Brownlee v. United Fidelity Life Insurance

117 F.R.D. 383, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9568
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Mississippi
DecidedJuly 17, 1987
DocketCiv. A. No. H86-0129(R)
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 117 F.R.D. 383 (Brownlee v. United Fidelity Life Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brownlee v. United Fidelity Life Insurance, 117 F.R.D. 383, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9568 (S.D. Miss. 1987).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DAN M. RUSSELL, Jr., District Judge.

This cause is presently before the Court on the Motions of United Fidelity Life Insurance Company (United Fidelity) for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for a New Trial. For the reasons more fully set out herein, this Court is of the opinion that the Motion for a New Trial is well taken and should be granted.

This case was tried in Hattiesburg, Mississippi in May, 1987. This Court then submitted the issues of actual and punitive damages to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in the amount of $2,500.00 actual damages and $57,200.00 punitive damages. This Court entered judgment on the jury verdict on May 21, 1987. United Fidelity then filed alternative post-trial motions in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), 54(d) and 59(a), within the time required pursuant to Rules 50 and 59. This Court is aware that United Fidelity’s alternative Motion for New Trial requested a judgment in its favor as to punitive damages and a new trial only as to actual damages. However, this Court is of the opinion that in light of the multiple improper statements made in closing argument by plaintiff's counsel, a complete new trial on all issues is warranted.

When determining if a new trial is required, the Court must separate the damages and liability issues. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck and Company, 512 F.2d [385]*385276 (5th Cir.1975). If it can be established that passion, prejudice, caprice, undue sympathy or arbitrariness tainted only the damage award and not the liability assessment, the proper response is a remittitur or a new trial addressed to damages alone. Pingatore v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 419 F.2d 1138 (6th Cir.1969) cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928, 90 S.Ct. 1818, 26 L.Ed 90 (1970). However, where it appears “that the improper jury action, in reasonable probability, affected both the liability and damages issues, then a new trial as to both issues must be ordered.” Edwards, 512 F.2d at 283.

The propriety of an argument is a matter of federal trial procedure, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525, 78 S.Ct. 893, 2 L.Ed.2d 953 (1958), and in a diversity case, subject to federal rather than state law. Baron Tube Co. v. Transport Insurance Co., 365 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.1966) (en banc). Therefore, even if no objections were made by defense counsel, this Court has been advised that where the defendant's right to a fair trial has been prejudiced, the error must be corrected and a new trial provided. Edwards, 512 F.2d at 286.

The following is the closing argument of plaintiffs counsel in its entirety. The areas of argument that this Court considers improper are specifically underlined.

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MR. ABERNATHY: He said they didn’t reduce because they didn’t have a policy. Ladies and gentlemen, if you believe they didn’t have a policy they did one of two things, they either reduced it or they can-celled it. One of the two. And they had the policy. No question about that in my mind and I think in your mind too.

They sent this amendment after the policy was issued. You look at the amendment. It says this file will be closed 4/31. The policy was issued a full two weeks before that. That’s why they put 4/31 on there. The policy was already in effect and they knew it.

They said, “We might be able to slide this in.”

It is also interesting to note that this man now has two policies sold by the same agent, for $500 apiece, and the maximum coordination of benefits that he can receive under those two policies came from this man on the stand, Mr. Barry, he said $800.

You know, it is just one story when they sell it to you and it is another story when you try to collect it, and that’s the truth of insurance. That’s the truth of this case right here.

You know, this morning at 2:30 I woke up and I hadn’t been able to go back to sleep thinking about it—I have been talking to you you-all, you know, I know you haven’t heard me but I have been talking to you-all, walking through the house and all and it just occurs to me that you folks have been called for jury- duty since April 10th, of 1986. That’s over a year, and some of you have been able to sit on cases and some of you haven’t and the cases that you sat on, more than likely, if they weren’t criminal matters, really—they were money disputes and it really didn’t much matter to you, for sure, but to anybody other than the people involved. They didn’t have any effect on the public in general. They didn’t have any effect on the law as it will be interpreted in the future. It just wouldn’t change anything. Your vote in those cases may or may not have been very important.

I kind of wonder when I go to vote, and I vote every time. Some guy wins and I’ll go look at the tally on the T.Y. that night and you know, some guy wins by a tremendous margin and I wonder, “What did my vote count?” You know? If I hadn’t even voted, would it have mattered?

I am sure you wonder in these kind of cases, “What does it mean?” You know? It is just a dispute. This guy wants some money and the insurance company don’t want to pay it. You know, a big deal.

But folks, I thought about it and it dawned on me, way before dawn, that this Bruce Barry came in here, he is not paid by this insurance company, he is not paid by this defendant, the lawyers. You heard what he said, “Well, I work for a subsidi[386]*386ary or two or three subsidiaries and we work for North American,” and I don’t remember all the insurance companies he named, but it is the entire insurance industry.

That’s what we are talking about. Billy Brownlee doesn’t matter. That’s what I thought this morning. This insurance company doesn’t matter. That’s not what this case is about. And it just hit me like a ton of bricks.

They sent this man in here, the industry. Of course, he testified he wasn’t an expert, but he was the president of the company and all this here. The industry is looking at this case. They want to know what it takes, what can they do, they can put these things in their brochures and they can tell you point blank, “We are not going to do this. We are not going to cancel you. You can renew this policy until you are 65 years old.” All this glorious language. You see it on T.V. I’ll bet you saw it this morning. “No physical exam.”

You-all, that’s what they want to know. They want to know how far they can take it. How much can they tell you until they say, “Yeah, that’s what it says. It says $1,000 on there but that ain’t what it means. We got these underwriting guidelines and all this other kind of stuff that we are going to refer to if you ever submit a claim,” and you had better believe if Billy Brown ever submits another claim—I hope he never breaks his neck again—but if he ever submits another claim they are going to say, “Ha! we have got this coordination of benefits. We are going to reduce it.” You know.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
117 F.R.D. 383, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9568, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brownlee-v-united-fidelity-life-insurance-mssd-1987.