Brooks v. Gray

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Brooks v. Gray

585 S.E.2d 188, 262 Ga. App. 232, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2218, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 880

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJuly 9, 2003

DocketA03A0266, A03A0267

StatusPublished

Cited by20 cases

This text of 585 S.E.2d 188 (Brooks v. Gray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Brooks v. Gray, 585 S.E.2d 188, 262 Ga. App. 232, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2218, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 880 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinions

Miller, Judge.

In separate lawsuits, Charles Flowers and Corey Brooks sued Peter Gray for injuries they received from an automobile collision in which Gray’s vehicle struck their vehicle. The plaintiffs also sought punitive damages on the ground that Gray’s driving his vehicle between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. (which former OCGA § 40-5-24 (b) (1) (A) prohibited because of Gray’s Class D license) amounted to wilful and wanton conduct and a conscious indifference to consequences. In both cases, the court granted partial summary judgment to Gray. Flowers and Brooks appeal. We discern no error and affirm.

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).” Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 226 Ga. App. 459 (1) (486 SE2d 684) (1997). We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in favor of the nonmovant. Id.

The evidence shows that soon after 1:00 a.m. on February 15, 1999, 16-year-old Gray was driving his friends home from a party when he steered his vehicle off the road’s right shoulder. He overcorrected, veering his car into the oncoming lane, where he collided with a vehicle driven by Flowers in which Brooks was a passenger. Both Flowers and Brooks were injured. Gray had a Class D license at the time.

Flowers and Brooks sued Gray separately to recover for their injuries. They also sued for punitive damages, claiming that under former OCGA § 40-5-24 (b) (1) (A), Gray’s license did not allow him to drive between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. and that his doing so was wilful and wanton conduct that showed a conscious indifference to consequences. See OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b). Gray moved for partial summary judgment on the punitive damage counts, which the court in both cases granted. Brooks appeals in Case No. A03A0266, and Flowers appeals in Case No. A03A0267.

1. “Punitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.” OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b). “Negligence, even gross negligence, is inadequate to support a punitive damage award. . . . [S] omething more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage.” (Citations and [233]*233punctuation omitted.) Tower Financial Svcs. v. Smith, 204 Ga. App. 910, 918 (5) (423 SE2d 257) (1992); see Gaither v. BarclaysAmerican/Financial &c., 194 Ga. App. 188-189 (390 SE2d 97) (1990).

Thus, in automobile collision cases, “punitive damages are not recoverable where the driver at fault simply violated a rule of the road.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Miller v. Crumbley, 249 Ga. App. 403, 405 (3) (548 SE2d 657) (2001), quoting Carter v. Spells, 229 Ga. App. 441, 442 (494 SE2d 279) (1997); accord Fowler v. Smith, 237 Ga. App. 841, 843 (2) (516 SE2d 845) (1999). To justify punitive damages, we have required that the collision result “from a pattern or policy of dangerous driving, such as driving while intoxicated or speeding excessively.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Miller, supra, 249 Ga. App. at 405 (3); see Carter, supra, 229 Ga. App. at 442.

Here plaintiffs do not argue that Gray’s veering into oncoming traffic met this standard, nor could they, as we have previously held that crossing the centerline “would not, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, authorize appellants to recover punitive damages.” Currie v. Haney, 183 Ga. App. 506 (359 SE2d 350) (1987); see Bradford v. Xerox Corp., 216 Ga. App. 83-84 (453 SE2d 98) (1994) (crossing median while speeding on wet pavement not sufficient to support punitive damages). Rather, plaintiffs focus on Gray’s Class D license, which at the time did not allow Gray to drive between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. (except under circumstances not applicable here). See Ga. L. 1998, p. 3, § 1 (former OCGA § 40-5-24 (b) (1) (A)). Plaintiffs claim that but for Gray violating this statute, he would not have been driving at the time and the collision would have been avoided. They conclude that “[a]ppellee’s actions in driving at a time not allowed by his restricted license amounts to wilful and wanton misconduct or a want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences of his actions. . . .”

2. We disagree. Even if operating a vehicle without a proper license affords a basis for actionable negligence, it does not warrant consideration of punitive damages, at least under the present circumstances. See Brundage v. Wilkins, 121 Ga. App. 652, 653 (3), (5) (175 SE2d 108) (1970). First, Gray’s driving after 1:00 a.m. was not the proximate cause of the accident; rather, it was his crossing the centerline that caused the accident. Second, his action did not constitute “a pattern or policy of dangerous driving, such as driving while intoxicated or speeding excessively.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Miller, supra, 249 Ga. App. at 405 (3). There is nothing inherently dangerous about teenagers or inexperienced drivers driving during the early hours of the morning. Indeed, the legislature statutorily authorized such drivers to drive during these hours if doing so for employment, school, religious organization, or emergency rea[234]*234sons. See Ga. L. 1998, p. 3, § 1 (former OCGA § 40-5-24 (b) (1) (A)). Driving while intoxicated (Moore v. Thompson, 255 Ga. 236, 237-238 (336 SE2d 749) (1985)), choosing to stop an unlit tractor-trailer for 35 minutes in the center lane of an interstate highway without warning devices at night (Fowler, supra, 237 Ga. App. at 843-844 (2)), or driving a tractor-trailer with serious mechanical problems that caused it for 20 miles prior to the collision to weave erratically from lane to lane (J. B. Hunt Transport v. Bentley, 207 Ga. App. 250, 255 (2) (427 SE2d 499) (1992)), are inherently dangerous activities, but simply driving at a forbidden time of the day or night is not, particularly when the purpose for that driving may exempt one from the prohibition. Driving at a forbidden time may be a violation of the rules of the road, but it is not wilful and wanton misconduct that shows conscious indifference to consequences. Cf. Saucedo v. The Salvation Army, 200 Ariz. 179, 182 (24 P3d 1274) (Ct. App. 2001) (driving with a suspended license did not warrant punitive damages).

The trial court did not err in granting partial summary judgment to Gray on the claims for punitive damages.

Judgment affirmed.

Andrews, P. J, concurs. Johnson, P.

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Miller, Judge.

In separate lawsuits, Charles Flowers and Corey Brooks sued Peter Gray for injuries they received from an automobile collision in which Gray’s vehicle struck their vehicle. The plaintiffs also sought punitive damages on the ground that Gray’s driving his vehicle between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. (which former OCGA § 40-5-24 (b) (1) (A) prohibited because of Gray’s Class D license) amounted to wilful and wanton conduct and a conscious indifference to consequences. In both cases, the court granted partial summary judgment to Gray. Flowers and Brooks appeal. We discern no error and affirm.

“Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c).” Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 226 Ga. App. 459 (1) (486 SE2d 684) (1997). We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the evidence in favor of the nonmovant. Id.

The evidence shows that soon after 1:00 a.m. on February 15, 1999, 16-year-old Gray was driving his friends home from a party when he steered his vehicle off the road’s right shoulder. He overcorrected, veering his car into the oncoming lane, where he collided with a vehicle driven by Flowers in which Brooks was a passenger. Both Flowers and Brooks were injured. Gray had a Class D license at the time.

Flowers and Brooks sued Gray separately to recover for their injuries. They also sued for punitive damages, claiming that under former OCGA § 40-5-24 (b) (1) (A), Gray’s license did not allow him to drive between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. and that his doing so was wilful and wanton conduct that showed a conscious indifference to consequences. See OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b). Gray moved for partial summary judgment on the punitive damage counts, which the court in both cases granted. Brooks appeals in Case No. A03A0266, and Flowers appeals in Case No. A03A0267.

1. “Punitive damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.” OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (b). “Negligence, even gross negligence, is inadequate to support a punitive damage award. . . . [S] omething more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage.” (Citations and [233]*233punctuation omitted.) Tower Financial Svcs. v. Smith, 204 Ga. App. 910, 918 (5) (423 SE2d 257) (1992); see Gaither v. BarclaysAmerican/Financial &c., 194 Ga. App. 188-189 (390 SE2d 97) (1990).

Thus, in automobile collision cases, “punitive damages are not recoverable where the driver at fault simply violated a rule of the road.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Miller v. Crumbley, 249 Ga. App. 403, 405 (3) (548 SE2d 657) (2001), quoting Carter v. Spells, 229 Ga. App. 441, 442 (494 SE2d 279) (1997); accord Fowler v. Smith, 237 Ga. App. 841, 843 (2) (516 SE2d 845) (1999). To justify punitive damages, we have required that the collision result “from a pattern or policy of dangerous driving, such as driving while intoxicated or speeding excessively.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Miller, supra, 249 Ga. App. at 405 (3); see Carter, supra, 229 Ga. App. at 442.

Here plaintiffs do not argue that Gray’s veering into oncoming traffic met this standard, nor could they, as we have previously held that crossing the centerline “would not, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, authorize appellants to recover punitive damages.” Currie v. Haney, 183 Ga. App. 506 (359 SE2d 350) (1987); see Bradford v. Xerox Corp., 216 Ga. App. 83-84 (453 SE2d 98) (1994) (crossing median while speeding on wet pavement not sufficient to support punitive damages). Rather, plaintiffs focus on Gray’s Class D license, which at the time did not allow Gray to drive between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. (except under circumstances not applicable here). See Ga. L. 1998, p. 3, § 1 (former OCGA § 40-5-24 (b) (1) (A)). Plaintiffs claim that but for Gray violating this statute, he would not have been driving at the time and the collision would have been avoided. They conclude that “[a]ppellee’s actions in driving at a time not allowed by his restricted license amounts to wilful and wanton misconduct or a want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences of his actions. . . .”

2. We disagree. Even if operating a vehicle without a proper license affords a basis for actionable negligence, it does not warrant consideration of punitive damages, at least under the present circumstances. See Brundage v. Wilkins, 121 Ga. App. 652, 653 (3), (5) (175 SE2d 108) (1970). First, Gray’s driving after 1:00 a.m. was not the proximate cause of the accident; rather, it was his crossing the centerline that caused the accident. Second, his action did not constitute “a pattern or policy of dangerous driving, such as driving while intoxicated or speeding excessively.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Miller, supra, 249 Ga. App. at 405 (3). There is nothing inherently dangerous about teenagers or inexperienced drivers driving during the early hours of the morning. Indeed, the legislature statutorily authorized such drivers to drive during these hours if doing so for employment, school, religious organization, or emergency rea[234]*234sons. See Ga. L. 1998, p. 3, § 1 (former OCGA § 40-5-24 (b) (1) (A)). Driving while intoxicated (Moore v. Thompson, 255 Ga. 236, 237-238 (336 SE2d 749) (1985)), choosing to stop an unlit tractor-trailer for 35 minutes in the center lane of an interstate highway without warning devices at night (Fowler, supra, 237 Ga. App. at 843-844 (2)), or driving a tractor-trailer with serious mechanical problems that caused it for 20 miles prior to the collision to weave erratically from lane to lane (J. B. Hunt Transport v. Bentley, 207 Ga. App. 250, 255 (2) (427 SE2d 499) (1992)), are inherently dangerous activities, but simply driving at a forbidden time of the day or night is not, particularly when the purpose for that driving may exempt one from the prohibition. Driving at a forbidden time may be a violation of the rules of the road, but it is not wilful and wanton misconduct that shows conscious indifference to consequences. Cf. Saucedo v. The Salvation Army, 200 Ariz. 179, 182 (24 P3d 1274) (Ct. App. 2001) (driving with a suspended license did not warrant punitive damages).

The trial court did not err in granting partial summary judgment to Gray on the claims for punitive damages.

Judgment affirmed.
Andrews, P. J, concurs. Johnson, P. J., Ruffin, P. J., and Adams, J., concur and concur specially. Smith, C. J, and Barnes, J., dissent.

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585 S.E.2d 188, 262 Ga. App. 232, 2003 Fulton County D. Rep. 2218, 2003 Ga. App. LEXIS 880, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brooks-v-gray-gactapp-2003.

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