stringent standard
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. Page 2 of 5 1987) (citing Redwood v. Council of the District of Columbia, 679 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)). The court must grant the plaintiff “the benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged,” Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216
F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 61 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir.
1979)), and “consider [their] filings as a whole before dismissing a complaint,” Schnitzler v.
United States, 761 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d
545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). However, this standard “does not constitute a license for a plaintiff
filing pro se to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or expect the Court to decide what
claims a plaintiff may or may not want to assert.” Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239.
III. ANALYSIS
As currently pled, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint suffers from several fatal defects. To
begin, it names DOC as Defendant, but “[g]overnmental agencies of the District of Columbia are
not suable entities.” Arnold v. Moore, 980 F. Supp. 28, 33 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Fields v. D.C.
Dep’t of Corr., 789 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating that the court “lacks jurisdiction over
[Defendant DOC]”). Plaintiff’s claims against DOC must, therefore, be dismissed. Arnold, 980
F. Supp. at 33. “When a plaintiff erroneously names as a defendant a District of Columbia
agency instead of the District of Columbia itself, a court may substitute the District as a
defendant for its agency.” Sampson v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 20 F. Supp. 3d 282, 285 (D.D.C.
2014). But even if the court did so here, Plaintiff does not state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The two legal bases he most clearly invokes for his claims are either inapplicable in this
context or unsupported by his allegations, and his references to a few other potential sources of
law—even liberally construed—do not plausibly plead a claim.
First, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim fails in this context because that Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments only applies to “persons against whom the Page 3 of 5 government ‘has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.’”
Powers-Bunce v. D.C., 479 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 536 n.16 (1979)). Plaintiff’s allegations appear to relate to his experience as a pre-trial
detainee. See Am. Compl. at 5 (referring to DOC agreements regarding “pre-trial detainees”
who “are waiting for a court date”). Rather than suing under the Eighth Amendment to protest
the conditions of his confinement, therefore, Plaintiff must instead “rely upon the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of due process.” Brogsdale v. Barry, 926 F.2d 1184, 1187 (D.C. Cir.
1991). Accordingly, the court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim without
prejudice; he may amend his Complaint to seek relief under the Fifth Amendment.
Second, Plaintiff’s claim that he should be reimbursed for Defendant’s HRA violation
also cannot succeed. See Am. Compl. at 5. The regulation he cites allows prevailing plaintiffs to
be reimbursed for expenses incurred from “any physiological, psychological, or emotional
problems as a result of the violation of the [HRA].” 31 D.C. Reg. § 205.1, at 6262 (1984). But
Plaintiff does not plead any violation of the HRA, which generally prohibits “discrimination for
any reason other than that of individual merit,” D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1401.01—he does not
allege that Defendant discriminated against him in any way or otherwise violated the HRA. As a
result, his allegations provide no basis for seeking the HRA’s corresponding reimbursement, and
the court will dismiss this claim without prejudice as well.
Plaintiff’s filings contain several fleeting references to other potential sources of law, but
his allegations—even liberally construed—do not support claims arising from them. For
instance, the Amended Complaint mentions that the U.S. Marshals Service has a contract with
DOC that prevents pre-trial detainees from being housed “in any space smaller than 48 square
feet where the inmate [is] waiting for a court date.” Am. Compl. at 5. But Plaintiff does not
Page 4 of 5 allege that contract was violated or why that would allow him to sue Defendant. Likewise, in
opposing the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff contends that the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments are also at issue in his case. See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 2. But he does not
identify—and the court is not aware of—any allegations that would support any of those
constitutional claims. Based on the Amended Complaint as written, therefore, the court cannot
draw the inference that the District of Columbia is liable to Plaintiff on any of these grounds.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court will GRANT in part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and
dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint without prejudice. A corresponding Order will
accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: July 7, 2023
Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge
Page 5 of 5