Briggs v. Legacy Salmon Creek Medical Center

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedJanuary 24, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-05053
StatusUnknown

This text of Briggs v. Legacy Salmon Creek Medical Center (Briggs v. Legacy Salmon Creek Medical Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Briggs v. Legacy Salmon Creek Medical Center, (W.D. Wash. 2025).

Opinion

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5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 CHRISTOPHER BRIGGS, CASE NO. 3:25-cv-05053-BHS 11 Plaintiff, v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 12 LEGACY SALMON CREEK Noting Date: February 7, 2025 13 MEDICAL CENTER, 14 Defendant.

15 This matter is before the Court on referral of Plaintiff Christopher Briggs’ Motion for 16 Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) and his Proposed Complaint. See Dkts. 1, 1-1; see 17 also Amended General Order 11-11. Plaintiff proceeds pro se. 18 For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Proposed Complaint 19 fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The deficiencies of the Proposed 20 Complaint cannot be cured with an amendment. Therefore, the Court recommends that this 21 matter be DISMISSED, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Dkt. 1) be DENIED, and that this case be 22 CLOSED. 23 24 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 In the Proposed Complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Legacy Salmon Creek Medical 3 Center violated his rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 4 (“HIPAA”). Dkt. 1-1. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts Defendant denied his request to opt out of

5 data sharing related to his medical records in violation of his HIPAA rights. Id. 6 II. DISCUSSION 7 A. Proposed Complaint 8 The Court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to 9 mandatory screening and order the sua sponte dismissal of any case that is “frivolous or 10 malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief 11 against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 12 Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 13 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 14 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua

15 sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that fails to state a claim). An IFP complaint is frivolous if “it 16 ha[s] no arguable substance in law or fact.” Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 17 1369 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also 18 Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984). 19 A pro se plaintiff’s complaint is to be construed liberally, but, like any other complaint, it 20 must nevertheless contain factual assertions sufficient to support a facially plausible claim for 21 relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 22 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is facially plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual 23

24 1 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 2 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 3 Here, in the Proposed Complaint, Plaintiff’s sole claim is that his HIPAA rights were 4 violated. Dkt. 1-1. The Ninth Circuit has definitively declared “HIPAA itself provides no private

5 right of action.” Garmon v. County of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 6 Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007)). Other circuits 7 have explicitly found that HIPAA cannot be enforced through Section 1983. Adams v. Eureka 8 Fire Prot. Dist., 352 F. App’x. 137, 139 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Since HIPAA does not create a private 9 right, it cannot be privately enforced either via § 1983 or through an implied right of action”); 10 Sneed v. Pan Am Hosp., 370 F. App’x. 47, 50 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We decline to hold that HIPAA 11 creates a private cause of action or rights that are enforceable through § 1983”). As HIPAA does 12 not provide a private right of action, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s allegations fail state a claim 13 upon which relief can be granted. See Davenport v. Richards, No. C06-5334RJB-KLS, 2008 WL 14 2678371, *3 (W.D. Wash. June 30, 2008) (finding the plaintiff’s claims relied solely on alleged

15 violations of HIPAA, and because HIPAA provides no private right of action, the claims must be 16 dismissed). 17 B. Leave to Amend 18 The Ninth Circuit has “established that a pro se litigant bringing a civil rights suit must 19 have an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome deficiencies unless it is clear that they 20 cannot be overcome by amendment.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135–36 (9th Cir. 1987). 21 As Plaintiff seeks relief solely for an alleged HIPAA violation, he cannot cure the deficiencies of 22 the Proposed Complaint. Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff should not be given leave to amend 23 the Proposed Complaint.

24 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The 3 Court further finds that the deficiencies of the Proposed Complaint cannot be cured with an 4 amendment. Therefore, the Court recommends the case be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim

5 and leave to amend not be given. As the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a claim, the Court 6 recommends Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Dkt. 1) be DENIED and this case be CLOSED. 7 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), the parties 8 shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this report to file written objections. See also Fed. 9 R. Civ. P. 6. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of 10 de novo review by the district judge, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and can result in a waiver of 11 those objections for purposes of appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985); Miranda 12 v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). Accommodating the time 13 limit imposed by Rule 72(b), the Clerk is directed to set the matter for consideration on February 14 7, 2025, as noted in the caption.

15 Dated this 24th day of January, 2025. 16 A 17 18 Grady J. Leupold United States Magistrate Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24

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Related

Den v. Turner
22 U.S. 541 (Supreme Court, 1824)
Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Anant Kumar Tripati v. First National Bank & Trust
821 F.2d 1368 (First Circuit, 1987)
Edward G. Eldridge v. Sherman Block
832 F.2d 1132 (Ninth Circuit, 1987)
Jesse J. Calhoun v. Donald N. Stahl James Brazelton
254 F.3d 845 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC
499 F.3d 1078 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Detrice Garmon v. County of Los Angeles
828 F.3d 837 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Miranda v. Anchondo
684 F.3d 844 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Rizzo v. Dawson
778 F.2d 527 (Ninth Circuit, 1985)

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Briggs v. Legacy Salmon Creek Medical Center, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/briggs-v-legacy-salmon-creek-medical-center-wawd-2025.