Brummett v. Cyr

355 P.2d 994, 56 Wash. 2d 904, 1960 Wash. LEXIS 431

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Decided: October 13, 1960
• Docket: 34964
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mallery, J.

— This action arose out of a rear-end automobile collision at a traffic-light controlled street intersection in the city of Yakima on December 6, 1956. The plaintiff was driving north on south First street at a speed of about fifteen miles an hour. He was followed by the defendant at a distance of from thirty to fifty feet. The streets were covered with packed snow and ice. Plaintiff had just mounted snow tires on his automobile and wanted to test their efficacy. As he approached the intersection with Maple street, the green light turned to amber. He applied his brakes and made a sudden stop with all but two and one-half feet of his car beyond the intersecting crosswalk. The defendant could not stop and rammed the rear end of plaintiff’s car, causing the injuries here in question.

From a judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff appeals.

The appellant assigns as error the trial court’s failure to give his requested instruction No. 1, which would have taken the issue of contributory negligence from the jury. He contends that as a matter of law he could not be guilty of contributory negligence in making a stop in compliance with the amber light.

The duty of a driver approaching an intersection when a light turns amber is governed by Yakima city ordinance No. B-1526, chapter V, § 24(a), which provides, inter alia:

“2. Yellow alone or the word ‘Caution’ when shown following green or ‘Go’ signal: Vehicular traffic facing the signal is thereby warned that the red or stop signal shall be exhibited immediately thereafter, and such vehicular traffic shall not enter or be crossing the intersection when the red or stop signal is exhibited. . '. .” (Italics ours.)

Under the ordinance, a driver approaching an amber light is justified in proceeding through an intersection when he can do so before the amber light turns red, but his right to stop is absolute. He need never gamble on his ability to clear the intersection in time.

At such an intersection, there are two different relationships between motor vehicle drivers. The first relates to the function of the light, which is to alternate the flow of traffic on the intersecting streets. The light indicates definitely and certainly the prevailing right of way at any given moment. The duty to yield the right of'way in accordance with the light is upon all vehicles both forward and following which are approaching the intersection. The achievement of a safe right of way, which is the purpose served by the light, could not be attained otherwise.

The relationship between forward and following vehicles on the same street is subservient to the primary purpose of determining the right of way at an intersection. The drivers are equally governed by a signal light. There is never a duty on a forward vehicle to violate the right of way of vehicles in an intersecting street in order to protect a following vehicle from the harm of its failure to- stop.

The decisive factor in this case is the duty upon everyone to anticipate light changes and be able to act accordingly. This precludes the right to invoke the emergency doctrine on behalf of the following vehicle. The driver of a forward vehicle does not create an emergency by obeying a signal light. The driver of a following vehicle must anticipate that he will stop on an amber light and be able to act accordingly. Intolerable confusion as to one’s duty would result from requiring a forward driver to watch out for following vehicles and to decide, at his peril', whether to heed the light signal or not.

Only certainty of one’s duty can produce a uniformity of practice which.will implement the purpose served by a signal light. The mandate of a traffic light is the law of the moment, and following drivers will disobey it at their peril.

The trial court erred in submitting a question of contributory negligence on the part of the appellant to the jury.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Weaver, C. J., Hill, Rosellini, and Foster, JJ., concur.