Boyett v. Wester

456 S.E.2d 504, 265 Ga. 387

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: May 8, 1995
• Docket: S95A0025
• Status: Published

Opinions

Hunt, Chief Justice.

The question in this discretionary appeal is whether the trial court erred in ordering Boyett, the father, to pay all medical expenses for the parties’ children, whether or not those expenses are covered by an insurance policy. We reverse.

Donald Boyett and Kaye Boyett Wester were divorced in 1992. The verdict of the jury was that Boyett was responsible for providing “Health Insurance along with Deductible and co-payments” for the two children. The final judgment and decree, drafted by Boyett’s attorney and approved by Wester’s attorney, stated:

In addition, Plaintiff shall furnish and pay premiums for major medical health insurance and shall maintain such insurance for the children until each of them reaches the age of 18, dies, marries or becomes self-supporting. Plaintiff shall pay the deductible and co-payment amounts required to be paid by the insured under the abovesaid major medical health insurance policy, and shall also pay the cost of prescription medicine for the children, if not covered by said insurance, during the time that Plaintiff is required to maintain such insurance.

Since the time of the divorce, Boyett and Wester have disagreed about what medical expenses Boyett is required to pay. In April 1994, Boyett filed an action seeking a declaration regarding his obligations under the divorce decree and claiming Wester was in contempt of the decree; Wester counterclaimed for contempt. The trial court found, inter alia, that Boyett was responsible for paying all of the children’s medical expenses, whether covered by an insurance policy or not; the court stated that “[i]f the major medical insurance policy required by the Divorce Decree does not cover all medical expenses of the children, then Plaintiff is responsible for these expenses independently.”

This court has repeatedly held that the trial court has no authority in a contempt proceeding to modify the terms of a divorce decree. Groover v. Simpson, 234 Ga. 714 (217 SE2d 163) (1975). The final decree requires Boyett to pay for a major medical insurance policy, and to pay deductible and co-payment expenses and the costs of prescription medicine. By maintaining the medical insurance policy and paying for those additional expenses enumerated in the final decree, Boyett is doing all that is required of him.¹ In holding that Boyett was responsible for medical expenses not covered by insurance or enumerated in the final decree, the trial court impermissibly modified the terms of the final decree;² accordingly, that portion of the trial court’s order requiring payment of medical expenses not covered by the medical insurance policy must be reversed.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, J., who dissents.

1 Required of him by decree, that is. One’s own concept of parental obligation may “require” more but that is a requirement unenforceable in a court of law.

2 Contrary to the view of the dissent, in this appeal we are not called upon to ascertain the intent of the jury or to find facts resulting in the final judgment and decree. Rather, our job is to construe the decree, which is eminently clear.