Bradley v. Milliken

460 F. Supp. 299, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16139
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedAugust 7, 1978
DocketCiv. A. 35257
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 460 F. Supp. 299 (Bradley v. Milliken) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bradley v. Milliken, 460 F. Supp. 299, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16139 (E.D. Mich. 1978).

Opinion

OPINION

DeMASCIO, District Judge.

We have re-examined carefully the demographic data characterizing the Detroit City Schools to determine whether further desegregation of Regions 1, 5 and 8 is possible. We undertake this task following an appeal of our remedial guidelines to the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. That court held our August 15, 1975 remedial guidelines for desegregation “insufficient as to Regions 1, 5 and 8” and remanded “for further consideration in regard to the[se] three central regions.” Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 239, 240 (6th Cir. 1976).

When considering all of the Regions collectively, the late Judge Stephen Roth found in 1972 that an adequate remedy based on pupil reassignments limited to the corporate limits of Detroit would be impossible. The U.S. Supreme Court did not disturb this finding. See Bradley v. Milliken, 402 F.Supp. 1096, 1104 (E.D.Mich.1975). We also agreed with Judge Roth’s conclusion. We stated that:

If Detroit’s school population were more equally divided between black and white or if the desegregation area were sufficiently large to permit greater equalization, it would be possible to diminish the inevitable limitations on the task of eliminating racially identifiable schools in the district.
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Limitations may be imposed by the desegregation area. For example, the black proportion of the population can be so great that racial balance will inevitably result in majority black schools. In such an area, only two alternatives are available: The desegregation area must be enlarged or flexibility must be permitted in defining a desegregated setting. 402 F.Supp. at 1102, 1131 (emphasis added).

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has agreed on several occasions that desegregation within the geographic limitations of *302 Detroit is “extremely difficult (if not impossible).” See, e. g., Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 236 (6th Cir. 1976).

As we seek to determine whether further desegregation b possible, it has become apparent that the litigants have not retained the adversary posture that characterized the liability issues tried before Judge Roth. 1 This changing adversary posture is only natural since the Detroit Board of Education has been willing to desegregate the school district without court prodding. Even before this action was filed in 1971, the Detroit Board planned the first stage for dismantling the dual system existing in the Detroit City Schools but was prevented from carrying it out by an act of the state legislature. In response to our April 1975 order, the Detroit Board submitted a plan for reassigning 51,000 students to desegregate the school district. At the hearings following the Court of Appeals remand, the Detroit Board produced demographic data to establish that it had accomplished all the desegregative pupil reassignments possible and that additional reassignments were not feasible. In addition, the Detroit Board offered extensive testimony to support a three-part plan for desegregating faculty and staff.

The plaintiffs are well aware that the Detroit Board of Education is striving to desegregate the school district. The plaintiffs persist, however, in their conclusion that a school district is desegregated only when the racial composition of each school mirrors the system-wide racial ratio within 15% in either direction. On the other hand, the defendant Detroit Board, charged with the primary responsibility for maintaining a viable school system, insists that a sound plan for desegregation must take into account the hard realities at hand. During the most recent evidentiary hearings, the plaintiffs did not produce any evidence to refute the Detroit Board’s contention that inclusion of Regions 1, 5 and 8 in the desegregation plan is no longer feasible. The plaintiffs argued instead that the Detroit Board’s “contained classroom” method of delivering bilingual instruction is resegregating Region 2 and is providing neighborhood schools for one ethnic group. Tr. Sept. 7, 1977 at 211. Thus, although the parties continue to disagree on an acceptable formula for desegregation, they are not and cannot be true adversaries.

Moreover, the state defendants are not in an adversary posture with either the Detroit Board of Education or the plaintiffs. They did not even participate in this last round of hearings. The state defendants have not really opposed the Detroit Board’s efforts to desegregate; they only oppose paying the cost of desegregation. As a practical matter, the state’s opposition to paying one half the cost for its own segregative acts is not always clear. After agreeing to pay 50% of the construction costs for five area vocational centers, the state appealed to the Supreme Court this court’s order requiring them to pay for one half of the other remedial programs. At the same time, the state voices no opposition to this court’s order requiring them to provide the budgetary requirements of the court-created Monitoring Commission and has not sought an annual review of that order.

No party has ever taken the initiative in the remedial phase of these proceedings. For example, although unfavorable Monitoring Commission Reports of lagging implementation of court-ordered remedial programs provided many opportunities for initiative, the plaintiffs have failed to take any action. In addition, following each appellate court mandate, it has been necessary for this court to order a status conference to determine how the parties intended to proceed. In each instance, the court then had to order one party or the other to proceed. Now that demographic projections predict that the school district will be 87% black in 1979, the prospect that the *303 parties will take adversary initiative in future proceedings is unlikely.

With the Court of Appeals remand in hand, we convened a status conference on October 27, 1076, to determine how the parties intended to proceed. Order of October 14, 1976. Five months later, with no party having moved for a hearing, we sua sponte ordered that hearings on the issue of faculty assignments begin on April 21,1977. The plaintiffs then filed a motion to compel the Detroit Board to submit a further pupil reassignment plan and to adjourn the faculty assignment hearings pending resolution of the reassignment issue. We declined to adjourn the faculty hearings and subsequently ordered the Detroit Board to show cause why it should not be compelled to include Regions 1, 5 and 8 in the pupil reassignment plan. Order of April 20,1977. The show cause hearing was subsequently adjourned at plaintiffs’ request until September 6, 1977. The hearings on both issues have been completed and the parties have been afforded an opportunity to argue and submit proposed findings, briefs, and responsive briefs.

SUMMARY OF PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

Four years ago, this cause was remanded by the Supreme Court for the “prompt formulation of a decree directed to eliminating the segregation found to exist in Detroit city schools . . . ” Milliken v.

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460 F. Supp. 299, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16139, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bradley-v-milliken-mied-1978.