Broughton v. Truist Bank

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 3, 2024
Docket1:23-cv-06042
StatusUnknown

This text of Broughton v. Truist Bank (Broughton v. Truist Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Broughton v. Truist Bank, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK TYRELL BROUGHTON, Plaintiff, 23-CV-6042 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD TRUST BANK, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action asserting that Defendant has violated his rights. By order dated July 24, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action, using the court’s general complaint form, against Trust Bank. In response to the question on the form asking for the facts underlying this action, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated “multiple federal laws.” (ECF 1 ¶ III.)1 Plaintiff does not provide any facts relating to these alleged violations, but attached to the complaint are more than 60 pages of documents,2 including: (1) a $30,000 retail installment contract between Plaintiff and Pepmore Auto Sales in Queens, New York, for a used 2018 vehicle; (2) a November 15, 2022 letter from Plaintiff to Trust Bank asking that it “cease and desist all contact and communication” regarding the “collection of an alleged debt and all related matters,” and characterizing its communications to him as “Deceitful,” “Threatening,” “Causing emotional and physical duress,” “Illegal,” “Unlawful,” and “Malpractice”; (3) a December 8, 2022 letter from Trust Bank stating

that it “appreciate[d] the opportunity to respond” to Plaintiff’s letter, noting that Plaintiff had taken out a $30,000 automobile loan on which $24,824.74 remained due, and that a lien would remain on the vehicle until the balance was paid; (4) an April 8, 2023 letter from Trust Bank stating that it had investigated the dispute and determined that the balance remained due; and

1 The Court quotes verbatim from the complaint. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. 2 Plaintiff filed another complaint naming a different defendant, but which may be related to this one. See Broughton v. VW Credit Volkswagen, ECF 1:23-CV-4884, 1 (S.D.N.Y. filed June 9, 2023) (pending). (5) monthly statements from Trust Bank to Plaintiff showing the loan balance. (Id. at 8-11, 24- 26, 33-34, 41-47.) Also attached to the complaint are several documents written by Plaintiff, entitled “Affidavit[s] of Truth,” in which he cites to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”).

(Id. at 13-14, 18-22, 27-39.) Plaintiff alleges that the loan contract should be “null and void,” because finance charges “can only be paid when money is in hand and or money [is] direct deposited into a consumer’s bank account,”’ and that Trust Bank “leveraged” his “name, merit, and social security number” on the promissory note. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff seeks to void the contract and to have the lien removed from the vehicle. (Id. at 19.) DISCUSSION A. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In

reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. Furthermore, under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “A complaint fails to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) if it is ‘so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.”’ Strunk v. U.S. House of Representatives, 68 Fed. App’x 233, 235 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988)); see Prezzi v. Schelter, 469 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that complaint did not comply with Rule 8 because “it contained a labyrinthian prolixity

of unrelated and vituperative charges that defied comprehension”). Rule 8 “does not demand that a complaint be a model of clarity or exhaustively present the facts alleged,” but it does require, “at a minimum, that a complaint give each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the ground upon which it rests.” Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “It is not the Court’s job – nor the opposing party’s – to decipher a complaint that is ‘so poorly composed as to be functionally illegible.’” Ghosh v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., No. 21-CV-6139, 2023 WL 3612553, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Wilma Prezzi v. Birg. Gen. L. J. Schelter
469 F.2d 691 (Second Circuit, 1972)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Atuahene v. City of Hartford
10 F. App'x 33 (Second Circuit, 2001)
Polanco v. NCO Portfolio Management, Inc.
930 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D. New York, 2013)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Barsella v. United States
135 F.R.D. 64 (S.D. New York, 1991)

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Bluebook (online)
Broughton v. Truist Bank, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/broughton-v-truist-bank-nysd-2024.