Boyd v. Young

246 S.W.2d 10, 193 Tenn. 272, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 355
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 22, 1951
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 246 S.W.2d 10 (Boyd v. Young) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Boyd v. Young, 246 S.W.2d 10, 193 Tenn. 272, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 355 (Tenn. 1951).

Opinions

[273]*273Mr. Chiee Justice Neil

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit by Mrs. Gertrude Young to recover workmen’s compensation for the death of her husband, Woodrow Young.

The original petition was filed by Woodrow Young and upon his death his widow became a party plaintiff adopting all the averments in the original petition and adding thereto the further averment that she was entitled to recover for the reasonable funeral and burial expenses not exceeding the maximum amount allowed by law. The original petition alleges the following: "The original petition of Woodrow Young is that petitioner, while in the course of his employment, reached down and picked up a box of cheese weighing about forty (40) pounds; that as he came up he suddenly felt something snap or pop in his upper back and felt a sharp pain; that he was taken to the hospital by the manager of plaintiffs ’ store and X-rayed; that petitioner shortly thereafter went [274]*274home and stayed in bed for a day or two but that he continued to suffer in his upper back; that two days after the occurrence petitioner returned to work and tried to work but continued to suffer pain; that petitioner continued to work for several weeks but was uncomfortable and could not sleep or rest properly at night; that about the middle of March, 1951, petitioner was sent to Knoxville, Tennessee, to Dr. Earl Donathon and was operated upon by Dr. Donathon; that it was determined by Dr. Dona-thon that petitioner had a cancerous condition; that said alleged accidental injury either caused petitioner’s disability or aggravated and accelerated a previous condition by reason of which petitioner was totally and permanently disabled and entitled to Workmen’s Compensation benefits as provided by Law.

“On July 9,1951, the amended petition was filed by the present petitioner, Mrs. Gertrude Young, in which it was alleged that the original petitioner, Woodrow Young, died on May 13,1951, and that she and one child would be entitled to Compensation for the death of her husband. We think it should here be stated that in the original petition filed for the deceased it was also said, among other things, 'that said accidental injury either caused petitioner’s disability or aggravated , and accelerated a previous condition.’ ” (The foregoing is copied from the defendant’s brief, the same being a correct statement of the complaint.)

The specific defenses made are, as follows: “Plea of general issue was interposed and also that defendant did not prevail upon original petitioner to go anywhere and it was admitted that deceased died of a cancer or a cancerous condition, but it was denied that said condition was the result of an accidential injury and it was denied there was either a direct, proximate, or causal connection [275]*275between said alleged injury and succeeding deatli; and it was denied that any condition of the deceased was aggravated or accelerated.”

The trial judge found the issues in favor of the petitioner as follows:

(1) “That the deceased, Young, died as a result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment with the defendants.

(2) “That it was an accident is clear to me from the proof. He was reaching in a strained position, and was lifting a box of cheese. While in this position and lifting the cheese, it is apparent that he strained or twisted himself in such a way that it injured the tissues or muscles in his back at a point between his shoulders, for he immediately grasped the back of his neck and showed that he was suffering great pain, and from this point he became progressively worse until the time of his death. He had been in excellent health all of his life until this time. It was after the accident that he became ill, and it is significant that when he was operated on the cancer or tumor was found at the spot where he placed his hand at the base of his neck and cried out in pain.

(3) “The tumor or cancer may or may not have been present at the time of the accident or strain, but in either ease, I find the accident or strain either caused the cancer or excited or accelerated it and thus brought on his death.”

The defendant appealed and assigned the following-errors :

1. “Because there is no competent, material evidence to support the judgment of the Court.

2. “Because the judgment is contrary to the law applicable to the case.

[276]*2763. “Because the judgment of the Court is based upon conjecture and speculation.

4. “Because there is no proof to support the Court’s finding that deceased may have had cancer at the time of the alleged accident, and there is no proof to support the Court’s findings that if a cancer did exist it- could have been aggravated because there was no proof that such condition did exist at the time of the alleged accident and, consequently, no competent proof of an aggravation of something the proof did not show to exist. ”

5. The court erred in refusing to grant defendants’ motion for a directed verdict, etc.

Wo will refer to the parties as they appeared in the court below.

It is earnestly insisted by the defendants’ counsel that there is no evidence to support the petitioner’s theory that the deceased had a cancer, or was suffering from a cancerous condition of the spine, at the time of the alleged accident, and there could be no acceleration of a condition that did not exist; that there is no evidence that the act of the deceased in lifting the box of cheese caused the cancer, and for this reason there is no causal connection between the accident and the death of the deceased.

The foregoing is a clear and concise statement of defendants’ case as against the petitioner’s claim for compensation and for a reversal of the holding of the trial court.

We think there is material evidence to support the conclusion of the trial court, conceding that the medical experts were in agreement that no one knows the cause of cancer. We think it is reasonable to conclude that the deceased had a cancerous condition of the spine at the time of the accident, because at the time of the operation it was the size of a grapefruit and had spread [277]*277into the surrounding tissue and muscles of the neck and upper back. It is really unreasonable to think that this unnatural and unhealthy condition could have developed from the time of the accident to the time of the operation which was approximately four months.

The determinative issue is whether or not the lifting of the thirty (30) or forty (40) pound box of cheese by the deceased was such a strain upon the muscles which were connected, or nearly so, with the diseased tissues, i. e. the cancer, that it accelerated its growth and further development and was a contributing cause of his death. It is doubtless true that sooner or later the deceased would have died from the cancer, but the case is still compensable if the accident so accelerated or aggravated it that it was a contributing cause to the shortening of his life.

Able counsel for the defendants insists that there was no acceleration or aggravation, shortening, or any limitation of life, and that the conclusion of the trial judge is pure conjecture.

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Bluebook (online)
246 S.W.2d 10, 193 Tenn. 272, 1951 Tenn. LEXIS 355, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/boyd-v-young-tenn-1951.