OPINION
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
In 1997, appellee, Buck Doe, brought an action against appellant, the United States Secretary of Labor (the Government), seeking damages under the Privacy Act for the wrongful disclosure of his Social Security number. We previously held— based on a reading of the Act’s text — that a party must show some actual damages in order to recover $1,000 in statutory damages. That decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court and we remanded to the district court, where the court granted Doe’s motion for attorney fees and costs. Neither the Supreme Court’s opinion nor our original opinion addressed the separate question presented today, which is whether a person who cannot show actual damages under the Act may still recover costs and reasonable attorney fees. We now affirm the district court’s conclusion that Doe is entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees even though he suffered no actual damages. Because, however, we conclude that the district court did not properly calculate the amount of attorney fees, we reverse the district court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings in light of this opinion.
I.
Because this is the second time this case is before us, we only briefly recite the pertinent facts and procedural history.
Like most applicants for benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act, Doe provided his Social Security number to the Department of Labor’s Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs. The Government, in order to facilitate the processing of black lung claims, used applicants’ Social Security numbers as unique identifiers. The Social Security numbers were often reproduced to other applicants, their employers, and counsel, and were frequently included in published administrative law decisions.
Robert Doe, who was also a Black Lung benefit claimant, filed suit against the Secretary of Labor on February 13, 1997. The Government promptly recognized that in reproducing Social Security numbers in such a way, it exceeded the limits set by the Privacy Act. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(b) (West 1996 & Supp.2005). On February [494]*49420, 1997, the Government stipulated to a district court consent decree in Robert Doe’s case prohibiting future publication of black lung benefit applicants’ Social Security numbers. Later that day, Doe and five other claimants initiated six separate lawsuits seeking equitable relief and money damages under the Privacy Act. See Doe v. Chao, 346 F.Supp.2d 840, 842 (W.D.Va.2004) (Doe IV) (summarizing case history).1 These lawsuits were consolidated with Robert Doe’s suit on June 4, 1997, and the seven claimants sought monetary damages for violations of the Privacy Act, as well as certification of the class of every Black Lung benefit claimant who applied for benefits since the passage of the Act.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and on July 24, 2000, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and granted summary judgment in favor of the Government for all claimants except Doe. Doe v. Herman, No. Civ.A. 2:97CV00043, 2000 WL 34204432 (W.D.Va. July 24, 2000) (Doe I). The court also granted summary judgment in favor of Doe and awarded him $1,000.00 in statutory damages despite the fact that Doe suffered no actual damages. Id. at *4.
The parties cross-appealed and we affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Government and reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Doe. Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170 (4th Cir.2002) (Doe II). We held that because Doe could not show actual damages, the plain language of the Privacy Act precluded him from obtaining an award of statutory damages. Id. at 177.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether “some actual damages must be proven before a plaintiff may receive the minimum statutory award” under the Privacy Act. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 124 S.Ct. 1204, 1206, 157 L.Ed.2d 1122 (2004) (Doe III). The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of this .Court on February 24, 2004, holding that Doe was not entitled to an award of statutory damages because he failed to show any actual damages. Id. at 1212.
After the Supreme Court’s decision, the case was remanded to the district court, where Doe made a motion for attorney fees and costs under 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(4)(B) of the Privacy Act, which the district court granted. Doe IV, 346 F.Supp.2d at 851. The district court reasoned that both the language of the statute and Congressional intent favored recovery of costs and fees by a party who did not recover any actual damages as long as the party could show an adverse effect caused by an intentional or willful violation. Id. at 847-48. Because the district court concluded that Doe’s earlier suit established that he was adversely affected by the Government’s intentional or willful violation, it awarded him $57,520.97 in costs and attorney fees. Id. at 850-51.
The Government timely appealed, arguing that when a party is unable to show actual damages, he or she is also precluded from recovering costs and fees. The Government bases its argument on (1) the plain text of the Privacy Act, (2) language from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Doe III, and (3) canons of construction. In the alternative, the Government argues that the only “reasonable” attorney fee in this case is no fee at all.
[495]*495II.
We review de novo the district court’s legal determination that § 552a(g)(4) of the Privacy Act permits a party who does not recover actual damages to recover costs and attorney fees. See In re Coleman, 426 F.3d 719, 724 (4th Cir.2005) (“A ruling concerning the proper interpretation of a statute is a legal determination, which we review de novo.”). As always, we begin our analysis with the text of the statute. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins., 514 U.S. 645, 655, 115 S.Ct. 1671, 131 L.Ed.2d 695 (1995) (noting that “we begin as we do in any exercise of statutory construction with the text of the provision in question”).
Section 552a(g)(4) provides:
In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1)(C) or (D) of this section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner which was intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of—
(A) actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000; and
(B) the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees as determined by the court.
5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(4).Subsection (g)(1)(D), under which Doe’s suit is maintained, authorizes individuals to bring a civil action for the government’s failure to comply with the Privacy Act when that failure causes an “adverse effect on [the] individual.”2
The text of §§ 552a(g)(l)(D) and (g)(4) clearly provide that (1) if an individual can show an adverse effect (2) caused by the Government’s intentional or willful breach of the statute, (3) the Government shall be liable to that individual for the sum of (a) actual damages and (b) the costs and reasonable attorney fees of the action. It is undisputed that Doe suffered an adverse effect caused by the Government’s intentional or willful violation of the Privacy Act. Under a plain reading, then, the Government is liable to Doe for the sum of his actual damages and costs and fees.
The Government, however, argues that the plain language of the statute shows that § 552a(g)(4) authorizes an award of attorney fees and costs only to parties who can show actual damages. In particular, the Government argues that the term “sum” means “that liability exists only if damages are established.” (Appellant’s Br. at 21.) We find the Government’s argument without merit.
The word “sum” — as it is used in this instance — requires a court to fulfill the simple act of adding actual damages and fees and costs once the preceding elements of the statute are satisfied. See Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary 1160 (1988) (defining sum as “[t]he total obtained as a result of adding”).3 Thus, subsection (g)(4)(B) acts independent of [496]*496subsection (g)(4)(A). In other words, the statute does not require a showing of actual damages under (g)(4)(A) in order to receive costs and reasonable attorney fees under (g)(4)(B). If a court determined actual damages to be $0.00 and costs and reasonable attorney fees to be $1,000.00, for example, as a mathematical matter the sum of those two numbers is $1,000.00. Likewise, if actual damages were determined to be $1,000.00 and costs and fees were $0.00, the sum would again be $1,000.00. In short, the fact that one 'of two numbers might be zero does not prove that when added to another number, the sum of the two numbers must als'o equal zero. The word “sum” requires 'us'to engage in addition, not multiplication.4
Thus, because Doe suffered an adverse effect caused by the Government’s intentional or willful violation of the Act, the Government is liable to Doe for actual damages plus costs and reasonable attorney fees. The face of the statute leaves no room for confusion on this point.5
III.
When the language of a statute fairly can be understood to have only one, specific reading — as is the case with § 5£>2a(g)(4)(B) — that fact would ordinarily signal the end of our discussion. See Dodd v. United States, — U.S.-,-, 125 S.Ct. 2478, 2483, 162 L.Ed.2d 343 (2005) (“When the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts — at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd — is to enforce it according to its terms.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). There are, however, two reasons to pause in this instance. First, the Government argues that language in the Supreme Court’s Doe III decision effectively decides this case in its favor. Second, a result that grants costs and attorney fees to a party who does not recover monetary damages is quite unusual, and as the Supreme Court has previously noted, “[bjefore we will conclude Congress abandoned [the] established principle that a successful party need not pay its unsuccessful adversary’s [497]*497fees ... a clear showing that this result was intended is required.” Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983).
A.
The Government’s argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Doe III precludes the holding we would reach based on the plain reading of the statute is primarily based on Doe Ill’s (1) reading of the term “liable” in the Act, (2) footnote 9, and (3) discussion of what completes a cause of action. We disagree with the Government’s reading of Doe III.
1.
In Doe III, the Supreme Court noted that “the statute does not speak of liability (and consequent entitlement to recovery) in a free-standing, unqualified way, but in a limited way, by reference to enumerated damages.” Doe III, 124 S.Ct. at 1209. In other words, the phrase “entitled to recovery” in subsection (g)(4)(A) informs the nature of the Government’s liability. A showing of an adverse effect and willfulness means not just that the Government is generally “hable;” rather, the Government is liable for something specific. Here, the Government is liable for the sum of (1) actual damages and (2) costs and reasonable attorney fees.
The Government interprets the Supreme Court’s above-quoted language, however, to mean that “[o]nly when a plaintiff proves [actual] damages as an element of his merits claim will the United States become ‘liable’ for damages and the accompanying costs and fees.” (Appellant’s Br. at 19.) It is unclear why the Government reads this language from Doe III — which was concerned entirely with § 552a(g)(4)(A), not 552a(g)(4)(B) — to have any implication on costs and attorney fees. In fact, in no place did the Court in Doe III purport to interpret § 552a(g)(4)(B). Instead, the Government’s rephrasing should have stopped a few words short, as a proper interpretation of the Supreme Court’s language is the more obvious one: that only when a plaintiff proves actual damages with his merits claim will the United States become liable for actual damages6 — -or the statutory damage amount that replaces actual damages.
The Government’s argument fails to recognize that the statute separates damages from costs and fees in two different subsections and requires courts to add the two amounts when liability attaches. That such liability attaches upon a showing of an adverse effect and that the violation was intentional or willful is clear from the statute’s text. Once such liability attaches, the Government is liable for actual damages (if there are any) plus costs and reasonable attorney fees (if there are any). The Supreme Court’s phrase, then, means nothing more than the obvious fact that the Government cannot be liable for actual damages if there are no actual damages.
2.
The Government also argues that Doe Ill’s footnote 9 rejects any analysis that fails to treat actual damages as the recov[498]*498ery entitling a plaintiff to costs and attorney fees. Again, we disagree with the Government.
Footnote 9 was a response to a specific argument put forth in dissent by Judge Michael in Doe II. In his dissent, Judge Michael recognized that the statute’s text “allows for a plaintiff who has proven an intentional or willful violation of the Privacy Act to recover costs and reasonable attorney fees even if the plaintiff has suffered no actual damages at all.” Doe II, 306 F.3d at 188-89 (Michael, J., dissenting in part). This recognition was nothing more than a restatement of the plain meaning of the statute. Judge Michael went on, however, to argue that the majority erred in concluding that “a person is not ‘entitled to recovery’ [under (g)(4)(A) ] even though the United States is liable to that person for costs and attorney fees [under (g)(4)(B) ].” Id. at 189. The majority in Doe II rejected this interpretation because it did “not believe that Congress would have invoked a term whose definition is dependent upon a subsequent statutory provision,” and, in the context of § 552a(g)(4)(A), which concerns damages, “ ‘recovery’ is not plausibly read to reference litigation costs in the absence of any underlying compensable injury.” Id. at 179.
In footnote 9, the Supreme Court also rejected Judge Michael’s argument. The Supreme Court understood Judge Michael to argue “that any plaintiff who can demonstrate that he was adversely affected by intentional or willful agency action is entitled to costs and reasonable attorney’s fees under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(B), and is for that reason ‘a person entitled to recovery’ [of actual damages] under subsection (g)(4)(A).” Doe III, 124 S.Ct. at 1211 n. 9 (emphasis added). The Court then dismissed the argument because “[ijnstead of treating damages as a recovery entitling a plaintiff to costs and fees, ... this analysis would treat costs and fees as the recovery entitling a plaintiff to minimum damages; it would get the cart before the horse.” Id. In other words, even assuming that Doe is entitled to attorney fees, it would be a mistake to conclude that an award of fees makes Doe a “person entitled to recovery” of actual damages under subsection (g)(4)(A). By so holding, the Supreme Court did not attempt to address in dicta whether Doe was entitled to attorney fees, but instead confined its inquiry to the issue before it; that is, whether Doe would be “entitled to recover” monetary damages because he incurred attorney fees.7
3.
The Government next argues that Doe III requires a showing of actual damages in order for a plaintiff to have a cause of action under subsection (g)(4). Although [499]*499the Supreme Court’s language may be subject to different interpretations, we do not believe it can be interpreted in the manner suggested by the Government.
In Doe III, the Court responded to Doe’s argument that “it would have been illogical for Congress to create a cause of action for anyone who suffers an adverse effect from intentional or willful agency action, then deny recovery without actual damages.” Doe III, 124 S.Ct. at 1210. Justice Souter’s opinion noted that subsection (g)(l)(D)’s language “recognizing a federal ‘civil action’ on the part of someone adversely affected” does not alone create a complete cause of action. Id. There must also be “proof of intent or willfulness in addition to adverse effect, and if the specific state of mind must be proven additionally, it is equally consistent with logic to require some actual damages as well.” Id. at 1210-1211. Accordingly, then, “an individual subjected to an adverse effect has injury enough to open the courthouse door, but without more has no cause of action for damages under the Privacy Act.” Id. at 1211.
The Government argues that this language stands for the proposition that actual damages are part of the underlying cause of action and that by failing to show actual damages, Doe may not now recover costs and fees. We disagree. We understand the Supreme Court’s language as stating what must be shown (or proved) in order to prevail under the cause of action created by subsection (g)(4) in order to be entitled to the remedy delineated in (g)(4)(A). In other words, in order to succeed on the underlying cause of action and be entitled to a remedy of actual damages, a litigant must show actual damages. Because he could not show actual damages, Doe was not entitled to monetary relief tor the violation of the underlying cause of action that Congress created with the Privacy Act.
The Government and Judge Michael’s dissent read far too much into one single paragraph of the Supreme Court’s Doe III opinion while simultaneously ignoring longstanding precedent. To accept the Government’s reading would be to conflate the underlying cause of action with the remedy provided. The Government’s argument suggests that relief is part of the underlying cause of action. This is not so. Such a reading fails to recognize traditional jurisprudential understandings of causes of actions.8
In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S.Ct. 2264, 60 L.Ed.2d 846 (1979), the Supreme Court detailed the history of the phrase “cause of action,” and recognized that traditionally the phrase refers “roughly to the alleged invasion of recognized legal rights upon which a litigant bases his claim for relief.” Id. at 237, 99 S.Ct. 2264 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, “[t]he concept of a ‘cause of action’ is employed specifically to determine who may judicially enforce the statutory rights or obligations.” Id. at 239, 99 S.Ct. 2264. The Davis court noted that “the question of whether a litigant has a ‘cause of action’ is analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, [500]*500a litigant may be entitled to receive.” Id. Moreover, the Court recognized that it is possible for a plaintiff to “have a cause of action even though he be entitled to no relief at all.” Id. at 239, 99 S.Ct. 2264 n. 18. Therefore, a cause of action is not connected to “the quality or extent” of injury, but instead concerns whether the plaintiff belongs to a class of litigants that may use the courts to enforce a right.9 Id.; see also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 30, 100 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed.2d 146 (1979) (noting that the question of “whether a cause of action exists” is distinct from “the question of the nature of relief available in such an action”); cf. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 89, 122 S.Ct. 1155, 152 L.Ed.2d 167 (2002) (“To prevail under a cause of action set out in [29 U.S.C.] § 2617, an employee must prove, as a threshold matter, that the employer violated [29 U.S.C.] § 2615 by interfering with, restraining, or denying his or her exercise of FMLA rights. Even then, § 2617 provides no relief unless the employee has been prejudiced by the violation.”).
In the case of § 552a(g)(4), then, Congress created a cause of action for a class of litigants who are adversely affected by the Government’s intentional or willful violation of the Privacy Act. In order to prevail — or be entitled to monetary relief— under subsection (g)(4)(A), a litigant must show actual damages.10 If there are no actual damages, of course, a litigant is entitled to none. Just the same, however, [501]*501in order to prevail — or be entitled to relief — under subsection (g)(4)(B), a litigant must show that he incurred costs and reasonable attorney fees. But the cause of action itself is provided to those litigants who are adversely affected by the Government’s intentional or willful violation of the Privacy Act.11 The Government’s argument, on the other hand, “mirrors the very misunderstanding over the difference between a cause of action and the relief afforded under it that [the Supreme Court] attempted to clarify in Davis.”12 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 69, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 117 L.Ed.2d 208 (1992).
In short, we find nothing in the Supreme Court’s Doe III opinion that trumps the plain meaning of the statute.
B.
The Government argues that aside from Doe III, we must also interpret § 552a(g)(4)(B) through the lens of two canons of statutory construction. First, it suggests that statutory grants of the right to recover attorney fees and costs must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign. Second, the Government argues that § 552a(g)(4) does not amount to a “clear showing” of congressional intent to depart from the rule that a prevailing party need not pay a non-prevailing party’s litigation costs and fees.13
The Government correctly recognizes that the scope of the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 116 S.Ct. 2092, 135 L.Ed.2d 486 (1996). Moreover, “[i]t is well-settled that attorneys’ fees may be assessed against the United States only when it has waived its sovereign immunity by statute.” O’Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 503 (4th Cir.2005) (internal quotation [502]*502marks and alterations omitted). Thus, we will conclude that Congress intended to waive the government’s sovereign immunity for an award of attorneys’ fees only when Congress expresses such intent unambiguously. See id. (noting the Court’s task of determining whether Congress’ waiver of immunity for fees in civil actions unambiguously extends to habeas proceedings).
In examining § 552a(g)(4)(B), we find no ambiguity in Congress’ waiver. As we noted in Part II, supra, we believe the text of this statute as it relates to Doe’s quest for attorney fees is clear. Our conclusion that the statute, on its face, undoubtedly allows for Doe to recover an award of attorney fees could not have been made without a simultaneous recognition that the statute also unambiguously waives the government’s immunity and makes it liable to Doe for costs and fees. The statute permits of no other reading.
In Ruckelshaus, the Supreme Court noted that “requiring a defendant, completely successful on all issues, to pay the unsuccessful plaintiffs legal fees would be a radical departure from long-standing fee-shifting principles adhered to in a wide range of contexts.” 463 U.S. at 683, 103 S.Ct. 3274. Relying on Ruckelshaus, the Government argues that in order for Doe’s attorney fee award to stand, we must find that Congress made a “clear showing” of its intent to abandon the principle that non-prevailing parties may not recover costs and attorney fees. See id. at 685, 103 S.Ct. 3274.
Ruckelshaus concerned a provision of the Clean Air Act, which permitted a court to “award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) whenever [the court] determines that such an award is appropriate.” Id. at 682-83, 103 S.Ct. 3274 (emphasis in original). In the underlying case, the Sierra Club was unsuccessful in its attacks against an EPA regulation, but the D.C. Circuit nonetheless granted the Club attorney fees because their briefs and arguments were helpful to understanding a very complex issue. See Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33, 41 (D.C.Cir.1982). The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s decision, concluding that Congress included the word “appropriate” in the statute in order to ensure that a party who was completely unsuccessful on the merits would not be able to recover costs and fees. Ruckel-shaus, 463 U.S. at 686, 103 S.Ct. 3274. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the provision lacked a clear showing from Congress, which was needed in order for “a party who wrongly charges someone with violations of the law ... to force [a] defendant to pay the costs of the wholly unsuccessful suit against it.” Id. at 685, 103 S.Ct. 3274.
Ruckelshaus does not aid the Government here. The Clean Air Act provision at issue in Ruckelshaus was meaningfully different from the Privacy Act provision here. The provision at issue in Ruckel-shaus allowed the award of costs and reasonable fees when “appropriate.” Other statutes have similar language, allowing for fee-shifting either when “appropriate” or “in the interest of justice.” See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 2072(a)(West 1998)(stating that in addition to damages in a suit under the Consumer Product Safety Act, a litigant may recover costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees “if the court determines it to be in the interest of justice”). Notably, however, Congress took a decidedly different path under § 552a(g)(4)(B) and did not condition the award of costs and reasonable fees on whether a court found them to be “appropriate” or “in the interest of justice.” 14 Instead, Congress at[503]*503tached no qualifications, only requiring an intentional or willful violation that causes an adverse effect. Moreover, in Doe I, the district court found that Doe suffered an adverse effect from the Government’s intentional violation of the Privacy Act. The Government was found to have violated the Privacy Act, but Doe suffered no actual damages because of that violation. Thus, unlike the Sierra Club in Ruckel-shaus, Doe is not an example of “a party who wrongly charges someone with violations of the law.” Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 685, 103 S.Ct. 3274.
In addition, because the statute is unambiguous, it necessarily makes a clear showing that plaintiffs — under circumstances like Doe’s — should recover costs and reasonable attorney fees. By declining to include any qualifying phrase like “appropriate” or “in the interest of the justice,” Congress created an explicit statutory scheme that has the potential of making the Government liable for costs and reasonable fees even when the Government is not hable for actual damages. Although this scheme may produce atypical results, it is not the province of the courts to alter plain congressional text that does not offend the Constitution; instead, we must take Congress at its word. See Connecticut Natl Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (“We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then ... judicial inquiry is complete.”).15
As it relates to attorney fees and costs, and given the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Doe III, § 552a(g)(4) is a clear statute. It makes the Government liable for costs and reasonable attorney fees when the Government intentionally or willfully violates the Privacy Act and that violation causes the litigant an adverse affect. Moreover, it does so unambiguously and without qualification.
IV.
The Government next contends that even if the district court was correct in concluding that the Government was liable to Doe for costs and reasonable attorney fees, the court abused its discretion and awarded Doe an unreasonable fee. We agree.
We review a district court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Johnson v. City of Aiken, 278 F.3d 333, 336 (4th Cir.2002). “In reviewing such discretionary rulings, we have adhered to the proposition that discretion has been abused if a court has failed adequately to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion, or in relying on erroneous factual or legal premises.” Mid Atl. Med. Servs., LLC v. Sereboff, 407 F.3d 212, 221 (2005) (internal [504]*504quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has held that when fee-shifting statutes use similar language, they should be interpreted alike. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758, 109 S.Ct. 2732, 105 L.Ed.2d 639 n.2 (1989). Moreover, the word “reasonable” is a term of art frequently used by Congress in fee-shifting statutes; accordingly, the Supreme Court’s “case law construing what is a ‘reasonable’ fee applies uniformly to all [fee-shifting statutes].” City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992).
The Government contends that because Doe sought money damages from the United States, and was awarded none, the only reasonable attorney fee is no fee at all.16 Doe, on the other hand, counters by arguing that the real value and importance in his suit should not be measured by the monetary award, but instead by the declaratory and injunctive relief he obtained. Accordingly, he argues that his attorney fee award can be justified based on that relief.
We find Doe’s argument unpersuasive. First, Doe did not win any declaratory or injunctive relief. While it is true that an injunction was entered prohibiting the Government from identifying black lung claimants’ Social Security numbers in the future, Doe had no meaningful role in that injunction. The district court issued a consent decree on February 20, 1997, granting the injunctive relief. It was not until later that day that Doe joined the action, and he was not even a signatory to the decree. See Doe IV, 346 F.Supp.2d at 842.
Second, and more importantly, subsection (g)(1)(D) of the Privacy Act does not allow courts to grant injunctive or declaratory relief. In fact, the only relief available to Doe under that subsection is monetary relief. See Doe III, 540 U.S. at 635, 124 S.Ct. 1204 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting on other grounds (“It bears emphasis that the Privacy Act does not authorize injunctive relief when suit is maintained under § 552a(g)(l)(C) or (D).”)); Doe v. Stephens, 851 F.2d 1457, 1463 (D.C.Cir.1988) (holding that aside from two specific subsections, the Privacy Act “precludes other forms of declaratory and injunctive relief’); Clarkson v. IRS, 678 F.2d 1368, 1375 n.ll (11th Cir.1982) (“The Privacy Act expressly provides for injunctive relief for only two types of agency misconduct, that is, wrongful withholding of documents under subsection (d)(1) and wrongful refusal to amend an individual’s record under subsection (d)(3). The remedy for violations of all other provisions of the Act is limited to recovery of damages upon a showing that the agency acted in an intentional or willful manner.”) (internal citation omitted); Hanley v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 623 F.2d 1138, 1139 (6th Cir.1980) (holding that “the injunctive relief sought by [the plaintiffs] is precluded under the Privacy Act by the failure of Congress to provide for such relief’); Parks v. United States, 618 F.2d 677, 684 (10th Cir.1980) (same); Cell Assoc., Inc. v. Nat’l Inst, of Health, 579 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (holding that the Privacy “Act makes no provision for [injunctive relief to prevent violations of subsection (b) ] as part of the remedies that it does provide”).17 Even assuming, [505]*505for the sake of argument, that Doe’s suit obtained some declaratory or injunctive relief, such relief could not possibly have been obtained, standing alone, under the relevant subsections of the Privacy Act. Instead, any equitable relief obtained in the original action stemmed from the Administrative Procedures Act.18 See Doe III, 540 U.S. at 619, 124 S.Ct. 1204 n. 1 (“Indeed, the District Court relied on the APA in determining that it had jurisdiction to enforce the stipulated order prohibiting the Department of Labor from using Social Security numbers in multiparty captions.”). Simply put, because the Privacy Act does not allow Doe to obtain injunctive relief under subsections (g)(1)(C) or (D), it also bars Doe from securing an award of costs and fees based on any injunctive relief he actually obtained.
We therefore return to the question of whether Doe’s fee award was reasonable in light of his failure to prove monetary damages. “Where recovery of private damages is the purpose of ... litigation, a district court, in fixing fees, is obligated to give primary consideration to the amount of damages awarded as compared to the amount sought.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992). Moreover, “[a] reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). Accordingly, if “a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages ... the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115, 113 S.Ct. 566. Finally, and most importantly, when a district court determines what, fee is reasonable, the “most critical factor” in that determination “is the degree of success obtained.” Hensley, at 436,103 S.Ct. 1933.
The basis of Doe’s suit under the Privacy Act was monetary damages. He sought damages for emotional distress, but as we concluded in Doe II, he failed to show any actual damages. Accordingly, the Government asks us to find that when a plaintiff fails to prove any actual damages in his quest for monetary relief under § 552a(g)(4), “the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 115,113 S.Ct. 566. ’
The district court considered, but ultimately rejected this argument, finding that it was “nothing more than a restatement of the [Government’s] previous argument that since' [ ] Doe failed to recover actual damages ... he is not entitled to an award of costs and attorneys’ fees.... ” Doe IV, 346 F.Supp.2d at 848. The district court found that the Government’s argument “reads ‘reasonable’ attorneys’ fees as requiring that a party achieve some success on the merits before he can recover.” Id. at 849. Thus, according to the district court, the Government’s definition of the word “reasonable” impermissibly incorporates a “substantially prevail” requirement into the statute. Id.
We disagree with the district court. Statutes that require a complainant to “substantially prevail” in order.to obtain costs and fees do so as a prerequisite to [506]*506obtaining fees. See Ruekelshaus, 463 U.S. at 701, 103 S.Ct. 3274 (“noting that most fee-shifting statutes require that a party ‘prevail’ or ‘substantially prevail’ in order to obtain fees” (emphasis added)). That is to say, a party has no claim whatsoever to fees under such provisions — which are not implicated in this action — unless the party substantially prevailed in their underlying claim. See, e.g., Reinbold v. Evers, 187 F.3d 348, 363 (4th Cir.1999) (noting that the question of “whether a party who has substantially prevailed is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees [ ] is not reached unless and until [the party] has proved he has substantially prevailed” (emphasis in original)). The word “reasonable,” as it is used in fee-shifting statutes, such as the one here, however, has a distinct meaning, and it is only after a district court determines that it may award attorney fees that the word “reasonable” comes into play. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (stating that after a court determines that a party “prevailed” under the statute, “[i]t remains for the district court to determine what fee is ‘reasonable’ ”). Put simply, “reasonableness” concerns the appropriate amount of fees once they are determined to be authorized, whereas whether a party “substantially prevails” concerns the appropriateness of awarding fees at all.
Thus, the district court erred in its reasonableness analysis by failing to “give primary consideration to the amount of damages awarded as compared to the amount sought” by Doe, a consideration that exists in order to constrain a court’s discretion in setting an award. See Far-rar, 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct. 566. “Indeed, the most critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is the degree of success obtained.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Doe failed to recover any monetary award, despite the fact that damages were the primary goal of his suit. Because his underlying litigation was largely unsuccessful, it is unlikely that Doe may recover significant attorney fees. See Hetzel v. County of Prince William, 89 F.3d 169, 173-74 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that because the plaintiff “gained but an insignificant portion of the relief she originally requested and because she has failed to prevail on her most consequential claims, she is entitled only to a fraction of her attorney’s fees”).
Accordingly, because we find that the district court abused its discretion in determining the reasonableness of the fee award, we vacate the award and because the district court is in the best position to determine what is a “reasonable” attorney fee award, we remand to the district court for recalculation of fees.19 We do not, however, disturb the district court’s calculation of Buck Doe’s litigation costs. Subsection (g)(4)(B) states that the Government shall be liable for “the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney fees.” Doe is therefore entitled to the actual costs of his action unrestrained by any reasonableness inquiry.
V.
In sum, we agree with the district court’s interpretation of the Privacy Act. It plainly states that the Government shall be liable for costs and reasonable attorney fees when its intentional or willful violation of the Act adversely affects a litigant, and neither the Supreme Court’s Doe III opinion nor canons of construction lead to an opposite conclusion. Because, however, [507]*507the district court failed to determine the reasonableness of Doe’s attorney fee award in light of the fact that Doe recovered no damages, we vacate that portion of the award pertaining to fees and remand to the district court for reconsideration. We affirm that portion of the award pertaining to costs.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.