Boyer v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review

454 A.2d 524, 499 Pa. 552, 1982 Pa. LEXIS 708

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: December 30, 1982
• Docket: 80-3-673
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION OF THE COURT

O’BRIEN, Chief Justice.

Appellant, Terry Boyer, was discharged from his employment with the City of Lancaster on May 18, 1978. Following a hearing, an unemployment compensation referee denied appellant’s request for benefits on the ground of willful misconduct under § 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, 43 P.S. § 802(e). The denial of benefits was affirmed by the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review [hereinafter cited as “Board”], and thereafter by the Commonwealth Court. Boyer v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 51 Pa.Cmwlth. 191, 415 A.2d 425 (1980). We granted appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal.

Boyer was discharged from his employment because he wrote a letter to his supervisor, Roy Falcone, and sent copies to four other Lancaster employees. The letter, titled “Unjustified Memos”, was a response to a number of memoranda appellant had received from Falcone in the preceding eighteen-month period. Appellant had received a memorandum from Falcone dated November 3, 1977, alleging that Boyer had engaged in illegal conduct in his use of a vehicle owned by the City of Lancaster. A copy of this memorandum was placed in appellant’s file. Appellant received a second memorandum from Falcone, also dated November 3, 1977, alleging that appellant had misused a city vehicle, and further threatening appellant with suspension. Copies of this memorandum were sent to the personnel department and to Lee Mowery, the union local president, and one copy was placed in appellant’s file.

One month later, Mr. Boyer received another letter, dated December 5, 1977, in which appellant was informed of a one day suspension without pay. Copies of this letter were sent to Arthur Morris, the Director of Public Works, Howard Goldberg, Personnel Manager, and again, one to Mowery. Thereafter appellant received another memorandum from Falcone, dated April 5, 1978, reprimanding Boyer for careless work and a poor attitude. Again, disciplinary action was threatened. Copies of this memorandum were sent to the personnel department, to Morris, to the union steward, and additionally, to Lancaster Mayor Scott. Finally, Boyer received a memorandum from Falcone dated April 27, 1978, reprimanding him for careless workmanship and a poor attitude. Copies of this memorandum were sent to the personnel department, to a union representative, and one copy was placed in appellant’s file.

Appellant believed the memoranda to be unsubstantiated and false,¹ and possibly the result of racial discrimination.² It is reasonable, we believe, that appellant would respond to the continuing allegations as he did.

The question before us is not whether the employer had the right to discharge Mr. Boyer, but whether appellant is entitled to unemployment benefits under the provisions of • the Unemployment Compensation Law. Frumento v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 466 Pa. 81, 351 A.2d 631 (1976). Legal conclusions drawn by the Board are subject to judicial review. LeGare v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 498 Pa. 72, 444 A.2d 1151 (1982); Taylor v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 474 Pa. 351, 378 A.2d 829 (1977). The question of whether an employee’s actions constitute willful misconduct is a question of law, subject to this Court’s review. McLean v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 476 Pa. 617, 383 A.2d 533 (1978).

In Frumento v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, supra, this Court adopted a concept of good cause when assessing whether an employee’s actions fall within the definition of willful misconduct. In Frumento we stated, “where the action of the employee is justifiable or reasonable under the circumstances it can not be considered wilful [sic] misconduct.” Id. 466 Pa. at 87, 351 A.2d at 634.

With this standard in mind, we examine the circumstances surrounding appellant’s discharge. As noted previously, appellant received five memoranda from his supervisor over an eighteen-month period. Copies of each memorandum were sent to various Lancaster employees. The record reveals that appellant initially tried to resolve the problems by speaking to both his supervisor and to the personnel manager. Following the incident that precipitated the memorandum dated April 5,1978, appellant and his supervisor met to discuss the problem. Mr. Falcone testified as follows.

“By Appellant’s Attorney: You had a personal conversation about it, is that correct?

“Mr. Falcone: Right, and . . .

“And there was a disagreement. He thought that he was being treated unfairly and you felt that he was being treated fairly.

“Right, and neither one of us were satisfied.”

Notes of Testimony at 23. Mr. Falcone testified subsequently, “Our discussions . . . were not getting us any place,” and communication had “broken down.” Notes of Testimony at 24.

Appellant testified that Mr. Falcone had not initiated any discussions with him concerning Falcone’s dissatisfaction with appellant’s job performance.

“By Appellant’s Attorney: Did your supervisor come and approach you before he wrote these two memos to try and discuss it to try and find out your feelings about it?

“By Appellant: No he didn’t. He gave me the memos first and I had to go to him after the memos were given.”

Notes of Testimony at 55. Appellant Boyer testified that because he felt that his relationship with his supervisor was deteriorating, he contacted Howard Goldberg, the Director of Administrative Services and Personnel Manager.

“By Appellant’s Attorney: Was this the period when you approached Mr. Goldberg? About your problems?

“By Appellant: Yes, it’s about the same time.

“Do you recall just generally when, why you approached Mr. Goldberg or what you explained to him about your feelings?

“Yes, because I felt as though I was being treated unfairly .... I tried to talk to Mr. Goldberg and tried to settle the differences that uh, Mr. Falcone and myself had.

“Did Mr. Goldberg take any action on behalf of you or after you had made your thoughts and feelings known to him?

“No he didn’t take any action at all.

“Did he indicate to you, did he say something to you about it?

“Yes he did say. He said I will look into the matter.”

Notes of Testimony at 50.

Mr. Goldberg, however, offered contrary testimony about his meetings with appellant.

“By Appellant’s Attorney: Do you recall Mr. Boyer coming to your office earlier in his term of employment and speaking to you about problems that he felt that he was having?

“By Mr. Goldberg: Yes, Mr. Boyer came to me on one, at least one occasion if not two, to talk to me about problems.

“And were you able to resolve those problems to Mr. Boyer’s satisfaction?

“No, I didn’t attempt to resolve them at all because I didn’t consider them to be problems.”

Notes of Testimony at 10 [emphasis added].

At the hearing before the referee, Mr. Goldberg asserted that appellant should have filed a grievance with the union. The record discloses that appellant had taken steps that he believed appropriate in order to file a grievance when his employment was terminated. However, up until that time the testimony suggests that appellant did not believe there was any formal discipline to grieve. Even Mr. Falcone acknowledged that he continually avoided entering formal discipline. Notes of Testimony at 23.

Both Mr. Falcone and Mr. Goldberg emphasized that they were offended by appellant’s use of the word “reprisal” in his memorandum. It is clear from a plain reading of the memorandum, and from Mr. Boyer’s testimony before the referee, that appellant was not educated in the finer points of English usage and grammar. Further, at the hearing before the referee, Mr. Boyer explained that he used the word “reprisal” to mean “response.” Notes of Testimony at 57. This error is not fatal to appellant’s claim for benefits.

Appellant attempted to resolve the continuing problems with his supervisor through personal discussions with that supervisor and with Mr. Goldberg, the personnel manager. Because there were no discussions between appellant and his supervisor before Falcone documented the allegations of poor workmanship in written memoranda, Mr. Boyer was continually forced to dispute, verbally, allegations already documented in writing. As revealed by the testimony, Goldberg made no attempt to resolve the situation. Mr. Boyer apparently also believed that because formal discipline was always threatened, but never imposed, there was nothing to grieve to the union. He finally chose to respond in writing to the allegations made about his careless workmanship and poor attitude. He sent copies of his response only to those persons who had received his supervisor’s memoranda.

Accordingly, appellant’s actions were justifiable and reasonable, Frumento v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, supra, and cannot be deemed willful misconduct under § 402(e).

The Order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed and the case is remanded to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review for the computation of benefits.

FLAHERTY, J., files a dissenting opinion in which McDermott, j., joins.

1 . It appears that appellant disputed the allegations of misconduct on more than one occasion. For example, the letter of December 5, 1977, accused appellant of seeking permission to miss a portion of a day’s employment in order to keep an appointment for which he never appeared. At the hearing, Falcone admitted that Boyer substantiated his whereabouts on the afternoon in question. Notes of Testimony at 21.

2 . Appellant testified that prior to beginning the position from which he was terminated, he had bid unsuccessfully for other jobs. Because he felt that he was the victim of racial discrimination, appellant filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission on August 30, 1977. On September 10, 1977, Mr. Boyer was awarded the position from which he was terminated.

Furthermore, at the hearing before the referee, appellant’s attorney asked Mr. Falcone if he had failed to institute disciplinary proceedings against Appellant Boyer because he was black. Falcone refused to answer the question and the referee refused to compel Mr. Falcone to respond. Notes of Testimony at 24.