Bunzel v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons

107 Cal. App. 3d 165, 165 Cal. Rptr. 433, 1980 Cal. App. LEXIS 1951
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 19, 1980
DocketCiv. 57307
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 107 Cal. App. 3d 165 (Bunzel v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bunzel v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 107 Cal. App. 3d 165, 165 Cal. Rptr. 433, 1980 Cal. App. LEXIS 1951 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinion

*167 Opinion

HASTINGS, J.

Arthur Bunzel, appellant, was rejected for membership in the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons (Academy or AAOS) and under the present action he sued the Academy for damages and for an order admitting him to membership. Academy moved for a summary judgment and it was granted on the ground that Academy controlled no vital professional privileges and certifications in the field of orthopaedic surgery. This appeal followed.

Appellant is a licensed physician practicing orthopaedic surgery and has been certified in this specialty by the American Board of Orthopaedic Surgery (ABOS). According to Academy, it is a society of orthopaedic surgeons whose sole purposes are educational and scientific. Academy does not certify the professional, ethical or educational competence of orthopaedic surgeons as this is done by ABOS. Orthopaedic surgeons are not eligible for Academy membership unless they have been board-certified. Membership in the Academy is an honor and as Academy states, not a sanction of specialized qualifications.

The activities of Academy related to orthopaedic surgery are open to members and nonmembers alike. These activities include presentation of scientific papers, educational courses and technical exhibits at Academy’s annual meeting and at other times during the year. Attendance at and participation in these educational activities are open to all licensed physicians regardless of Academy membership.

Other activities will be detailed as required later in this opinion.

It is appellant’s contention that Academy is a Pinsker-type organization (Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc. of Orthodontists (1969) 1 Cal.3d 160 [81 Cal.Rptr. 623, 460 P.2d 495], referred to as Pinsker I and Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists (1974) 12 Cal.3d 541 [116 Cal.Rptr. 245, 526 P.2d 253], referred to as Pinsker II). Dr. Pinsker, a dentist, was a member of the American Dental Association and was licensed to practice dentistry in California. He applied for membership in the American Association of Orthodontists (AAO). His application was denied. Membership in the AAO is apparently, if not absolutely essential, at least extremely helpful in obtaining certification by the American Board of Orthodontics (ABO). Membership may also be á prerequisite to attaining membership in certain foundations dedicated to special orthodontics techniques and being admitted to certain *168 advanced educational programs. Dr. Pinsker sued to enjoin the AAO from excluding him from membership in the organization. The Supreme Court in Pinsker I affirmed the trial court’s injunction in his favor stating (p. 166): “Because of the unique position in the field of orthodontics occupied by defendant AAO and its constituent organizations, membership therein, although not economically necessary in the strict sense of the word... would appear to be a practical necessity for a dentist who wishes not only to make a good living as an orthodontist but also to realize maximum potential achievement and recognition in such specialty. Defendant associations hold themselves out to the public and the dental profession generally as the sole organizations recognized by the ADA, which is itself a virtual monopoly, to determine standards, both ethical and educational, for the practice and certification of orthodontics. Thus, a public interest is shown, and the associations must be viewed as having a fiduciary responsibility with respect to the acceptance or rejection of membership applications.”

And in Pinsker II, supra, the court stated (p. 552): “In Pinsker I we concluded that although membership in defendant orthodontic associations could not be said to be ‘an economic necessity,’ the associations still wielded monopoly power and affected sufficiently significant economic and professional concerns so as to clothe the societies with a ‘public interest.’”

Appellant contends that he presented to the trial court sufficient evidence to establish Academy’s tie-in with ABOS and the American Medical Association (AMA) that demonstrated Academy’s unique position in the field of orthopaedic surgery in that it wielded monopoly power and affected significant economic and professional concerns so as to clothe it with a public interest, as defined in Pinsker I and Pinsker II. Appellant insists that the trial court was incorrect in granting the summary judgment because at the very least he presented sufficient facts to permit the issue or issues raised by Pinsker I, Pinsker II and subsequent cases to go to the trier of fact.

The trial court concluded that Academy is not in a monopoly position, does not control access to the profession and does not control advancement in the profession. It further held there is no indication that Academy controls access to vital professional privileges and certifications and that it does not comport with the meaning of a “unique” position as used in the Pinsker cases.

*169 Discussion

Though often said, it appears necessary to again reiterate that a summary judgment is a drastic measure which deprives the losing party of trial on the merits. It therefore may not be invoked unless it is clear from the affidavits (or declarations) filed in connection with the motion that there are no triable issues of fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.) Doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (People ex rel. Riles v. Windsor University (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 326, 331 [139 Cal.Rptr. 378].)

In our present case Academy supported its motion for summary judgment with the affidavit of Dr. Charles V. Heck, the executive director of the organization. There are numerous and clear contradictions between his declarations concerning Academy activities and appellant’s evidence as presented in his affidavits and declarations. In the two Pinsker cases our Supreme Court was concerned with the monopoly power wielded by the society and whether it effected significant economic and professional concerns, so as to clothe the society with a public interest. Appellant presented to the trial court evidence directly pointing to such power by Academy. 1 In examining the sufficiency of affidavits filed in connection with the motion, the affidavits of the *170 moving party are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 20 [112 Cal.Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Johnson v. Superior Court
49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 52 (California Court of Appeal, 2006)
Bushling v. Fremont Medical Center
11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653 (California Court of Appeal, 2004)
Bahl v. Bank of America
107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 270 (California Court of Appeal, 2001)
Rincon v. Burbank Unified School District
178 Cal. App. 3d 949 (California Court of Appeal, 1986)
Brown v. Bleiberg
651 P.2d 815 (California Supreme Court, 1982)
Southern California Edison Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp.
120 Cal. App. 3d 842 (California Court of Appeal, 1981)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
107 Cal. App. 3d 165, 165 Cal. Rptr. 433, 1980 Cal. App. LEXIS 1951, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bunzel-v-american-academy-of-orthopaedic-surgeons-calctapp-1980.