OPINION
CANTRELL, Judge.
The plaintiff-appellant, a former Principal of Riverdale High School in Rutherford County, Tennessee, brought suit against Elam Carlton, Superintendent of Rutherford County Schools, and G.K. Kersey, former Assistant Principal of Riverdale High School, for damages arising out of his dismissal as the Principal pursuant to the Teachers’ Tenure Act, T.C.A. § 49-1401, et seq. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and, in addition, held that executive immunity and T.C.A. § 49-1416(9) barred the claim against appellee Carlton. In addition, the Court held that the complaint constituted a collateral attack upon the decision of the Rutherford County Board of Education to dismiss the appellant. That decision is currently before the Rutherford County Chancery Court for judicial review.
The complaint alleges that on two separate occasions Carlton, out of a malicious desire to discredit and damage the appellant, brought charges against him before the Rutherford County Board of Education which, if proven true, would result in the appellant’s dismissal as a tenured teacher in the Rutherford County School System. Among the initial charges were allegations that the appellant misused school funds for the purchase of a microwave oven. When a private citizen questioned Carlton about the trivial nature of the charge, Carlton allegedly responded that “this is all we can get him on.” At this time, it is also alleged, Carlton also falsely informed a student that the appellant embezzled school funds in the microwave transaction and Carlton requested that the student obtain a criminal warrant charging the appellant with embezzlement. The student attempted to obtain the warrant but both the District Attorney General and a General Sessions Judge refused to issue- it. After a hearing before the School Board on January 16th, 1979 the Board dismissed the charges.
Carlton then allegedly conspired with Kersey to have Kersey falsely testify before the Board of Education that appellant had misappropriated insurance money. It is alleged that Carlton also made other charges regarding violations by the appellant of bid regulations in selling school property to himself. Appellant admitted these charges but defended himself on the grounds that the practice was widespread and condoned. These charges were filed with the Board on April 6th 1979 and the appellant was dismissed after a hearing.
The initial complaint alleges that the actions of the appellees induced a breach of contract between the School Board and the appellant. The amended complaint further alleges that the violation of criminal statutes prohibiting official oppression (T.C.A. § 39-3203), conspiracy (T.C.A. § 39 — 1101), solicitation (T.C.A. § 39-115), and subornation of perjury (T.C.A. § 39-3304) support a cause of action against the appellees. The appellant does not raise any issue with respect to any cause of action other than these two.
The primary issue then is whether the appellees can claim immunity from suit under either the common law rule of executive immunity or T.C.A. § 49-1416(9).
[104]*104The common law rule recognized a qualified immunity from suit for executive officials which has been stated as follows:
Where an officer is invested with discretion and is empowered to exercise his judgment in matters brought before him he is sometimes called a quasi judicial officer, and when so acting he is usually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the result of an erroneous decision, provided the acts complained of are done in the scope of the officer’s authority, and without willfulness, malice, or corruption. State, ex rel. Robertson v. Farmers State Bank, 162 Tenn. 499, 505, 39 S.W.2d 281, 282 (1931).
The appellant however has alleged facts which if proven true show that the appel-lees acted willfully, maliciously, and corruptly in investigating and prosecuting the appellant under the Teachers’ Tenure Act. Common law executive immunity is therefore an insufficient basis for dismissal of the appellant’s complaint.
The appellees however also rely on T.C.A. § 49 — 1416(9) which provides:
The superintendent or other school officials shall not be held liable, personally or officially, when performing their duties in prosecuting charges against any teacher or teachers under this chapter.
Before discussing the scope of the immunity provided in the statute, we must first dispose of the appellant’s assertion that the immunity granted by the statute applies to superintendents and members of the school board but not to assistant principals such as Mr. Kersey. In Jacox v. Memphis City Board of Education, 604 S.W.2d 872 (Tenn.App.1980), a discharged teacher filed an independent suit for defamation against the Board of Education and five individuals for statements made during the investigation and prosecution of dismissal charges against the teacher. The five individuals sued were the Superintendent, an Assistant Superintendent, a Director of Certified Personnel, and the Principals at the two schools where the plaintiff taught. The Court held that the immunity granted by the statute covered these defendants. An assistant principal, such as Mr. Kersey, at a school where the principal is under investigation should be entitled to the same immunity as that enjoyed by the school principals and other school officials in Jacox.
There are no reported cases deciding whether the immunity granted under T.C.A. § 49-1416(9) is qualified or absolute such that the officer is immune from suit even though malice or corruption is present. In our opinion the immunity is absolute. A statutory grant of qualified immunity would be unnecessary since school officials already enjoy such immunity at common law. And it is unlikely that the Legislature merely intended to codify the common law since the immunity applies only to certain acts performed by a limited group of administrative officials. It is more reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended the statute to be a grant of absolute immunity within the narrow scope of the Act.
An absolute grant of immunity within this limited area of administrative action would also be consistent with other grants of absolute immunity.
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OPINION
CANTRELL, Judge.
The plaintiff-appellant, a former Principal of Riverdale High School in Rutherford County, Tennessee, brought suit against Elam Carlton, Superintendent of Rutherford County Schools, and G.K. Kersey, former Assistant Principal of Riverdale High School, for damages arising out of his dismissal as the Principal pursuant to the Teachers’ Tenure Act, T.C.A. § 49-1401, et seq. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and, in addition, held that executive immunity and T.C.A. § 49-1416(9) barred the claim against appellee Carlton. In addition, the Court held that the complaint constituted a collateral attack upon the decision of the Rutherford County Board of Education to dismiss the appellant. That decision is currently before the Rutherford County Chancery Court for judicial review.
The complaint alleges that on two separate occasions Carlton, out of a malicious desire to discredit and damage the appellant, brought charges against him before the Rutherford County Board of Education which, if proven true, would result in the appellant’s dismissal as a tenured teacher in the Rutherford County School System. Among the initial charges were allegations that the appellant misused school funds for the purchase of a microwave oven. When a private citizen questioned Carlton about the trivial nature of the charge, Carlton allegedly responded that “this is all we can get him on.” At this time, it is also alleged, Carlton also falsely informed a student that the appellant embezzled school funds in the microwave transaction and Carlton requested that the student obtain a criminal warrant charging the appellant with embezzlement. The student attempted to obtain the warrant but both the District Attorney General and a General Sessions Judge refused to issue- it. After a hearing before the School Board on January 16th, 1979 the Board dismissed the charges.
Carlton then allegedly conspired with Kersey to have Kersey falsely testify before the Board of Education that appellant had misappropriated insurance money. It is alleged that Carlton also made other charges regarding violations by the appellant of bid regulations in selling school property to himself. Appellant admitted these charges but defended himself on the grounds that the practice was widespread and condoned. These charges were filed with the Board on April 6th 1979 and the appellant was dismissed after a hearing.
The initial complaint alleges that the actions of the appellees induced a breach of contract between the School Board and the appellant. The amended complaint further alleges that the violation of criminal statutes prohibiting official oppression (T.C.A. § 39-3203), conspiracy (T.C.A. § 39 — 1101), solicitation (T.C.A. § 39-115), and subornation of perjury (T.C.A. § 39-3304) support a cause of action against the appellees. The appellant does not raise any issue with respect to any cause of action other than these two.
The primary issue then is whether the appellees can claim immunity from suit under either the common law rule of executive immunity or T.C.A. § 49-1416(9).
[104]*104The common law rule recognized a qualified immunity from suit for executive officials which has been stated as follows:
Where an officer is invested with discretion and is empowered to exercise his judgment in matters brought before him he is sometimes called a quasi judicial officer, and when so acting he is usually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the result of an erroneous decision, provided the acts complained of are done in the scope of the officer’s authority, and without willfulness, malice, or corruption. State, ex rel. Robertson v. Farmers State Bank, 162 Tenn. 499, 505, 39 S.W.2d 281, 282 (1931).
The appellant however has alleged facts which if proven true show that the appel-lees acted willfully, maliciously, and corruptly in investigating and prosecuting the appellant under the Teachers’ Tenure Act. Common law executive immunity is therefore an insufficient basis for dismissal of the appellant’s complaint.
The appellees however also rely on T.C.A. § 49 — 1416(9) which provides:
The superintendent or other school officials shall not be held liable, personally or officially, when performing their duties in prosecuting charges against any teacher or teachers under this chapter.
Before discussing the scope of the immunity provided in the statute, we must first dispose of the appellant’s assertion that the immunity granted by the statute applies to superintendents and members of the school board but not to assistant principals such as Mr. Kersey. In Jacox v. Memphis City Board of Education, 604 S.W.2d 872 (Tenn.App.1980), a discharged teacher filed an independent suit for defamation against the Board of Education and five individuals for statements made during the investigation and prosecution of dismissal charges against the teacher. The five individuals sued were the Superintendent, an Assistant Superintendent, a Director of Certified Personnel, and the Principals at the two schools where the plaintiff taught. The Court held that the immunity granted by the statute covered these defendants. An assistant principal, such as Mr. Kersey, at a school where the principal is under investigation should be entitled to the same immunity as that enjoyed by the school principals and other school officials in Jacox.
There are no reported cases deciding whether the immunity granted under T.C.A. § 49-1416(9) is qualified or absolute such that the officer is immune from suit even though malice or corruption is present. In our opinion the immunity is absolute. A statutory grant of qualified immunity would be unnecessary since school officials already enjoy such immunity at common law. And it is unlikely that the Legislature merely intended to codify the common law since the immunity applies only to certain acts performed by a limited group of administrative officials. It is more reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended the statute to be a grant of absolute immunity within the narrow scope of the Act.
An absolute grant of immunity within this limited area of administrative action would also be consistent with other grants of absolute immunity. The officials protected by the statute are charged with the duty of investigating and prosecuting tenured teachers who may be guilty of conduct warranting suspension or dismissal from their teaching positions. These officials essentially act as prosecutors. The statute gives them immunity only with regard to their prosecutorial duties.
In the criminal justice system public prosecutors generally enjoy an absolute immunity from suit for acts related to the instigation and prosecution of criminal charges. 52 Am.Jur.2d, § 67, Malicious Prosecution (1970). In holding that a State prosecutor acting within the scope of his duties is absolutely immune from suit under 42 U.S.C., § 1983, the U. S. Supreme Court noted:
The common law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the common law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties.
[105]*105These include concern that harassment by unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor’s energies from his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23, 96 S.Ct. 984, 991, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976).
These considerations apply with equal force to investigations and prosecutions of tenured teachers. Although criminal penalties are not involved a teacher faced with the possibility of a loss of job and professional reputation might readily conclude that school officials are out to “get” him or her, and thus retaliate with a lawsuit after the hearing has concluded.
The focus on the function of the executive official’s actions as the key factor in determining whether immunity is qualified or absolute was highlighted in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). The plaintiff sued the Department of Agriculture and several agency officials for initiating administrative proceedings against it before the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, alleging among several counts that the charges against it were brought maliciously and without probable cause. The plaintiff contended, and the Second Circuit held, that in a hearing before an agency of the Executive Branch, only qualified executive immunity should be permitted. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that absolute immunity should be granted to “agency officials performing certain functions analogous to those of a prosecutor.” Id. at 2915.
Any immunity available, of course, applies only where the appellees were acting within the scope of their duties as school officials prosecuting the appellant. Although the statute protects the appellees from suits alleging malicious prosecution of the dismissal charges, it does not apply when the appellees are acting outside the scope of their prosecutorial duties. We hold therefore that the appellees were immune from suit for the acts alleged in the complaint.
The other real issue raised by the appellant concerns causes of action based on the alleged violation of criminal statutes.
The leading case on the implication of a private cause of action from the violation of a criminal statute is Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975). The Court listed three factors relevant here in determining this issue. “First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.” Id. at 2088. “Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create or deny” a private cause of action. Id. Third, is the private cause of action consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislation.
The plaintiff-appellant alleges a violation of T.C.A. § 39-3203 which provides:
If any person, by color of his office, willfully and corruptly oppresses any person, under pretense of acting in his official capacity, he shall be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one (1) year.
There is no indication of a legislative intent to create or deny a private right of action for oppression. A private right of action would probably not interfere with the underlying purpose of the oppression statute, although it could be argued the private enforcement of the statute through a civil cause of action with its lesser standard of proof would hamper the activities of government officials to an extent not intended by the Legislature. But the factor weighing most heavily against an implied right of action is.that the oppression statute as well as the criminal statutes concerning conspiracy and solicitation are intended for the protection of the general public. When courts have implied a private right of action from a criminal statute, the statute invariably is intended to protect a particular class of people. See, e. g., Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 482, 60 L.Ed. 874 (1916) (Act for the Protection of Railroad Employees and Travelers); J. I. Case Company v. Borak, 377 [106]*106U.S. 426, 84 S.Ct. 1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 (1964) (Protection of Investors). On the basis of this factor none of the statutes relied on by the appellant will support a private cause of action. Moreover, assuming that a cause of action is available, the appellees could claim immunity under T.C.A. § 49-1416(9).
The thrust of the plaintiff-appellant’s complaint is that defendants willfully and maliciously and in bad faith brought the charges against him which resulted in his dismissal by the Board of Education. As discussed above, the appellees are immune from the acts giving rise to this cause of action. Furthermore, the criminal statutes cited in the complaint do not give rise to a private cause of action.
The action of the Trial Court in dismissing the complaint is affirmed. We do not take a position on the Trial Court’s holding that this is a collateral attack on the decision of the Rutherford County Board of Education. The costs of the appeal are taxed to the appellant.
AFFIRMED.
TODD, P. J., concurs.
CONNER, J., dissents in separate opinion.