BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
Paul Bruce appeals the district court’s grant of attorney’s fees in the amount of $7,500 to the City of Gainesville, Georgia (“the City”) as the prevailing party in Bruce’s suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADA”).1 After summary judgment was entered on its behalf, the City moved for attorney’s fees under the fee-shifting provision of the ADA:
In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs....
42 U.S.C. § 12205.
This Court has not directly addressed the issue of what standard must be applied in assessing attorney’s fees under the ADA. The district court applied the test established in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 [951] L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), which construed an almost identical provision under Title VII and which has been adopted by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits for the purposes of deciding fee disputes under the ADA. See, e.g., Adkins v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 159 F.3d 306 (7th Cir.1998); Summers v. A Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.1997).
In Christiansburg, the Supreme Court reiterated that, under Title VII, a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances. However, the Court noted that the equitable considerations supporting this standard for prevailing plaintiff attorney’s fees is absent for prevailing defendants,2 and thus a different standard was needed to be applied for prevailing defendants. The Court stated that Congress wanted to assure that defendants could be protected from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis, and held that “a district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Id. at 418-21, 98 S.Ct. 694. To be deemed “meritless” for purposes of assessing a prevailing defendant’s attorney’s fees, it is not enough that the plaintiff had ultimately lost his case. The Court cautioned district courts to
resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom, can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest one’s belief that he has been a victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one’s claim may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable.
Id. at 421-22, 98 S.Ct. 694.
We agree with the Seventh and Ninth circuits and find that there are substantial justifications for finding that the reasons for assigning attorney’s fees under Title VII apply equally to attorney’s fees under the ADA. First, the language of the ADA’s fee-shifting provision is substantially the same as the Title VII provision involved in Christiansburg and the Supreme Court has stated that “fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is 'a strong indication’ that they are • to be interpreted alike.” Independent Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 2732, 105 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (quoting Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980)). Second, the ADA’s legislative history indicates that Congress intended that the standards set forth in Christians-burg would apply to cases brought under the ADA. The House Report cites Christiansburg in finding that, “[i]t is intended that the term ‘prevailing party’ be interpreted consistently with other civil rights laws. Plaintiffs should not be assessed opponents’ attorneys’ fees unless a court finds the plaintiffs claim is ‘frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.’ ” Staff of House Education and Labor Committee, 101st Congress, Legislative History of Public Law 101-336, the Americans with Disability Act, Committee Print Prepared for the House Education and Labor Com[952] mittee (Comm. Pript 1990). Finally, we note that Christiansburg’s rationale applies squarely in ADA eases. In Title VII cases as well as cases under the ADA, the enforcement of civil rights statutes by plaintiffs as private attorneys general is an important part of the underlying policy behind the law. Such a policy ensures an incentive for “impecunious” plaintiffs who can ill afford to litigate their claims against defendants with more resources and thus justifies the differential treatment of prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants. See Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (declining to apply Christiansburg to cases under the Copyright Act because unlike the civil rights context, both the plaintiffs and defendants can “ ‘run the gamut from corporate behemoths to starving artists’ ”) (quoting Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 617 F.Supp. 619, 622-23 (E.D.Va.1985)).
This Circuit, recognizing that determinations regarding frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis, has identified several factors to help inform that determination, among them: “(1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on the merits.” Sullivan v. School Board of Pinellas County, 773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir.1985). As this Court noted in Sullivan, however, “[wjhile these general guidelines can be discerned from the case law, they are general guidelines only and not hard and fast rules. Determinations regarding frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis.” Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1189. Thus, we hold that Christians-burg applies under the ADA and that the district court was correct in using the Christiansburg standard.
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BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
Paul Bruce appeals the district court’s grant of attorney’s fees in the amount of $7,500 to the City of Gainesville, Georgia (“the City”) as the prevailing party in Bruce’s suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADA”).1 After summary judgment was entered on its behalf, the City moved for attorney’s fees under the fee-shifting provision of the ADA:
In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs....
42 U.S.C. § 12205.
This Court has not directly addressed the issue of what standard must be applied in assessing attorney’s fees under the ADA. The district court applied the test established in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 694, 54 [951] L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), which construed an almost identical provision under Title VII and which has been adopted by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits for the purposes of deciding fee disputes under the ADA. See, e.g., Adkins v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 159 F.3d 306 (7th Cir.1998); Summers v. A Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.1997).
In Christiansburg, the Supreme Court reiterated that, under Title VII, a prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily be awarded attorney’s fees in all but special circumstances. However, the Court noted that the equitable considerations supporting this standard for prevailing plaintiff attorney’s fees is absent for prevailing defendants,2 and thus a different standard was needed to be applied for prevailing defendants. The Court stated that Congress wanted to assure that defendants could be protected from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis, and held that “a district court may in its discretion award attorney’s fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Id. at 418-21, 98 S.Ct. 694. To be deemed “meritless” for purposes of assessing a prevailing defendant’s attorney’s fees, it is not enough that the plaintiff had ultimately lost his case. The Court cautioned district courts to
resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom, can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how honest one’s belief that he has been a victim of discrimination, no matter how meritorious one’s claim may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely predictable.
Id. at 421-22, 98 S.Ct. 694.
We agree with the Seventh and Ninth circuits and find that there are substantial justifications for finding that the reasons for assigning attorney’s fees under Title VII apply equally to attorney’s fees under the ADA. First, the language of the ADA’s fee-shifting provision is substantially the same as the Title VII provision involved in Christiansburg and the Supreme Court has stated that “fee-shifting statutes’ similar language is 'a strong indication’ that they are • to be interpreted alike.” Independent Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 2732, 105 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (quoting Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 n. 4, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980)). Second, the ADA’s legislative history indicates that Congress intended that the standards set forth in Christians-burg would apply to cases brought under the ADA. The House Report cites Christiansburg in finding that, “[i]t is intended that the term ‘prevailing party’ be interpreted consistently with other civil rights laws. Plaintiffs should not be assessed opponents’ attorneys’ fees unless a court finds the plaintiffs claim is ‘frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.’ ” Staff of House Education and Labor Committee, 101st Congress, Legislative History of Public Law 101-336, the Americans with Disability Act, Committee Print Prepared for the House Education and Labor Com[952] mittee (Comm. Pript 1990). Finally, we note that Christiansburg’s rationale applies squarely in ADA eases. In Title VII cases as well as cases under the ADA, the enforcement of civil rights statutes by plaintiffs as private attorneys general is an important part of the underlying policy behind the law. Such a policy ensures an incentive for “impecunious” plaintiffs who can ill afford to litigate their claims against defendants with more resources and thus justifies the differential treatment of prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants. See Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 524, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994) (declining to apply Christiansburg to cases under the Copyright Act because unlike the civil rights context, both the plaintiffs and defendants can “ ‘run the gamut from corporate behemoths to starving artists’ ”) (quoting Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 617 F.Supp. 619, 622-23 (E.D.Va.1985)).
This Circuit, recognizing that determinations regarding frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis, has identified several factors to help inform that determination, among them: “(1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on the merits.” Sullivan v. School Board of Pinellas County, 773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir.1985). As this Court noted in Sullivan, however, “[wjhile these general guidelines can be discerned from the case law, they are general guidelines only and not hard and fast rules. Determinations regarding frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis.” Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1189. Thus, we hold that Christians-burg applies under the ADA and that the district court was correct in using the Christiansburg standard.
Turning to the facts of this case, we find that Bruce’s belief that he had been terminated because of his disability to be not unreasonable under the circumstances. Bruce had worked as a laborer in the City’s Sanitation Department for more than 10 years and had received several promotions and pay raises before his right hand was crushed by a broken safety cover. After taking medical leave and returning to work, the City told him that there was no work for him to perform and to “turn in [his] uniforms,” a turn-of-phrase commonly used when a worker has been terminated. While he was out, Bruce did not receive what appeared to him to be his normal paycheck or his expected pay increase. However, he was given a job as a groundskeeper at the City cemetery shortly after he filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging disability discrimination arising from his alleged forced retirement.
While Bruce’s allegations, taken as a whole, do not provide enough evidence to support denial of the City’s summary judgment motion on Bruce’s ADA claim, we disagree that Bruce’s lawsuit was so factually or legally groundless as to constitute a frivolous lawsuit from the outset. As we have said,
[i]n determining whether a suit is frivolous, “a district court must focus on whether the case is so lacking in arguable merit as to be groundless or without foundation rather than whether the claim was ultimately successful.”
Id. at 1189 (quoting Jones v. Texas Tech. University, 656 F.2d 1137, 1145 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that unless the district court finds all testimony to be “absolutely incredible, and pure fabrication,” its finding of frivolity cannot be sustained)). In this case, we cannot say that Bruce’s contentions and testimony at the outset of the case were so lacking in merit that the filing and maintaining of the lawsuit deserved an award of attorney’s fees for the defendant. For this reason, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that, under the Christians-burg standard, fees should be assessed against Bruce, and we vacate the district court’s grant of attorney’s fees to the City.
[953] REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance herewith.