24-970-cv Brown v. Mellekas
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER“). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 3rd day of April, two thousand twenty-five.
PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------
RALSTON BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 24-970-cv
MELLEKAS, POLICE OFFICER COL.; IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, SUPERIOR FOR THE CONNECTICUT; IN HIS OR HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, MATTHEW GARCIA, POLICE OFFICER SAG.; IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY,
Defendants-Appellees.* 1 ------------------------------------------------------------------
FOR APPELLANT: Ralston Brown, pro se, Bridgeport, CT
FOR APPELLEES: David C. Yale, Assistant Attorney General, for William Tong, Attorney General for the State of Connecticut, Hartford, CT
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut (Jeffrey Alker Meyer, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
Ralston Brown, proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J.) dismissing his
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three Connecticut State Police officers.
The complaint arises from the enforcement of a state law requirement that Brown
register as a sex offender for a conviction that predated the existence of
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above. 2 Connecticut’s registry law. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as
necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations
in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002).
“[S]ubmissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to
raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Meadows v. United Servs., Inc.,
963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). To survive a
Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007).
Based on a guilty plea entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25 (1970) (an “Alford plea”), Brown was convicted in 1993 in Connecticut state
court of conspiracy to engage in third-degree sexual assault. Connecticut
subsequently enacted legislation requiring the registration of sex offenders and
made the requirement retroactive for anyone “convicted” of sexually violent
3 offenses, including Brown’s count of conviction. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-252
(Connecticut’s “Megan’s Law”). Brown argues that the retroactive application of
Megan’s Law—particularly its residence verification requirement—violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. He asserts that the Connecticut
sex offender registration scheme is unconstitutional because when he entered an
Alford plea, he did not know that he would later be required to register as a sex
offender. We are not persuaded. “To violate the Ex Post Facto Clause . . . a law
must be retrospective—that is, it must apply to events occurring before its
enactment—and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it, by altering the
definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.” U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ahmed, 72 F.4th 379, 401 (2d Cir. 2023) (quotation marks
omitted). A non-punitive legislative act that is applied retroactively does not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 106 (2003). And the
United States Supreme Court and this Court have described as not punitive state
laws that are similar in every relevant way to Connecticut’s Megan’s Law. Id. at
105–06 (Alaska); Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 109–12 (2d Cir. 2014) (New York); Roe
v. Office of Adult Probation, 125 F.3d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that Connecticut’s
Office of Adult Probation sex offender notification policy is not punitive). The
4 Connecticut Supreme Court has similarly “conclude[d] that [Connecticut’s
Megan’s Law] is regulatory and not punitive in nature.” State v. Kelly, 256 Conn.
23, 94 (2001); Goguen v. Comm’r of Corr., 341 Conn. 508, 530–31 (2021).
Brown next claims that his procedural due process rights were violated
because the registration requirement was imposed without a hearing regarding
his future dangerousness. We reject this argument because, as the United States
Supreme Court observed, “Connecticut . . . has decided that the registry
requirement shall be based on the fact of previous conviction, not the fact of
current dangerousness.” Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); see
id. at 7–8. Because “an Alford plea results in the defendant’s conviction on the
crime at issue to the same extent as any other guilty plea,” Burrell v. United States,
384 F.3d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 2004), Brown was subject to the registration requirement
based on a valid conviction.
Brown likewise suggests that the registration requirement violates his
substantive due process right to privacy. For the reasons stated in decisions that
have addressed similar challenges, we reject that challenge as well. See Cuomo,
755 F.3d at 114. Here, too, Brown has failed to allege government conduct that
“may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Goe v. Zucker, 43
5 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted).
We also reject Brown’s argument that the District Court erroneously
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
24-970-cv Brown v. Mellekas
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER“). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 3rd day of April, two thousand twenty-five.
PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------
RALSTON BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 24-970-cv
MELLEKAS, POLICE OFFICER COL.; IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, SUPERIOR FOR THE CONNECTICUT; IN HIS OR HER INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY, MATTHEW GARCIA, POLICE OFFICER SAG.; IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY,
Defendants-Appellees.* 1 ------------------------------------------------------------------
FOR APPELLANT: Ralston Brown, pro se, Bridgeport, CT
FOR APPELLEES: David C. Yale, Assistant Attorney General, for William Tong, Attorney General for the State of Connecticut, Hartford, CT
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut (Jeffrey Alker Meyer, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
Ralston Brown, proceeding pro se, appeals from a judgment of the United
States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Meyer, J.) dismissing his
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against three Connecticut State Police officers.
The complaint arises from the enforcement of a state law requirement that Brown
register as a sex offender for a conviction that predated the existence of
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above. 2 Connecticut’s registry law. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as
necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations
in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor.” Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002).
“[S]ubmissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted to
raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Meadows v. United Servs., Inc.,
963 F.3d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). To survive a
Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007).
Based on a guilty plea entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25 (1970) (an “Alford plea”), Brown was convicted in 1993 in Connecticut state
court of conspiracy to engage in third-degree sexual assault. Connecticut
subsequently enacted legislation requiring the registration of sex offenders and
made the requirement retroactive for anyone “convicted” of sexually violent
3 offenses, including Brown’s count of conviction. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-252
(Connecticut’s “Megan’s Law”). Brown argues that the retroactive application of
Megan’s Law—particularly its residence verification requirement—violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. He asserts that the Connecticut
sex offender registration scheme is unconstitutional because when he entered an
Alford plea, he did not know that he would later be required to register as a sex
offender. We are not persuaded. “To violate the Ex Post Facto Clause . . . a law
must be retrospective—that is, it must apply to events occurring before its
enactment—and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it, by altering the
definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.” U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ahmed, 72 F.4th 379, 401 (2d Cir. 2023) (quotation marks
omitted). A non-punitive legislative act that is applied retroactively does not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 106 (2003). And the
United States Supreme Court and this Court have described as not punitive state
laws that are similar in every relevant way to Connecticut’s Megan’s Law. Id. at
105–06 (Alaska); Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105, 109–12 (2d Cir. 2014) (New York); Roe
v. Office of Adult Probation, 125 F.3d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that Connecticut’s
Office of Adult Probation sex offender notification policy is not punitive). The
4 Connecticut Supreme Court has similarly “conclude[d] that [Connecticut’s
Megan’s Law] is regulatory and not punitive in nature.” State v. Kelly, 256 Conn.
23, 94 (2001); Goguen v. Comm’r of Corr., 341 Conn. 508, 530–31 (2021).
Brown next claims that his procedural due process rights were violated
because the registration requirement was imposed without a hearing regarding
his future dangerousness. We reject this argument because, as the United States
Supreme Court observed, “Connecticut . . . has decided that the registry
requirement shall be based on the fact of previous conviction, not the fact of
current dangerousness.” Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); see
id. at 7–8. Because “an Alford plea results in the defendant’s conviction on the
crime at issue to the same extent as any other guilty plea,” Burrell v. United States,
384 F.3d 22, 28 (2d Cir. 2004), Brown was subject to the registration requirement
based on a valid conviction.
Brown likewise suggests that the registration requirement violates his
substantive due process right to privacy. For the reasons stated in decisions that
have addressed similar challenges, we reject that challenge as well. See Cuomo,
755 F.3d at 114. Here, too, Brown has failed to allege government conduct that
“may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Goe v. Zucker, 43
5 F.4th 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted).
We also reject Brown’s argument that the District Court erroneously
rejected his claim that the Defendants-Appellees, who were sued in their
individual capacities, violated his 1993 plea. We agree with the District Court
that Brown failed to allege that the Defendants-Appellees were personally
involved in his 1993 plea, conviction, or sentence in order for them to be liable in
their individual capacities. See Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 129 (2d Cir. 2023).
Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s
motion for judicial estoppel. 1 See Clark v. AII Acquisition, LLC, 886 F.3d 261, 265
(2d Cir. 2018). The Defendants-Appellees were not parties to the state court
criminal case against Brown. They accordingly did not adopt an “earlier
position” that conflicts with their current position, as is required for judicial
estoppel to apply. See United States v. Swartz Fam. Tr., 67 F.4th 505, 519 (2d Cir.
2023) (quotation marks omitted).
1 Brown maintains that the registration requirement frustrates the purpose of his plea bargain. It is unclear whether this argument is the same breach of contract argument Brown made before the District Court or whether it is newly raised on appeal and therefore forfeited. In any event, we reject the argument because Connecticut’s registration requirement did not render Brown’s plea agreement “valueless” to him. United States v. Gen. Douglas MacArthur Senior Vill., 508 F.2d 377, 381 (2d Cir. 1974). 6 CONCLUSION
We have considered Brown’s remaining arguments and conclude that they
are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court
is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court