Briggs v. Midfirst

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: April 6, 2023
• Docket: Misc. No. 2023-0027
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

) BRYAN BRIGGS, et al., ) ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Miscellaneous Action 23-mc-0027 (TSC) ) MIDFIRST, et al., ) ) ) Respondents. ) ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Petitioner Brett Jones, also known as “Eeon,” filed this miscellaneous

action purportedly on behalf of Bryan “Briggs, et al, and Eeon et al,” against two named

Respondents and “Doe’s 1-20, et al.” See Pet. to Enforce at 3–4, ECF No. 1. For the

reasons set forth below, the court will dismiss this action sua sponte without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

The nature of Jones’s claims is unclear, and much of his filings are illegible. His

Civil Cover Sheet names as Defendants “MIDFIRST, et al,” “Doe’s 1-20, et al,” and

THE FEDERAL RESERVE, et al.” See ECF No. 1-1. His Petition to Enforce appears

to assert that this action involves, among other things, a loan “agreement between the

parties” and “the depositing of [a] ‘collateral security’ with the local Federal Reserve

agent for the advancements of Federal Reserve notes to reimburse the Federal Reserve

for the extension of bank credits.” Pet. to Enforce at 4–5. The relief Jones seeks

includes court-ordered “compliance with the provisions of the Federal Reserve Act,” a

Page 1 of 4 declaration of “the conversion of a promissory note to a negotiable instrument as valid

and enforceable,” and “penalties on the Federal Reserve.” Id. at 18.

Jones did not provide the court with an address for the Petitioners or

Respondents, but contends that “[t]his Court holds jurisdiction over the matter due to

the requirement for the Federal Reserve to operate under the Federal Reserve Act and

the agreement between the parties being created within the jurisdiction of this court.”

Id. at 17. Jones also asserts that because “the local Federal Reserve agent is a member

bank registered as a State bank and operating under license with the Secretary of State”

it has thus “waiv[ed] any rights respecting jurisdiction within the limits and and

confines of the State.” Id.

II. ANALYSIS

A district court “may sua sponte dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) without notice

where it is patently obvious that the plaintiff could not possibly prevail based on the facts alleged

in the complaint.” Jafari v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 3d 277, 279 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 621 F. App'x

676 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir.

2012)) (internal quotations and brackets removed). “The Court is mindful that a pro se litigant’s

complaint is held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Jarrell

v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing Redwood v. Council of the District of

Columbia, 679 F.2d 931, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972)).

But this standard “does not constitute a license for a plaintiff filing pro se to ignore the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure or expect the Court to decide what claims a plaintiff may or may not

want to assert.” Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239 (citations omitted).

Page 2 of 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that complaints contain, among other

things, “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). In other words, Rule 8(a) requires that the plaintiff “give the defendant fair

notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007) (holding that the complaint must contain enough “factual matter” to

suggest liability) (citation and alterations omitted). A plaintiff must assert enough facts to give

the defendant “fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the [defendant] the

opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the

doctrine of res judicata is applicable.” Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977)

(citation omitted).

Jones’ petition does not meet the Rule 8 pleading standard. His factual allegations are

unclear—as is the legal theory ostensibly providing the basis for the petition. Thus, he has not

given the Respondents “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Moreover, it appears that this case may have been improperly filed as a

miscellaneous case. Miscellaneous cases include “(a) actions to perpetuate testimony as in

Rule 27, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (b) actions to enforce administrative subpoenas and

summonses; (c) proceedings ancillary to an action pending in another district; (d) supplementary

proceedings brought in aid of execution; (e) motions for return of property in criminal

proceedings; and (f) requests for judicial assistance.” Matter of Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec.

Surveillance Applications & Ords., 300 F. Supp. 3d 61, 69, n.4 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Local Civil

Rules (“LCvR”) 40.3(a)(1) n.1, 57.10(a)(1) n.3). Further, miscellaneous cases may “relate[] to a

bankruptcy case or proceeding,” id. (citing LCvR 403.3(c)(2)(iii)), may include a “motion or

Page 3 of 4 application filed in connection with a grand jury subpoena or other matter occurring before a

grand jury,” id. (citing LCrR 6.1), and may include “[a]ny news organization or other interested

person, other than a party or a subpoenaed witness, who seeks relief relating to any aspect of the

proceedings in a criminal case.” Id. (citing LCrR 57.6). Assuming that Jones intended to

address a loan agreement or bank transaction, a miscellaneous action is not the proper judicial

vehicle to resolve this dispute.

Finally, while Jones may appear pro se, he is not authorized to seek relief on

behalf of other litigants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“[P]arties may plead and conduct their own

cases personally or by counsel.”); Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir.

1984) (rejecting pro se party’s attempt to represent other parties).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, this court will dismiss this action sua sponte

without prejudice.

Date: April 6, 2023

Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge

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