Buchholz v. North Dakota Department of Transportation

2002 ND 23, 639 N.W.2d 490, 2002 N.D. LEXIS 28, 2002 WL 241135
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 20, 2002
Docket20010211
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 2002 ND 23 (Buchholz v. North Dakota Department of Transportation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Buchholz v. North Dakota Department of Transportation, 2002 ND 23, 639 N.W.2d 490, 2002 N.D. LEXIS 28, 2002 WL 241135 (N.D. 2002).

Opinion

MARING, Justice.

[¶ 1] The North Dakota Department of Transportation (“Department”) appeals from a district court judgment reversing the Department’s decision to suspend Deanna Buchholz’s driving privileges for ninety-one days. We reverse the judgment of the district court and reinstate the hearing officer’s suspension of Buchholz’s license.

I

[¶ 2] On March 11, 2001, North Dakota Highway Patrol Officer Trevor Wahlen arrested Deanna Lynn Buchholz for driving under the influence of alcohol. After arresting Buchholz, Officer Wahlen transported her to the Morton County Law Enforcement Center where she consented to an Intoxilyzer test. The Intoxilyzer test administered by Officer Wahlen recorded Buchholz’s blood alcohol concentration at .22 percent. Officer Wahlen then issued Buchholz a temporary operator’s permit and a Report and Notice. Buch-holz requested and received an administrative hearing on the suspension of her driving privileges.

[¶ 3] During the hearing, Officer Wah-len testified he allowed Buchholz to use the restroom when they arrived at the Morton County Law Enforcement Center. Buchholz was not supervised while she was in the restroom. Officer Wahlen further testified that Buchholz emerged from the restroom at 1:43 a.m. According to the Intoxilyzer test report, Buchholz provided her first breath sample at 2:05 a.m. On the checklist submitted with the test re *492 port, Officer Wahlen indicated Buchholz had nothing to eat, drink, or smoke in the twenty minutes prior to the administration of the Intoxilyzer test, as required by the State Toxicologist’s approved method for operating the Intoxilyzer. However, at the hearing, he testified he did not physically look into Buchholz’s mouth at any time prior to administering the test. Officer Wahlen also stated that, although he routinely instructs arrestees not to place anything in their mouths, he could not recall if he asked Buchholz if she had anything in her mouth prior to administering the Intoxilyzer test.

[¶ 4] After hearing Officer Wahlen’s testimony, Buchholz objected to the admission of the Intoxilyzer test results on the ground that Officer Wahlen did not comply with the twenty-minute waiting period of the method approved by the State Toxicologist for conducting a breath test. The hearing officer overruled the objection and suspended Buchholz’s driving privileges for ninety-one days.

[¶ 5] Buchholz appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the district court. The district court found Officer Wahlen “made no notes and does not have a recollection of ‘ascertain(ing) that the subject had nothing to eat, drink, or smoke within 20 minutes prior to the collection of the breath sample.’ ” Therefore, the court concluded the Intoxilyzer results were inadmissible and reversed the decision of the hearing officer. The Department appealed the district court’s decision to this Court.

II

[¶ 6] The Administrative Agencies Practices Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 28-32, governs our review of administrative license suspensions. Houn v. N.D. Dept. of Transp., 2000 ND 131, ¶ 5, 613 N.W.2d 29. We limit our review to the record before the administrative agency, and we do not review the decision of the district court. Ringsaker v. Director, N.D. Dept. of Transp., 1999 ND 127, ¶5, 596 N.W.2d 328. We are required to affirm the agency’s decision unless:

1) the decision is not in accordance with the law; 2) the decision violates the constitutional rights of the appellant; 3) provisions of the Administrative Agencies Practices Act were not complied with in the proceedings before the agency; 4) the agency’s rules or procedures have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing; 5) the agency’s findings are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence; or 6) the conclusions of law and the agency’s decision are not supported by its findings of fact.

N.D. Dept. of Transp. v. DuPaul, 487 N.W.2d 593, 595 (N.D.1992). The findings of fact made by the Department at an administrative hearing are entitled to great deference. Houn, at ¶ 6. In reviewing the Department’s findings, “we determine only whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have concluded the Department’s findings were supported by the weight of the evidence from the entire record.” Id.

Ill

[¶ 7] “Section 39-20-07(5), N.D.C.C., governs the admissibility of In-toxilyzer test results.” Ringsaker, 1999 ND 127, ¶ 7, 596 N.W.2d 328. The statute provides, in pertinent part:

The results of the chemical analysis must be received in evidence when it is shown that the sample was properly obtained and the test was fairly administered, and if the test is shown to have been performed according to methods and with devices approved by the state toxicologist, and by an individual possessing a certificate of qualification to *493 administer the test issued by the state toxicologist.

N.D.C.C. § 39-20-07(5). Fair administration of an Intoxilyzer test may be established by proof that the method approved by the State Toxicologist for conducting the test has been scrupulously followed. See McPeak v. Moore, 545 N.W.2d 761, 764 (N.D.1996). “However, ‘scrupulous’ compliance does not mean ‘hypertechnical’ compliance.” City of West Fargo v. Hawkins, 2000 ND 168, ¶ 16, 616 N.W.2d 856.

[¶ 8] The portion of the State Toxicologist’s approved method at issue in this case provides “[bjefore proceeding, the operator must ascertain that the subject has had nothing to eat, drink, or smoke within twenty minutes prior to the collection of the breath sample.” Approved Method to Conduct Breath Test ivith Intoxilyzer 5000 KB, dated September 1, 2000. At the administrative hearing, Buchholz argued Officer Wahlen failed to comply with this portion of the approved method because he acknowledged he did not check Buchholz’s mouth and could not recall if he asked her if she had anything in her mouth or if he told her not to put anything in her mouth. The hearing officer rejected this argument and concluded “Intoxilyzer testing was done in accordance with the state toxicologist’s approved method, with results showing an alcohol concentration of .22 percent.” On appeal, the Department contends the In-toxilyzer test results were properly admitted at the administrative hearing because the hearing officer could have reasonably concluded Officer Wahlen followed the approved method by observing Buchholz for twenty minutes after she emerged from the restroom. Thus, at issue is whether the State Toxicologist’s approved method requires Intoxilyzer operators to ask subjects if they have anything in their mouths or to look in their mouths prior to administering the Intoxilyzer test.

[¶ 9] While this is a question of first impression in North Dakota, the Oregon Court of Appeals has addressed related questions under a requirement very similar to the portion of the approved method at issue in this case. The requirement at issue in State v. Kacalek, 34 Or.App. 967, 580 P.2d 205

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hoistad v. NDDOT
2025 ND 45 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2025)
Meiers v. NDDOT
2025 ND 21 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2025)
Keller v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
2015 ND 81 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2015)
Olson v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
2013 ND 104 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2013)
Mees v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
2013 ND 36 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2013)
Thorsrud v. Director, North Dakota Department of Transportation
2012 ND 136 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2012)
City of Lincoln v. Johnston
2012 ND 139 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2012)
State v. Stroh
2011 ND 139 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2011)
Gussiaas v. Neustel
2011 ND 133 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2011)
Martin v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
2009 ND 181 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2009)
Steinmeyer v. Department of Transportation
2009 ND 126 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2009)
State v. Willie
2009 NMSC 037 (New Mexico Supreme Court, 2009)
Buchholtz v. Director, North Dakota Department of Transportation
2008 ND 53 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2008)
Buchholtz v. DIRECTOR, ND DEPT. OF TRANSP.
2008 ND 53 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2008)
Johnson v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
2004 ND 59 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2004)
Sonsthagen v. Sprynczynatyk
2003 ND 90 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2003)
State v. Paul
2002 ND 75 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2002)
Knoll v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
2002 ND 84 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2002)
State v. Ringsrud
2002 ND 17 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 2002)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2002 ND 23, 639 N.W.2d 490, 2002 N.D. LEXIS 28, 2002 WL 241135, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/buchholz-v-north-dakota-department-of-transportation-nd-2002.