Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Luckie

286 S.W.2d 712, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2438, 1955 Tex. App. LEXIS 2355

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 18, 1955
• Docket: 14987
• Status: Published

Opinions

YOUNG, Justice.

This is a class action brought by F. L. Luckie and twelve others, all operating employees of MK&T Railway Company of Texas (herinafter styled Katy), and each a member of one of the four Brotherhoods, defendant-appellants, for themselves and others similarly situated, against the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, Order of Railway Conductors and Brakemen, certain local lodges of said Brotherhoods, the Texas & Pacific Railway Company (hereinafter styled T&P), and others; for tern-porary restraint and ultimately a permanent injunction to prevent the placing into effect of a directive dated November 7, 1952, of the chief executives of said four named Brotherhoods; the directive stating in part that T&P train and engine employees will be permitted to maintain at least one passenger crew on Katy trains operating between Whitesboro and Fort Worth, Texas. The four Brotherhoods above named' are the duly constituted bargaining representatives of appellees (plaintiffs below) and are fraternal benefit societies as well as railway labor unions.

On November 30, 1954, the trial court granted a temporary restraining order relative to the above directive, and on hearing for temporary injunction (January 24, 1955) such interlocutory relief was, granted, “to preserve and maintain the status quo” pending final determination of this cause; which ruling becomes the basis of this appeal.

We glean from the record, aided by briefs of the parties, that material facts antecedent to the instant controversy are these: The Katy corporations (two in number) operate a line of railroad from St. Louis and Kansas City via Denison, Fort Worth and Waco (also Dallas and Waco) to Houston, San Antonio and Galveston. Trains of the Katy operating between Den-ison and Waco via Fort Worth use 71 miles of track between Whitesboro and Forth Worth that belong to the T&P Railway, which use is under and by virtue of contracts between predecessor companies of these lines of railroads, dated April 1881 and July 1920. The contracts extend to> the Katy the right to both man and operate its trains over said track — an interpretation concurred in by both Katy amid T&P management; and since 18811 Katy train and service employees have operated all Katy trains running over the Whites-boro-Fort Worth track with the following-exception : In 1920 during Government control of railroads a consolidated train; made up of both T&P and Katy equipment and under joint control, was operated by T&P personnel over the tracks between Whitesboro and Fort Worth, continuing •for a, short period of time; otherwise the record discloses no T&P operation of an exclusively Katy train, either passenger or freight, over this track. And while Katy employees presently manning Katy trains— Fort Worth to Whitesboro — are under joint supervision of both Roads, the Katy men are subject to discipline only from their own Company employer.

In July 1950, the T&P sought and obtained from the Railroad Commission of Texas authority to discontinue its passenger trains No. 31 and 32, running from Fort Worth to Texarkana via Whitesboro, such change being accomplished without notice to the Katy or its participation in the Commission hearing; the latter Company at the time manning and operating three passenger trains daily over said 71 miles of track — Whitesboro to Fort Worth. Following the mentioned discontinuance of passenger service by T&P, a Committee of its transportation employees (union) made request of T&P management to man one Katy passenger train between Whites-boro and Fort Worth in lieu of their own train which had been discontinued, which request was denied; said T&P Committee then requesting that a Grand Lodge officer be assigned to make investigation and report to the national president of the particular Brotherhood. The result was a ruling by that chief official, concurred in by Chief Executives of the other Brotherhoods, in favor of such request, i. e., that T&P employees were entitled to man one Katy passenger train between these points. This ruling was appealed by Denison Lodge No. 15 (Brakemen and Conductors) to the General Board of Appeals, that Body sustaining the position of its Brotherhood president.

This order, if and when applied, would take Katy men off their own passenger trains and substitute to that extent T&P operatives; and obviously result in loss of employment and interference with seniority rights of the former (appellees). And they allege that such would be the result, they having exhausted their remedy within the respective Brotherhoods. In this connection, to complete a summary of defensive pleading, appellant Brotherhoods answered, along with other defendants; filing motions to dismiss, or in the alternative to abate the suit on grounds that Federal proceedings were and are presently pending before the National Mediation Board at Dallas, pursuant to Title 45, U.S. Code Annotated, § 151 et seq.; that the subject matter of suit involves an interpretation of working agreements, seniority, rates of pay, rules and working conditions, of which exclusive jurisdiction is vested under the National Railway Labor Act, Title 45, U.S.C.A., in the National Railway Adjustment Board; alternatively, that the suit has been prematurely brought, plaintiffs-appellees having an adequate remedy at law; that plaintiffs are bound by Union laws not to sue their Brotherhoods; that complainants, charging “arbitrary, capricious and unjust actions” by superior officers of their Brotherhoods, cannot thus sue their Brotherhoods, who are co-principals, for wrongful acts of a joint agent, because they are thereby in effect suing themselves; and bound, on the other hand, by the decisions of their Brotherhoods. Lastly, that plaintiffs are not true representatives of a class, hence not entitled to bring the action in question, for the reason that seniority rights of the class are not joint, common, or secondary, with no common question of law affecting the several rights; the seniority rights and grievances, if any, of each employee being wholly different. The T&P filed a general denial and cross-action against the Katy, all plaintiffs and defendants, inclusive of appellant Brotherhoods and some of its own employees ; the content of said cross-plaintiff’s affirmative pleading being enlarged upon in the concurring opinion by Chief Justice Dixon.

The Federal Mediation proceeding above mentioned, now in recess, appears to have been invoked at instance of the Chief Executives of the four Brotherhoods.

There are four classes or crafts of employees here involved. Each of the four defendant Brotherhoods is certified through its General Grievance Committee and General Chairman of the Katy to act as the bargaining representative ©f its particular class. Likewise each is, by separate' and distinct action, so certified on the T&P. The Brotherhoods thereby are authorized to bargain with the Katy concerning only those persons in the craft or class that they are certified to represent, who have an employee status with the Katy. Similarly, they are authorized to bargain with the T&P only concerning the members of such craft or class having an employed status with the T&P; and as we interpret both the Railway Labor Act and Constitutions of each organization in evidence, these separate employer-employee groups are not to be commingled in a joint bargaining effort; see Report of the National Railroad Adjustment Board, 1935, at page 22; and Stephenson v. New Orleans & N.E.R. Co., 180 Miss. 147, 177 So. 509, at page 517 (unless, of course, by consent of all concerned). In the same connection there is testimony that to effectuate the directive of November 7, 1952 would require necessary alteration of passenger crew terminals; several of the Brotherhood Constitutions providing for such a change only on approval of the employees to be affected thereby; or at least, by consent of the General Grievance Committee, no approval or consent having been so obtained.

Turning to particular record evidence, the following parties-defendant, all General Chairmen, Grievance Committee, of their respective Unions, Katy Railroad, were called by plaintiffs to testify: Carl L. Flanery, Sr., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, T. E. Penn, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, Walter Johnson, Order of Railway Conductors and "Brakemen, and L. A. Dye, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers. That these Officials and the Katy Lodges represented by them were not at all in accord with this 1952 Order requiring T&P train and engine employees to man a Katy passenger train, is certain. However, under veiled threats of disciplinary measures, they were required to sign a letter prepared by Chief Executives of the Orders, directed to both Railroad managements, requesting that said ruling be put into effect. Each witness testified that their respective duties embraced the making of bargaining contracts between Union and the Railroad, inclusive of the handling of grievances; that no labor dispute existed within their jurisdictions, the Order in question having the effect of changing or amending present contracts of collective bargaining; witness Johnson pointing out that the existing contract was inclusive of seniority rights (working conditions) ; all asserting • that such Order was arbitrary and discriminatory to Katy men. On the other hand, from standpoint of Brotherhood Chief Executives, the 1952 Order simply restored to T&P train and engine crews the jobs taken from them by the 1950 discontinuance of passenger trains by T&P management. In the situation thus presented, appellees (Katy employees) assert a case of unjust discrimination by their own Brotherhood Chiefs, in that they alone are penalized in consequence of action (discontinuance of trains) lawfully taken by the management of another and different Railroad Company.

The Railway Labor Act, Title 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., creating two separate Boards (National Railroad Adjustment and National Mediation) to hear disputes with which it has power to deal, contemplates jurisdiction only of employee-employer problems; specifically stated in sec. 15S(i) of the Act as “The disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, ‡ * * ”; and the issue here does not involve interpretation of the December 1952 Order, but is rather an outright attack upon its validity; the attempted amendment of their existing contract of collective bargaining, in violation of Union Constitution; and constituting arbitrary, capricious and unjustly discriminatory action by defendant Brotherhoods.

In our opinion, appellees have made just such a case, cognizable in a court of equity. Statutory power of the Brotherhoods and Grand Lodge officers in their representation of all for whom they act, is not absolute; Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 73 S.Ct. 681, 97 L.Ed. 1048, and may be challenged judicially by members of the Brotherhood for actions found discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious.

Controlling here is Hargrove v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, D.C., 116 F.Supp. 3, 7, in applicable principles and conclusions reached. There a contract was involved, similar in effect to the Order in question here, the Federal Court assuming jurisdiction to declare it invalid with respect to aggrieved Union members. In the Hargrove appeal, plaintiffs and those similarly situated were members of defendant Brotherhoods in good standing. Under a 1946 contract between Brotherhoods and Railway Company, plaintiffs had acquired seniority rights upon trackage within the Oak Ridge (Tenn.) Reservation Project, which tracks were operated by the Railway Company. On August 26, 1949 the Brotherhoods proposed a new contract which would fill the jobs on the Reservation with men from the Knoxville and Atlanta Division of the Railroad; which contract, being executed by the Brotherhoods and Railroad Company, served to remove plaintiffs and those similarly situated from service and to replace them with men from the Knoxville-Atlanta Division. Following are excerpts from the Court’s conclusions in taking jurisdiction of the cause as against the contention that the remedy of plaintiffs was through Administrative Boards set up by the Railway Labor Act: “* * * the charge is that defendants have sacrificed their interests and rights, not on the basis of differences relevant to authorized and reasonable purposes of collective bargaining, but solely for the benefit of another group of employees represented by them, thereby violating the duties and obligations imposed upon the Brotherhoods by the Railway Labor Act. * * * I am therefore of the opinion that the complaint states a case in which the court is not lacking in jurisdiction over the subject matter, and furthermore, under the authority of Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., supra [323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173], the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Indeed, it might be difficult to find a constitutional basis for relegating this controversy to the Railway Adjustment Board as contended by defendants, and such procedure appears particularly abhorrent when it is considered that the defendants named herein participate in making the selections of membership on the Board, who would pass upon the validity of their acts charged to be in disregard of the trust imposed upon them.” (Emphasis ours.) See also Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 72 S.Ct. 1022, 96 L.Ed. 1283; 142 A.L.R., Annotations, pp. 1067-1068. Appellants seek to distinguish Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173, and Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Howard, supra, because the issue there raised was exceptional (racial discrimination). But even in the dissenting opinion in Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Howard [343 U.S. 768, 72 S.Ct. 1026], the right of aggrieved members of a Labor Union to carry disputes with their bargaining representatives to the Courts, claiming unjust discrimination, is recognized, viz.: “ * * * It would have been the same if the Brotherhood had discriminated against him on some other ground, unrelated to race. It was the Brotherhood’s duty ‘to act on behalf of all the employees which, by virtue of the statute, it undertakes to represent.’ Steele, supra, 323 U.S. at page 199, 65 S.Ct. at page 230, 89 L.Ed. 173.” And though the Hargrove case is not an Appellate Decision, it has been cited with approval by the Circuit Court of Appeals in Switchmen’s Union of North America v. Ogden Union Ry., etc. Co., 10 Cir., 209 F.2d 419, certiorari denied 347 U.S. 989, 74 S.Ct. 852, 98 L.Ed. 1123.

The foregoing view of this controversy sufficiently demonstrates, in our opinion, that it is not one exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Act; but that to the contrary, the claims asserted by appellees are proper matters .for adjudication in a court of equity.. Concerning further points presented, the following will suffice by way of disposition: (1) Manifestly this is not a jurisdictional dispute; (2) it is undisputed that appellees have exhausted all remedies within their respective unions; and under the precedents already cited, they are not precluded from suing their Brotherhoods, Chief Executives and Grand Lodge Officers — the ground of action being arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious conduct; or that such was beyond the powers or authority granted in their respective Constitutions and Union laws. See also Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210, 65 S.Ct. 235, 89 L.Ed. 187; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232, 70 S.Ct. 14, 94 L.Ed. 22; Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 57 S.Ct. 592, 81 L.Ed. 789; Williams v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., D.C., 124 F.Supp. 164; Stephenson v. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co., 180 Miss. 147, 177 So. 509. (3) The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that this is a class action under Rule 42, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the purpose thereof being fully explained in McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, Vol. 1, sec. 234, at page 269. The Texas procedure is in language of Federal Rule 23 (a, c), 28 U.S.C.A., which has been given a like judicial construction. Parker v. Lester, D.C., 112 F.Supp. 433; System Federation No. 91, etc. v. Reed, 6 Cir., 180 F.2d 991.

All points advanced are accordingly overruled and judgment of the trial court affirmed.