Bry-Fern Care Center, Inc., Petitioner/cross-Respondent v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent/cross-Petitioner

21 F.3d 706, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2041, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3853
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 28, 1994
Docket92-6484, 92-6561
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 21 F.3d 706 (Bry-Fern Care Center, Inc., Petitioner/cross-Respondent v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent/cross-Petitioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Bry-Fern Care Center, Inc., Petitioner/cross-Respondent v. National Labor Relations Board, Respondent/cross-Petitioner, 21 F.3d 706, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2041, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3853 (6th Cir. 1994).

Opinion

SILER, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner, Bry-Fern Care Center, Inc. (“Bry-Fern”), a nursing home in Michigan, challenges an order of the National Labor Relations Board (“the Board”) requiring Bry-Fern to bargain with and furnish relevant information to Local 79, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC (“the Union”). Bry-Fern claims that the collective-bargaming unit determined by the Board is inappropriate. The Board has filed a cross-application for enforcement of its order.

For the reasons stated below, we deny Bry-Fem’s petition and grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.

I.

Bry-Fern employs thirty-five to forty service and maintenance employees. In July 1991, Bry-Fern purchased a four-stall commercial car wash about five miles from the nursing home and converted two of the stalls into a laundry facility, installing two commercial washers and three commercial dryers. Previously, the nursing home did not have commercial laundry facilities and always contracted with outside laundry services; Bry-Fern did, however, have two residential-sized washers and dryers, and Bry-Fern employees used these machines to do the patients’ personal laundry. The home was subject to maximum daily water usage limits that precluded it from meeting all of its laundry needs on-site, so Bry-Fern obtained the off-site laundry facility to reduce on-site water consumption. In mid-September 1991, the off-site facility began handling all of the nursing home’s laundry, including the patients’ personal laundry, though one of the car wash stalls continued to operate as a customer-operated car wash.

The laundry is staffed by two full-time employees, Beatrice Holmes and Rheba Williams, who had worked previously at the nursing home. Holmes had worked in the on-site laundry, and Williams had worked with the housekeeping staff, in addition to occasionally substituting for Holmes. They both transferred voluntarily to the off-site laundry when it began operating.

Holmes and Williams work exclusively at the off-site laundry facility. Their duties involve only the laundry operations; they have no responsibilities relating to the coin-operated car wash. Their supervisor, Chris Laski, is Director of Plant Operations for the nursing home, and his office is at the nursing home. Holmes and Williams are on the same payroll system as the nursing home’s other employees and are subject to the same personnel policies as the other employees of the nursing home. They work the same hours and receive the same wage and employment benefits as the other housekeeping employees of the home. Aside from Laski, who disburses their payroll checks, and other supervisors, who deliver the home’s laundry to the off-site facility, Holmes and Williams have no working contact with the other employees. Since they began working at the laundry facility, neither Holmes nor Williams has had any need, in the course of her work, to go to the nursing home.

On November 12, 1991, the Union filed a representation petition with the Board, seeking certification as the collective bargaining representative of the nursing home’s service and maintenance employees. The Union and the nursing home agreed that the bargaining unit would include the nursing home’s full-time and regular part-time nursing assistants, cooks, dietary aides, and housekeeping and custodial employees. A representation hearing was held on December 9, 1991 to determine whether the two employees from *709 the off-site laundry should be included in the unit.

The Regional Director issued a Decision and Direction of Election on December 20, 1991, finding that the laundry was a “satellite” of the nursing home and that Holmes and Williams were appropriately included in the bargaining unit. Bry-Fem filed a request for review, which the Board denied on January 16, 1992.

On January 17, 1992, the Board conducted a secret-ballot election among the unit employees. The Union won by a vote of 15 to 13, and the Regional Director certified the Union as the unit’s exclusive collective bargaining representative.

Subsequently, Bry-Fern refused the Union’s requests to bargain and furnish information. The General Counsel issued a complaint alleging that the nursing home was engaging in unfair labor practices; Bry-Fem responded by contesting the validity of the Board’s certification of the Union. The Board granted summary judgment for the General Counsel and ordered the nursing home to bargain with and furnish information to the Union.

II.

Determining an appropriate bargaining unit is closely tied to the unique facts of any given case. See Park Manor Care Ctr., 305 N.L.R.B. 872, 1991WL 276548 at *5 (Dec. 18, 1991). Therefore, the Board is given broad discretion in making unit determinations, NLRB v. Catherine McAuley Health Ctr., 885 F.2d 341, 344 (6th Cir.1989), and we will uphold a unit determination unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or an abuse of discretion, Armco, Inc. v. NLRB, 832 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042, 108 S.Ct. 2034, 100 L.Ed.2d 619 (1988). Any factual findings made by the Board in the course of a unit determination, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive. Id. at 362-63. A Board decision, “if not final, is rarely to be disturbed.” Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491, 67 S.Ct. 789, 793, 91 L.Ed. 1040 (1947). See also NLRB v. First Union Management, Inc., 777 F.2d 330, 333 (6th Cir.1985); NLRB v. American Seaway Foods, Inc., 702 F.2d 630, 632 (6th Cir.1983). In making a unit determination, the Board must select an “appropriate” bargaining unit. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b). Often there will be a range of appropriate units, and the Board is not required to select the most appropriate unit. American Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606, 610, 111 S.Ct. 1539, 1542, 113 L.Ed.2d 675 (1991); First Union Management, 777 F.2d at 333; NLRB v. Fuelgas Co., 674 F.2d 529, 530 (6th Cir.1982).

In evaluating the appropriateness of a unit determination, we follow the “community of interests” test: two groups of employees can properly be included in the same bargaining unit if they share a “ ‘community of interests sufficient to justify their mutual inclusion in a single bargaining unit.’ ” Armco, 832 F.2d at 362 (quoting Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir.1978)). The community of interests test considers several factors:

(1) similarity in skills, interests, duties, and working conditions;

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21 F.3d 706, 146 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2041, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 3853, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bry-fern-care-center-inc-petitionercross-respondent-v-national-labor-ca6-1994.