Boynton Landscape Co. v. Dickinson
This text of 487 So. 2d 1106 (Boynton Landscape Co. v. Dickinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Boynton Landscape Company and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company appeal from a lump sum advance of permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.
Dickinson, the claimant, suffered an industrial accident on December 12, 1979, and thereafter began receiving permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. His average weekly wage at the time of the accident was $129.08. On March 25, 1985, claimant filed a petition for a lump sum advance of PTD pursuant to Section 440.-20(12), Florida Statutes (1979).
At the hearing on claimant’s petition for a lump sum advance, Mr. Henry L. Turner, III, a financial consultant, testified that claimant was presently receiving on a monthly basis $372.49 compensation benefits, $366.00 social security disability and $103.00 state supplemental income, totaling $841.49. Turner computed the present value of claimant’s future PTD at the four percent statutory discount in effect on the date of his injury to be $86,167.36, based upon a life expectancy of 37.6 years. Turner’s plan allocated a substantial portion of [1107]*1107the lump sum advance to be used to purchase a 30-year annuity, payable to claimant. Under the revised financial program, Turner concluded that the social security disability and state supplemental income would remain the same, yielding to claimant a net monthly increase of $170.88. The deputy approved Turner’s plan, including the underlying assumption that social security and supplemental income would continue, finding that it was in claimant’s best interests and not materially prejudicial to the employer/carrier (e/e). The e/e contends that the financial plan did not consider the consequences of Sections 440.15(10) and 440.15(l)(e)(l), Florida Statutes (1979), insofar as it failed to take into account that supplemental benefits would be discontinued, and that the social security offset would apply. Accordingly the e/e argues that the deputy could not make a reasoned decision that the lump sum advance was in claimant’s best interests, as required by section 440.20(12)(a). We agree.
Section 440.15(l)(e)(l), when read in pari materia with Section 440.20(12)(a),1 provides that a lump sum payment of all PTD benefits operates to discharge a claimant’s right to supplemental benefits. See Central States Diversified v. Walters, 485 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Buono v. City of Riviera Beach, 484 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Shipp v. State of Florida Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund, 481 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Therefore, the deputy erred in determining that the lump sum advance was in claimant’s best interests by basing his approval of the advance on an erroneous assumption that supplemental benefits would continue.
As to the argument that the deputy did not consider the effect of the social security offset provision on the lump sum advance, Section 440.15(10)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that weekly compensation benefits payable to a claimant, when combined with social security disability benefits, cannot “exceed 80 percent of the employee’s average weekly wage.” (emphasis supplied) See also Sunland Training Center v. Brown, 396 So.2d 278, 279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The financial consultant’s plan, approved by the deputy, assumed that the claimant’s social security disability benefits would remain the same throughout his lifetime, and thereby implicitly concluded that the social security offset would not apply. We agree with the claimant that Section 440.15(10) is inapplicable to lump sum advances. Section 440.15(10), by the language employed, applies to weekly, periodic disability benefits. Moreover there is no other statutory basis on which to apply [1108]*1108the offset to lump sum advances.2 To say that the lump sum awarded to a claimant, in combination with his social security disability benefits, could not under any circumstances exceed eighty percent of his average weekly wage, which at the time of the accident would have been $103.26, would substantially eviscerate the purpose of providing claimants with lump sum advances under the circumstances allowed by section 440.20(12).
While recognizing that the social security offset is not under section 440.15(10) applicable to lump sum advances, we do not mean to say that it is not a relevant factor to be considered in determining whether the lump sum advance is, as provided in section 440.20(12)(a), in claimant’s best interests, since § 224(a) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 424a, may offset social security disability benefits when state law is silent or inapplicable. The federal social security offset “applies when the total of an individual’s [social security disability] benefits and workers’ compensation exceeds eighty percent of his or her pre-dis-ability earnings [average current earnings], and it reduces federal benefits by the excess.”3 Swain v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 543, 544 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991, 103 S.Ct. 349, 74 L.Ed.2d 388 (1982).
In contrast to Florida, the federal offset provision explicitly provides that it may apply to lump sum advances. 42 U.S.C. § 424a(b) states that if lump sum payments are “a commutation of, or a substitute for, periodic payments”, the federal offset applies, (emphasis supplied) Most courts have held that an ordinary, lump sum award is to be regarded as a substitute for periodic payments and thus subject to the federal offset. 4 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 97.34, at 18-26 (1984); Black v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 108 (9th Cir.1982); Kananen v. Matthews, 555 F.2d 667 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939, 98 S.Ct. 429, 54 L.Ed.2d 298 (1977); Graves v. Richardson, 358 F.Supp. 1310, 1312 (W.D.Va.1973) (lump sum benefits in full extinguishment of claimant’s rights is a substitute for periodic payments). Professor Larson observes that whether a lump sum is a substitute for periodic payments turns on “the real nature and purpose of the payment rather than the words used to describe it...” Larson, at 18-27. The key inquiry then is whether it can be said that a “claimant gives up in exchange for the settlement ... his right to periodic payments.” Id.
Section 440.20(12)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that lump sum payments are made “in exchange for the employer’s or carrier’s release from liability for future payments of compensation.” (emphasis supplied) We therefore regard that lump sum payments under section 440.2Q(12)(a) are a substitute for periodic payments, and thus may be made subject to the offset provision of 42 U.S.C. § 424a.
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487 So. 2d 1106, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 797, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 7170, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boynton-landscape-co-v-dickinson-fladistctapp-1986.