Bullard v. the United States Patent and Trademark Office
This text of Bullard v. the United States Patent and Trademark Office (Bullard v. the United States Patent and Trademark Office) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
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FILED UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SEP - 2 2009 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Clerk, U.S. District and Bankruptcy Courts
Christopher Bullard, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) Civil Action No. 09 1670 The United States et al., ) ) Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on its initial review of plaintiffs pro se complaint, which
is accompanied by an application to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court will grant the
application and will dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as required by Rule
12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff, a prisoner in North Carolina, alleges that on May 12,2009, he filed two non-
provisional patent applications with the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), but the PTO
returned them on June 1,2009, as incomplete in part because they were submitted without the
$165 filing fee. See CompI. Attachments. "An applicant for a patent, any of whose claims has
been twice rejected, may appeal from the decision of the primary examiner to the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences, having once paid the fee for such appeal." 35 U.S.C. § 134(a). And
"[ a]n applicant dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ...
may, unless appeal has been taken to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
have remedy by civil action against the Director in the United States District Court for the
District ofColumbia[.]" 35 U.S.C. § 145.
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The exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a civil
lawsuit arising from the denial of a patent. Leighton v. Cae, 130 F.2d 841, 842 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
see Field v. Manbeck 1990 WL 116818, *3 (D.D.C., Aug. 2, 1990) ("The plaintiff has not
received a decision from the Board of Patent Appeals and thus this Court does not have
jurisdiction over this action in the absence ofa final agency decision, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145
and 5 U.S.C. § 704."). To the extent that plaintiff is seeking a writ of mandamus under 28
U.S.C. § 1651 to compel the PTO Director to waive the patent filing fee, see Form CompI. at 5
(relief sought), he has not cited authority showing that he has a "'clear and indisputable' right to
[such] relief," In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 730 (D.C. Cir. 2005), and "[i]t is well-settled that a
writ of mandamus is not available to compel discretionary acts," Cox v. Sec'y a/Labor, 739 F.
Supp. 28, 30 (D.D.C. 1990) (citing cases). The complaint therefore is dismissed. A separate
Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
United States ~ Date: August 2..JL, 2009
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