Brandt-Airflex Corp. v. Long Island Trust Co., N.A. (In Re Brandt-Airflex Corp.)

73 B.R. 59, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3548
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedApril 10, 1987
Docket87 CV 586
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 73 B.R. 59 (Brandt-Airflex Corp. v. Long Island Trust Co., N.A. (In Re Brandt-Airflex Corp.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brandt-Airflex Corp. v. Long Island Trust Co., N.A. (In Re Brandt-Airflex Corp.), 73 B.R. 59, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3548 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PLATT, District Judge.

This bankruptcy appeal involves the complex interaction between appellate jurisdiction and post-judgment motions filed in the court of original jurisdiction.

Debtor commenced the underlying adversary proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York to obtain a determination of its employment tax liability and the employment tax liability of Long Island Trust Company (“LITC”), which allegedly financed debtor’s payroll through an overdraft financing arrangement. See I.R.C. § 3505(a), (b), and (c) (1985). The defendants moved to dismiss the proceeding pursuant to Rule 7012(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy (“Bankruptcy Rule”). By order dated January 20, 1987, Bankruptcy Judge C. Albert Párente converted defendants’ motions on the pleadings into motions for summary judgment pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7056 and directed the parties to submit any additional, relevant material. By decision dated February 6, 1987, Judge Párente denied defendants’ motions to dismiss and declared LITC liable for debtor’s accrued employment taxes. Thereafter, there followed a flurry of activity in the Bankruptcy Court.

*60 On February 13, 1987, LITC filed a notice of appeal from the February 6th order and also filed a motion to reargue the January 20th and February 6th orders. On February 17th, the New York State Tax Commission (“NYS”) also filed a notice of appeal from the February 6th order. On February 20th, the United States moved the Bankruptcy Court pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9023 1 to alter or amend the judgment on the February 6th order. On March 4th, NYS also filed a Bankruptcy Rule 9023 motion. The United States and NYS were seeking a clarification as to whether the February 6th decision relieved debtor of liability for its accrued tax liability. This Court is informed that by decision dated March 30, 1987, entered on April 2, 1987, Judge Párente denied the United States’ and NYS’s motions. Although Judge Párente declined to alter or amend the judgment, this Court understands that he orally clarified his February 6th decision, indicating that debtor was not relieved of liability. This Court is also informed that by decision dated and entered on April 6, 1987, Judge Párente denied LITC’s motion for reargument.

The United States has moved to dismiss this appeal as premature pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 8002(b). 2 Under that rule, if any party timely files one of the motions listed in the rule, the time for filing a notice of appeal runs from the entry of the order disposing of the motion, rather than from the entry of the judgment at which the motion was directed, and a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of the motion has no' effect. Fed.R.Bankr. 8002(b). Bankruptcy Rule 8002(b) tracks the language of Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (“Appellate Rule”), 3 and the motions listed in Bankruptcy Rule 8002(b) are the equivalent of the motions listed in Appellate Rule 4(a)(4).

Under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4), a notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Civil Rules”) 4 has no effect. An appeal based on such a notice of appeal “simply self-destructs.” Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 60-61, 103 S.Ct. 400, 403, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (quoting 9 J. Moore, B. Ward & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 204.-12[1], p. 4-67 n. 17 (1982)). Because a valid notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review, the filing of a Civil Rule 59(e) motion divests the appellate court of jurisdiction. See id. at 58, 103 S.Ct. at 402. The result is the same whether the motion is filed before or after the notice of appeal. Id. at 60-61, 103 S.Ct. at 403.

Only the motions listed in Appellate Rule 4(a)(4) affect the time for filing and validity of a notice of appeal. A motion under Civil *61 Rule 60(b), 5 for example, does not affect the finality of the judgment and therefore does not extend the time to appeal or divest the appellate court of jurisdiction. Despite the fact that the difference between making a motion under Civil Rule 59(e) or under Civil Rule 60(b) can be critical as to whether a party has properly taken an appeal, there is considerable overlap between the two motions. 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 112817, p. 110 (1973). Recognizing that form should not be elevated over substance, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that when a post-judgment motion filed within the time permitted by Civil Rule 59(e) “calls into question the validity of the judgment” it may be treated as a motion pursuant to Civil Rule 59(e), even if the movant relied upon Civil Rule 60(b). Lyell Theatre Corp. v. Loews Corp., 682 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.1982) (quoting Dove v. Codesco, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir.1978)).

This Court believes that the same approach to appellate jurisdiction should be taken under the bankruptcy rules as under the parallel rules of civil and appellate procedure. The motions listed in Bankruptcy Rule 8002(b) include a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Bankruptcy Rule 9023, which incorporates Civil Rule 59(e), and a motion to make additional findings of fact under Bankruptcy Rule 7052, which incorporates Civil Rule 52(b). 6 Under Bankruptcy Rule 8002(b), as under the rules of appellate procedure, only the listed motions affect the time to appeal and the validity of a notice of appeal.

In the present case, LITC’s February 13th motion was filed more than ten days after the January 20th decision, which is beyond the period provided in Bankruptcy Rule 9023. Therefore, we may not treat that portion of the motion addressed to the January 20th order as a Bankruptcy Rule 9023 motion even if it raised grounds properly presented in such a motion. See Lyell Theatre Corp., 582 F.2d at 41. The portion of the motion directed at the February 6th order was, however, filed within ten days of that order. Although that portion of the motion contains explicit reference to and language from Civil Rule 60(b), it also raises grounds running to the substance of the decision rather than just to the technical or jurisdictional defects contemplated by Civil Rule 60(b).

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73 B.R. 59, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3548, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brandt-airflex-corp-v-long-island-trust-co-na-in-re-brandt-airflex-nyed-1987.