Broughton v. V.W. Credit Volkswagon

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 28, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-04884
StatusUnknown

This text of Broughton v. V.W. Credit Volkswagon (Broughton v. V.W. Credit Volkswagon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Broughton v. V.W. Credit Volkswagon, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK TYRELL BROUGHTON, Plaintiff, 23-CV-4884 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL V.W. CREDIT VOLKSWAGON, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action invoking the Court’s federal question jurisdiction and asserting that Defendant has violated his rights. By order dated June 21, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint but grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff, who resides in Bronx, New York, brings this action using the court’s general complaint form. He names “V.W. Credit Volkswagon” as the sole defendant, checks the box on the complaint form to invoke the court’s federal question jurisdiction, and, in response to the question on the form asking which of his federal constitutional or federal statutory rights have been violated, he asserts “multiple law’s I have documentation (proof).” (ECF 1, at 2.)1 Plaintiff does not, however, provide any facts relating to the alleged violations, only providing the following statement in the facts section of the complaint: “could not make certain doctor apointment’s and missed jobs apointments.” (Id. at 6.) In the relief section of the complaint, Plaintiff writes “breach of peace.” (Id.) Plaintiff attaches to the complaint several documents relating to debt collection on an

auto loan. The documents include, (1) a November 15, 2022 letter, from Plaintiff to VW Credit, in which he disputed an auto loan debt and demanded that the company cease further contact under the he Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA” ), 15 U.S.C. § 1692; (2) “Affidavit[s] of Truth” and an “Audit Demand Notice” addressed to the State of Oregon, County of Washington, concerning a debt with VW Credit; several forms from irs.gov; and a January 31,

1 Plaintiff writes using irregular capitalization. For readability, the Court uses standard capitalization when quoting from the complaint. All other grammar, spelling, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated. 2023 letter from Audi Financial Services to Plaintiff concerning his payment history for a 2022 Audi. DISCUSSION A. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. Furthermore, under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “A complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) if it is ‘so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”’ Strunk v. U.S. House of Representatives, 68 Fed. App’x 233, 235 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)); see Prezzi v. Schelter, 469 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that complaint did not comply with Rule 8 because “it contained a labyrinthian prolixity of unrelated and vituperative charges that defied comprehension”). Rule 8 “does not demand that a complaint be a model of clarity or exhaustively present the facts alleged,” but it does require, “at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “It is not the Court’s job – nor the opposing party’s – to decipher a complaint that is ‘so poorly composed as to be functionally illegible.’” Ghosh v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 21-CV-6139, 2023 WL 3612553, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2023)

(quoting Avramham v. N.Y., No. 20-CV-4441, 2020 WL 4001628, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2020)). A complaint that fails to comply with Rule 8 may be dismissed. See Da Costa v. Marcucilli, 675 Fed. App’x 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (dismissing a complaint because it was convoluted, repetitive and difficult to understand); Anduze v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-519, 2021 WL 795472, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2021) (dismissing a complaint as incomprehensible because it was illegible and the legible portions were incomprehensible, such that “the [c]ourt is unable to properly evaluate the full nature and extent of [the] [p]laintiff’s claims”); Barsella v.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Wilma Prezzi v. Birg. Gen. L. J. Schelter
469 F.2d 691 (Second Circuit, 1972)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Atuahene v. City of Hartford
10 F. App'x 33 (Second Circuit, 2001)
Polanco v. NCO Portfolio Management, Inc.
930 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D. New York, 2013)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Barsella v. United States
135 F.R.D. 64 (S.D. New York, 1991)

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Broughton v. V.W. Credit Volkswagon, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/broughton-v-vw-credit-volkswagon-nysd-2023.