People Ex Rel. Riles v. Windsor Univ., Inc.

71 Cal. App. 3d 326, 139 Cal. Rptr. 378, 71 Cal. App. 2d 326, 1977 Cal. App. LEXIS 1616
California Court of Appeal·Decided June 29, 1977·No. Civ. 49115·Published·Cited by 33 cases

Opinions

Opinion

HASTINGS, J.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment granting a permanent injunction to the Superintendent of Public Instruction (plaintiff or Superintendent where appropriate) prohibiting Windsor University (University) from (1) “offering without the approval of the . . . Superintendent . .. courses that lead to a vocational objective or . .. issuing . .. any diploma or honorary degree based on completion or participation in said course or courses of study,” more specifically, the granting of a degree for its respiratory therapy technician program and operating room technician program and a diploma for its home health aide program.1

[329]*329University has statutory authority to grant degrees under section 29023, subdivision (a)(3), infra, (hereinafter referred to as (a)(3) of the Education Code2).

Beginning on June 30, 1974, University, a private corporation, offered with the approval of the Superintendent certain courses which, are not the subject of this suit. This approval was granted pursuant to section 29025,3 infra. Approval for these courses expired on June 30, 1975 as the approval under section 29025 lasts for only one year.

On June 13, 1975, University requested by letter that all courses previously approved be granted new approvals. In the same communication University sought approval for three new courses entitled Operating Room Technician Training Course, Respiratory Therapy Technician Training Course and Home Health Aide Training Course.

In June of 1975 the bureau of school approvals, the agency charged with the enforcement of division 21,4 informed University that based on the fact that its application was incomplete approval could not be granted. No subsequent application from University was received by the bureau. An inspection of University on July 25, 1975, by the bureau of school approvals revealed that University was nonetheless offering the three new courses listed above without the approval of the Superintendent.

The following month plaintiff filed a complaint for injunction. The complaint alleged in substance that University was in violation of section 29025, infra, by offering vocational courses without approval of Superintendent. The complaint contended that vocational courses could not be offered without such approval and prayed for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction “enjoining Windsor from offering any course leading to an educational, vocational or professional objective without the approval of the Superintendent of Public Instruction.”

[330]*330Three different judges ruled in favor of plaintiff in that a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction and permanent injunction were granted. Defendant filed notices of appeal from the orders granting the preliminary and the permanent injunction. Both appeals were consolidated into this appeal.

Argument

Section 29023 (now § 94310) provides in pertinent part: “Except as otherwise provided by law, no . . . corporation may issue, ... an academic or honorary ‘degree’ . .. which signifies ... or is generally taken to signify satisfactory completion of the requirements of an academic, technological, or professional program of study beyond the secondary school level unless such . .. corporation meets the requirement of any one of the three subdivisions (a) of this section.” (Italics added.)

The subdivision applicable here provides in pertinent part: “(a)(3) A corporation which has filed with the Superintendent of Public Instruction an affidavit .. . stating that the corporation owns an interest in real or personal property or both real and personal property used exclusively for the purpose of education, of a fair market value of not less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000). . . .”

Section 29025 (now § 94312), as pertinent here, provides: “Except as otherwise provided for in this code, no course of education or training leading to an educational, technological, professional or vocational objective shall be offered, and no diploma or honorary degree shall be issued . .. by any . .. corporation . . . which has not been approved by the Superintendent of Public Instruction. Application for such approval shall be made in writing on application forms provided by the Department of Education. Pending final approval of new or added courses of instruction, the Superintendent of Public Instruction may issue a temporary approval upon submission of the complete application. A temporary approval shall be for a period of one year, subject to prior termination or conversion to annual approval basis by the Superintendent of Public Instruction. . . .” (Italics added.) (The statute then continues to describe the types of schools that are authorized to grant degrees.)

University contends that the trial court erred in granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, arguing that it is authorized to issue, without first obtaining Superintendent’s approval, a degree to the [331]*331students who successfully complete the respiratory therapy technician program of study and the operating room technician program of study under subdivision (a)(3) because they are technological and academic in nature and not vocational.5 It also argues that respiratory therapy is an emerging profession rather than a vocation. In addition, University maintains that it is authorized to issue a diploma for the home health aide program under section 29023, subdivision (c),6 since it has been accredited by the Department of Public Health for the State of California to educate home health aides.

Plaintiff asserts that the three courses offered by University have a definite vocational objective and fall within the purview of section 29025. Additionally, plaintiff contends that section 29023, subdivision (c) does not give University the authority to offer its Home Health Aide course.

It is elementary that summary judgment is a drastic measure which deprives the losing party of trial on the merits. It therefore may not be invoked unless it is clear from the affidavits (or declarations) filed in connection with the motion that there are no triable issues of fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.) Doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Lacy v. Laurentide Finance Corp., 28 Cal.App.3d 251, 256 [104 Cal.Rptr. 547]; Crescenta Valley Moose Lodge v. Bunt, 8 Cal.App.3d 682, 686 [87 Cal.Rptr. 428]; Rafeiro v. American Employers’ Ins. Co., 5 Cal.App.3d 799, 804 [85 Cal.Rptr. 701].)

Whether certain courses lead to a technological, professional or academic objective or whether they are vocational in nature is a factual question that must be determined in each particular case. In the present case, from the declarations and papers before the court on the motion for summary judgment, it appears that there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the respiratory therapy technician program and the operating room technician program offered by University are vocational or technological and academic in nature.

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People Ex Rel. Riles v. Windsor Univ., Inc., 71 Cal. App. 3d 326, 139 Cal. Rptr. 378, 71 Cal. App. 2d 326, 1977 Cal. App. LEXIS 1616 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).

71 Cal. App. 3d 326 (People Ex Rel. Riles v. Windsor Univ., Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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