In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-21-00151-CR __________________
BRADLEY JOSEPH PRUITT, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 356th District Court Hardin County, Texas Trial Cause No. 25286 __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Bradley Joseph Pruitt guilty of aggravated assault of a public
servant and assessed Pruitt’s punishment at ninety-nine years of imprisonment and
assessed a $10,000 fine. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(1), (b)(2)(B). In one
issue on appeal, Pruitt’s counsel addresses whether the trial court erred by including
an order of restitution in the written judgment that was not supported by a jury
1 verdict finding or part of the trial court’s oral pronouncement of Pruitt’s sentence.1
We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
PERTINENT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After the jury found Pruitt guilty of aggravated assault of a public servant, the
trial court proceeded with the punishment phase of Pruitt’s trial. The record shows
that the State did not mention restitution during the punishment phase, and the jury
charge did not include a request that the jury make a finding concerning restitution.
The jury returned a verdict assessing Pruitt’s punishment at ninety-nine years of
confinement and a $10,000 fine, and the trial court orally pronounced Pruitt’s
sentence, which did not include an order that Pruitt pay restitution. The trial court’s
written judgment indicates Pruitt was ordered to pay “733,964.74” in restitution, and
the “special findings” ordered Pruitt to pay $4,512.22 restitution to the Office of the
Attorney General and $729,452.52 to the TML Governmental Risk Pool.
ANALYSIS
In his sole issue, Pruitt argues this Court should vacate the judgment and
remand the case to the trial court for a restitution hearing despite the State failing to
present any evidence regarding restitution during his trial and the trial court failing
1On March 18, 2022, this Court abated the appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for appointment of new counsel to address any arguable errors and specifically directed new appellate counsel to address whether the trial court erred by including an order of restitution in the written judgment. 2 to orally pronounce restitution as part of his punishment. The State agrees that Pruitt
may be entitled to have the restitution order deleted, because the law requires a trial
court’s written judgment to comport with the sentence orally pronounced and the
amount of restitution must have a factual basis in the record. However, the State
recommends that we remand the case for the trial court to conduct a restitution
hearing. Both Pruitt and the State rely on Burt v. State, 445 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014), to support the contention that the case should be remanded for a
restitution hearing because there is insufficient factual evidence to support the
amount of restitution.
Due Process requires that a defendant receive fair notice of all the terms of his
sentence, which must be orally pronounced in his presence. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 42.03 § 1(a); Burt, 445 S.W.3d at 757. The written judgment,
including the sentence assessed, is merely the written declaration and embodiment
of that oral pronouncement. Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004). Generally, when the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written
judgment vary, the oral pronouncement controls. Id.; Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d
131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Ette v. State,559 S.W.3d 511, 516-17
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (acknowledging this rule but noting an exception where the
trial court’s oral pronouncement conflicts with the jury’s lawful verdict that has been
read aloud in the defendant’s presence).
3 Restitution is punishment, and it must be included in the trial court’s oral
pronouncement of sentence to be properly included in the written judgment. Ex parte
Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). As such, the assessment of
restitution should be orally pronounced in open court in the presence of the
defendant. Brown v. State, No. 02-08-063-CR, 2009 WL 1905231, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth July 2, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). If it is
not so announced, the defendant may be entitled to have the restitution order deleted
from the judgment. Burt, 445 S.W.3d at 760 (so recognizing); see Taylor, 131
S.W.3d at 500, 502 (discussing fine as punishment which must be orally
pronounced).
The record shows the State did not mention restitution during the punishment
phase of the trial. Although the State presented testimony from the victim’s wife
about the victim’s injuries and medical care, it failed to present any evidence
concerning the cost of that care. The jury charge for punishment did not include a
request that the jury make a finding concerning restitution, and there were no
objections to the jury charge. Pruitt elected for the jury to assess his punishment, and
the jury’s verdict did not include restitution as part of his punishment.
The State argues this Court should vacate the restitution order and remand the
case for a hearing on restitution to strike the necessary balance between the
defendant’s right to be heard and the public policy that favors granting restitution to
4 crime victims. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.037
(allowing the court to order a defendant convicted of an offense to make restitution
to any victim); Hanna v. State, 426 S.W.3d 87, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citations
omitted). Pruitt also contends that this Court may vacate the restitution order and
remand for a restitution hearing.
In Burt, the trial court orally pronounced restitution at sentencing but failed
to state an amount, and the trial court informed the parties that if they could not agree
upon an amount, a restitution hearing would be necessary. Burt, 445 S.W.3d at 759.
The Burt Court distinguished its facts from other cases in which neither the parties
nor the judge ever mentioned restitution during the sentencing hearing or as part of
the oral pronouncement of sentence. Id. at 759 & n.32 (citing cases where defendant
was never put on notice that restitution may be ordered until it first appeared in the
written judgment). Importantly, the Burt Court noted that when a trial court orders
restitution in its written judgment but not in its oral pronouncement of judgment, the
oral pronouncement controls and the defendant is entitled to have the restitution
deleted. Id. at 759-60 & n.33.
Here, the trial court did not orally pronounce any restitution at sentencing and
the jury did not assess any restitution as part of Pruitt’s punishment.
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In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-21-00151-CR __________________
BRADLEY JOSEPH PRUITT, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 356th District Court Hardin County, Texas Trial Cause No. 25286 __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Bradley Joseph Pruitt guilty of aggravated assault of a public
servant and assessed Pruitt’s punishment at ninety-nine years of imprisonment and
assessed a $10,000 fine. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(1), (b)(2)(B). In one
issue on appeal, Pruitt’s counsel addresses whether the trial court erred by including
an order of restitution in the written judgment that was not supported by a jury
1 verdict finding or part of the trial court’s oral pronouncement of Pruitt’s sentence.1
We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
PERTINENT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After the jury found Pruitt guilty of aggravated assault of a public servant, the
trial court proceeded with the punishment phase of Pruitt’s trial. The record shows
that the State did not mention restitution during the punishment phase, and the jury
charge did not include a request that the jury make a finding concerning restitution.
The jury returned a verdict assessing Pruitt’s punishment at ninety-nine years of
confinement and a $10,000 fine, and the trial court orally pronounced Pruitt’s
sentence, which did not include an order that Pruitt pay restitution. The trial court’s
written judgment indicates Pruitt was ordered to pay “733,964.74” in restitution, and
the “special findings” ordered Pruitt to pay $4,512.22 restitution to the Office of the
Attorney General and $729,452.52 to the TML Governmental Risk Pool.
ANALYSIS
In his sole issue, Pruitt argues this Court should vacate the judgment and
remand the case to the trial court for a restitution hearing despite the State failing to
present any evidence regarding restitution during his trial and the trial court failing
1On March 18, 2022, this Court abated the appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for appointment of new counsel to address any arguable errors and specifically directed new appellate counsel to address whether the trial court erred by including an order of restitution in the written judgment. 2 to orally pronounce restitution as part of his punishment. The State agrees that Pruitt
may be entitled to have the restitution order deleted, because the law requires a trial
court’s written judgment to comport with the sentence orally pronounced and the
amount of restitution must have a factual basis in the record. However, the State
recommends that we remand the case for the trial court to conduct a restitution
hearing. Both Pruitt and the State rely on Burt v. State, 445 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014), to support the contention that the case should be remanded for a
restitution hearing because there is insufficient factual evidence to support the
amount of restitution.
Due Process requires that a defendant receive fair notice of all the terms of his
sentence, which must be orally pronounced in his presence. See Tex. Code Crim.
Proc. Ann. art. 42.03 § 1(a); Burt, 445 S.W.3d at 757. The written judgment,
including the sentence assessed, is merely the written declaration and embodiment
of that oral pronouncement. Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 500 (Tex. Crim. App.
2004). Generally, when the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written
judgment vary, the oral pronouncement controls. Id.; Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d
131, 135 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also Ette v. State,559 S.W.3d 511, 516-17
(Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (acknowledging this rule but noting an exception where the
trial court’s oral pronouncement conflicts with the jury’s lawful verdict that has been
read aloud in the defendant’s presence).
3 Restitution is punishment, and it must be included in the trial court’s oral
pronouncement of sentence to be properly included in the written judgment. Ex parte
Cavazos, 203 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). As such, the assessment of
restitution should be orally pronounced in open court in the presence of the
defendant. Brown v. State, No. 02-08-063-CR, 2009 WL 1905231, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth July 2, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). If it is
not so announced, the defendant may be entitled to have the restitution order deleted
from the judgment. Burt, 445 S.W.3d at 760 (so recognizing); see Taylor, 131
S.W.3d at 500, 502 (discussing fine as punishment which must be orally
pronounced).
The record shows the State did not mention restitution during the punishment
phase of the trial. Although the State presented testimony from the victim’s wife
about the victim’s injuries and medical care, it failed to present any evidence
concerning the cost of that care. The jury charge for punishment did not include a
request that the jury make a finding concerning restitution, and there were no
objections to the jury charge. Pruitt elected for the jury to assess his punishment, and
the jury’s verdict did not include restitution as part of his punishment.
The State argues this Court should vacate the restitution order and remand the
case for a hearing on restitution to strike the necessary balance between the
defendant’s right to be heard and the public policy that favors granting restitution to
4 crime victims. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.037
(allowing the court to order a defendant convicted of an offense to make restitution
to any victim); Hanna v. State, 426 S.W.3d 87, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citations
omitted). Pruitt also contends that this Court may vacate the restitution order and
remand for a restitution hearing.
In Burt, the trial court orally pronounced restitution at sentencing but failed
to state an amount, and the trial court informed the parties that if they could not agree
upon an amount, a restitution hearing would be necessary. Burt, 445 S.W.3d at 759.
The Burt Court distinguished its facts from other cases in which neither the parties
nor the judge ever mentioned restitution during the sentencing hearing or as part of
the oral pronouncement of sentence. Id. at 759 & n.32 (citing cases where defendant
was never put on notice that restitution may be ordered until it first appeared in the
written judgment). Importantly, the Burt Court noted that when a trial court orders
restitution in its written judgment but not in its oral pronouncement of judgment, the
oral pronouncement controls and the defendant is entitled to have the restitution
deleted. Id. at 759-60 & n.33.
Here, the trial court did not orally pronounce any restitution at sentencing and
the jury did not assess any restitution as part of Pruitt’s punishment. We conclude
based on the record before us, that the trial court’s written judgment varies from its
oral pronouncement and the judgment must be modified to delete the restitution. See
5 Ette, 559 S.W.3d at 517; Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 500. Accordingly, we modify the
first page of the trial court’s judgment and delete “$733,964.74” in restitution and
reflect a restitution amount of “$0.” We also modify the third page of the trial court’s
judgment under “special findings or orders” and delete “$4,512.22 RESTITUTION
TO OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL and $729,452.52 to TML
Intergovernmental Risk Pool, (worker’s compensation)[.]” We overrule Pruitt’s sole
issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
_________________________ W. SCOTT GOLEMON Chief Justice
Submitted on October 3, 2022 Opinion Delivered October 12, 2022 Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.