ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
We confront several questions of first impression involving Indiana's new drug tax. The State imposed both civil and criminal sanctions on appellant Ross Bryant for his failure to pay the Indiana Controlled Sub[294]*294stance Excise Tax (CSET)1 He appealed the criminal penalty, claiming he was twice punished for the same offense. We hold that the civil and criminal penalties were each jeopardies, and that both cannot be imposed without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution.
I. Statement of Facts
In August 1992, Grant County Sheriffs deputies responded to an alarm at Bryant's home. Discovering an open door with fresh pry marks on it, they entered the dwelling and searched it. There was no one in the home, but police found over 250 marijuana plants in the basement, outhouse and garden. Officers then obtained a warrant and completed a more thorough search which uncovered marijuana seeds, dried marijuana and other drug paraphernalia When police questioned Bryant upon his return, he confessed that the marijuana was his and that he was growing it for his own use. Police then arrested Bryant and transported him and the objects seized to the Grant County Jail.
The deputies next contacted the Indiana Department of Revenue to report their findings. The Department dispatched a special agent to the jail to determine the amount of Controlled Substance Excise Tax owed by Bryant.2 The agent weighed the marijuana and assessed a tax of $88,680.83 The agent then met with Bryant and demanded payment. Because Bryant did not immediately pay the CSET, the agent served him with a "Record of Jeopardy Findings and Jeopardy Assessment Notice and Demand" which required payment of the CSET plus a 100 percent penalty for nonpayment of the tax.4 Bryant's total obligation to the State was thus $167,360. The very next day, the Department levied on Bryant's "checking and/or savings accounts, contents of safe deposit boxes, money market accounts, certificates of deposit, ... [and] any other evidence of indebtedness" as payment on this obligation. (R. 456.) Counsel informed us at oral argument that the Department also seized Bryant's home.
The State next charged Bryant with failure to pay the CSET, a class D felony;5 growing and cultivating more than 30 grams of marijuana, a class D felony;6 maintaining a common nuisance, a class D felony;7 and, possession of less than 30 grams of marijuana, a class A misdemeanor.8
In April 1998, Bryant was convicted on all four counts. The court sentenced him to two and a half years in prison on each of the four felony counts and one year for misdemeanor possession. His sentences were to run concurrently, with one year suspended to probation.
[295]*295Bryant subsequently appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals. After briefing was completed, I transferred the case to this Court pursuant to the authority granted me by Ind. Appellate Rule 4(D).
Bryant raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Whether the State violated the Double Jeopardy Clause by assessing both the CSET's civil and eriminal sanctions against Bryant; 9
2. Whether the trial court erroneously convicted Bryant for failure to pay the CSET based on evidence that he grew and cultivated marijuana;
3. Whether the trial court erred when it admitted evidence obtained in the search of Bryant's home;
4. Whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Bryant's prior convictions; and,
5. Whether there was sufficient evidence to convict Bryant of possessing marijuana and maintaining a common nuisance.
We hold the Department's assessment of the CSET against Bryant was a jeopardy. His criminal prosecution for failure to pay the CSET constituted a second jeopardy in violation of his double jeopardy rights under the United States Constitution, as did his criminal prosecutions for growing and possessing marijuana. Accordingly, we vacate his conviction on those counts.10 We affirm his conviction on the remaining count.
II The CSET and Dowble Jeopardy
Bryant claims that because the State assessed the CSET and its 100 percent penalty for nonpayment against him and later convicted him of a felony for nonpayment, it violated his double jeopardy rights under the United States and Indiana Constitutions.11 U.S. Const. AmEnp. V; Inp. Const. art. I, § 14.12
The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. Amignp. V. This clause is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). It protects a person from suffering (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction and B) multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 28 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).
Jeopardy is, in its constitutional sense, a technical term which has traditionally applied only to eriminal prosecutions. Evans v. Brown, 109 U.S. 180, 3 S.Ct. 83, 27 L.Ed. 898 (1883). Departing from this historical rule, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has held in recent years that particular forfeitures, civil fines and financial exactions can be "jeopardies." Montana Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, - U.S. --, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989). Cf. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1998). -In determining whether a jeopardy has occurred, the Court has said that the sanction's label of "criminal" or "civil" is not controlling. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447, 109 S.Ct. at 1901; see also United States v. Haywood, 864 F.Supp. 502, 506 (W.D.N.C.1994) (description of sanction as "civil" does not foreclose possibility it is a jeopardy). Rather, the test is whether the [296]*296civil sanction constitutes a "punishment." Kurth Ranch, -- U.S. at --, 114 S.Ct. at 1946. When the sanction serves the goals of punishment rather than the remedial purposes of compensating the government for its loss, it is a "punishment" and thus a "Jjeopar-dy" within the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. The sanction's essence as a punishment can be identified "only by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of the state." Halper, 490 U.S. at 447, 109 S.Ct. at 1901.
A. Is the CSET's Civil Sanction a Punishment?
The Supreme Court recently delineated the analysis for determining whether a tax is a punishment in Kurth Ranck - U.S. --, 114 S.Ct. 1987, a case bearing strong resemblance to the one before us. In Kurth, the Montana Department of Revenue sought to impose both criminal and tax penalties for the same possession of marijuana. In determining whether the tax was a "punishment" and thus a jeopardy under double jeopardy analysis, the Court examined four factors: the tax's deterrent purpose (as opposed to revenue purpose), its high rate, its prerequisite of the commission of a crime before assessment, and the nature of the tax. Ultimately, the Court found that when considered in tandem these factors revealed that the Montana tax was a punishment and thus a second jeopardy imposed on the taxpayer in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
To apply the Kurth analysis, we examine first the purpose and rate of the CSET.13 It is apparent that the CSET is aimed at least partly towards deterrence. One who pays the CSET receives a receipt that admonishes him that delivery, sale, possession or manufacture of a controlled substance is a crime. Ind.Code Ann. § 6-7-3-10(a) (West Supp. 1994). The taxpayer is required to show this receipt to officials to prove he has paid the tax, but the receipt is valid for only forty-eight hours. Ind.Code Ann. § 6-7-3-10(b) (West Supp.1994). A taxpayer who possesses the same drug for over forty-eight hours must therefore repay the tax every forty-eight hours to continue to possess a valid receipt and thereby avoid the CSET's additional sanctions. Both the receipt's admonition and the limited period for which it is valid suggest a deterrent purpose.
Second, just as the Kurth Court found the high rate of the Montana tax demonstrated its punitive character, we find the CSET'"s rate similarly revealing. The Montana tax was imposed at the rate of $100 per ounce, roughly eight times the market value of the marijuana taxed. Kurth Ranch, - U.S. at --, n. 12, 114 S.Ct at 1943, n. 12. Indiana's CSET imposes a tax of $40.00 per gram, or $1,133.96 per ounce. This is a rate of over ninety times the market value and more than eleven times the rate imposed in Kurth.14 It indicates a punitive character.
The third factor the Kurth Court found suggestive of the tax's punitive nature was the fact that it was conditioned on the commission of a crime and was exacted only after the possessor was arrested. The Court found these conditions " 'significant of [the tax's] penal and prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of revenue'" Kurth Ranch, -- U.S. at --, 114 S.Ct. at 1947 (quoting United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295, 56 S.Ct. 223, 227, 80 L.Ed. 233 (1985)). The CSET is similarly conditioned on the commission of a crime. It is imposed only on individuals who deliver, possess or manufacture controlled substances "in viola[297]*297tion of IC 35-48-4 or 21 U.S.C. 841 through 21 U.S.C. 852." Ind.Code Ann. § 6-7-8-5 (West Supp.1994). .
Moreover, while the plain language of the statute does not limit the imposition of the CSET to a time after arrest, this is its effect. The law does say that a taxpayer owes the tax regardless of whether she is arrested. The Department assesses the tax, however, only when police contact it to report an individual who is in custody for the delivery, possession or manufacture of a controlled substance. The resemblance between the two schemes seems more compelling than the difference.
Finally, the Kurth Court found that because the Montana tax was characterized as a "property" tax but was assessed only after the controlled substance was confiscated, the tax possessed none of the indicia of "a species of a property tax." Kurth Ranch, -- U.S. at --, 114 S.Ct. at 1948. Likewise, the CSET is so far removed from a normal excise tax that it must be classified as a punishment. An excise tax is one which is imposed upon the performance of an act or the enjoyment of a privilege. Black's Law Dictionary 506 (5th ed. 1979). As in Kurth, however, the Department routinely imposes the CSET only after a taxpayer's drugs have been confiscated. The taxpayer neither enjoys a privilege nor performs an act at the time of taxation. The CSET cannot therefore be classified as a normal excise tax.15
The CSET differs from a traditional excise tax in another respect. The rate of the tax so significantly outreaches that of other excise taxes in this state that its classification as a normal excise tax is impossible. No other Indiana excise tax imposes such a severe civil penalty for nonpayment. See, eg., Ind.Code Ann. § 6-7-1-24(a)(2) (West Supp. 1994) (failure to pay cigarette tax can result in fifty percent penalty).
The CSET is not identical to the Kurth tax in every respect, but the factors outlined in Kurth do not create a bright line. After evaluating the CSET as a whole, like the Court in Kurth, we conclude that "this drug tax is a concoction of anomalies, too far-removed in crucial respects from a standard tax assessment to escape characterization as punishment for the purpose of Double Jeopardy analysis." Kurth Ranch, - U.S. at ---, 114 S.Ct. at 1948. Accordingly, the assessment of the CSET and its 100 percent penalty against Bryant was a punishment and thus a jeopardy.
B. Were the CSET's Civil and Criminal Sanctions Multiple Punishments for the Same Offense?
Having concluded the CSET's civil sanction was a jeopardy, we must now determine whether the imposition of the CSET's civil and eriminal penalties constituted multiple punishments for the same offense. Because the CSET imposes its civil and erimi-nal penalties in two separate proceedings, we are not required to address the permissibility of "multiple punishments" imposed in the same proceeding. See, e.g., Kurth Ranch, -- U.S. at --, n. 21, 114 S.Ct. at 1947, n. 21; cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076-77, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). Rather, we must address whether the CSET's criminal and civil punishments violate the double jeopardy prohibition against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction or acquittal because it imposes separate sanctions in successive proceedings.16
In determining whether the two offenses are the same, we apply the test first announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), and recently revived in United States v. Dizon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 [298]*298L.Ed.2d 556 (1993).17 Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, "the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not. If each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not," the offenses are not the "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. For example, a state violates double jeopardy protection when it punishes a defendant for a greater offense and a "lesser included offense." That is, if the lesser included offense requires no proof beyond that required for the greater offense, the two are the "same offense" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.18 There are, however, similar offenses which do not violate the "same elements" test. Crimes which possess overlapping proof are not conclusively double jeopardies. The con-duet proved may be " 'one and the same' " so long as each offense possesses " 'an element not embraced in the other'" Dizon, 509 U.S. at 704, 113 S.Ct. at 2860 (quoting Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 345, 31 S.Ct. 421, 423, 55 L.Ed. 489 (1911)).
Employing the "same elements" analysis, we find that the CSET's civil and eriminal sanctions are punishments for the same offense. Both punishments require that a person deliver, possess or manufacture a controlled substance without having paid the CSET to be subject to prosecution. The only distinction between the punishments is found in the criminal sanction imposed for nonpayment in subsection (b) of § 6-7-8-11. This provision requires a mens rea of "knowingly or intentionally" for criminal conviction. The CSET's civil sanction requires no mens rea. However, its elements are identical to the criminal sanction's elements in all other respects. Because the civil penalty invoked by subsection (a) of the statute requires no elements other than those included in the criminal penalty found in subsection (b), these subsections are two punishments for the same offense.
C. Which Jeopardy is Barred as the Second Jeopardy?
The determination of when jeopardy attaches is the lynchpin for concluding which jeopardy is barred as a second jeopardy. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 2162, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). Consequently, we turn to the question of which CSET sanction was Bryant's first jeopardy and which was the second jeopardy prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. To resolve this question we must settle when jeopardy attaches in a civil proceeding. Of course, the U.S. Supreme Court has not considered this question since its decision just last year in Kurth. Thus, we write on largely a clean slate.19 The Court has, however, enumerated factors and policies underlying attachment [299]*299which will help identify the point when jeopardy attached in this action.
Although the Fifth Amendment declares that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, this constitutional prohibition is not against being twice punished, but is against twice being put in jeopardy. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). The Double Jeopardy Clause thus refers to the risk that a person will, for a second time, be convicted of the same offense. Id. The notion that "Jeopardy" is "risk" is the very core of double jeopardy jurisprudence. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975). Where a risk of a determination of guilt exists, for example, jeopardy attaches. See, e.g., Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975); see also Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970) (jeopardy is the risk of trial and conviction, not punishment). These cases are consonant with the well-known rule that jeopardy attaches when a jury has been impaneled and sworn. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977).
Using the point at which there is a risk of conviction as the moment when jeopardy attaches for Fifth Amendment purposes assures that a person is not foreed to endure the personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a trial more than onee for the same offense. The Double Jeopardy Clause achieves this result by effectively dictating that the government cannot make multiple attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, "thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 2063, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969); see also Breed, 421 U.S. at 530, 95 S.Ct. at 1786. Accordingly, it is essential to determine the time of attachment to protect promptly the accused's rights to finality of judgment, to minimization of exposure to the ordeals of trial and to continue with a chosen jury. Crist, 437 U.S. at 38, 98 S.Ct. at 2162; see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (constitutional policy of finality inherent in Fifth Amendment). A court's conclusion that jeopardy attached at a specific point reflects its judgment that the constitutional policies underpinning the Double Jeopardy Clause are implicated at that stage of the proceeding. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 480, 91 S.Ct. at 554-55.
We conclude that jeopardy first attached when the Department served Bryant with its Record of Jeopardy Findings and Jeopardy Assessment Notice and Demand. At that moment, Bryant faced more than a risk of being found guilty; he had actually been found guilty. The assessment itself was a judgment against Bryant for the CSET and its 100 percent nonpayment penalty. This judgment enabled the Department to levy on Bryant's property immediately, and the Department exercised that authority the day after it issued Bryant's jeopardy assessment. To hold jeopardy attached at any point later than assessment would give the Department latitude to subject the taxpayer to the ordeal of assessment and levy multiple times for the same offense.20 That would be contrary to the constitutional policies underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The dissent suggests that finding jeopardy attached at assessment forecloses prosecution. This is correct so long as the State prosecutes the defendant after the Department assesses the CSET. We know from oral argument on this cause, however, that the Department does not conduct independent investigations, searching for drug of[300]*300fenders. Rather, it learns of an offense only when contacted by the police or prosecutor. This situation creates the opportunity for discussion between the Department and law enforcement authorities as to who will proceed first, Moreover, it seems plain enough for Fifth Amendment purposes that, from the citizen's point of view, it is irrelevant whether penalties imposed by one branch of the government foreclose penalties by another branch.
In any event, if there is any problem of coordination between the Department and law enforcement authorities (and what we were told at oral argument suggests there is none), the General Assembly may simply amend the statute to require the Department and prosecutor to consult with one another about who should go first.
The CSET assessment was Bryant's first jeopardy. The moment the jury was sworn in his criminal trial for nonpayment of the CSET a second jeopardy attached. Crist, 437 U.S. at 38, 98 S.Ct. at 2162. Accordingly, the Double Jeopardy Clause barred Bryant's criminal prosecution for nonpayment. We vacate the conviction for failure to pay the CSET.
Moreover, having concluded the CSET is a jeopardy, Bryant's convictions for growing more than 30 grams of marijuana and possessing less than 30 grams of marijuana were also subsequent jeopardies barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. As we explain today in Clifft v. Indiana Dep't of State Revenue (1995) Ind., 660 N.E.2d 310, subsequent prosecutions under the eriminal law for the same drug offenses twice places a defendant in jeopardy. We therefore vacate Bryant's criminal convictions.
III. The Warrantless Search of Bryant's Home
This case presents another novel issue unrelated to the CSET and double jeopardy. Bryant contends the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted evidence obtained in the police search of his home, saying it was illegally obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.21 The State contends that exigent cireumstances justified the warrantless search because officers reasonably believed a person inside Bryant's home may have been in need of aid and because the deputies possessed probable cause to believe a burglary was in progress.
The Fourth Amendment provides each person the right to be secure in his or her person, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amenp. 4; Inp. Const. art. I, § 11. Generally, a search or seizure may only be conducted pursuant to a lawful warrant. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979); Taylor v. State (1992), Ind., 587 N.E.2d 1293. The cardinal principle in search and seizure jurisprudence therefore is that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable ...-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Fair v. State (1993), Ind., 627 N.E.2d 427, 430 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2412, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)). Exigent cireumstances compelling quick action before a warrant can be obtained are recognized as such an exception. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (building on fire). The State bears the burden of proving the existence of exigent cireum-stances sufficient to justify the lack of formalities. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
The State initially argues that its warrantless search was justified because a person inside Bryant's home may have been in need of aid. The U.S. Supreme Court and this Court have recognized a limited exception to the warrant requirement where an [301]*301officer reasonably believes such cireum-stances exist. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); Tata v. State (1986), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 1025. In cases employing this exception, however, police possessed objective evidence that a violent crime had or was about to occur. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642; Tata, 486 N.E.2d at 1028. There was no such evidence in this case. Officers did not find any evidence outside the home and did not hear any sound from the home which could reasonably lead them to conclude a person inside was in need of aid.22 The warrantless search of Bryant's home cannot be justified on these grounds.
Until today, this Court had not considered the State's second argument: that police may enter a home when they reasonably believe a burglary may be in progress or has recently been committed. Numerous state and federal courts, however, agree that these are exigent cireumstances excusing warrantless entry. See, e.g., Reardon v. Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir.1987); State ex rel. Zander v. District Court, 180 Mont. 548, 591 P.2d 656 (1979) (warrantless entry necessary to protect property and determine whether suspect was hiding inside where police believed burglary was in progress); United States v. Salava, 978 F.2d 320 (7th Cir.1992).
Our own Court of Appeals has also recognized this exception. B.P.O.E. # 576, Elks Club v. State (1980), Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 660. These courts and other authorities generally agree that such an entry and search does not offend the Fourth Amendment because the emergency cireumstances surrounding a potential burglary justify the action. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 6.6(b), at 706-707 (2d ed. 1987). We agree that police may enter private property to protect that property when they reasonably believe the premises have recently been or are being burglarized.
Of course, any search conducted because police reasonably believe a burglary is in progress or has just occurred is limited to areas in which an intruder could reasonably conceal himself, Officers may not use the situation as an excuse to conduct a general search for evidence. State v. Crabtree, 655 S.W.2d 173 (Tenn.Crim.App.1983). A search beyond the exigencies presented would violate the Fourth Amendment.
In Bryant's case, Grant County Sheriff's deputies entered the home after receiving an emergency call from a neighbor who reported that a home alarm was sounding. When deputies arrived at the seene, they observed fresh pry marks on an open door. They entered the house and conducted a protective sweep of the residence.
The totality of these cireumstances reveals that exigent circumstances justified the search The sounding alarm, fresh pry marks and open door led police to a reasonable belief that a burglary was in progress or had recently occurred. The officers searched no more area than was reasonably necessary, but still discovered hundreds of marijuana plants in plain view. Admission of evidence found during the search was therefore not error.
IV. Admissibility of Bryant's Prior Convictions
During Bryant's trial, the State cross-examined him regarding his convictions for robbery and armed burglary thirty-five and forty years prior to his arrest. Bryant contends these convictions were too remote to be admissible.
The trial court has considerable latitude in admitting or rejecting evidence. Error in admitting evidence is not a basis for setting aside a conviction unless the erroneous admission was inconsistent with substantial justice or affects the substantial rights of the parties. Ind.Trial Rule 61; Fleener v. State (1995), Ind., 656 N.E.2d 1140.
Under our common law eviden-tiary rules,23 a prior criminal conviction may [302]*302be used for impeachment if it involved dishonesty or false statement or constituted what is commonly referred to as an "infamous crime" which would have rendered the witness incompetent to testify. Ashton v. Anderson (1972), 258 Ind. 51, 279 N.E.2d 210, 217. Bryant's convictions for robbery and burglary fall squarely within the Ashton "infamous erimes" which the trial court could rightfully admit for impeachment purposes. A question regarding the lapse of time between the conviction and the testimony to be impeached does not affect the admissibility of the conviction. Robinson v. State (1983), 446 N.E.2d 1287. Rather, the lapse of time from the defendant's prior conviction is a matter for the jury to weigh in assessing the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witness. Id. The trial court properly admitted evidence of Bryant's prior convictions.
V. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses when considering a sufficiency question on appeal. Alfaro v. State (1985), Ind., 478 N.E.2d 670. These are matters exclusively within the province of the jury. Rather, we consider the evidence most favorable to the verdict, along with any reasonable inferences therefrom, to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Moore v. State (1987), Ind., 515 N.E2d 1099. We affirm if each element of the crime is supported by substantial evidence. Loyd v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 404, 398 N.E.2d 1260, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 881, 101 S.Ct. 281, 66 L.Ed.2d 105.
Bryant challenges his misdemeanor conviction for possession of marijuana, claiming he was not in exclusive possession of the property in which officers found two bags of dried marijuana and over 800 marijuana plants. We need not address this issue based on our conclusion that the conviction was a second jeopardy barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. We note, nonetheless, that Bryant owned the home in which the marijuana was found and confessed to police that the marijuana was his. Various other drug paraphernalia found in Bryant's home compounded the evidence of his guilt. We conclude there was no evidence which could reasonably lead the court to believe someone other than Bryant possessed the drugs.24 There was sufficient evidence to support Bryant's conviction.
Bryant also challenges his conviction for maintaining a common nuisance, contending the State failed to prove he committed a continuous or recurring violation sufficient to constitute the "maintenance" of a common nuisance. The Code required the State to prove Bryant knowingly or intentionally maintained a building that was used for unlawfully keeping, offering for sale, selling or delivering a controlled substance described in § 85-48-4-8.5 to convict him of maintaining a common nuisance. Ind.Code Ann. § 85-48-4-18(b)(2) (West Supp.1994). We have not previously addressed whether § 85-48-4-13 requires the State to prove continuous or recurring possession. We did conclude, however, that continuous or recurring possession was an element under a former statute on the grounds that the "maintains" or "maintaining" language of the act implicitly required proof of a continuing or recurring violation. Keeth v. State (1923), 193 Ind. 549, 550, 139 N.E. 589, 590.25 Because § 35-48-4-18(b) contains this same language in its body and title, we hold the State must have proven Bryant's recurring or continuous violation.
[303]*303At trial, the State presented evidence which proved Bryant possessed substantial amounts of marijuana, a complex growing system and a variety of drug paraphernalia employed to cultivate, preserve and use marijuana in his home. When coupled with Bryant's confession that he was growing the marijuana for his own use, this evidence was sufficient to prove continuing possession of a common nuisance.
VI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Bryant's convictions for failure to pay the CSET, growing and cultivating marijuana and misdemeanor possession. We affirm his conviction for maintaining a common nuisance.
DICKSON and SELBY, JJ., concur.
DeBRULER, J., concurs and dissents with separate opinion to follow.
SULLIVAN, J., dissents with separate opinion.