Britton Roberts v. Brightview Landscapes, LLC

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 7, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05894
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT SEATTLE

7 NO. 25-cv-5894-BJR BRITTON ROBERTS, 8 ORDER GRANTING REMAND Plaintiff, 9 v. 10 BRIGHTVIEW LANDSCAPES, LLC, 11 Defendant. 12

13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff, Britton Roberts, originally filed this case in Pierce County Superior Court alleging 15 that Defendant, Brightview Landscapes, LLC, had violated a specific provision of Washington 16 State’s Equal Pay and Opportunities Act (“EPOA”), RCW 49.58.110, which requires certain 17 employers to disclose the wage scale or salary range, and a general description of other 18 compensation and benefits, in each posting for an available position.1 Defendants removed the case 19 to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and under the Class Action Fairness Act 20 (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). See Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Now pending before the Court 21

22 1 A detailed statutory background may be found in this Court’s decisions in related cases. See, e.g., Floyd v. Insight Global LLC, et al., 23-CV-1680-BJR, 2024 WL 2133370, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2024); Atkinson v. Aaron’s 23 LLC, et al., 23-CV-1742-BJR, 2024 WL 2133358, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2024).

24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 9. Having reviewed the materials,2 the record of the case, 2 and the relevant legal authorities, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion and remand this case to 3 Pierce County Superior Court. The reasoning for the Court’s decision follows. 4 II. BACKGROUND 5 On April 23, 2025, Britton Roberts applied for a job opening as an Enhancement Landscape 6 Laborer with Brightview in Puyallup, Washington. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 18, Ex. A,3 ECF No. 1-2. She 7 alleges that the posting for the job opening did not disclose the wage scale or salary range to be 8 offered. Id. ¶ 18; Ex. A. She further alleges that she “lost valuable time applying for jobs” and was 9 “harmed” as a result of the inability to evaluate the pay for the position. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21. Ms. Roberts 10 also claims to represent “hundreds” of potential class members who also applied for jobs with 11 Brightview for positions that did not disclose the wage scale or salary range. Id. ¶¶ 10, 15, 24. Ms.

12 Roberts’ complaint was virtually identical to numerous other putative class-action lawsuits filed by 13 multiple plaintiffs, and subsequently removed to this Court by the defendants. Ms. Roberts filed the 14 pending motion seeking remand back to state court, asserting that this Court lacks subject matter 15 jurisdiction because she lacks Article III standing to proceed in federal court. Mot. Remand 2. 16 III. LEGAL STANDARD 17 A defendant may remove to federal court any case filed in state court over which the federal 18 court would have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal question jurisdiction exists 19 over “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 20 § 1331. “The general rule, referred to as the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ is that a civil action 21

22 2 Including Plaintiff’s remand motion, ECF No. 9; response in opposition, ECF No. 13; and reply, ECF No. 14. 3 The Court notes that the exhibit shows a job posting on Indeed.com, although it is not evident that Ms. Roberts 23 applied for the job. See Compl. Ex.A, ECF No. 1-2.

24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 arises under federal law for purposes of § 1331 when a federal question appears on the face of the 2 complaint.” City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Caterpillar 3 Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). Jurisdiction is based on the pleadings filed at the time 4 of removal and is based “solely on the plaintiff’s claims for relief and not on anticipated defenses 5 to those claims.” Id. (quoting ARCO Env’t Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Health & Env’t Quality 6 of Mont., 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000)). 7 Removal requirements should be strictly construed. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 8 (9th Cir. 1992). A removing party bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction and must 9 overcome a “strong presumption” against removal. Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 10 F.3d 676, 685 (9th Cir. 2006). Federal jurisdiction “must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the 11 right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. “[T]he court resolves all ambiguity

12 in favor of remand to state court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 13 2009) (citing Gaus, 980 F.3d at 566). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the federal 14 district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, “the case shall be remanded” to state court. 28 U.S.C. 15 § 1447(c); see also Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996). 16 IV. DISCUSSION 17 Ms. Roberts requests that this matter be remanded for lack of Article III standing and subject 18 matter jurisdiction. Mot. Remand 2 (citing multiple similar cases that have been remanded). “Under 19 Article III, the Federal Judiciary is vested with the ‘Power’ to resolve not questions and issues but 20 ‘Cases’ or ‘Controversies.’” Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (2011). 21 “Among other things, that limitation requires a plaintiff to have standing.” Fed. Election Comm’n

22 v. Cruz, 596 U.S. 289, 295–96 (2022). In the context of a class action, the class representatives must 23 have standing. See NEI Contracting & Eng’g, Inc. v. Hanson Aggregates Pac. Sw., Inc., 926 F.3d

24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 528, 532 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[I]f none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class 2 establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf 3 of himself or any other member of the class.”) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 4 (1974))); see also Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003) 5 (“[S]tanding is the threshold issue in any suit. If the individual plaintiff lacks standing, the court 6 need never reach the class action issue.”). Whether plaintiffs have Article III standing to proceed 7 with this lawsuit implicates the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 8 490, 498 (1975) (stating that standing is jurisdictional). 9 “[T]o establish standing, a plaintiff must show (i) that [s]he suffered an injury in fact that is 10 concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the 11 defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion LLC v.

12 Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) ((citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 13 (1992)). “[E]ach element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the 14 plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the 15 successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 16 As Ms. Roberts argues, this Court has found in similar— virtually identically pleaded— 17 cases, that the plaintiffs failed to allege that they applied for the posted positions in good faith with 18 a genuine interest in employment with the employer. See, e.g., Floyd v. Insight Global, LLC, No. 19 2:23-cv-01680-BJR (W.D. Wash.); Atkinson v. Aaron’s, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-01742-BJR (W.D. 20 Wash.); David v. Herc Rentals Inc., No. 2:24-cv-00175-BJR (W.D. Wash.). At issue in those cases, 21 as here, is the “[f]irst and foremost” of standing’s three requirements—“a harm suffered by the

22 plaintiff that is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Steel Co. v. 23 Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998) (citations omitted).

24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 To establish an injury in fact, plaintiffs must show that they suffered “an invasion of a 2 legally protected interest.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted). Injury is particularized if it 3 affects a plaintiff “in a personal and individual way.” Id. at 560 n.1. And it is concrete if it “actually 4 exist[s],” meaning that it is “real, and not abstract.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo I), 578 U.S. 5 330, 340 (2016) as revised (May 24, 2016) (citations omitted). Importantly, “Article III standing 6 requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation.” Id. at 341 (emphasis added). 7 A plaintiff may not “allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and 8 satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III.” Id. “[T]he Supreme Court made clear that a 9 plaintiff does not ‘automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a 10 person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.’” Robins 11 v. Spokeo, Inc. (Spokeo II), 867 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Spokeo I, 578 U.S. at

12 341). To establish a concrete injury, “the plaintiff must allege a statutory violation that caused [her] 13 to suffer some harm that ‘actually exist[s]’ in the world; there must be an injury that is ‘real’ and 14 not ‘abstract’ or merely ‘procedural.’” Id. (quoting Spokeo I, 578 U.S. at 340). 15 Intangible injuries, such as the omission of statutorily required information, “can 16 nevertheless be concrete.” Magadia v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 999 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2021) 17 (quoting Spokeo I, 578 U.S. at 340). “[A]n intangible injury may be concrete if it presents a material 18 risk of tangible harm or ‘has a close relationship to a harm that has traditionally been regarded as 19 providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts,’ like common law torts or certain 20 constitutional violations.” Phillips v. United States Customs & Border Prot., 74 F.4th 986, 991 (9th 21 Cir. 2023) (quoting Spokeo I, 578 U.S. at 340-41). To determine whether the violation of a statute

22 constitutes a concrete harm, the Ninth Circuit engages in a two-part inquiry. Magadia, 999 F.3d at 23 679. First, a court considers “whether the statutory provisions at issue were established to protect .

24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 . . concrete interests (as opposed to purely procedural rights).” Id. (citation omitted). The court then 2 assesses “whether the specific procedural violations alleged in this case actually harm, or present a 3 material risk of harm to, such interests.” Id. 4 In Floyd and Atkinson, referred to above, this Court further reviewed various cases that 5 analyzed statutory violations in the context of Article III standing and concluded that the statutory 6 violation at issue here is distinctly different from those cases that relate to privacy interests or where 7 misleading information creates a risk of harm. See 2:23-cv-01680-BJR; No. 2:23-cv-01742-BJR. 8 The Court found that in cases such as these, there is no obvious analogue in the history of American 9 courts and plaintiffs must allege some personal harm. Id. Indeed, in Magadia, the Ninth Circuit 10 Court confirmed that the “‘procedural violation of an informational entitlement does not by itself 11 suffice to keep a claim in federal court.’ The plaintiff must further allege ‘at least that the

12 information had some relevance to her.’” 999 F.3d at 679-80 (quoting Brintley v. Aeroquip Credit 13 Union, 936 F.3d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 2019)). This Court concluded that a violation of the statutory 14 provision at issue here—a job posting with no compensation information included—is a technical 15 or procedural violation that by itself does not manifest concrete injury but requires a bona fide 16 applicant before there is a risk of harm sufficient to satisfy an injury-in-fact. Plaintiffs must allege, 17 at minimum, that they applied for the job with good-faith intent, and became personally exposed to 18 the risk of harm caused by the violation. 19 Brightview argues that Ms. Roberts alleged actual harm by pleading that she “lost valuable 20 time”4 and that she was “harmed” as a result of the inability to evaluate the pay for the position. 21 Opp’n 2 (quoting Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21). Brightview contends that these allegations represent a

22 4 The Court notes that any time wasted in applying for a job without good faith is actually a self-inflicted harm. 23

24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 cognizable informational injury and no further showing of harm is required. Id. at 3, 7-9. And 2 Brightview argues that the decision in Branson created a broad informational entitlement that 3 changes this Court’s prior analysis of the statute’s informational injury. Id. at 6, 8-9 (citing Branson 4 v. Wash. Fine Wine & Spirits, LLC, 5 Wn. 3d 289 (2025) (en banc)). 5 The Court disagrees. First, Ms. Roberts’ allegations fail to show any actual harm against 6 which the EPOA intends to protect. See Hill v. ACV Auctions Inc., No. C25-616 MJP, 2025 WL 7 1582249, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 4, 2025) (concluding that the EPOA’s legislative history 8 “confirms that the EPOA’s procedural requirement of disclosure was established to protect 9 applicants by arming them with sufficient information to ensure fair and equitable pay negotiations, 10 and to avoid wasting time interviewing for positions whose pay would never be adequate.”); see 11 also Partridge v. Heartland Express Inc. of Iowa, No. 3:24-CV-05486-DGE, 2024 WL 4164245,

12 at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2024) (stating that when a plaintiff “does not allege that he was offered 13 employment or an interview,” he “does not suggest that the deprivation of information 14 compromised his bargaining power in pay negotiations, placed him at a disadvantage relevant to 15 other applicants, or resulted in him having to exit a lengthy interview process after learning the pay 16 was insufficient for his needs.”). Indeed, Ms. Roberts herself argues that she lacks Article III 17 standing. Ms. Roberts’ conclusory allegations of harm in her complaint are insufficient to allege 18 Article III standing. See Lujan, 497 U.S. at 888 (holding that neither conclusory allegations nor 19 conclusory affirmations are sufficient to confer standing). As this Court has stated before, a nominal 20 applicant with no interest in the position will neither receive a benefit from early pay disclosure nor 21 be harmed by the lack thereof.

22 Further, the state Supreme Court’s decision in Branson does not change this Court’s Article 23 III standing analysis. The Branson court did not address standing—neither federal nor statutory—

24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 but answered the question: “What must a plaintiff prove to be deemed a ‘job applicant’ within the 2 meaning of RCW 49.58.110(4)?” 5 Wn. 3d at 293. The Branson decision clarifies that a plaintiff 3 does not have to prove they are a “bona fide” or “good faith” applicant to qualify as a “job applicant” 4 that can sue to obtain remedies under the statute. Id. at 305. But a plaintiff must still show an injury- 5 in-fact for Article III purposes. Spokeo II, 867 F.3d at 1112. Ms. Roberts has failed to plead such 6 an injury. 7 Brightview also contends that remand would be futile because the State court’s standing 8 jurisprudence is strikingly similar to Article III, and Ninth Circuit precedent requires dismissal if 9 remand is futile. Opp’n 5-6, 12-15 (citing Global Rescue Jets v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 10 30 F.4th 905, 920 n.6 (9th Cir. 2022)). In Global Rescue, the Ninth Circuit noted that there is a 11 “narrow” exception to the general rule that a case must be remanded to the state court if it lacks

12 subject matter jurisdiction—“if there is ‘absolute certainty’ that the state court would dismiss the 13 action following remand.” 30 F.4th at 920 n.6. Acknowledging Brightview’s observation that 14 Washington’s standing jurisprudence is similar to Article III, Opp’n 14, the Court is not convinced 15 that there is an “absolute certainty” this case would be dismissed by the Washington state court for 16 lack of standing. 5 The State court is a court of general, rather than limited, jurisdiction, and “the 17 Washington Constitution places few constraints on superior court jurisdiction.” West v. Seattle Port 18 Comm’n, 194 Wn. App. 821, 829 (2016). “Remand is the correct remedy because a failure of federal 19 subject-matter jurisdiction means only that the federal courts have no power to adjudicate the 20 21

22 5 The Court notes that Brightview provides no cites of similar cases being dismissed in state court for lack of standing, whereas Ms. Roberts cites three example cases in which Washington state courts have denied motions to dismiss 23 virtually identical claims. Reply 10.

24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND 1 matter. State courts are not bound by the constraints of Article III.” Polo v. Innoventions Int’l, LLC, 2 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir. 2016). 3 Federal Article III standing is a mandatory jurisdictional hurdle that exists independently of 4 the legal theory at issue; a federal court lacks the power to rule if the plaintiff cannot demonstrate 5 standing. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 498. Because this Court has determined that Ms. Roberts does not 6 have Article III standing, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and the case must be remanded 7 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 8 V. CONCLUSION 9 For the foregoing reasons, 10 1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED for lack of Plaintiff’s Article III standing; and 11 2. This case is remanded to Pierce County Superior Court. 12 DATED this 7th day of January 2026. 13 A 14 B arbara Jacobs Rothstein 15 United States District Court Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 ORDER GRANTING REMAND