BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.
Brenda Faye Benson brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII asserting that she had been discharged as a chambermaid at the Little Rock Hilton Inn (Inn) in retaliation for bringing a suit for individual and class action relief under section 1981. The district court1 denied Benson’s motion for class certification and dismissed the action on its merits. Benson appeals, asserting that the district court erred in concluding that she was not discharged in retaliation for having filed her section 1981 claim. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND.
Brenda Faye Benson is a black woman. At the time of her discharge, she had worked at the Inn as a chambermaid for about two months. Her regular job duties included cleaning the hotel’s executive offices. On December 27, 1978 Benson was cleaning the office of William Malleson, the hotel’s general manager. In picking up some papers from the floor to place upon his desk, she discovered a document entitled “Nigger Application for Employment.” The racial slurs on this paper, which the district court rightly found to be “a sick and bigoted attempt at humor, that can only be viewed as utterly deplorable,” greatly upset Benson. Malleson discussed the mock application with Benson later that day. He called in two dining room managers who were responsible for the document, and made them apologize to her. He did not otherwise discipline these employees.
On January 10,1979, Benson filed a class action against the Inn under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1988 and the thirteenth amendment. In her complaint, Benson alleged that the defendant “maintain[ed] policies and practices which adversely affect black female employees because of their race by subjecting them to fill out applications that is [sic] attached to this complaint as Exhibit A,” referring to the application mentioned above. On January 11, 1979 Malleson read in the Arkansas Gazette that Benson had filed this lawsuit. The article reported that Benson’s attorney “said his client had been instructed to fill out the form after she came to work.” Malleson approached Benson at the hotel and inquired about the article. After their conversation, he fired her.
The district court dismissed Benson’s initial complaint for failure to state a claim. She filed an amended complaint on October 31, 1979, alleging that her discharge from the Inn was in retaliation for filing her section 1981 claim. The amended complaint invoked both sections 1981 and Title [416]*416VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.2 The ease went to trial without a jury in the district court on January 12, 1983. After hearing conflicting accounts from Malleson and Benson about their January 11, 1979 conversation, the district court found that Benson lied in telling her lawyer that she was instructed to fill out the mock application, that she admitted this lie to Malleson, and that she also lied in telling Malleson that she had lost her copy of the application. The court concluded that Malleson fired Benson “because he believed in good faith that she had falsely libeled the hotel, had lied to him, and had stolen the document. No racial considerations entered into that decision.” The court thus denied her claim, and Benson now appeals.3
II. DISCUSSION.
Benson’s retaliation claim properly arises only under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because at the time of her dismissal, she had not filed suit under Title VII. Although section 1981, unlike Title VII,4 does not expressly prohibit an employer from terminating an employee in retaliation for charging the employer with unlawful discrimination, this court has held that the principles underlying Title VII and section 1981 are the same, and has treated retaliation claims under section 1981 as though they were brought under Title VII. See Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Construction Co., 655 F.2d 146, 150 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976, 102 S.Ct. 1485, 71 L.Ed.2d 688 (1982); Setser v. Novack Investment Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1146-47 (8th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 615, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981); Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.1982). As the Fifth Circuit has expressly held, “[section] 1981 does encompass claims of retaliation when an adverse action is taken in response to a person’s filing of an EEOC charge or civil rights lawsuit in which discrimination is alleged.” Id. at 598. Thus, Benson’s claim of retaliation is cognizable under section 1981.
This court has given employees filing discrimination claims with the EEOC or the federal courts broad protection from retaliation. In Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981), we said:
The merits of a charge made against an employer is irrelevant to its protected status. Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 211 (9th Cir.1979); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir.1969). Access is protected; administrative and judicial mechanisms determine the truth, falsity, frivolousness or maliciousness of an EEOC charge or court complaint. Thus, employer retaliation even against those whose charges are unwarranted cannot be sanctioned.
Id. at 1298. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir.1969) (employee filing EEOC charge [417]*417protected from retaliation regardless of truth or falsity of claim). So long as the employee has a reasonable belief that he is opposing conduct that constitutes unlawful discrimination, he is protected from retaliation by his employer. See Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Construction Co., supra, 655 F.2d at 150.
In Setser v. Novack Investment Co., supra, we articulated the rationale for this rule, stating,
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BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.
Brenda Faye Benson brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII asserting that she had been discharged as a chambermaid at the Little Rock Hilton Inn (Inn) in retaliation for bringing a suit for individual and class action relief under section 1981. The district court1 denied Benson’s motion for class certification and dismissed the action on its merits. Benson appeals, asserting that the district court erred in concluding that she was not discharged in retaliation for having filed her section 1981 claim. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND.
Brenda Faye Benson is a black woman. At the time of her discharge, she had worked at the Inn as a chambermaid for about two months. Her regular job duties included cleaning the hotel’s executive offices. On December 27, 1978 Benson was cleaning the office of William Malleson, the hotel’s general manager. In picking up some papers from the floor to place upon his desk, she discovered a document entitled “Nigger Application for Employment.” The racial slurs on this paper, which the district court rightly found to be “a sick and bigoted attempt at humor, that can only be viewed as utterly deplorable,” greatly upset Benson. Malleson discussed the mock application with Benson later that day. He called in two dining room managers who were responsible for the document, and made them apologize to her. He did not otherwise discipline these employees.
On January 10,1979, Benson filed a class action against the Inn under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, 1988 and the thirteenth amendment. In her complaint, Benson alleged that the defendant “maintain[ed] policies and practices which adversely affect black female employees because of their race by subjecting them to fill out applications that is [sic] attached to this complaint as Exhibit A,” referring to the application mentioned above. On January 11, 1979 Malleson read in the Arkansas Gazette that Benson had filed this lawsuit. The article reported that Benson’s attorney “said his client had been instructed to fill out the form after she came to work.” Malleson approached Benson at the hotel and inquired about the article. After their conversation, he fired her.
The district court dismissed Benson’s initial complaint for failure to state a claim. She filed an amended complaint on October 31, 1979, alleging that her discharge from the Inn was in retaliation for filing her section 1981 claim. The amended complaint invoked both sections 1981 and Title [416]*416VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.2 The ease went to trial without a jury in the district court on January 12, 1983. After hearing conflicting accounts from Malleson and Benson about their January 11, 1979 conversation, the district court found that Benson lied in telling her lawyer that she was instructed to fill out the mock application, that she admitted this lie to Malleson, and that she also lied in telling Malleson that she had lost her copy of the application. The court concluded that Malleson fired Benson “because he believed in good faith that she had falsely libeled the hotel, had lied to him, and had stolen the document. No racial considerations entered into that decision.” The court thus denied her claim, and Benson now appeals.3
II. DISCUSSION.
Benson’s retaliation claim properly arises only under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because at the time of her dismissal, she had not filed suit under Title VII. Although section 1981, unlike Title VII,4 does not expressly prohibit an employer from terminating an employee in retaliation for charging the employer with unlawful discrimination, this court has held that the principles underlying Title VII and section 1981 are the same, and has treated retaliation claims under section 1981 as though they were brought under Title VII. See Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Construction Co., 655 F.2d 146, 150 (8th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976, 102 S.Ct. 1485, 71 L.Ed.2d 688 (1982); Setser v. Novack Investment Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1146-47 (8th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064, 102 S.Ct. 615, 70 L.Ed.2d 601 (1981); Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.1982). As the Fifth Circuit has expressly held, “[section] 1981 does encompass claims of retaliation when an adverse action is taken in response to a person’s filing of an EEOC charge or civil rights lawsuit in which discrimination is alleged.” Id. at 598. Thus, Benson’s claim of retaliation is cognizable under section 1981.
This court has given employees filing discrimination claims with the EEOC or the federal courts broad protection from retaliation. In Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981), we said:
The merits of a charge made against an employer is irrelevant to its protected status. Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 211 (9th Cir.1979); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007 (5th Cir.1969). Access is protected; administrative and judicial mechanisms determine the truth, falsity, frivolousness or maliciousness of an EEOC charge or court complaint. Thus, employer retaliation even against those whose charges are unwarranted cannot be sanctioned.
Id. at 1298. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir.1969) (employee filing EEOC charge [417]*417protected from retaliation regardless of truth or falsity of claim). So long as the employee has a reasonable belief that he is opposing conduct that constitutes unlawful discrimination, he is protected from retaliation by his employer. See Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Construction Co., supra, 655 F.2d at 150.
In Setser v. Novack Investment Co., supra, we articulated the rationale for this rule, stating,
While it is conceivable that an applicant could incorrectly believe that he or she was the victim of racial discrimination prompting the filing of a complaint, a retaliatory response by an employer against such an applicant who genuinely believed in the merits of his or her complaint would inherently be in the nature of a racial situation. See Winston v. Lear-Siegler, Inc., 558 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir.1977). Judicial recognition of appellees’ distinction could lead courts into the factual mire of determining whether a retaliatory act was based purely on nonracial criteria.
638 F.2d at 1146. In other words, if employers could dismiss employees for filing charges that later turned out to be unwarranted, “it would be impossible completely to disassociate the retaliation claim from the underlying charge of discrimination.” Goff v. Continental Oil Co., supra, 678 F.2d at 599. Thus, to establish a claim of retaliation, an employee must establish that the employer retaliated against him for opposing conduct which the employee reasonably believed constituted unlawful discrimination.5
Whether the Inn retaliated against Benson for filing a section 1981 action is a fact question which required the trial court to determine whether the Inn “was motivated by a desire to retaliate.” Sisco v. J.S. Alberici Construction Co., supra, 655 F.2d at 150. After hearing the evidence, the trial judge made the following findings:
With respect to the circumstances of the actual discharge on January 11,1979, the Court again accepts the testimony of Mr. Malleson, which in many ways is not too different from that of Ms. Benson. However, the Court specifically finds that Mr. Malleson did not at any time refer to Ms. Benson in any racially, derogatory, or demeaning manner.
The Court finds that upon reading the article in the Arkansas Gazette,6 Mr. Malleson became very upset and called Ms. Benson in. He asked her if she had told her attorney that black employees at the Hilton were required to fill in the offensive application, and she acknowledged that she had. He also asked her if she had kept the document and had lied to him when she said that she had lost it, and she acknowledged that she had. He also accused her in effect of stealing the document which she had taken from his office.
Whether rightly or wrongly, Mr. Malleson fired Ms. Benson because he believed in good faith that she had falsely libeled the hotel, had lied to him, and had stolen the document. No racial considerations entered into that decision.
Focusing on the Inn’s motivation, and not on Benson’s reasonable belief that the Inn’s conduct amounted to racial discrimination, the district court concluded that Malleson fired Benson because he believed that she lied to him about losing the scurrilous employment application, that she [418]*418lied in telling her attorney that she had to fill out such an application, and that she had stolen the application. Although allegations of discrimination in a section 1981 complaint are protected, see Goff v. Continental Oil Co., supra, 678 F.2d at 598, the district court found that Benson was not fired in retaliation for any of the allegations contained in the complaint. Rather, the court found that she was fired solely because she had, without authorization, taken the application forms from her employer’s place of business and that she made false statements to her employer and lawyer. These reasons are separate from and independent of her lawsuit. Thus, the district court’s finding that Malleson possessed no improper motive in terminating Benson is supported by the evidence and is not clearly erroneous.
Our holding in this case is not inconsistent with this court’s decision in Womack v. Munson, supra. There the employee, who had filed an EEOC complaint and Title VII action against his former employer, was discharged by his current employer for statements he made relating to that lawsuit. 619 F.2d at 1297. We determined that the employee’s postcomplaint statements were similar to the allegations in the Title VII complaint, and that they were “so inextricably related to the allegation[s] in the complaint that they [could not] be considered independently of one another.” Id. In Benson’s ease, however, the district court found that the employer discharged Benson for reasons independent of the allegations in her complaint, and that no racial considerations entered into the employer’s decision. This determination is amply supported by the record which establishes beyond any doubt that the employer in fact had never utilized that form and Benson knew of that fact. Her statement that the employer used the form was a fabrication. Thus, the untruthful statement in the context of this case cannot be said to amount to conduct opposing racial discrimination. The employer’s motivation focused on an event which the trial court found to be independent of her complaint in the circumstances of this case. We will not overturn that determination.
III. CONCLUSION.
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the decision of the district court is affirmed.