UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CHAD BRANDON,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 25-cv-1188 (TSC)
OUTPOST 24, Inc., et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Chad Brandon brings claims under the D.C. Human Rights Act against his former
employer Outpost 24, Inc., and his former supervisor Paul Rowe. See Compl. ¶¶ 1–5, 48–110,
ECF No. 1-1. Defendants now move to dismiss. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 4 (“MTD”).
Because Brandon has failed to state any claims, the court will GRANT the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Outpost 24, Inc., is a company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Compl. ¶ 2; see also Decl. of Johan Ogren ¶ 3, ECF No. 7. Chad
Brandon, a Black man, joined Outpost in April 2023 as an Account Executive with the North
America sales team. Compl. ¶¶ 15–16. Outpost allowed Brandon to work fully remote from his
home in the District of Columbia, though Brandon occasionally traveled to Philadelphia for
company events. Id. ¶¶ 3, 8, 19, 26. Brandon reported directly to Paul Rowe, Outpost’s Senior
Vice President of North American Sales. Id. ¶¶ 4, 16. Rowe is a White man and a citizen and
resident of Pennsylvania who works full time from Outpost’s Philadelphia office. Decl. of Paul
Rowe ¶¶ 1, 4, ECF No. 7; see also Compl. ¶¶ 4, 16.
Page 1 of 14 On November 16, 2023, Brandon attended a company-sponsored outing at Misconduct
Tavern in Philadelphia. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 21. During the event, Brandon told Mark Woodward, a
White salesman, that he was a Baltimore Ravens fan. See id. ¶¶ 19, 23. Brandon is “a relatively
new fan of the team” and Woodward became “upset” when “Brandon did not remember
accurately” “some trivial Raven’s history.” Id. ¶ 23. “[A]fter learning that [] Brandon was not a
‘die hard’ Baltimore Ravens fan,” Woodward, who was drunk, “beat[] his fist on [] Brandon’s
chest,” repeatedly yelled “[f]uck you,” and called Brandon a “bitch” in front of Rowe and other
team members. Id. ¶ 19. Woodward—who apparently took the name of the venue to heart—
yelled and screamed so loudly he attracted the attention of the bartenders. Id. ¶ 21. Shortly after
the incident, Rowe told Brandon, “[i]f I were you, I would have told him to step outside” to fight.
Id. ¶ 22.
“A few times after” the November event, “Woodward called [] Brandon a ‘pathological
liar’ because of the discussion about NFL football teams.” Compl. ¶ 23. Brandon complained to
Rowe about Woodward’s conduct. Id. ¶ 25. Then, in January 2024, Rowe reassigned a deal from
Brandon to Woodward without explanation. Id. When Brandon later complained to Rowe about
the deal being reassigned, “Rowe brought up the fact . . . that [] Brandon had only closed ‘a
handful’ of deals . . . up to that point.” Id. ¶ 37.
On March 19, 2024, Brandon, Woodward, and Rowe attended another company-sponsored
event, again at Misconduct Tavern. Compl. ¶¶ 26–27. During this second event, Rowe “joked
about how ‘wasted’ . . . Woodward had been at the previous” outing. Id. ¶ 26. Woodward, again
drunk, flipped a middle finger at Brandon. Id. ¶ 27. Brandon told Woodward that his behavior
was disrespectful, and that it was unacceptable for Woodward to treat Brandon “in this manner,
especially in front of [Rowe] and their team.” Id. ¶ 29. “Woodward became defensive,” appeared
Page 2 of 14 ready to leap from his chair, accused Brandon of “just being sensitive,” and “laughed at []
Brandon’s obvious frustration.” Id. ¶¶ 30, 32. “Rowe attempted to intervene by telling []
Woodward, ‘[Brandon] is just trying to tell you how he feels,’” but Woodward “was not hearing
it.” Id. ¶ 30.
On March 20, Rowe emailed Brandon, “I think it’s important for us to connect before
Friday just so I can understand what the issue is with you and [Woodward].” Defs.’ Ex. 4 at 2,
ECF No. 7. Brandon wrote back, “I can take a joke just as good as anybody else, but [Woodward
is] OBVIOUSLY crossing the line. This is the second time he got drunk and disrespected me in
front of you and our teammates. . . . He’s called me a bitch to my face. He said fuck you way too
many times at this point. And then has the audacity to give me the middle finger right in front of
you and everyone.” Id. at 1. Brandon did not indicate in his email that he thought Woodward’s
behavior was racially charged or motivated. See id.
On March 21, Brandon spoke by phone with Rowe and asked Rowe how “to file a formal
complaint with HR.” Compl. ¶ 33. Five days later, Brandon emailed his formal complaint to
Gudrun Gudmundsdottir, Outpost’s head of HR. Id. ¶ 34; see also Defs.’ Ex. 5 at 1, ECF No. 7.
In it, Brandon described “two separate occurrences” involving Woodward. Defs.’ Ex. 5 at 1. In
the first occurrence, Woodward began cursing at him “after learning I was not a ‘die-hard’
Baltimore Ravens fan.” Id. Brandon conceded that “although I can admit [Woodward] wasn’t
trying to punch me or really hurt me,” Woodward did “put his hands on me.” Id. Brandon noted
that Woodward “called me a ‘pathological liar’ a few times because of the discussion about NFL
football teams.” Id. Brandon also described the second incident involving the middle finger. Id.
Nowhere in his formal complaint to HR did Brandon mention race or discrimination or otherwise
indicate that Woodward’s conduct towards him was racially motivated. See id.
Page 3 of 14 “Almost immediately after” Brandon “filed his complaint with HR, [] Rowe’s demeanor
and attitude toward [] Brandon changed.” Compl. ¶ 35. Ten days after reaching out to HR,
Brandon had not heard back, so he emailed Gudmundsdottir asking for an update. Id. ¶ 39.
Gudmundsdottir replied that she had “not yet been able to review” Brandon’s complaint and that
she would “hopefully be in touch next week.” Id. ¶ 40. Four days later, on April 9, Rowe called
Brandon and informed him that he was being let go. Id. ¶¶ 42, 44. Rowe told Brandon that he
“was ‘the most expensive guy on the team’ and his termination was for cost cutting reasons,” not
“performance.” Id. ¶¶ 43–44.
In March 2025, Brandon filed this lawsuit in D.C. Superior Court asserting four claims
under the D.C. Human Rights Act. Count One alleges that Outpost created a hostile work
environment against Brandon because of his race, including by failing to address Woodward’s
behavior and by “failing to even review [] Brandon’s official complaint” within ten days after he
filed it. Compl. ¶¶ 51–52. Count Two claims that Rowe aided and abetted this hostile work
environment. Id. ¶¶ 62–63. Count Three asserts that Outpost retaliated against Brandon each of
the three times he complained about Woodward’s harassing conduct, specifically when (1) Rowe
took a deal away from Brandon in January 2024, (2) Rowe changed his demeanor towards Brandon
after they spoke in March, and (3) Rowe fired Brandon after he filed a formal complaint with HR.
Id. ¶¶ 74–81. Count Four alleges that Rowe aided and abetted the retaliation. Id. ¶¶ 93–95.
Brandon seeks $2 million in damages. See Notice of Removal – Ex. A at 1, ECF No. 1-1.
In April 2025, Defendants removed the case to this court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). See
Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. The court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) because
there is complete diversity of citizenship between Plaintiff and Defendants, and the amount in
Page 4 of 14 controversy exceeds $75,000. Defendants now move to dismiss. See MTD; see also Defs.’ Mem.
Supp. MTD, ECF No. 5 (“Defs.’ Br.”).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
When confronted with a claim under the D.C. Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”), this court
applies federal procedural law and D.C. substantive law. See Novak v. Cap. Mgmt. & Dev. Corp.,
452 F.3d 902, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see also Burke v. Air Serv. Int’l, Inc., 685 F.3d 1102, 1107
(D.C. Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider factual allegations in the
complaint, as well as documents attached to or “incorporated by reference” in the complaint, “even
if the document is produced . . . by the defendant in a motion to dismiss.” Cordoba Initiative Corp.
v. Deak, 900 F. Supp. 2d 42, 46 n.5 (D.D.C. 2012) (cleaned up). Considering “document[s] that
[the] complaint specifically references”—including Brandon’s emails to Rowe and
Gudmundsdottir—does not “convert[] the motion into one for summary judgment.” Banneker
Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2015).1 When an allegation in the
complaint “conflict[s] with any exhibits or documents . . . adopted by reference, the exhibits or
documents prevail.” Alston v. District of Columbia, 772 F. Supp. 3d 43, 55 (D.D.C. 2025) (quoting
Davis v. World Savings Bank, 806 F. Supp. 2d 159, 172 (D.D.C. 2011)).
1 Plaintiff does not dispute that the emails provided by Defendants are authentic, nor does he contest that his Complaint incorporated these emails by reference. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n to MTD, ECF No. 10.
Page 5 of 14 When applying D.C. substantive law, this court must seek to “achieve the same outcome”
that the D.C. Court of Appeals would reach if it were to decide the case. Novak, 452 F.3d at 907.
Notably, in deciding cases under the DCHRA, the D.C. Court of Appeals “consistently relies upon
decisions of the federal courts in Title VII cases as particularly persuasive authority” given the
substantial overlap between the two statutes. Daka, Inc. v. Breiner, 711 A.2d 86, 94 (D.C. 1998);
see also Propp v. Counterpart Int’l, 39 A.3d 856, 864 n.11 (D.C. 2012). Consequently, the court
draws from both D.C. Court of Appeals and D.C. Circuit case law.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Defendants first move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. They contend that
this court lacks jurisdiction because the DCHRA does not extend to the alleged discrimination at
issue here, which occurred in Pennsylvania. See Defs.’ Br. at 16–20. Before deciding any other
issue, this court must assure itself of subject-matter jurisdiction; it may not assume hypothetical
jurisdiction for the purpose of dismissing on some other ground. See Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F.3d 501, 510 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998)).
But as another court in this district has explained, “although Defendants [and some courts]
nominally frame their [analysis] in terms of the subject-matter jurisdiction of this court, the thrust
of [their] argument really goes to the territorial reach of the DCHRA as it relates to the facts alleged
in this case . . . not [to] subject-matter jurisdiction.” Tolton v. Jones Day, No. 19-cv-945, 2020
WL 2542129, at *35 (D.D.C. May 19, 2020). Indeed, “to ask what conduct [the DCHRA] reaches
is to ask what conduct [the DCHRA] prohibits, which is a merits question.” Morrison v. Nat’l
Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010); see also United States ex rel. Hawkins v. ManTech Int’l
Page 6 of 14 Corp., 752 F. Supp. 3d 118, 122 (D.D.C. 2024) (explaining that whether a statute covers the
conduct at issue “is a merits question, not a matter that goes to subject matter jurisdiction”).
“Subject-matter jurisdiction, by contrast, ‘refers to a tribunal’s power to hear a case.’” Morrison,
561 U.S. at 254 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67, 81 (2009)).
Because the close merits question of whether the DCHRA reaches the conduct alleged here is not
jurisdictional, the court needs not resolve it. Even if the DCHRA extended to Defendants’
Pennsylvania-based behavior, Brandon has otherwise failed to adequately allege either a hostile
work environment or retaliation in response to protected activity.
B. Hostile Work Environment
“To assert a hostile work environment claim under the [DCHRA], . . . an employee must
plausibly allege that [he] was subjected to ‘severe or pervasive’ harassment based on [his]
membership in a protected class.” Sonmez v. WP Co., 330 A.3d 285, 324–25 (D.C. 2025) (citation
omitted). Brandon’s claim fails for two reasons. First, he alleges nothing in the Complaint to
support a plausible inference that he was subjected to hostility because of his race. See Joyner v.
Morrison & Foerster LLP, 140 F.4th 523, 534 (D.C. Cir. 2025). Second, the conduct that Brandon
complains of was neither severe nor pervasive. See Sonmez, 330 A.3d at 325.
a. Discrimination Because of Race
To start, Brandon’s own allegations advance an “‘obvious alternative explanation’” for
Woodward’s alleged behavior which indicates “that discrimination is not a plausible inference.”
Joyner, 140 F.4th at 534 (quoting Ho v. Garland, 106 F.4th 47, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2024))2; see also
2 Although Joyner analyzes several claims under Section 1981 as well as Title VII, the D.C. Circuit “‘use[s] the same framework for determining whether unlawful discrimination has occurred’ under both statutes.” Joyner, 140 F.4th at 534 (quoting Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
Page 7 of 14 Morris v. District of Columbia, 313 A.3d 545, 551 (D.C. 2024) (emphasizing that the allegations
“suggest that, aside from [plaintiff’s] membership in a protected class, there is a non-
discriminatory, alternative explanation” for the conduct complained of). Specifically, the
Complaint alleges that Woodward’s boorish conduct began only “after [Woodward] learn[ed] that
[] Brandon was not a ‘die hard’ Baltimore Ravens fan.” Compl. ¶ 19 (emphasis added). The
Complaint states that a drunken Woodward became “upset” when “Brandon did not remember
accurately” “some trivial Raven’s history.” Id. ¶ 23. The Complaint further alleges that
Woodward “called [] Brandon a ‘pathological liar’ because of the discussion about NFL football
teams.” Id. (emphasis added). Brandon’s email to HR offers this same nondiscriminatory
explanation. See Defs.’ Ex. 5 (“His words began after learning I was not a ‘die-hard’ Baltimore
Ravens fan.”); see also id. (“He’s called me a ‘pathological liar’ a few times because of the
discussion about NFL football teams.” (emphasis added)). And nowhere in either his email to HR
or to Rowe did Brandon indicate that Woodward’s behavior was motivated by race. See generally
Defs.’ Exs. 4 & 5. Accordingly, Brandon’s “own pleadings raise—and then offer nothing to rebut”
an “obvious alternative explanation” for Woodward’s conduct: a drunk co-worker overzealous
about football. Joyner, 140 F.4th at 534.
Notably, Brandon does not allege that Woodward used any racial slurs or racially charged
language at any time. Although such direct evidence of animus is not necessary, without it,
Brandon must at least allege circumstantial evidence of discrimination, such as evidence that “he
‘was treated differently from similarly situated employees’ outside his protected class.” Joyner,
140 F.4th at 529 (quoting Brown v. Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). Brandon
attempts to make this showing—he vaguely asserts that “Woodward did not treat his other
colleagues (who were not African-American/Black) in the same manner.” Compl. ¶¶ 20, 24, 28.
Page 8 of 14 But it is not “enough to simply allege that the plaintiff was treated differently from a ‘similarly
situated’ comparator, without additional allegations showing the comparators are in fact ‘similarly
situated’ in some meaningful respect.” Joyner, 140 F.4th at 531. Such an allegation amounts to
“a ‘threadbare recital’ of a ‘legal conclusion,’ ‘devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Id.
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Brandon’s conclusory allegation is exactly that. He “plead[s] essentially no facts at all to
show that his identified comparators were similarly situated to him in relevant respects” vis-à-vis
Woodward. Joyner, 140 F.4th at 533; see also Morris, 313 A.3d at 551 (“Beyond the mere
conclusory statement that her ‘male and U.S.-born colleagues were not subjected to the same
actions’ . . . Ms. Morris failed to allege in her complaint that these colleagues . . . were similarly
situated to her.”). Brandon has not alleged, for example, that Woodward reacted with less hostility
when he had a similar disagreement with a non-Black colleague. “[W]hen ‘the only information’
a plaintiff provides is that an ‘ambiguous’ ‘co-worker’ of a different race was treated differently
in some way, he ‘has failed to state a claim for disparate treatment discrimination.’” Hicks v. D.C.
Water & Sewer Auth., No. 24-cv-2288, 2025 WL 2439161, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2025) (quoting
Budik v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 986 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2013)).
b. Severe or Pervasive Harassment
Brandon’s claim also fails because he has not adequately alleged that Woodward’s conduct
transformed his workplace into a hostile work environment. The DCHRA is not a “general civility
code[]” for policing “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace.” Clemmons v. Acad. for Educ.
Dev., 107 F. Supp. 3d 100, 120 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 788 (1998)). The requirement of “severe or pervasive” harassment is “meant to be
‘demanding.’” Sonmez, 330 A.3d at 325 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788). “The series of acts
Page 9 of 14 giving rise to the alleged hostile environment must be of such severity or pervasiveness as to ‘alter
the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment,’ to the
degree that the workplace is ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and/or insult,’
or is otherwise transformed into a comparable toxic, discriminatory milieu on a day-to-day basis.”
Id. (quoting D.C. Dep’t of Pub. Works v. D.C. Off. of Hum. Rts., 195 A.3d 483, 495 (D.C. 2018)).
Although a “single” extreme incident, such as the use of an egregious racial epithet by a supervisor,
“may be severe enough,” a plaintiff must usually point to “more than a few isolated incidents” of
hostile conduct. D.C. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 195 A.3d at 495–96 (quoting Smith v. D.C. Off. of
Hum. Rts., 77 A.3d 980, 997 (D.C. 2013)); see also Sonmez, 330 A.3d at 325 (“[C]onduct must be
extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.” (quoting Faragher,
524 U.S. at 788)). Moreover, a plaintiff must demonstrate not only that he felt the environment
was abusive, but that it “objectively” was. Sonmez, 330 A.3d at 325.
Brandon’s allegations, accepted as true, fall short of this “demanding” standard. Sonmez,
330 A.3d at 325 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788). Although Woodward’s alleged behavior
was decidedly boorish, it amounts to what Brandon described as “two separate occurrences” four
months apart, Defs.’ Ex. 5 at 1, interspersed with a “few” instances of Woodward calling Brandon
a “pathological liar.” Compl. ¶¶ 19, 23, 27. That sort of “sporadic use of abusive language” by a
single co-worker is insufficient to “transform[]” the workplace into “an abusive working
environment . . . on a day-to-day basis.” Sonmez, 330 A.3d at 325 (cleaned up). That is especially
so here because Brandon worked fully remote and was not exposed to Woodward on a regular
basis. Cf. Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1223 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that an assigning
an employee to work in close proximity to harassers is a significant factor in the hostile work
environment inquiry, though not a per se requirement). And notably, Brandon does not allege that
Page 10 of 14 Woodward used any racial slurs or otherwise racially charged language, much less the sort of
extreme racist language that could render more infrequent harassment sufficiently severe. See
D.C. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 195 A.3d at 495–96.
To be sure, Woodward’s physical aggression makes his conduct more severe. See Sonmez,
330 A.3d at 325 (asking whether the conduct was “physically threatening”). But Brandon
conceded in his HR complaint that Woodward “wasn’t trying to punch me or really hurt me,”
precluding an inference that Woodward was truly threatening. Defs.’ Ex. 5. Thus, notwithstanding
his aggressive behavior, Woodward’s conduct still only amounts to isolated incidents of mostly
verbal, non-racial harassment. See Brooks v. Grundmann, 748 F.3d 1273, 1275, 1277 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (meeting where supervisor “yelled” at plaintiff, slammed his hand on the table, and
“violently threw a book” in plaintiff’s direction was “at its worst . . . an isolated” incident).
It matters, too, that all the alleged abuse came from a single co-worker, not Brandon’s
supervisor. See McIver v. Bridgestone Ams., Inc., 42 F.4th 398, 408 (4th Cir. 2022) (“The status
of the harasser is also a ‘significant factor’ to be considered; harassment by a supervisor tends to
be more serious, while harassment by a co-equal is less serious.” (quoting Boyer-Liberto v.
Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 278 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc))). Woodward’s lack of authority
over Brandon and lack of status in the workplace mean his harassing conduct had less ability to
humiliate Brandon or alter his working conditions. See id. Although Rowe and Gudmundsdottir
allegedly failed to address Woodward’s conduct, neither endorsed it. To the contrary, Rowe made
fun of Woodward for his drunkenness, and “attempted to intervene” when Woodward dismissed
Page 11 of 14 Brandon’s grievances “by telling [] Woodward, ‘[Brandon] is just trying to tell you how he feels.’”
Compl. ¶¶ 26, 30.3
Simply put, Brandon’s allegations are not “extreme” enough to establish a hostile
workplace “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and/or insult.” Sonmez, 330
A.3d at 325. Compare Brandon’s allegations to Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir.
2008). There, a supervisor repeatedly reprimanded the plaintiff, gave him a bad performance
review, sought to suspend him, and verbally abused him on several occasions, including by
allegedly threatening to have him “arrested, led out of the building in handcuffs, and jailed.” Id.
at 1195. The D.C. Circuit held that these “disciplinary actions” and verbal altercations by a
supervisor “were not so ‘severe’ or ‘pervasive’ as to have changed the conditions of [plaintiff’s]
employment.” Id. at 1201. Here, Brandon alleges only isolated altercations with a co-worker, and
no threats of serious disciplinary actions like suspension.
Brandon’s allegations fare no better when compared to George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405
(D.C. Cir. 2005). There, the plaintiff was told on three separate occasions by separate co-workers
to “go back to Trinidad” or “go back to where [you] came from.” Id. at 408. “On these and other
occasions,” co-workers “shouted at” the plaintiff, told her “that she should never have been hired,”
and told her to “shut up.” Id. The D.C. Circuit held that those racially charged insults by multiple
co-workers were “exactly the sort of ‘isolated incidents’ that . . . cannot form the basis” of a hostile
3 To the extent Brandon suggests that Rowe’s decision to reassign a single sale from Brandon to Woodward in January 2024 was connected to Brandon’s complaint about Woodward’s conduct and formed part of the hostile work environment, that assertion is not plausible. See Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“The constituent acts must be adequately linked such that they form a coherent hostile environment claim.” (cleaned up)). Brandon’s suggestion is undercut by his own allegation that Rowe’s demeanor toward him only shifted in late March 2024, and the fact that Rowe offered a facially legitimate reason for reassigning the sale which Brandon does not dispute the truth of—specifically “that [] Brandon had only closed ‘a handful’ of deals . . . up to that point.” Compl. ¶¶ 35, 37.
Page 12 of 14 work environment claim. Id. at 417. Here, Brandon alleges similarly infrequent harassment by a
single co-worker who did not use any racially charged language. Although Woodward’s alleged
behavior was undoubtedly obnoxious and unprofessional, it does not rise to the level of a hostile
work environment.
C. Retaliation
To plead a retaliation claim under the DCHRA, a plaintiff must allege, among other things,
that “she engaged in protected activity by opposing or complaining about employment practices
that are unlawful under the Act.” Sonmez, 330 A.3d at 328. To satisfy this requirement, the
plaintiff must have “‘clearly voice[d] her opposition’ to illegal discrimination.” Vogel v. D.C. Off.
of Planning, 944 A.2d 456, 465 (D.C. 2008) (quoting Howard Univ. v. Green, 652 A.2d 41, 48
(D.C. 1994)). “It is not enough . . . to object to . . . mistreatment in general”; the plaintiff must
“connect[] [the mistreatment] to membership in a protected class.” Sonmez, 330 A.3d at 328.
“Employer awareness that the employee is engaged in protected activity . . . is essential.” Vogel,
944 A.2d at 464 (quoting Green, 652 A.2d at 46). Thus, “a vague charge of discrimination will
not support a subsequent retaliation claim.” Sonmez, 330 A.3d at 328 (quoting Vogel, 944 A.2d at
465). Even the “use of words like ‘bias,’ ‘prejudice,’ and ‘hostile work environment’” are
insufficient to put the employer on notice that the plaintiff is complaining of illegal discrimination
“if untethered to the allegation that the conduct occurred because of membership in a protected
class.” Id. (cleaned up).
Brandon alleges that he engaged in protected activity by (1) complaining to Rowe about
Woodward’s conduct sometime after the November event, (2) emailing a complaint to Rowe in
March, and (3) submitting a formal complaint to HR that same month. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 31, 34. But
he fails to adequately allege that any of these complaints put his employer on notice that he was
Page 13 of 14 complaining of discrimination based on race. True, Brandon states in conclusory terms that he
reported Woodward’s “discriminatory” behavior. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 34 (“In the written
complaint, [] Brandon reported [] Woodward’s verbally abusive, discriminatory, and harassing
conduct[.]”). But Brandon does not allege that he described Woodward’s behavior as
discriminatory to management, nor does he assert that his complaints mentioned his membership
in a protected class, connected the mistreatment he experienced to that membership, or otherwise
described Woodward’s conduct as discrimination on the basis of a protected characteristic. See
Beyene v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 815 F. Supp. 2d 235, 247 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s
retaliation claim because he failed to link his supervisor’s harassment to his protected characteristic
in his complaints to his employer). Brandon’s emails to Rowe and Gudmundsdottir likewise do
not mention “discrimination” by Woodward, nor do they describe mistreatment motivated by race,
only mistreatment motivated by a quarrel over Baltimore Ravens trivia. Brandon therefore “did
not say enough to alert [his] employer that [he] was objecting to discrimination based on a
protected characteristic.” Sonmez, 330 A.3d at 329 (emphasis added).
IV. CONCLUSION
Because Brandon failed to state predicate claims of a hostile work environment or
retaliation, his aiding-and-abetting claims against Rowe necessarily fail. The court will therefore
GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. A separate order will follow.
Date: February 10, 2026
Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge
Page 14 of 14