EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.
Briggs & Stratton Corporation has a collective bargaining agreement with Local 232 of the Paperworkers Union. The workers promised that during its term they would not participate in “any concerted slow down, strike, work stoppage or other concerted interruptions of Company operations relative to any dispute amenable to the arbitration provisions of the labor agreement”. In August 1993 Briggs & Stratton reorganized its Large Engine Division. Local 232 and its parent international (collectively, “the union”) believed that the changes, which altered the way in which seniority could be exercised, violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and called on its members to “work to rule”—that is, to enforce every picayune rule found in the contract and the plant’s operating procedures. It aimed to place economic pressure on the employer. Local 232 urged its members to reject overtime assignments, and the faithful shunned and put other social pressure on workers who displayed a lack of enthusiasm for the job action. The union also filed a grievance and took the dispute about the new organization to arbitration.
Contending that the campaign was a “concerted slow down” forbidden by the agreement, the employer filed this suit under § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, seeking an injunction requiring its workers to resume work as usual. Although § 1 of the Norris-LaGuar-dia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101, forbids injunctions in labor disputes, the Supreme Court held in Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970), that if the union promises not to strike over an arbitrable dispute, the court may enforce that promise with an injunction while arbitration proceeds. See also Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 96 S.Ct. 3141, 49 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1976) (if the dispute is not arbitrable, no injunction may issue even if the agreement contains a no-strike clause). The “work to rule” campaign ended on September 23, two weeks before the suit got under way. By the time the district court took evidence, things were humming again at the plant. The court brushed aside a suggestion that this made the request for an injunction moot (voluntary cessation generally does not moot a dispute) and did not discuss the question whether Boys Markets authorizes an injunction after a strike or slowdown has ended. After finding that the union’s campaign was a “concerted slow down” within the meaning of the agreement, the court issued an injunction pending the outcome of the arbitration. The union appealed.
Arbitrator Robert J. Mueller issued his decision on March 29, 1994, shortly before the oral argument of the appeal. He dismissed the union’s grievance after concluding that Briggs & Stratton had not violated the collective bargaining agreement in reorganizing the Large Engine Division. The injunction lapsed the same day. “When an order expires by its own terms, there is nothing to review.” Certified Grocers of Illinois, Inc. v. Produce Union, 816 F.2d 329, 331 (7th Cir.1987). The dispute cannot be characterized as one capable of repetition but evading review, because damages remain in issue—the union wants to collect under an injunction bond (although it is hard to see what its injury might be, given its representation that the campaign was over before the suit began). See Henco, Inc. v. Brown, 904 F.2d 11, 13-14 (7th Cir.1990). The appeal from the injunction is dismissed as moot.
Briggs & Stratton, too, wants damages. It contends that it lost production before the campaign ended on September 23. The union asked the district court to dismiss the claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to arbitrate or, at a minimum, to order [714]*714the employer to present its demand to an arbitrator and to stay proceedings in the interim. The district court denied both requests on February 15, 1994, ruling that the collective bargaining agreement “is not susceptible to a construction that the company is bound to arbitrate its claim for damages against the union for breach of the no-strike clause.” From this decision the union took a second appeal, whose interlocutory nature presents an obvious question of appellate jurisdiction. To the extent the union wants us to review the district court’s failure to dismiss the case outright, it hasn’t a leg to stand on. Goetz v. Cappelen, 946 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir.1991). To the extent the union seeks review of the district court’s failure to stay proceedings in favor of arbitration, things are murkier.
After Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988), junked the Ene-low-Ettelson doctrine, the courts of appeals divided on the question whether a decision refusing to stay litigation in favor of arbitration could be appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Several circuits answered yes on the theory that proceeding with the litigation amounted to an injunction against arbitration. E.g., Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 861 F.2d 420, 422 (4th Cir.1988); Nordin v. Nutri/System, Inc., 897 F.2d 339, 341-42 (8th Cir.1990). See also Abernathy v. Southern California Edison Co., 885 F.2d 525, 527-28 (9th Cir.1989) (taking jurisdiction of an appeal from a stay pending arbitration while reserving question whether the denial of a stay would be appealable). Others saw no injunction in proceeding with a suit seeking monetary relief. Queipo v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 867 F.2d 721, 722 (1st Cir.1989); Zosky v. Boyer, 856 F.2d 554, 560-61 (3d Cir.1988); Jolley v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 864 F.2d 402, 403 (5th Cir.1989); Administrative Management Services, Ltd. v. Royal American Managers, Inc., 854 F.2d 1272, 1278-79 (11th Cir.1988). Searching for an injunction in orders controlling the progress of damages litigation has an artificial quality. Every decision to proceed or wait imposes costs, but none resolves the merits. If potential costs of procedural decisions make for appellate jurisdiction, then many interlocutory orders are appealable—a step the Supreme Court has told us to resist. See Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994). Cf. In re Springfield, 818 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.1987) (order that imposes costs but does not affect ultimate disposition of the merits is not appealable as an “injunction”). It is, after all, established that the costs of litigation are not “irreparable injury.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 244, 101 S.Ct. 488, 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980); Renegotiation Board v.
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EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.
Briggs & Stratton Corporation has a collective bargaining agreement with Local 232 of the Paperworkers Union. The workers promised that during its term they would not participate in “any concerted slow down, strike, work stoppage or other concerted interruptions of Company operations relative to any dispute amenable to the arbitration provisions of the labor agreement”. In August 1993 Briggs & Stratton reorganized its Large Engine Division. Local 232 and its parent international (collectively, “the union”) believed that the changes, which altered the way in which seniority could be exercised, violated the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and called on its members to “work to rule”—that is, to enforce every picayune rule found in the contract and the plant’s operating procedures. It aimed to place economic pressure on the employer. Local 232 urged its members to reject overtime assignments, and the faithful shunned and put other social pressure on workers who displayed a lack of enthusiasm for the job action. The union also filed a grievance and took the dispute about the new organization to arbitration.
Contending that the campaign was a “concerted slow down” forbidden by the agreement, the employer filed this suit under § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, seeking an injunction requiring its workers to resume work as usual. Although § 1 of the Norris-LaGuar-dia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101, forbids injunctions in labor disputes, the Supreme Court held in Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970), that if the union promises not to strike over an arbitrable dispute, the court may enforce that promise with an injunction while arbitration proceeds. See also Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 96 S.Ct. 3141, 49 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1976) (if the dispute is not arbitrable, no injunction may issue even if the agreement contains a no-strike clause). The “work to rule” campaign ended on September 23, two weeks before the suit got under way. By the time the district court took evidence, things were humming again at the plant. The court brushed aside a suggestion that this made the request for an injunction moot (voluntary cessation generally does not moot a dispute) and did not discuss the question whether Boys Markets authorizes an injunction after a strike or slowdown has ended. After finding that the union’s campaign was a “concerted slow down” within the meaning of the agreement, the court issued an injunction pending the outcome of the arbitration. The union appealed.
Arbitrator Robert J. Mueller issued his decision on March 29, 1994, shortly before the oral argument of the appeal. He dismissed the union’s grievance after concluding that Briggs & Stratton had not violated the collective bargaining agreement in reorganizing the Large Engine Division. The injunction lapsed the same day. “When an order expires by its own terms, there is nothing to review.” Certified Grocers of Illinois, Inc. v. Produce Union, 816 F.2d 329, 331 (7th Cir.1987). The dispute cannot be characterized as one capable of repetition but evading review, because damages remain in issue—the union wants to collect under an injunction bond (although it is hard to see what its injury might be, given its representation that the campaign was over before the suit began). See Henco, Inc. v. Brown, 904 F.2d 11, 13-14 (7th Cir.1990). The appeal from the injunction is dismissed as moot.
Briggs & Stratton, too, wants damages. It contends that it lost production before the campaign ended on September 23. The union asked the district court to dismiss the claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to arbitrate or, at a minimum, to order [714]*714the employer to present its demand to an arbitrator and to stay proceedings in the interim. The district court denied both requests on February 15, 1994, ruling that the collective bargaining agreement “is not susceptible to a construction that the company is bound to arbitrate its claim for damages against the union for breach of the no-strike clause.” From this decision the union took a second appeal, whose interlocutory nature presents an obvious question of appellate jurisdiction. To the extent the union wants us to review the district court’s failure to dismiss the case outright, it hasn’t a leg to stand on. Goetz v. Cappelen, 946 F.2d 511, 514 (7th Cir.1991). To the extent the union seeks review of the district court’s failure to stay proceedings in favor of arbitration, things are murkier.
After Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988), junked the Ene-low-Ettelson doctrine, the courts of appeals divided on the question whether a decision refusing to stay litigation in favor of arbitration could be appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Several circuits answered yes on the theory that proceeding with the litigation amounted to an injunction against arbitration. E.g., Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 861 F.2d 420, 422 (4th Cir.1988); Nordin v. Nutri/System, Inc., 897 F.2d 339, 341-42 (8th Cir.1990). See also Abernathy v. Southern California Edison Co., 885 F.2d 525, 527-28 (9th Cir.1989) (taking jurisdiction of an appeal from a stay pending arbitration while reserving question whether the denial of a stay would be appealable). Others saw no injunction in proceeding with a suit seeking monetary relief. Queipo v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 867 F.2d 721, 722 (1st Cir.1989); Zosky v. Boyer, 856 F.2d 554, 560-61 (3d Cir.1988); Jolley v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 864 F.2d 402, 403 (5th Cir.1989); Administrative Management Services, Ltd. v. Royal American Managers, Inc., 854 F.2d 1272, 1278-79 (11th Cir.1988). Searching for an injunction in orders controlling the progress of damages litigation has an artificial quality. Every decision to proceed or wait imposes costs, but none resolves the merits. If potential costs of procedural decisions make for appellate jurisdiction, then many interlocutory orders are appealable—a step the Supreme Court has told us to resist. See Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1992, 128 L.Ed.2d 842 (1994). Cf. In re Springfield, 818 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.1987) (order that imposes costs but does not affect ultimate disposition of the merits is not appealable as an “injunction”). It is, after all, established that the costs of litigation are not “irreparable injury.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529, 108 S.Ct. 1945, 100 L.Ed.2d 517 (1988); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 244, 101 S.Ct. 488, 66 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980); Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24, 94 S.Ct. 1028, 1040—41, 39 L.Ed.2d 123 (1974); Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 304 U.S. 209, 222, 58 S.Ct. 834, 841, 82 L.Ed. 1294 (1938). If a district court errs in conducting a lawsuit when a contract calls for arbitration, that mistake may be corrected on appeal from a final decision; proceeding with the litigation therefore is not appealable as a “collateral order” under the approach of Digital Equipment and its predecessors.
Congress eliminated the significance of this issue for most purposes by adding a new section to the Arbitration Act, spelling out which interlocutory orders concerning arbitration are appealable and which are not. 9 U.S.C. § 16. Yet § 1 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, excludes from its coverage— and therefore from the jurisdictional rules of § 16—“contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.” Several of the circuits have concluded that this language places collective bargaining agreements outside the Arbitration Act. E.g., Street, Electric Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir.1951); Electrical Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir.1954). In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 1651 n. 2, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), the Supreme Court noticed the issue but left it unresolved. If collective bargaining agreements are indeed excluded by § 1, then courts must continue to wrestle in labor cases with questions of [715]*715appellate jurisdiction under § 1292. E.g., Tejidos de Coamo, Inc. v. ILGWU, 22 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.1994). As it happens, however, our circuit is among the minority that has limited § 1 to the transportation industries and therefore applies the Arbitration Act to most collective bargaining agreements. Pietro Scalzitti Co. v. Operating Engineers, 351 F.2d 576, 579-80 (7th Cir.1965). Neither side has asked us to revisit Pietro Scalzitti, so we turn to § 16 of the Arbitration Act to decide whether we have appellate jurisdiction.
Section 16(a) provides:
An appeal may be taken from—
(1) an order—
(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of this title,
(B) denying a petition under section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed,
(C) denying an application under section 206 of this title to compel arbitration,
(D) confirming or denying confirmation of an award or partial award, or
(E) modifying, correcting, or vacating an award;
(2) an interlocutory order granting, continuing, or modifying an injunction against an arbitration that is subject to this title; or
(3) a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title.
Section 16(a)(1)(A) and (B) provides the only potential grants of jurisdiction. These two subsections send us to sections 3 and 4 of the Arbitration Act. Section 3 provides that if a dispute is “referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing” the court must “stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration.” Section 4 says that a “party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration” may petition a district court “for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.”
Sections 3 and 4 pose paradigmatic cases. When the parties have commenced an arbitration, the court stays the litigation under § 3 to prevent duplicative proceedings (unless the party requesting the stay is “in default”). When one of the litigants has refused to arbitrate, § 4 tells the court to order that party to abide by its agreement. Our case fits neither pattern. Neither side had made a formal demand for arbitration, and at oral argument counsel for both sides treated arbitration as a poor cousin.
What the union is requesting is not so much arbitration as the dismissal of the suit. It does not believe that the Employer is required to arbitrate any dispute. Arbitration under this agreement is optional: “Should there be no settlement of a grievance or grievances between the Union and the Company after the outlined steps of the Contract grievance procedure have been exhausted, either party may submit such grievance or grievances to arbitration within sixty (60) days after the grievance has first been discussed at the third step of the grievance procedure.” The union believes that an arbitrator’s decision on the question whether “work to rule” is a forbidden “concerted slow down” is a precondition to obtaining damages. This is an exhaustion theory: no award, no damages. That is why the union has not itself requested arbitration. As it sees things, an award in its favor by the arbitrator would leave it no better off (because, in its view, as things stand Briggs & Stratton cannot get damages), while an award in the employer’s favor would be a disaster. The employer has not requested arbitration for mirror-image reasons: it thinks that it does not need an award, while if it goes to an arbitrator and loses it will certainly be kicked out of court as well.
Each party, then, has reasons for preferring the court to the arbitrator. Because each side had elected not to arbitrate, there is no pending arbitral proceeding. There is nothing to wait for, making a stay inappropriate. Because arbitration is contractual, and subject to principles of waiver, a district judge cannot order an arbitration that neither side wants. The dispute does not come within § 4 of the Arbitration Act because no one has demanded arbitration. The union does not want the court to direct [716]*716Briggs & Stratton to take part in a pending arbitration; it wants the court to dismiss the suit. It does not come within § 3 because, given the contractual nature of arbitration, a dispute that neither side wants to arbitrate is not “referable to arbitration”—and perhaps because the union, by refusing to submit its own demand, is “in default”. This is not at all to say that a dispute is “referable to arbitration” only if a party has made a formal demand; as we discuss below, requests in the course of litigation may suffice. We do not believe, however, that the presence of an arbitration clause in a contract renders any dispute within its scope “referable to arbitration” even if both sides now prefer litigation. Contracts obliging one party to arbitrate if the other so requests do not compel a court to send the parties to that forum even if both now prefer litigation. Arbitration under this contract is elective, and collective bargaining agreements also may be altered by course of performance. Matuszak v. Torrington Co., 927 F.2d 320, 324 (7th Cir.1991). Treating the phrase “referable to arbitration” as directing exclusive attention to the language of the agreement would disable parties from foregoing or waiving arbitration, and nothing in the Arbitration Act is designed to imprison them in their privileges.
We appreciate the possibility that the union’s request to dismiss or stay suit might be characterized as implying a demand for arbitration (although one that would be irregular and untimely under the collective bargaining agreement). See Mautz & Oren, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 279, 882 F.2d 1117, 1126 (7th Cir.1989) (presenting as an affirmative defense an employer’s failure to arbitrate preserves arbitral options, without the need to make a formal demand). Compare Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962), with Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 82 S.Ct. 1346, 8 L.Ed.2d 474 (1962). Although moving to dismiss failure to arbitrate may support an inference that the objecting party wants to arbitrate, it does not compel such an inference. We therefore explored the question at oral argument and learned that the union sees arbitration as a fallback: better than losing outright, but worse than winning on its principal theory that, by failing to start the arbitral process itself, the employer surrendered any right to damages. The union’s lawyer stated that his client is “prepared to arbitrate” if the employer so desires (“if they want to arbitrate we will arbitrate the dispute”) but reiterated that the union’s essential view is that whether to arbitrate is for the employer to decide. Neither side affirmatively desires arbitration, which negates the inference that by opposing the employer’s suit the union has effectively made its own contractual demand for arbitration.
In sum, dismissing the appeal does not frustrate the arbitral process or create any risk of duplication or delay. If the employer is right and arbitration is not required, then the district judge’s decision on the merits of the claim for damages will resolve the dispute. If the union is right, and an arbitral award on the “concerted slow down” question is a precondition to damages, then the employer will lose this suit outright. There will be one trial, one appeal, and no arbitration, no matter what happens. (Briggs & Stratton has assuredly forfeited its own right to use arbitration as a backstop.) Section 16 of the Arbitration Act does not authorize an interlocutory appeal when there is no arbitration in prospect. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance Co. v. Quantum Chemical Corp., 968 F.2d 631 (7th Cir.1992). The union put the right caption on its initial motion: it made (and the district court denied) a proper request for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), but the denial of such a motion is not appealable.
Appeal No. 93-3868 is dismissed as moot, and appeal No. 94-1484 is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.