Brown v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.

Ninth Circuit

Brown v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.

653 F.2d 1266

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJuly 30, 1981

DocketNo. 77-3101

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 653 F.2d 1266 (Brown v. Federated Department Stores, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Brown v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 653 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1981).

Pincite

Opinion

In Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981), the Supreme Court [1267]*1267reversed our decision in Moitie v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 1267 (1980), and remanded for proceedings in conformity with its opinion. We now affirm the decision of the district court dismissing the action on the basis of res judicata.

The only issue unresolved by the Court’s opinion is whether Brown presented state law claims that are not barred by res judicata.

We held:

Appellants first contend that removal was improper because they stated a valid state claim. We disagree. The court below correctly held that the claims presented were federal in nature, arising solely from price fixing on defendants’ part.

611 F.2d at 1268. Since this holding was not reversed, the law of the case is that Brown presented no valid state law claims.

Even if he did, they are barred. A judgment on the merits is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties on the same claim. See IB Moore’s Federal Practice 10.410[2] at 1163; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 61 (Tent. Draft No. 5, March 10, 1978). Two claims are the same if they arise from the same transactions or events. Id.

The federal antitrust claim in Brown I and the state law claims in Brown II arise from the same transactions. See 611 F.2d at 1268. It is not clear that the district court in Brown I would have refused to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims. See - U.S. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 2430 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The state law claims are barred by res judicata.

The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, - U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981), the Supreme Court [1267]*1267reversed our decision in Moitie v. Federated Department Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 1267 (1980), and remanded for proceedings in conformity with its opinion. We now affirm the decision of the district court dismissing the action on the basis of res judicata.

The only issue unresolved by the Court’s opinion is whether Brown presented state law claims that are not barred by res judicata.

We held:

Appellants first contend that removal was improper because they stated a valid state claim. We disagree. The court below correctly held that the claims presented were federal in nature, arising solely from price fixing on defendants’ part.

611 F.2d at 1268. Since this holding was not reversed, the law of the case is that Brown presented no valid state law claims.

Even if he did, they are barred. A judgment on the merits is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties on the same claim. See IB Moore’s Federal Practice 10.410[2] at 1163; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 61 (Tent. Draft No. 5, March 10, 1978). Two claims are the same if they arise from the same transactions or events. Id.

The federal antitrust claim in Brown I and the state law claims in Brown II arise from the same transactions. See 611 F.2d at 1268. It is not clear that the district court in Brown I would have refused to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims. See - U.S. at -, 101 S.Ct. at 2430 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The state law claims are barred by res judicata.

The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.

The Travelers Indemnity Company v. George K. Sarkisian, John Sarkisian, Norman Preskitt, Ivy Mechanical & Electrical Associates, Inc., Sarkisian Brothers, Inc., Sarco Industries, Inc., Sarbro Equipment Corp., and John Doe and Richard Roe, Said Names Being Fictitious but Meant to Designate the Officers, Employees And/or Agents of the Aforesaid Presently Unknown to the Who Participated in the Acts Set Forth Herein, the Travelers Indemnity Company, as Assignee of Judgments Against Midstate Constructors, Inc., to Enforce Certain Judgments v. George Sarkisian, John Sarkisian, Norman Preskitt, Sarco Industries, Inc., Charlotte Street Builders, Inc., and Sarkisian Brothers, Inc., Respondents

794 F.2d 754 (Second Circuit, 1986)

Derish v. San Mateo-Burlingame Board of Realtors

724 F.2d 1347 (Ninth Circuit, 1983)

Salveson v. Western States Bankcard Ass'n

525 F. Supp. 566 (N.D. California, 1981)

Brown v. Federated Department Stores

653 F.2d 1266 (Fifth Circuit, 1981)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

653 F.2d 1266, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-federated-department-stores-inc-ca9-1981.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack