Buchanan v. City of Jackson, Tenn.

683 F. Supp. 1537, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3970, 1988 WL 32828
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Tennessee
DecidedFebruary 5, 1988
Docket77-1022
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 683 F. Supp. 1537 (Buchanan v. City of Jackson, Tenn.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Buchanan v. City of Jackson, Tenn., 683 F. Supp. 1537, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3970, 1988 WL 32828 (W.D. Tenn. 1988).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER REJECTING DEFENDANTS’ FIRST PROPOSED REMEDY

TODD, District Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 5, 1988, the court filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order holding *1540 that the present system of at-large election of the Jackson, Tennessee, Board of Commissioners resulted in a denial or abridgement of plaintiffs’ and other black persons’ right to vote on account of race or color in violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq. Defendants were enjoined from holding further elections under the current system, pending further orders of this court. Mem.Op. at 50-51.

On January 28, 1988, a hearing was held concerning the appropriate remedy in this action. The parties presented evidence, and defendants submitted for the court’s consideration a plan for electing commissioners which they contend satisfies the requirements of the Voting Rights Act.

The defendants’ plan consists of a nine-member commission. All nine members would wield the legislative power, while the administrative power would be shared by three of the nine commissioners. The three-member administration, or Administrative Commissioners, would be elected at-large; the six additional District Commissioners would be elected from single-member districts. Retained in the proposed plan is the requirement that each commissioner receive a majority of the votes cast for his or her position, along with the corresponding runoff election procedure.

The Board of Commissioners has enacted a resolution specifically amending the City Charter to effectuate this plan, to become effective upon the entry of a final order in this litigation or on July 1, 1991, whichever is later.

The defendants contend that the proposed plan cures the Voting Rights Act violation in that, as drawn, the six single-member districts provide blacks a realistic opportunity to elect representatives of their choice. Two of the six districts are so-called “safe” black districts, with black populations of over 65% under the 1980 U.S. Census of Population. A third district, slightly over 40% black under the 1980 census, is expected to have a majority of black residents under the 1990 census figures. The percentage deviation (the sum of the largest positive and the largest negative deviations) from strict mathematical equality of the six districts is 13.2%.

The plaintiffs are opposed to defendants’ proposed plan. Their position is that any plan which perpetuates the maintenance of at-large seats, whether administrative or legislative, cannot completely remedy the Voting Rights Act violation. Further, plaintiffs contend that the retained run-off provision makes the proposed plan an inadequate remedy. At-large elections, however, are not per se unconstitutional. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 541, 98 S.Ct. 2493, 2498, 57 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978). Further, run-off elections, without more, do not violate either the Constitution or the Voting Rights Act. See Butts v. City of New York, 779 F.2d 141 (2d Cir.1985). The task of the court is to determine whether this particular plan is appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

II. APPLICABLE LAW

The role of the court in fashioning a remedy for a violation of the Constitution was clearly delineated by the Supreme Court in Wise v. Lipscomb, supra. The Court stated:

[Rjedistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task which the federal courts should make every effort not to pre-empt. When a federal court declares an existing apportionment scheme unconstitutional, it is therefore, appropriate, whenever practicable, to afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a substitute measure rather than for the federal court to devise and order into effect its own plan. The new legislative plan, if forthcoming, will then be the governing law unless it, too, is challenged and found to violate the Constitution.
Legislative bodies should not leave their reapportionment tasks to the federal courts; but when those with legislative responsibilities do not respond, or the imminence of a state election makes it impracticable for them to do so, it becomes the “unwelcome obligation” of the federal court to devise and impose a *1541 reapportionment plan pending later legislative action.

437 U.S. at 539-540, 98 S.Ct. at 2496-97. (citations omitted). The court has a similar role in fashioning a remedy for a violation of the Voting Rights Act. Where the legislative body proposes a plan which is not unconstitutional or otherwise illegal, a federal court must defer to that legislative judgment, even if it is not the plan the court would have chosen. Seastrunk v. Burns, 772 F.2d 143, 151 (5th Cir.1985).

The court must not, however, defer blindly to legislative prerogative. There are clear standards which must be applied in deciding whether defendants' proposed plan is acceptable under the Voting Rights Act.

The court should exercise its traditional equitable powers to fashion the relief so that it completely remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides equal opportunity for minority citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their choice.

Dillard v. Crenshaw County, Ala., 831 F.2d 246, 250 (11th Cir.1987) (quoting 1982 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 177, 208) (emphasis added by 11th Circuit). As the Supreme Court has recently stated,

A district court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar discrimination in the future. Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.

United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 1053, 1073, 94 L.Ed.2d 203 (1987) (quotations and citations omitted).

Although “nothing in [the Voting Rights Act] establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population,” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b), it is clear that any proposal to remedy a § 2 violation must itself satisfy § 2. Dillard, 831 F.2d at 249. Furthermore, the court “cannot authorize an element of an election proposal that will not with certitude completely remedy the Section 2 violation.” Id. at 252.

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Buchanan v. City of Jackson, Tenn.
683 F. Supp. 1545 (W.D. Tennessee, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
683 F. Supp. 1537, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3970, 1988 WL 32828, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/buchanan-v-city-of-jackson-tenn-tnwd-1988.