Briggs v. Legacy Salmon Creek Medical Center

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05053-BHS Plaintiff, v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION LEGACY SALMON CREEK Noting Date: February 7, 2025 Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on referral of Plaintiff Christopher Briggs’ Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) and his Proposed Complaint. See Dkts. 1, 1-1; see also Amended General Order 11-11. Plaintiff proceeds pro se. For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Proposed Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The deficiencies of the Proposed Complaint cannot be cured with an amendment. Therefore, the Court recommends that this matter be DISMISSED, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Dkt. 1) be DENIED, and that this case be In the Proposed Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Legacy Salmon Creek Medical Center violated his rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). Dkt. 1-1. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts Defendant denied his request to opt out of

data sharing related to his medical records in violation of his HIPAA rights. Id. A. Proposed Complaint The Court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case that is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua

sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that fails to state a claim). An IFP complaint is frivolous if “it ha[s] no arguable substance in law or fact.” Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984). A pro se plaintiff’s complaint is to be construed liberally, but, like any other complaint, it must nevertheless contain factual assertions sufficient to support a facially plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is facially plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Here, in the Proposed Complaint, Plaintiff’s sole claim is that his HIPAA rights were violated. Dkt. 1-1. The Ninth Circuit has definitively declared “HIPAA itself provides no private

right of action.” Garmon v. County of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007)). Other circuits have explicitly found that HIPAA cannot be enforced through Section 1983. Adams v. Eureka Fire Prot. Dist., 352 F. App’x. 137, 139 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Since HIPAA does not create a private right, it cannot be privately enforced either via § 1983 or through an implied right of action”); Sneed v. Pan Am Hosp., 370 F. App’x. 47, 50 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We decline to hold that HIPAA creates a private cause of action or rights that are enforceable through § 1983”). As HIPAA does not provide a private right of action, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s allegations fail state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Davenport v. Richards, No. C06-5334RJB-KLS, 2008 WL 2678371, *3 (W.D. Wash. June 30, 2008) (finding the plaintiff’s claims relied solely on alleged

violations of HIPAA, and because HIPAA provides no private right of action, the claims must be dismissed). B. Leave to Amend The Ninth Circuit has “established that a pro se litigant bringing a civil rights suit must have an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome deficiencies unless it is clear that they cannot be overcome by amendment.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 1987). As Plaintiff seeks relief solely for an alleged HIPAA violation, he cannot cure the deficiencies of the Proposed Complaint. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff should not be given leave to amend the Proposed Complaint.

The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court further finds that the deficiencies of the Proposed Complaint cannot be cured with an amendment. Therefore, the Court recommends the case be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim

and leave to amend not be given. As the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Dkt. 1) be DENIED and this case be CLOSED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this report to file written objections. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of de novo review by the district judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and can result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985); Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Accommodating the time limit imposed by Rule 72(b), the Clerk is directed to set the matter for consideration on February 7, 2025, as noted in the caption.

Dated this 24th day of January, 2025. A Grady J. Leupold United States Magistrate Judge