TROTT, Circuit Judge:
C.A. Terhune, Director of the California Department of Corrections, (“State”) appeals the district court’s grant of Brian Buckley’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State’s appeal is timely, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. The district court did not afford [1151]*1151the state court’s determination of facts the appropriate level of deference. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court because it resulted from a misapplication of the strict standard of review mandated by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 (“AEDPA”).1
I
On November 27, 1987, Buckley was charged in Ventura County, California with felony murder, robbery, and burglary. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187(a), 190.2(a), 211, 459. On December 15, 1987, the prosecutor, Donald C. Glynn, wrote Buckley a letter offering a plea bargain. The proposal contemplated that Buckley would testify against suspects Curtis Fau-ber and Christopher Caldwell as to three murders, but the agreement did not specify the sentence to be imposed should Buckley accept the offer. Attached to Glynn’s letter was a document entitled “Felony Disposition Statement.”
According to the Felony Disposition Statement, Buckley was to plead guilty to a violation of California Penal Code section 187 (murder) on Count 1, and the prosecutor was to recommend that the court declare the murder to be murder in the second degree and that the remaining counts be dismissed in the interests of justice. The agreement contained also the following relevant paragraphs, which Buckley initialed:
F. CONSEQUENCES OF PLEA (Defendant to initial)
/BB/ My attorney has explained to me the direct and indirect consequences of this plea including the maximum possible sentence. I understand that the following consequences could result from my plea:
/BB/ I could be sentenced to the state prison for a maximum possible term of 15 year(s).
* * *
/BB/ After I have served my prison term, I may be subject to a maximum parole period of LIFE2 (In re Cambes, 144 Cal.App.3d 927, 193 Cal.Rptr. 65).
At some point in time before Buckley entered his plea of guilty, the prosecutor added — and the prosecutor alone initialed — a handwritten paragraph to the Felony Disposition Statement that stated:
/BB/ At the time of sentencing the people will move the court to declare the murder to be murder in the second degree, with a maximum term of 15 years to life.
Neither Buckley nor his defense attorney, Willard Wiksell, initialed this paragraph. On December 17, 1987, Buckley signed the prosecutor’s December 15, 1987 letter and initialed and signed the Felony Disposition Statement. At the change of plea hearing on January 4, 1988, the prosecutor engaged Buckley in the following colloquy:
Q: And has your attorney explained all of the consequences of your plea to this charge?
A: Yes.
[1152]*1152Q: Do you understand that for second degree murder you could be sentenced to state prison for a maximum possible term of 15 years?
A: Yes.
Q: And do you understand that after serving a prison term you’ll be subject to a parole period' — I'm sorry, your Honor, does the Court know the parole period for second degree murder? I didn’t enter that in the document.
The Court: Yes, it’s — the possibility is parole for life.
Q: (By Mr. Glynn:) All right. I’ve entered this into the document.3 You could be subject to a parole period of life. And you could also be ordered to pay a fine of not less than a hundred dollars nor more than $10,000. Do you understand that?
A: Yes.
* * *
Q: Now as I stated before and it’s also contained in this Felony Disposition form, that at the time of sentencing the people will ask the Court to declare the murder to be murder in the second degree with a maximum term of 15 years to life. And the People’s reason for entering into that plea agreement are contained in this document that’s attached to the Felony Disposition Statement [the December 15,1987 letter].
I’d like to go into the terms of this agreement with you. In order — or as your part of the agreement you will agree to cooperate in the trials against Curtis Fauber and Christopher Cogwell [sic], and that you will testify in the Fauber case at all proceedings regarding the murder of Thomas Urell, David Church, and Jack Dowdy, and testify truthfully regarding whatever you know about those murders. Do you understand that to be the situation?
A: Yes.
Q: I’m showing you the Felony Disposition form, this yellow form here, that has some initials B.B. against a number of the paragraphs .... And at the end of the form I see the date December 17, 1987 and your signature. Did you sign this document on that date?
A: Yes.
Q: And did you sign this document because you read each of the paragraphs that you have initialed and you understand what’s contained in these paragraphs?
A: Yes.
(emphasis added). The prosecutor then asked Buckley if he agreed to testify as a witness for the State against two other defendants, and Buckley responded, “Yes.”
The prosecutor’s letter and the Felony Disposition Statement were entered into evidence as the written plea bargain agreement. The judge then accepted Buckley’s guilty plea to Count 1 on the charge of murder. Sentencing was suspended until after Buckley testified at the trials of Fauber and Caldwell.
At some point on January 4, 1988, defense attorney Wiksell signed the December 15, 1987 letter, and both he and prosecutor Glynn signed the Felony Disposition Statement, which Buckley had already initialed and signed three weeks earlier.
At the sentencing hearing, Judge McGrath began by saying, “It would be my intention to follow the recommendation. That’s just an indication to counsel and is subject to change if counsel changes my mind during the argument or evidence.” [1153]*1153The trial court ordered the probation report filed. The prosecutor moved the court to declare Count 1 to be murder in the second degree and to dismiss Counts 2 and 3. The court granted both motions. The prosecutor then stated for the record that Buckley had complied with all the terms of the plea agreement: “He has been a cooperative witness in all of the phases of the Fauber trial and he has testified at the preliminary hearing in the case against Christopher Caldwell.” After a discussion about Buckley’s concerns for his safety, the possible options for where to house him, and the nature of the crime, the court sentenced Buckley:
The Court does impose the term prescribed by law as 15 years to life. The Defendant is granted presentence credits by the Court of 110 days actual time, 55 days good time-work time, a total of 165 days.
The Defendant is ordered to pay a restitution fine of $10,000 to the State Restitution Fund. The Court finds and the Court requests that the clerk show on the Abstract and Minutes that the Defendant’s life is in danger in prison because of the testimony that he gave against his co-defendant in this case ... and that the Court requests that the Department of Corrections give Defendant protective custody status in state prison and seriously consider him as a candidate for out-of-state placement.
This specific offense carries a parole term for the rest of your natural life once you would be released from the state prison facility.
If you should violate a term or condition of parole, you would be placed back into prison for up to one year for any single violation.
(emphasis added). The judge then asked Buckley, “Do you understand that?” Buckley responded, “Yes.” No objection was made on his behalf to the sentence as imposed.
Eight years later, Buckley filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of California, claiming that the State had breached the plea agreement because Buckley had agreed only to a determinate 15-year sentence, not the indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life the court imposed. At the conclusion of the proceedings occasioned by that petition, the Superior Court found “that with the exception of one statement in the negotiated disposition statement, and a reference at the time of the taking of the plea on January 4, 1988, the records demonstrate that the advisement was that the sentence would be 15 years to life as provided by law, and that the petitioner well knew this.” The court continued:
Any ambiguity, concerning petitioner’s understanding ... is put to rest by petitioner’s own statement ... during petitioner’s testimony at the trial of Curtis Fauber that he understood his term of imprisonment would be 15 years to life. This is underscored by the judge’s comments at the time the sentence was pronounced on March 1,1988....
In addition, the Superior Court took judicial notice of its own records in Buckley’s case wherein Buckley indicated, just 33 days after he was sentenced, in his own hand, and without quarrel, that his sentence was “15 years to life, plea bargain.” The California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court both summarily denied Buckley’s successive petitions.
Dissatisfied with this result, Buckley petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The court referred the case to a magistrate judge and granted an evidentiary hearing. Following the hearing, the court adopted the [1154]*1154magistrate’s report, making findings of fact and ultimately holding that “to the extent that the state court’s ruling is properly characterized as a factual finding, it is an incorrect and unreasonable one, and petitioner has met his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that it is erroneous.” Buckley v. Terhune, 266 F.Supp.2d 1124, 1141 (C.D.Cal.2002) (citation omitted). The court opined that “[t]he Superior Court’s findings and conclusion rest on a flawed foundation. It lacked the benefit of an evidentiary hearing during which it could have developed the record regarding any discussions or advice which occurred off the record.” Id. After considering evidence, much of which without excuse Buckley did not present to the state court, the district court ultimately found that Buckley understood he would receive a 15-year determinate sentence and granted the petition, ordering his release from custody “upon the expiration of [his] 15 year sentence.” Id. at 1143-44.
II
A.
We review the district court’s decision to grant a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition de novo, as we do issues of law — including the proper application of the law to the facts. Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir.2003). We review findings of fact made by the district court for clear error. Id.
Under the AEDPA, § 2254 habeas petitions “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim — (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determinar tion of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2) (emphasis added). Additionally, § 2254(e)(1) states: “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
B.
When reviewing state convictions, the principles of comity and federalism embodied in the relevant sections of the controlling federal habeas statute militate against substituting our judgment for that of the state courts. As the Supreme Court explained in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), § 2254(d)(1) “places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner’s, application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court.” Id. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. As we recently stated, “[A] federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.2004) (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003)) (emphasis added); Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107-08 (9th Cir.2000) (same standard of unreasonableness applies under subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2)).
In Maddox, this circuit established a two-part analysis under §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). First, federal courts must undertake an “intrinsic review” of the state court’s factfinding under the “unreasonable determination” clause of § 2254(d)(2). Id. at 1000. The intrinsic review requires federal courts to examine the state court’s [1155]*1155factfinding process, not its findings. We noted that “intrinsic challenges to state-court findings pursuant to the ‘unreasonable determination’ standard come in several flavors, each presenting its own peculiar set of considerations.” Id. at 1000-01 (listing, e.g.: “where the state court should have made a finding of fact but neglected to do so[;] ... where the state court does make factual findings, but does so under a misapprehension as to the correct legal standard[;] ... and, where the fact-finding process itself is defective”).
“Once the state court’s factfinding process survives this intrinsic review — or in those cases where petitioner does not raise an intrinsic challenge to the facts as found by the state court — the state court’s findings are dressed in a presumption of correctness,” as laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Id. at 1000. That presumption
helps steel them against any challenge based on extrinsic evidence, i.e., evidence presented for the first time in federal court. AEDPA spells out what this presumption means: State-court fact-finding may be overturned based on new evidence presented for the first time in federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and convincing proof that the state-court finding is in error.
Id. (citation omitted).
Ill
In this appeal, we are presented with two competing versions of the facts — those found by the state court, on one hand, and those found by the federal court, on the other. According to the Ventura County Superior Court, Buckley “well knew” that he pleaded guilty in exchange for an indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life, but according to the United States District Court, the Superior Court’s finding “is an incorrect and unreasonable one.” Buckley, 266 F.Supp.2d at 1141. The district court concluded that Buckley reasonably “understood that he was receiving a sentence of no more than 15 years.” Id. at 1141.
As the competing findings demonstrate, the record regarding the terms of the plea agreement in this case is subject to dispute. Nevertheless, the issue we must first decide is not which of these versions of the facts is correct, but whether the district court correctly concluded that the Superior Court’s version is an unreasonable one. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). We focus on the decision of the Superior Court as the “last reasoned decision,” because the California Court of Appeal and Supreme Court summarily denied Buckley’s successive habeas petitions without comment. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991).4
Following the construct established in Maddox, first we undertake an “intrinsic review” of the state’s factual finding process. In order to do so with the precision required by the statute and our controlling precedents, we ordered the parties to provide us with the complete record of Buckley’s state habeas proceedings in the Ventura County Superior Court — which [1156]*1156they did. We asked them also to give us their views on the impact of Maddox in this case — which they have also done.
What we find in the Superior Court record is as follows:
1. Petitioner Buckley’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus dated March 28,1996.
2. Five supporting evidentiary exhibits to his petition:
a. The felony complaint filed against the petitioner. (Ex.# 1)
b. The plea agreement negotiated in return for his testimony against Curtis Fauber and Christopher A. Caldwell. (Ex.# 2)
c. The Superior Court felony disposition statement memorializing Buckley’s plea of guilty and all the required waivers. (Ex.# 3)
d. A reporter’s transcript dated January 4, 1988, of the entry of the plea of guilty to second degree murder. (Ex.# 4)
e. A reporter’s transcript dated March 1, 1987, of Buckley’s sentence (without objection) to “the term prescribed by law as 15 years to life.” (Ex.# 5)
3. Respondent district attorney Bradbury’s return to Buckley’s petition dated July 12, 1996, supplemented by an addendum dated July 15,1996.
4. A supporting evidentiary declaration by the prosecutor, Donald C. Glynn.
5. Exhibit A to the Glynn declaration consisting of a reporter’s transcript dated January 7, 1988, of Buckley’s guilt-phase testimony against Curtis Fauber indicating that his anticipated sentence was “15 years to life.”
6. A Superior Court order dated July 22, 1996, directing Buckley to file a traverse, or an answer, to the prosecutor’s return, and ordering a specific response to the “factual allegations set forth in paragraph 12, paragraph 13, and paragraph 14, wherein it appears that petitioner was well aware at the time of the entry of his plea to second degree murder that the punishment was 15 years to life.”
7. Buckley’s responsive traverse dated August 21,1996.
8. The Superior Court’s order dated September 10, 1996, denying the petition.
9. Court Exhibit # 1 to its September 10, 1996, order consisting of Buckley’s petition for writ of appeal “from his conviction dated April 3, 1988, and indicating in his own hand that his sentence was “15 years to life, plea bargain.”
What we do not find in the record — or in Buckley’s counsel’s response to our order to produce the record — is any indication that Buckley asked for or was denied either: (1) an opportunity to develop or to offer additional evidence; (2) an opportunity orally to argue in support of his petition; or (3) an evidentiary hearing in open court on any of the issues. What we deduce instead is that Buckley was content to have the claims in his petition decided upon the extensive written evidentiary record and argument submitted by both sides, which is exactly what transpired. The final document in Buckley’s response to our order is a declaration of mailing to the parties of the Superior Court’s order denying writ of habeas corpus, dated September 10, 1996. Conspicuous by its absence is any request by Buckley for reconsideration.
Here, we take note of what appears to be an omission of important information in Buckley’s evidentiary submission to the Superior Court. Buckley’s evidentiary Exhibit # 4 is a copy of a transcript of Buckley’s arraignment on Monday, Janu[1157]*1157ary 4, 1988, and the entry of his guilty plea. The pages of the reporter’s transcript itself are consecutively numbered 1-13. However, page 12 was omitted from this Exhibit and does not appear in the parties’ recent submissions to this court. Why is this important? Because, as pointed out by the prosecutor in 1996 in his return, the missing page 12 of Buckley’s Exhibit # 4 quotes Buckley’s counsel’s description of Buckley’s sentence during his arraignment and in his client’s presence as “15 to life.” Here is the exchange, which Buckley apparently did not include in his exhibit to the Superior Court:
The Court: I’m leaving this department [at] the end of January. If you gentlemen like and the defendant requests, I’ll keep the case for sentencing, or you can keep this case here.... But whatever you want to do is fine with me.
[Buckley’s counsel responded:] Why don’t you — normally wouldn’t make any difference because it’s a second degree murder and you can only sentence him to 15 to life.
(emphasis added).
From the foregoing, we conclude that petitioner had a full, fair, and complete opportunity to present evidence to the state courts — of which he took full advantage. He had an evidentiary hearing, albeit on the written record. In his petition to the Superior Court, he included five evidentiary exhibits. The Superior Court judge referred to the evidence on the record before him, asked for and received a response to certain factual assertions and submissions by the respondent, and then made a reasoned decision “in light of the evidence presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Thus, the state court’s fact-finding process easily survives an intrinsic review. We find no defect whatsoever in the process invoked by Buckley and employed by the Superior Court.
The error made here by the district court was in believing' — on the basis of evidence not submitted to the Superior Court — that because the Superior Court did not conduct an open evidentiary hearing and solicit additional input, its process was flawed and its findings did not need to be honored in federal court. To reiterate, the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation says, “[t]he Superior Court’s findings and conclusions rest on a flawed foundation. It lacked the benefit of an evidentiary hearing during which it could have developed the record regarding any discussions or advice which occurred off the record.” Buckley, 266 F.Supp.2d at 1141. He continued, “to the extent that the state court’s ruling is properly characterized as a factual finding, it is an incorrect and unreasonable one, and petitioner has met his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that it is erroneous.” Id. (citation omitted).
In Mendiola v. Schomig, 224 F.3d 589, 592-93 (7th Cir.2000), the Seventh Circuit noted the differences between pre-AEDPA § 2254(d) and the current § 2254(e)(1). Id. The latter “does not require findings to be based on evidentiary hearings.” Id. Under this rationale, the magistrate in this case erred by determining that because the California Superior Court’s finding was not based on a separate evidentiary hearing it is not entitled to deference under the AEDPA. As the Mendiola court noted, “[i]f a state court’s findings rest on thin air, the petitioner will have little difficulty satisfying the standards for relief under § 2254. But if the state court’s finding is supported by the record, even though not by a ‘hearing on the merits of the factual issue’, then it is presumed to be correct.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994) (pre-AEDPA)). We agree with our sister circuit: we do not read either the AEDPA or Maddox as mandating an in-court evi-dentiary hearing under all circumstances. [1158]*1158The question is whether the factfinding process was fatally defective. Moreover, petitioner challenged the state court’s finding in his federal habeas petition on the basis that it was simply wrong, not on the basis that the factfinding process was intrinsically flawed.
We note here that all the “new” evidence petitioner brought to the district court’s attention was not evidence that was unknown or unavailable to the petitioner in state court — to the contrary. In this respect, his federal presentation to the district court runs afoul of the requirement that before he can obtain federal habeas relief, he must have fairly presented his claims to the state court. As the Supreme Court said in Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 118 L.Ed.2d 318 (1992):
It is hardly a good use of scarce judicial resources to duplicate factfinding in federal court merely because a petitioner has negligently failed to take advantage of opportunities in state-court proceedings.
Furthermore, ensuring that full factual development of a claim takes place in state court channels the resolution of the claim to the most appropriate forum. The state court is the appropriate forum for resolution of factual issues in the first instance, and creating incentives for the deferral of factfinding to later federal-court proceedings can only degrade the accuracy and efficiency of judicial proceedings. This is fully consistent with, and gives meaning to, the requirement of exhaustion.... Exhaustion means more than notice. In requiring exhaustion of a federal claim in state court, Congress surely meant that exhaustion be serious and meaningful.
* * *
The purpose of exhaustion is not to create a procedural hurdle on the path to federal habeas court, but to channel claims into an appropriate forum, where meritorious claims may be vindicated and unfounded litigation obviated before resort to federal court. Comity concerns dictate that the requirement of exhaustion is not satisfied by the mere statement of a federal claim in state court.
Id. at 9-10, 112 S.Ct. 1715.
In this connection, § 2254(e)(2) provides as follows:
If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in state court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless [petitioner] shows that—
(A) the claim relies on—
(i) a new rule of constitutional law ...; or
(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and
(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found [petitioner] guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this statute as follows in connection with a petitioner’s responsibility fully to develop the record in state court:
For state courts to have their rightful opportunity to adjudicate federal rights, the prisoner must be diligent in developing the record and presenting, if possible, all claims of constitutional error. If the prisoner fails to do so, himself or herself contributing to the absence of a [1159]*1159full and fair adjudication in state court, § 2254(e)(2) prohibits an evidentiary-hearing to develop the relevant claims in federal court, unless the statute’s other stringent requirements are met. Federal courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings. Yet comity is not served by saying a prisoner “has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim” where he was unable to develop his claim in state court despite diligent effort. In that, circumstance, an evidentiary hearing is not barred by § 2254(e)(2).
Id. at 437, 120 S.Ct. 1479.
When the “stringent requirements” of § 2254(e)(2) are cast in terms of a petitioner’s dispute with his sentence, and whether the facts underlying his claim would have been such that no reasonable factfinder could have found against him, we are persuaded that he fails to satisfy this test — as will become evident from our extrinsic review of the factfinding process. See infra Part III B. See also Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir.1999) (a petitioners indefensible failure in state court to advance evidence in support of his federal claim bars him pursuant to § 2254(e) from an evidentiary hearing in federal court).
State courts cannot be expected, sua sponte, to order testimonial evidentiary hearings when they are not requested or when the need for such a hearing is not apparent from the material submitted. Where, as here, the state court considered all of the evidence submitted by the petitioner and did not refuse the petitioner the opportunity to develop those claims — indeed, the court solicited more factual input and argument — we cannot conclude that the decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (emphasis added).
Having concluded that the state court employed a proper process in determining the facts, Maddox next instructs us to undertake an “extrinsic review” under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) of the state’s fact-finding process. In this setting, the AED-PA “steels” the state court findings with a presumption of correctness. Maddox, 366 F.3d at 1000. “[The] presumption means; State-court fact-finding may be overturned based on new evidence presented for the first time in federal court only if such new evidence amounts to clear and convincing proof that the state-court finding is in error.” Id. (citation omitted).
As noted above, contradictory statements regarding petitioner’s sentence appear in the Superior Court record. Nonetheless,'that record contains evidence and information sufficient to support the Superior Court’s conclusion. As we have explained, during his testimony against Curtis Fauber, Buckley himself contemporaneously described his expected sentence, in return for his cooperation, to be the standard term of “15 years to life,” as did his own attorney at the time of his plea. Moreover, Buckley repeated this understanding shortly after his sentence in his petition for writ of appeal: “15 years to life, plea bargain.” Given this evidence, we find it impossible to say that the Superior Court’s findings of fact as to Buckley’s contemporaneous understanding and the nature of the plea bargain to amount to an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
Petitioner relies heavily on the alleged failure of the Superior Court to consider Buckley’s testimony during the penalty phase of his co-defendant’s trial. When [1160]*1160asked during that trial when he believed he would be released, from prison, Buckley-replied, “Seven and a half years.” However, Buckley did not present this evidence to the Superior Court. Moreover, this evidence is contradicted by his testimony during the guilt phase of that trial, where he stated that he understood his sentence to be “15 years to life.” Furthermore, his first statement does not conclusively determine that he understood he was facing a determinate 15-year sentence. As the State points out, then extant California law regarding application of good time credits to sentences of 15 years to life was unclear, so Buckley could have understood he would serve only half of the indeterminate sentence. See In re Oluwa, 207 Cal.App.3d 439, 442, 255 Cal.Rptr. 35 (1989) (holding that “persons serving sentences of 15 years to life for second degree murder are not eligible to receive the 1-for-l custody credits ... but only l-for-2,” which results in a minimum sentence of 10 years rather than 7-1/2 years).
At the federal evidentiary hearing, Buckley, his mother, his attorney Willard Wiksell, prosecutor Donald Glynn, and investigator Larry Troxel testified regarding Buckley’s plea negotiation and agreement. Again, the various witnesses presented conflicting testimony. Wiksell, Buckley’s trial counsel and a practiced defense attorney who had tried “hundreds” of criminal cases prior to representing Buckley, testified that he told his client he would receive the standard sentence for second-degree murder, 15 years to life. This testimony finds support in the missing page from Buckley’s Exhibit #4, where Wiksell describes his client’s sentence during his arraignment as “15 to life.” [Evid. Hearing Tr. 129]. As related above, Buckley testified also that he thought he was getting the standard sentence. Troxel, who was not present during any part of the actual plea negotiation, testified that the prosecutor represented Buckley’s sentence to him as a 15-year sentence. [Evid. Hearing Tr. 15-17]. Buckley’s mother testified that she met with Glynn, who explained to her that Buckley would probably only serve seven and a half years. [Evid. Hearing Tr. 32], She testified also that in a conversation in an elevator, Troxel, who had no authority to participate in any part of the plea bargain, told her Buckley was receiving a 15-year determinate sentence. [Evid. Hearing Tr. 33].
This contradictory testimony does not amount to “clear and convincing” evidence that the Superior Court’s finding was in error. Here, we are faced with evidence that might support either conclusion. Buckley’s evidence is anything but clear, and not at all convincing. In cases such as this, we “may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process unless, after review of the state-court record, [we] de-terminen that the state court was not merely wrong, but actually unreasonable." Maddox, 366 F.3d at 999 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). “To secure habeas relief, petitioner must demonstrate that a state court’s finding of [fact] was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and that the corresponding factual determination was ‘objectively unreasonable’ in light of the record before the court.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 348, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003).
Of consequence in this analysis is the fact that we are examining a state court’s construction of the terms of a plea agreement. The Supreme Court addressed this situation in Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2680, 97 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987), a case that reversed our holding regarding the provisions of a state court plea agreement. In its opinion, the Court offered this authoritative guidance:
[O]nce a state court has, within broad bounds of reasonableness, determined [1161]*1161that a breach of a plea agreement results in certain consequences, a federal habeas court must independently assess the effect of those consequences on federal constitutional rights. This independent assessment, however, proceeds without second-guessing the finding of a breach and is not a license to substitute a federal interpretation of the terms of a plea agreement for a reasonable state interpretation.
* * *
[T]he construction of the plea agreement and the concomitant obligations flowing therefore are, within broad bounds of reasonableness, matters of state law, and we will not disturb [the state court’s] reasonable disposition of those issues.
Id. at 5 n. 3. In fine, Buckley has not demonstrated that the Superior Court’s factual determination was objectively unreasonable, and he has not carried his “burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
CONCLUSION
Because the state court’s determination of the facts was not unreasonable under the AEDPA, we reverse the district court’s decision granting Buckley’s § 2254 habeas petition.
REVERSED; PETITION DENIED.