Burton v. District of Columbia Department of Corrections

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: December 9, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2019-2769
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DUANE BURTON,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 19-cv-2769 (TSC)

WANDA PATTEN, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

From 2019 until 2021, pro se Plaintiff Duane Burton was held at the D.C. Jail while

awaiting trial on federal criminal charges. See Second Am. Compl. at 12, 16, ECF No. 74. In

2019, Burton sued the D.C. Department of Corrections, challenging conditions at the Jail. See

generally Compl., ECF No. 1. Although Burton was transferred to a federal prison in Virginia in

2021, see Notice of Change of Address, ECF No. 42, he continued to press his claims against the

Department and filed an Amended Complaint in 2022 claiming in relevant part that conditions at

the Jail violated the Eighth Amendment. First Am. Compl. at 5, ECF No. 56. In 2023, the court

dismissed Burton’s First Amended Complaint, both because the Department was not a proper

defendant and because the Eighth Amendment did not apply to Burton’s time at the D.C. Jail as a

pretrial detainee. See Mem. Op. at 3–4, ECF No. 68. Burton has now filed a Second Amended

Complaint substituting D.C. Jail officials for the Department. But he again alleges violations of

the Eighth Amendment. See Second Am. Compl. at 16, ECF No. 74. For the reasons below, the

court will dismiss the Second Amended Complaint without prejudice. But Burton is warned that

if he again “files an amended complaint that merely recycles the complaint presently before the

Page 1 of 3 court, it may be dismissed with prejudice.” Brown v. WMATA, 164 F. Supp. 3d 33, 35 (D.D.C.

2016) (cleaned up).

A district court may dismiss sua sponte a complaint for failure to state a claim where “it is

patently obvious” that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint. Baker v.

Director, U.S. Parole Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Rollins v. Wackenhut

Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (same). It is patently obvious that Burton cannot

prevail on his Eighth Amendment claim. As the court has already explained, a pretrial detainee

challenging conditions at the D.C. Jail must “rely upon the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due

process” rather than the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Mem.

Op. at 4 (quoting Brogsdale v. Barry, 926 F.2d 1184, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). That is because the

Eighth Amendment applies only to “persons against whom the government ‘has secured a formal

adjudication of guilt,’” Powers-Bunce v. District of Columbia, 479 F. Supp. 2d 146, 153 (D.D.C.

2007) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979)), and “different” standards govern

the treatment of those who have not yet been convicted. See Brogsdale, 926 F.2d at 1187 & n.4.

Burton also appears to assert a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Second Am.

Compl. at 16, but it is patently obvious that such a claim would fail as well. “The Fourteenth

Amendment . . . does not apply to the District of Columbia.” Muhammad v. United States, 300 F.

Supp. 3d 257, 267 (D.D.C. 2018); see also Powers-Bunce, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 153 (“[B]y its terms,

the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to the states . . . .”). “Because D.C. is a political entity

created by the federal government, it is subject to the restrictions of the Fifth Amendment, not the

Fourteenth.” Propert v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1330 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).

Page 2 of 3 Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Burton’s Second Amended Complaint, ECF No.

74, is DISMISSED without prejudice and the pending Motion to Quash, ECF No. 83, is DENIED

AS MOOT.

Date: December 9, 2025

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

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