Amestoy, C.J.
Norwich University appeals from the denial of its post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for a new trial, following a jury verdict finding it liable and awarding compensatory and punitive damages on several tort claims arising from incidents of hazing suffered by plaintiff while a freshman. Norwich University raises numerous issues with respect to its liability, the award of lost earnings damages, and the award of punitive damages. We affirm the court’s rulings on liability and lost earnings damages, but reverse the award of punitive damages because there was an insufficient showing of malice to support the award.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as we must on the appeal of both a motion for judgment as [121]*121a matter of law, see Silva v. Stevens, 156 Vt. 94, 101-02, 589 A.2d 852, 856 (1991), and a motion for a new trial, see Lent v. Huntoon, 143 Vt. 539, 552, 470 A.2d 1162, 1170 (1983), the facts are as follows. In August 1990, plaintiff William C. Brueckner, Jr. arrived as an incoming freshman, or “rook,” at the Military College of Vermont of Norwich University (Norwich). At the time, he was a twenty-four year old, five-year veteran of the United States Navy, having been awarded a four-year naval ROTC scholarship in the amount of $80,000 to attend Norwich. Under the authority and training of Norwich and its leadership, certain upperclassmen were appointed by the university to indoctrinate and orient the incoming rooks, including plaintiff. These upperclassmen were known as the “cadre.”
Plaintiff attended Norwich for only sixteen days as a result of his subjection to, and observation of, numerous incidents of hazing. In those sixteen days, plaintiff withstood a regular barrage of obscene, offensive and harassing language. He was interrogated at meals and thereby prevented from eating. He was ordered to disrobe in front of a female student, although he did not follow the order. He was prevented from studying during some of the assigned study periods and, on several occasions, cadre members destroyed his academic work with water. Members of the cadre also forced him to squat in the hall as they squirted him with water. He was forced to participate in unauthorized calisthenic sessions, despite an injured shoulder. He was slammed into a wall by a cadre member riding a skateboard in the hall. After cadre members vandalized his room by dumping water in it, plaintiff was ordered to clean up the mess. On two occasions, plaintiff was prevented from attending mandatory ROTC study hall on time, leading him to believe his scholarship status was endangered. One morning, as plaintiff walked along the corridor in the dormitory, he encountered two cadre members, one of whom asked plaintiff where plaintiff’s name tag was. When plaintiff responded that he had forgotten it, one cadre member hit plaintiff hard in the shoulder, which was injured' and in a sling. After the other cadre member told the hitter to stop, the hitter struck plaintiff again in the same shoulder, causing pain and bruises. After reporting the hazing problems to Norwich officials, plaintiff left the campus, believing that his situation would not improve. He returned briefly once more, then withdrew from Norwich, his scholarship terminated. Norwich investigated plaintiff’s complaints and, as a result, several cadets were disciplined.
Plaintiff brought this action against Norwich for assault and battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction [122]*122of emotional distress and negligent supervision. By means of special interrogatories, the jury found Norwich liable on all counts and awarded plaintiff $100,000 for emotional distress, $8,600 for medical expenses, $80,000 for the lost four-year college scholarship and $300,000 to cover lost earnings (past and future). The jury also awarded $1.75 million in punitive damages. The court denied Norwich’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. Norwich appeals.
I. Norwich’s Liability
Norwich challenges the court’s denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law on each of plaintiff’s theories of liability. We find no error.
Judgment as a matter of law may be granted where “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [the nonmoving] party.” V.R.C.P. 50(a)(1), (b). Under the rule, a trial court considers the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, excluding the effect of any modifying evidence.” Lussier v. North Troy Eng’g Co., 149 Vt. 486, 490, 544 A.2d 1173, 1176 (1988). If evidence exists that may fairly and reasonably support all elements of the nonmoving party’s claim, judgment as a matter of law is improper. On appeal from a denial or grant of judgment as a matter of law, this Court also views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and excludes the effects of any modifying evidence. See Center v. Mad River Corp., 151 Vt. 408, 413, 561 A.2d 90, 93 (1989). The question is whether the result reached by the jury is “sound in law on the evidence produced.” Kinzer v. Degler Corp., 145 Vt. 410, 412, 491 A.2d 1017, 1018 (1985).
A. Vicarious Liability — Assault and Battery, Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
i. Vicarious Liability
Norwich claims error in the court’s entry of judgment on the claims of assault and battery, as well as negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, because those claims are premised on acts of the cadre members that were not authorized and did not occur within the scope of their employment. Norwich claims it should not be held vicariously liable for the cadre’s hazing.
Under the settled doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer or master is held vicariously liable for the tortious acts of an [123]*123employee or servant committed during, or incidental to, the scope of employment. See Anderson v. Toombs, 119 Vt. 40, 44-45, 117 A.2d 250, 253 (1955); Poplaski v. Lamphere, 152 Vt. 251, 257, 565 A.2d 1326, 1330 (1989). Norwich concedes that cadre members acted as its agents in “indoctrinating and orienting” rooks such as plaintiff. Norwich claims, however, that the tortious acts complained of were not committed within the cadre members’ “scope of employment.” Whether a given act is committed within the scope of employment is properly determined by the finder of fact after consideration of the attendant facts and circumstances of the particular case. See Anderson, 119 Vt. at 48, 117 A.2d at 254.
To be within the scope of employment, conduct must be of the same general nature as, or incidental to, the authorized conduct. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229(1) (1958). Conduct of the servant falls within the scope of employment if: (a) it is of the kind the servant is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master; and (d) in a case in which the force is intentionally used by the servant against another, it is not unexpectable by the master. See id. § 228(1). Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time and space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master. See id. § 228(2).
Here, the cadre were authorized by Norwich to indoctrinate and orient rooks through activities performed at various times of the day and night. A jury could reasonably find members of the cadre were acting in furtherance of their general duties to indoctrinate and orient the rooks and thus within their “scope of employment” at the time of the hazing incidents of which plaintiff complains.
Norwich argues that, because it had adopted policies against hazing and had instructed the cadre to refrain from mistreating the rooks, the tortious conduct was outside the scope of employment. Norwich contends that McHugh v. University of Vermont, 966 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1992), supports this result. In McHugh, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Vermont law, concluded that an employee who sexually and religiously harassed a fellow employee was not acting within the scope of employment. There, a major in the United States Army and an employee at the University of Vermont’s Department of Military Studies told plaintiff, a female secretary, that his definition of a “secretary” was a “paid whore.” The employee repeatedly joked about plaintiff contracting AIDS, stating that he [124]*124hoped she would be able to avoid infection. The employee also told plaintiff that it was “a good day to watch Catholic babies burn.” Id. at 68-69. The court rejected the argument that the employee’s conduct was within his scope of employment because it was within that scope for him to talk -with the plaintiff, either to give instructions or to avoid the awkwardness of silence at work. It held: “It can hardly be contended that [the employee’s] alleged conduct furthered the business” of his employer. Id. at 75.
The same cannot be said of this case, where the actions involved in hazing rooks may fairly be seen as qualitatively similar to the indoctrination and orientation with which the cadre members were charged. Indeed, Norwich described some of the acts of which plaintiff complained, such as forced calisthenics and questioning at mealtime, as not far removed from the official system of military discipline and training which recruits are expected to endure. The evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that the cadre members were acting within the scope of employment. See Belanger v. Village Pub I, Inc., 603 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992) (under doctrine of respondeat superior, employee’s failure to follow employer’s orders would not relieve employer of liability for employee’s tortious conduct if employee acted with apparent authority in furtherance of employer’s business).
ii. Assault and Battery
Norwich next claims that there was insufficient evidence to support plaintiff’s claim for assault and battery and thus, that the court erred when it denied Norwich judgment as a matter of law. Norwich concedes that an assault and battery occurred, but claims that vicarious liability cannot be established because insufficient evidence exists to identify the assailant as a member of the cadre. At trial, plaintiff could not recall whether the person who had struck him in the shoulder was a member of the cadre, but testified that he knew the assailant was not a rook and thought he was a member of the senior class. Plaintiff’s counsel stressed in closing argument that, although plaintiff’s memory failed him at trial, a report prepared in connection with plaintiff’s case contained his earlier statement to his roommate that the hitter had been a cadre member. Norwich claims that the identification in the report is triple hearsay and amounts to “conjecture, surmise or suspicion,” (quoting Burlson v. Caledonia Sand & Gravel Co., 127 Vt. 594, 597, 255 A.2d 680, 682 (1969)), which is inadequate as a matter of law to support the jury’s verdict.
[125]*125There is no absolute prohibition against the use of admitted hearsay evidence to support a jury’s verdict. See In re M.P., 138 Vt. 144, 146, 333 A.2d 116, 118 (1975). Particularly in light of the fact that Norwich commissioned the report and moved for its introduction at trial, it cannot complain of the jury’s consideration of a statement recorded therein. Notwithstanding plaintiff’s memory lapse at trial, the jury reasonably could have concluded that plaintiff’s earlier statement accurately recorded the attacker’s identity. The court correctly denied the motion for judgment as a matter of law.
iii. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Norwich claims that it was error for the court to uphold the jury’s finding of liability for the claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. To establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must make a threshold showing that he or someone close to him faced physical peril. See Francis v. Gaylord Container Corp., 837 F. Supp. 858, 864 (S.D. Ohio 1992), aff’d, 9 F.3d 107 (6th Cir. 1993). The prerequisites for establishing a claim differ according to whether plaintiff suffered a physical impact from an external force. See Kingston Square Tenants Ass’n v. Tuskegee Gardens, Ltd., 792 F. Supp. 1566, 1576-77 (S.D. Fla. 1992). If there has been an impact, plaintiff may recover for emotional distress stemming from the incident during which the impact occurred. See id. If plaintiff has not suffered an impact, plaintiff must show that: (1) he was within the “zone of danger” of an act negligently directed at him by defendant, (2) he was subjected to a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury, and (3) he in fact suffered substantial bodily injury or illness as a result. See Vaillancourt v. Medical Ctr. Hosp. of Vermont, 139 Vt. 138, 143, 425 A.2d 92, 95 (1980).
In this case, plaintiff withstood at least two incidents of physical impact by a cadre member. Plaintiff testified about the fear of personal injury he felt in connection with a cadre member’s careening down the dormitory hallway on a skateboard and “plowing” into rooks. On one such occasion, the cadre member ran into plaintiff. Plaintiff also testified as to the fear and apprehension he felt when struck twice in the shoulder he had previously injured. Plaintiff’s doctor testified that plaintiff suffered from post-traumatic-stress disorder and a major depressive disorder as a result of his perception that he was at risk of serious physical injury during the incidents just [126]*126described. The evidence at trial fairly and reasonably supported the jury’s verdict on negligent infliction of emotional distress.1
B. Direct Liability — Negligent Supervision
Norwich argues it was not liable to plaintiff for negligent supervision of the students in the cadre because it owed no duty of care to plaintiff. Norwich’s claim is premised on the fact that the hazing in question came at the hands of fellow students. It cites Smith v. Day, 148 Vt. 595, 599, 538 A.2d 157, 159 (1987), for the proposition that Norwich owed no duty to control the actions of Norwich students for the protection of plaintiff. We disagree because, unlike the Smith case, Norwich specifically charged cadre members with “indoctrinating and orienting” plaintiff.
A principal may, in addition to being found vicariously liable for tortious conduct of its agents, be found directly liable for damages resulting from negligent supervision of its agents’ activities. See Trahan-Laroche v. Lockheed Sanders, Inc., 657 A.2d 417, 419 (N.H. 1995); Mainella v. Staff Builders Indus. Servs., Inc., 608 A.2d 1141, 1145 (R.I. 1992) (direct liability for negligent supervision of employees or agents constitutes an entirely separate and distinct type of liability from vicarious liability under respondeat superior); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213. Norwich’s claim that it owed no duty to plaintiff under the circumstances of this case fails under these established principles. Under the Restatement, “[a] person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless . . . in the supervision of the activity.” Id. According to the Restatement’s drafters, § 213 “is a special application of the general rules stated in the Restatement of Torts .... Liability exists only if all the [127]*127requirements of an action of tort for negligence exist.” Id. cmt. a. In this instance, the cadre members, and by extension Norwich, owed plaintiff at minimum the duty to use reasonable care to avoid harming him. “One who engages in an enterprise is under a duty to anticipate and to guard against the human traits of his employees which unless regulated are likely to harm others. He is likewise required to make such reasonable regulations as the size or complexity of his business may require.” Id. cmt. g. Norwich, therefore, owed plaintiff a duty of reasonable care in the control and supervision of the cadre.
In the instant case, the court correctly instructed the jury that Norwich owed plaintiff a duty to use reasonable care in avoiding harm to plaintiff, and the evidence in the record fairly and reasonably supports the jury’s finding of liability.
II. Actual Damages — The Jury’s Lost Earnings Award
Norwich argues next that the trial court erred in failing to vacate the jury’s award of $300,000 in lost earning capacity, and that the expert testimony offered to support the award was based on speculation and was therefore irrelevant and should not have been admitted. When reviewing a jury’s award of damages, this Court must affirm the award “unless it appears to be clearly erroneous when the supporting evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and any modifying evidence is disregarded.” Meadowbrook Condo. Ass’n v. South Burlington Realty Corp., 152 Vt. 16, 26, 565 A.2d 238, 244 (1989). Specifically, when a party appeals a court’s refusal to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial on the grounds that the jury’s verdict is not supported by the evidence, “[w]e need only determine ‘whether the jury could reasonably have found its verdict for damages on the evidence before it.’” Lorrain v. Ryan, 160 Vt. 202, 209, 628 A.2d 543, 548 (1993) (quoting Brunelle v. Coffey, 128 Vt. 367, 370, 264 A.2d 782, 784 (1970)).
Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence before the jury concerning lost earnings consisted of the following. Plaintiff graduated from high school and spent five years as an enlisted officer in the Navy. He consistently received high ratings by his superior officers, and he improved his aptitude examination rating during his time in the Navy. In 1990, his application for admission into the civil engineering program at Norwich was accepted, and he was granted a full four-year ROTC scholarship. Although plaintiff remained at Norwich only long enough to take one examination in the fall of 1990, [128]*128he performed satisfactorily. As a result of hazing, plaintiff withdrew from Norwich and thereafter worked a series of relatively low-paying jobs, culminating with his employment as a postal worker at the time of trial. He testified that he wished ultimately to complete college but, due to work and family pressures existing since his departure from Norwich, he had not been able to resume college studies other than to take one night course at a community college. At the time of trial, plaintiff’s pursuit of a college education had been delayed more than six years as a result of his experiences at Norwich.
In calculating plaintiff’s lost earnings, his expert economist analyzed the difference in earnings over a lifetime between a high school graduate and a college graduate. Using U.S. Census Bureau data, and discounting the figures for present value, he determined that if plaintiff were a college graduate he would earn between $600,000 and $932,593 more over the course of his working life than he would as a high school graduate. The jury awarded plaintiff $300,000.
The difficulty of precise computation of the losses plaintiff has and will continúe to incur as a result of his premature departure from Norwich is not a ground to reverse a lost earnings award. See Imported Car Ctr., Inc. v. Billings, 163 Vt. 76, 82, 653 A.2d 765, 770 (1994) (upholding award of damages where plaintiff continued to incur expenses throughout trial and exact amount of damages could not be ascertained). Nor do we reverse such an award where a plaintiff has not yet acquired an earning capacity. See Melford v. S.V. Rossi Constr. Co., 131 Vt. 219, 223-24, 303 A.2d 146, 148 (1973) (holding that a person is not deprived of right to recover damages for loss of earning capacity in future, by fact that at time of injury he is not engaged in any particular employment).
There was ample evidence before the jury to support its award of lost earning capacity. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have considered and weighed such issues as whether and when plaintiff would return to college, the impact of the six years that had elapsed since his departure from Norwich, as well as his likelihood of successful completion if he returned to college. Applying its assessment of these and other variables to the testimony of the expert, the jury could reasonably have found that plaintiff lost or would lose approximately one-third of a college-educated working life as a result of his withdrawal from Norwich and subsequent inability to resume a college education; the jury’s award of $300,000 for past and future lost earning capacity — less than one-third of the [129]*129total amount the expert testified plaintiff would lose over his working lifetime — is reasonably supported by the evidence.
III. Punitive Damages
The purpose of punitive damages is to ‘“punish conduct which is morally culpable . . . [and] to deter a wrongdoer . . . from repetitions of the same or similar actions.’” Coty v. Ramsey Assocs., 149 Vt. 451, 467, 546 A.2d 196, 207 (1988) (quoting Davis v. Williams, 402 N.Y.S.2d 92, 94 (Civ. Ct. 1977)). Punitive damages are permitted “[w]here the defendant’s wrongdoing has been intentional and deliberate, and has the character of outrage frequently associated with crime.” W. Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 2, at 9 (5th ed. 1984). It is not enough to show that defendant’s acts are wrongful or unlawful — there must be proof of defendant’s “bad spirit and wrong intention.” Agency of Natural Resources v. Riendeau, 157 Vt. 615, 624-25, 603 A.2d 360, 365 (1991). Consistent with the view that punitive damages are to be applied to deter and to punish “truly reprehensible conduct,” Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1361 (Me. 1985), Vermont has long required a plaintiff to demonstrate that a defendant acted with malice in order to recover punitive damages. See Sparrow v. Vermont Savings Bank, 95 Vt. 29, 33, 112 A. 205, 207 (1921).
The Vermont test for the malice necessary to establish liability was first announced in 1921 in Sparrow, and most notably stated in Shortle v. Central Vermont Public Service Corp., 137 Vt. 32, 33, 399 A.2d 517, 518 (1979): “It must be shown that there was actual malice. This may be shown by conduct manifesting personal ill will or carried out under circumstances evidencing insult or oppression, or even by conduct showing a reckless or wanton disregard of one’s rights.” This test has been cited frequently since. See, e.g., Murray v. J & B Int’l Trucks, Inc., 146 Vt. 458, 465, 508 A.2d 1351, 1355 (1986); Bruntaeger v. Zeller, 147 Vt. 247, 252-53, 515 A.2d 123, 127 (1986); Ryan v. Herald Ass’n, Inc., 152 Vt. 275, 281, 566 A.2d 1316, 1320 (1989); Meadowbrook Condominium Ass’n, 152 Vt. at 28, 565 A.2d at 245; Crump v. P &C Food Markets, Inc., 154 Vt. 284, 298, 576 A.2d 441, 449 (1990); Wheeler v. Central Vt. Med. Ctr., Inc., 155 Vt. 85, 96, 582 A.2d 165, 171 (1989); Riendeau, 157 Vt. at 624, 603 A.2d at 365.
We have found punitive damages inappropriate where the evidence shows only that the defendant engaged in wrongful conduct. See Bruntaeger, 147 Vt. at 254, 515 A.2d at 127 (punitive damages properly denied because “defendant’s conduct, however wrongful, [130]*130was not malicious”); Meadowbrook, 152 Vt. at 28, 565 A.2d at 245 (after trial court assessed punitive damages because of defendant’s “willful violation” of consumer protection statute, Supreme Court reversed because “defendant’s conduct . . . however wrongful, did not evince the degree of malice required”). In Riendeau, the trial court assessed civil and punitive damages because the defendants in that case “knowingly and willfully discharged substances into waters of the state.” 157 Vt. at 623-24, 603 A.2d at 361-62. This Court remanded for further proceedings on punitive damages because “we believe that there must be some showing of bad motive to make knowing and intentional conduct malicious.” Id. at 625, 603 A.2d at 365.2
Here, plaintiff’s theory of Norwich’s liability for punitive damages was predicated not upon a showing of defendant’s “bad motive” in engaging in intentional misconduct, but instead upon “Norwich’s conscious choice to remain ignorant [of hazing] activities.” In upholding the punitive damages award, the judge described the rationale for the punitive damages request: “The jury was asked to impose punitive damages in order to punish Norwich for its inaction and inattention to the issue of hazing on campus.” (Emphasis added.)
A corporation may be held directly liable for punitive damages. As stated in Shortle, 137 Vt. at 33, 399 A.2d at 518:
The fact that the defendant is a corporation does not prevent an award of punitive damages in an appropriate case, but the malicious or unlawful act relied upon must be that of the governing officers of the corporation or one lawfully exercising their authority, or, if the act relied upon is that of a servant or agent of the corporation, it must be clearly shown that the governing officers either directed the act, participated in it, or subsequently ratified it.
While we have made clear our view that the board of trustees and management hierarchy of a corporation cannot insulate itself from the malice or its equivalent exhibited by staff, see Wheeler, 155 Vt. at 96, 582 A.2d at 171, we are not prepared to hold that inaction or inattention of senior corporate officers constitutes malice sufficient to [131]*131establish punitive damages liability. This is particularly true where, as here, the findings of fact made by the judge in upholding the jury’s punitive damages award are insufficient to support an inference that the defendant’s inaction was infused with “a bad motive,” Riendeau, 157 Vt. at 625, 603 A.2d at 365, giving rise to “outrage frequently associated with crime.” Prosser, supra, § 2, at 9.3
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as we must, the facts demonstrate that senior leadership at Norwich knew of numerous, often serious, hazings by the cadre that had taken place on campus during the years preceding plaintiff’s arrival there, and that Norwich officials left the cadre in “virtually unsupervised control” of plaintiff as a rook. A senior vice-president knew that rooks felt intimidated by the prospect of entering a complaint about hazing through the chain of command, and that no formal method of complaining about hazing outside of the chain of command existed while plaintiff was a rook. Furthermore, a security officer testified that he felt he was not encouraged to report hazing. From 1987 to 1991, Norwich did not implement any changes to its training of student leaders related to hazing, and no changes were introduced to the training patterns that were aimed at avoiding or reducing hazing. Significantly, however, the evidence indicates that Norwich considered hazing to be an inappropriate behavior and, when training the cadre, advised its members to stay within the rule and treat each other suitably. Norwich had an honor code, sworn to by all students, which prohibited hazing. When specific incidents of hazing were reported to the senior vice-president, investigations were conducted. If reports were found to be valid, disciplinary action was taken, ranging from punishment within the corps or loss of a cadet’s rank, to suspension or dismissal from Norwich. Disciplines were announced to the students by publishing an order from the administrative officer of the commandant’s office, posting it on all bulletin boards, and giving it to all members of the corps. It was also read in company formation.
On the basis of this record it may be fair to conclude, as indeed the court did, that the defendant was “indifferent to the health and safety [132]*132of the rooks in its custody and control.” But indifference attributable to negligence is not malice. See Prosser, supra, § 2, at 10:
There is general agreement that, because it lacks [the element of malice], mere negligence is not enough, even though it is so extreme in degree as to be characterized as “gross,” a term of ill-defined content, which occasionally, in a few jurisdictions, has been stretched to include the element of conscious indifference to consequences, and so to justify punitive damages.4
“‘To sanction punitive damages solely upon the basis of conduct characterized as ‘heedless disregard of the consequences’ would be to allow virtually limitless imposition of punitive damages.’” Tuttle, 494 A.2d at 1361 (quoting Miller Pipeline Corp. v. Broeker, 460 N.E.2d 177, 185 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984)).5
We conclude, then, with the view that Norwich’s action or inaction, “however wrongful, did not evince the degree of malice required” under our cases. Meadowbrook, 152 Vt. at 28, 565 A.2d at 245. Punitive damages awarded on these facts would only “dull[] the potentially keen edge of the doctrine as an effective deterrent of truly reprehensible conduct.” Tuttle, 494 A.2d at 1361.6
IV. Motion for New Trial
Finally, Norwich claims that the court erred by denying its motion for a new trial. A decision concerning a motion for new trial pursuant to V.R.C.P. 59(a) lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only where there has been an abuse of [133]*133discretion. See Hoague v. Cota, 140 Vt. 588, 591, 442 A.2d 1282, 1283 (1982). “Such abuse will be found only when the trial court has entirely withheld its discretion or where the exercise of its discretion was for clearly untenable reasons or to an extent that is clearly untenable.” Lent, 143 Vt. at 552, 470 A.2d at 1171. We afford “all possible presumptive support, similar to the support the trial court owes to a jury verdict.” Gregory v. Vermont Traveler, Inc., 140 Vt. 119, 121, 435 A.2d 955, 956 (1981)). In light of our consideration of the record in connection with Norwich’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, we find no abuse of discretion.
The judgment of punitive damages is reversed. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.