Burnes v. The Parks at Monterey Bay

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: January 29, 2024
• Docket: 5:23-cv-05474
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 JOLEIGH BURNES, et al., Case No. 23-cv-05474-EJD

9 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO REMAND 10 v.

11 THE PARKS AT MONTEREY BAY, et al., Re: ECF No. 9 Defendants. 12

13 14 Plaintiff Joleigh Burnes and her two daughters, plaintiffs Riana Martinez, and Olivia 15 Martinez (together, “Plaintiffs”), filed this action against Defendants The Parks at Monterey Bay 16 (“The Parks”), Michaels Management Services, LLC (“Michaels Management”), and Monterey 17 Bay Military Housing, LLC (“MBMH” and, with The Parks and Michaels Management, 18 “Defendants”) on September 27, 2023 in the Superior Court of California, County of Monterey. 19 See Not. of Removal (“Not.”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. On October 24, 2023, Michaels Management and 20 MBMH removed the action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441. See id.1 Now pending 21 before the Court is Plaintiffs’ motion to remand the action (the “Motion”), which Plaintiffs timely 22 filed on November 9, 2023. See Mot., ECF No. 9; 28 U.SC. § 1447(c). The Court finds the 23

24 1 The general requirement that all defendants must join in a petition for removal, see 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A), does not apply to a defendant who has not been served, see, e.g., Losurdo v. 25 JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. LA CV16-01409, 2016 WL 8730559, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2016) (citing Salveson v. W. States Bankcard Ass’n, 731 F.2d 1423, 1429 (9th Cir. 1984)). As 26 alleged in the Notice of Removal and supported by the docket, there has been no service on The Parks, which is not itself a separate entity but rather a fictitious name under which Michaels 27 Management does business. See Not. ¶¶ 9–11. The validity of the Notice of Removal is therefore not affected by the lack of joinder or consent by the Parks. 1 Motion suitable for determination without oral argument, see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and, having 2 considered the parties’ submissions and the relevant law, hereby GRANTS the Motion. 3 I. BACKGROUND 4 This action arises out of a dispute related to Plaintiffs’ lease of residential property from 5 Defendants. As alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiffs signed a rental agreement with The Parks for 6 the premises at 401 Nijmegan Road, Unit No. ML-NIJ0401, Seaside, California 93955 (the 7 “Property”) and resided there from February 2022 to February 2023. See Compl. 4–5, ECF No. 8 1.2 Plaintiffs allege that the Property was owned, maintained, managed, and operated by all three 9 Defendants. See id. at 4. Plaintiffs further allege that the Property was defective due to gas leaks, 10 inadequate plumbing, and clogged drains, which Defendants did not repair despite Plaintiffs’ 11 repeated requests beginning in April 2022. See id. at 4–6. Consequently, Plaintiffs allege, they 12 experienced airborne exposure to noxious gas, molds, and bacteria, which in turn caused Plaintiffs 13 to undergo emotional and psychological distress, psychological trauma, respiratory issues, asthma, 14 headaches, brain damage, e. coli poisoning, and property damages. See id. Plaintiffs further 15 allege that Defendants responded to Plaintiffs’ demand for remediation of the Property’s defects 16 by serving on Plaintiffs a Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit, and that Defendants’ conduct was 17 either malicious and willful, intentional and unreasonable, or unintentional, negligent, and 18 reckless, and evinced a conscious disregard for Plaintiffs’ rights. See id. 19 On September 27, 2023, Plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court of California, County of 20 Monterey. See Compl. The Complaint asserts four causes of action based on the above 21 allegations: (1) premises liability; (2) wrongful eviction; (3) breach of the implied warranty of 22 habitability; and (4) breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. Id. at 4–6. Plaintiffs 23 effected service of process on Michaels Management and MBMH on or about September 29, 24 2023, via service on the registered agent of each entity. See Not. ¶¶ 2–3; see id. at Exhs. A–B. 25 On October 24, 2024, Michaels Management and MBMH removed this action to federal 26

27 2 The Complaint is located at pages 15 through 21 of the Notice of Removal. See Not. 15–21. 1 court on the grounds that this Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over the entire action 2 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 under the doctrine of federal enclave jurisdiction. See id. at 2. 3 Michaels Management and MBMH allege that the Property is privatized military housing owned 4 by MBMH and “entirely located on land owned by the U.S. Army and leased” to MBMH. See id. 5 ¶ 17. Michaels Management and MBMH further allege that the Court has supplemental 6 jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over any claims over which it does not have original 7 subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 2. 8 Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion on November 9, 2023. See Mot. Michaels Management 9 and MBMH filed an opposition, see Opp’n, ECF No. 14, and Plaintiffs filed a reply, see Reply, 10 ECF No. 15. 11 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 12 A. Removal 13 A defendant may remove from state court to federal court “any civil action . . . of which 14 the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see also, 15 e.g., Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 2009). Federal courts 16 have original federal question jurisdiction over civil actions “arising under the Constitution, laws, 17 or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Further, federal courts have supplemental 18 jurisdiction over all claims that are “so related to claims . . . within such original jurisdiction that 19 they form part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 20 B. Original Jurisdiction – Federal Enclave Doctrine 21 “The Constitution establishes the principle that federal law applies in federal enclaves.” 22 County of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 32 F.4th 733, 749 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing U.S. Const. art. I, 23 § 8, cl. 17 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o exercise exclusive Legislation . . . [and] like 24 Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the 25 Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful 26 Buildings.”). Courts have interpreted this principle to mean that “unless an exception applies, any 27 conduct on a federal enclave is governed by federal law.” Id. Thus, “a claim based on injuries 1 stemming from such conduct arises under federal law, and a [federal] court has jurisdiction over 2 such a claim under § 1331.” Id. 3 This principle, known as the federal enclave doctrine, is premised upon the reasoning that 4 Congress “has excluded all exercise of state jurisdiction, [so that] the only laws that can apply are 5 federal, and federal law will be deemed to incorporate existing state law in order to ensure ‘that no 6 area however small will be left without a developed legal system for private rights.’” Lake v. 7 Ohana Mil. Comtys., LLC, 14 F.4th 993, 1002–03 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting James Stewart & Co. v. 8 Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940)). Accordingly, if the federal government permits concurrent 9 state legislative jurisdiction over a location, the rationale behind the federal enclave doctrine “has 10 no application,” and the “state law governing . . . state claims is still [state] law—not federal law.” 11 Id. at 1003. 12 C. Remand 13 “A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal.” Moore-Thomas, 14 553 F.3d at 1244 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). Removal statutes are “strictly construed, and any 15 doubt about the right of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.” Id. (citing Gaus v. Miles, 16 Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). This “‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction 17 means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus, 980 18 F.2d at 566. “However, a plaintiff seeking remand has the burden to prove that an express 19 exception to removal exists.” Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 20 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 21 The Ninth Circuit has explained that a plaintiff’s motion to remand is “the functional 22 equivalent of a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 23 12(b)(1).” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2014). As such, a motion to remand 24 may be based on either a facial attack or a factual attack on the defendant’s jurisdictional 25 allegations. See id. A factual attack usually introduces evidence outside the pleadings, and the 26 party asserting federal jurisdiction must then “support her jurisdictional allegations with 27 ‘competent proof,’ . . . under the same evidentiary standard that governs in the summary judgment 1 context,” and must establish federal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1121 2 (citations omitted). “[I]f the existence of jurisdiction turns on disputed factual issues, the district 3 court may resolve those factual disputes itself.” Id. (citations omitted). 4 III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 5 Plaintiffs request that the Court take judicial notice of three documents submitted in 6 support of the Motion: (1) a Resolution of Retrocession of Legislative Jurisdiction filed with the 7 Monterey County Recorder’s Office on December 5, 2000, see Req. Judicial Not. (“RJN”), at Exh. 8 1, ECF No. 9-1; (2) a Resolution of Cession of Concurrent Criminal Legislative Jurisdiction filed 9 with the Monterey County Recorder’s Officer on April 20, 2011, see RJN, at Exh. 2; and (3) a 10 Resolution of Cession of Concurrent Criminal Legislative Jurisdiction filed with the Monterey 11 County Recorder’s Office on November 17, 2017, see RJN, at Exh. 3. Michaels Management and 12 MBMH do not oppose the request, and in fact repeatedly cite to one of the documents. See Opp’n 13 5 & n.2. 14 As noted above, see supra, at Part II(C), the Court evaluates evidence submitted in 15 connection with a jurisdictional challenge using a summary judgment standard. The documents 16 submitted by Plaintiffs are public government documents, and are properly before the Court. See 17 Decl. of Mark S. Martinez ¶¶ 4–7, ECF No. 9-2; see also, e.g., Leite, 749 F.3d at 1122. 18 IV. DISCUSSION 19 Plaintiffs argue that this action must be remanded because the only asserted basis for 20 original subject matter jurisdiction—i.e., federal jurisdiction pursuant to the federal enclave 21 doctrine—fails because there exists concurrent state jurisdiction over the location at issue. See 22 Mot. 10–14. Plaintiffs further request attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of the removal. 23 See id. at 14–15. Michaels Management and MBMH counter that the Court should deny the 24 Motion because the Notice of Removal provides prima facie evidence that the property is located 25 within a federal enclave, and Plaintiffs’ Motion does not establish the existence of concurrent 26 jurisdiction. See Opp’n 3–6. The Court first turns to the merits of the Motion before addressing 27 Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees and costs. 1 A. Existence of Federal Jurisdiction 2 Michaels Management and MBMH removed this action on the sole ground that this Court 3 has original jurisdiction over the action pursuant to the federal enclave doctrine, due to the 4 location of the Property on land owned by the federal government and over which the federal 5 government has exclusive jurisdiction. See generally Not.; see also Mot. 10. In their Motion, 6 Plaintiffs assert that the federal government does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the location 7 of Property, but rather that the federal government and the state of California exercise concurrent 8 jurisdiction over the Property. See Mot. 11–14. 9 The evidence before the Court indicates that: (1) the Property is located at 401 Nijmegan 10 Road, Unit No. ML-NIJ0401, Seaside, California 93955, see Compl. 4–6; (2) the Property is 11 located at the Fort Ord United States Military Installation at the U.S. Army Garrison Presidio of 12 Monterey, and thus located on land owned by the federal government, see Not. 2; id. ¶¶ 4, 16–17; 13 see also Reply, at Exhs. 1–2; and (3) on November 29, 2000, the California State Lands 14 Commission “accepted a retrocession of exclusive legislative jurisdiction from the United States 15 and established concurrent legislative jurisdiction over Fort Ord Military Reservation, the Presidio 16 of Monterey and Monterey United States Organization, all in Monterey County,” RJN, at Exh. 1, 17 at 1. Based on these facts, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should follow the Ninth Circuit’s ruling 18 in Lake v. Ohana Military Communities, LLC, 14 F.4th 993 (9th Cir. 2021), and find that the 19 federal enclave doctrine does not apply to or provide for federal jurisdiction over areas subject to 20 concurrent state and federal jurisdiction. See Mot. 13. 21 The Court agrees that Lake is controlling. There, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 22 court’s denial of a motion to remand an action in which the plaintiffs brought state law claims 23 related to military housing on a military base. See Lake, 14 F.4th at 998. The circuit court 24 rejected the district court’s finding that federal question jurisdiction exists pursuant to the federal 25 enclave doctrine even where the state has full concurrent jurisdiction. See Lake, 14 F.4th at 1003– 26 04. The court instructed that where a state exercises “broad concurrent legislative jurisdiction” 27 over land owned by the federal government, the federal enclave doctrine does not apply. See id. at 1 1003 (“We have only found federal question jurisdiction in enclaves in which Congress has not 2 permitted concurrent jurisdiction, and we have not extended that rule to federal land that is subject 3 to broad state concurrent jurisdiction.”). Here, as in Lake, the evidence before the Court indicates 4 that the state government exercises “broad concurrent legislative jurisdiction” over the Property at 5 issue. See RJN, at Exh. 1. Accordingly, the federal enclave doctrine does not alone permit a 6 finding of original federal question jurisdiction over this action, in which only state law claims are 7 asserted. See Lake, 14 F.4th at 1003. 8 Michaels Management and MBMH argue that the Notice of Removal provides prima facie 9 evidence that the property is located within a federal enclave, and that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently 10 establish that the Property is located within the bounds of the land retroceded by the United States 11 to California for the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction. See Opp’n 3–6. Neither argument can 12 prevail. First, the allegations in the Notice of Removal are insufficient to counter the evidence 13 produced by Plaintiffs in their factual jurisdictional challenge. See Leite, 749 F.3d at 1122 (noting 14 that following a factual challenge to jurisdiction, the party asserting federal jurisdiction must 15 “support her jurisdictional allegations with ‘competent proof,’ . . . under the same evidentiary 16 standard that governs in the summary judgment context”). Second, Plaintiffs have provided 17 sufficient evidence to establish that the Property is located within the bounds of the land subject to 18 concurrent jurisdiction. Compare Not. 2 (“Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries occurred entirely on the 19 grounds of the U.S. Army Garrison Presidio of Monterey”); id. ¶ 4 (“Plaintiffs lived . . . at the Fort 20 Ord United States Military Installation.”); with RJN, at Exh. 1, at 1 (establishing concurrent 21 legislative jurisdiction over “Fort Ord Military Reservation [and] the Presidio of Monterey”). 22 Following Plaintiffs’ submission, it is Michaels Management and MBMH’s burden to provide 23 “competent proof” by which the Court can determine by a preponderance of the evidence that 24 there exists federal jurisdiction. See Leite, 749 F.3d at 1122. As Michaels Management and 25 MBMH have provided no competent proof at all, the Court can make no such determination. 26 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion. 27 1 B. Request for Attorney Fees and Costs 2 Plaintiffs request attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of the removal to this Court. 3 || See Mot. 14-15. A district court remanding a case “may require payment of just costs and any 4 actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 5 The Supreme Court has instructed that “[a]bsent unusual circumstances, courts may award 6 attorney's fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable 7 basis for seeking removal.” Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). In 8 || evaluating a request for attorney fees based on removal, “district courts retain discretion to 9 || consider whether unusual circumstances warrant a departure from the rule in a given case.” Id. 10 For the Court to find that the removal of this action was objectively unreasonable, it would 11 have to find that Michaels Management and MBMH had a clear obligation to review the records 12 || of the Monterey County Recorder’s Office with respect to the property at issue and locate the 5 13 || retrocession agreement. The Court does not so find, and accordingly DENIES Plaintiffs’ request 14 || for attorney fees and costs. 2 15 Vv. ORDER 16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows: 3 17 1. Plaintiffs’ motion for remand is GRANTED. 18 2. Plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees and costs is DENIED. 19 3. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the Clerk of Court shall mail a certified copy of 20 || this order of remand to the clerk of the Superior Court of California, County of Monterey. 21 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 Dated: January 29, 2024 24

EDWARD J. DAVILA 26 United States District Judge 27 28 || Case No.: 23-cv-05474-EJD ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND