Breitfeller Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner
This text of 28 T.C. 1164 (Breitfeller Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION.
It is true that up to the end of 1948, the latest year before us, not a single dollar of taxable dividends had ever been declared by petitioner, although as of the end of that period a surplus of almost half a million dollars had been accumulated of which over half was in marketable securities unrelated to petitioner’s business. It is likewise true that during this time loans were made by petitioner to its sole stockholder. This is some indication that under section 1021 the purpose of the absence of dividends was to furnish funds to the stockholder while at the same time avoiding the imposition upon him of the high surtaxes which the record shows would have been due had petitioner’s earnings been distributed to him as dividends. Helvering v. Nat. Grocery Co., 304 U. S. 282; Helvering v. Stock Yards Co., 318 U. S. 693.
But we have made the finding which we think the record compels, that a reasonable requirement of the business then existed for these accumulations. The working capital needed to fulfill petitioner’s agreement with General Motors coupled with the expenses of physical expansion and the continuing possibility that it might be required to finance a new dealership in the adjoining St. Albans territory 2 are alone sufficient to account for all of the contemporary surplus.3 Petitioner’s directors having currently faced the problem, cf. Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, (C. A. 4) 241 F. 2d 197, reversing T. C. Memo. 1956-82, certiorari denied 354 U. S. 922,4 and having, as we have found, made the required analysis of petitioner’s position, and the consequent decision that its existing resources could not safely be dispensed with, we are not in a position to assume, as would be necessary, that their true judgment was otherwise, or that the ostensible purpose of the failure to distribute dividends was different from its real motivation. Dill Manufacturing Co., 39 B. T. A. 1023, 1031; J. L. Goodman Furniture Co., 11 T. C. 530. On the situation as it existed during the tax period in controversy, we conclude that respondent’s action was unjustified.
We arrive at this result on the record as a whole and, although the matter is the subject of controversy between the parties, without the necessity of determining under section 534, I. R. C. 1954, where the burden of proving5 business necessity lies. Cf. Pelton Steel Casting Co., 28 T. C. 153, on appeal C. A. 7. While some possibility always remains that the presumption of the determination’s correctness survives even proof of reasonable needs, see Felton Steel Casting Co., supra, this proceeding was litigated on the apparently mutual assumption that decision of this total issue would dispose of the matter. See Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, supra.
It goes without saying that subsequent developments in later years might lead to altogether different conclusions. We are required to express no opinion as to such issues. Suffice it to say that nothing shown here as to petitioner’s conduct after 1948 throws doubt on the conclusion we have reached as to its purpose during the period under review.
To adjust for conceded issues,
Decision will he entered under Rule 50.
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28 T.C. 1164, 1957 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 94, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/breitfeller-sales-inc-v-commissioner-tax-1957.