Bowers v. Northern Telecom, Inc.

905 F. Supp. 1004, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20139, 1995 WL 656739
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Florida
DecidedSeptember 25, 1995
Docket93-50083/LAC
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 905 F. Supp. 1004 (Bowers v. Northern Telecom, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bowers v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 1004, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20139, 1995 WL 656739 (N.D. Fla. 1995).

Opinion

ORDER

COLLIER, District Judge.

This cause comes before the court upon Defendant’s motion for summary judgment *1006 on general causation, (doc. 110). For the reasons below, the motion is denied.

I. Introduction

Plaintiffs are directory assistance operators (“DAOs”) who, at all times relevant to this action, worked for American Telegraph and Telephone Company (“AT & T”) in its Panama City and Chipley, Florida offices. As part of their duties, Plaintiffs regularly used the CCI Version II computer keyboard manufactured by Northern Telecom, Inc. (“NTI”). In 1993 Plaintiffs filed this suit alleging the CCI Version II keyboard caused them to suffer a variety of upper-extremity musculoskeletal disorders such as carpal tunnel syndrome, tendinitis, and tenosynovitis (hereinafter referred to collectively as “cumulative trauma disorders” or “CTDs”). Plaintiffs maintain NTI’s keyboard is defective in the following three ways: (1) it has an unusually sharp front or leading edge which depresses the soft tissue area over the carpal tunnel; (2) it is too high or too thick, thus causing the user to maintain his or her arms and/or wrists in awkward positions; and (3) it lacks tactile feedback — the mechanism that alerts the user the key has been depressed sufficiently to register the keystroke — thus causing the user to press the keys with greater force.

The complaint alleges counts of negligence, strict liability, breach of implied warranty and breach of express warranty. Under Florida law, each of these causes of action requires, as an essential element, that the alleged defect caused the plaintiffs’ injuries. See Pulte Home Corporation, Inc. v. Ply Gem Industries, Inc., 804 F.Supp. 1471, 1486 (M.D.Fla.1992); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80, 84 (Fla.1976). In cases such as this, moreover, the causation element can be divided into two components: general causation (the capacity of the product to cause the injury) and specific causation (proof that the product actually caused the injury of which the plaintiffs complain). See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 958 (3rd Cir.1990). To prove general causation in this case, Plaintiffs rely entirely on expert witness testimony.

NTI directs this motion for summary judgment to the issue of general causation. NTI argues the opinions of Plaintiffs’ experts as to general causation are inadmissible under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). Because Plaintiffs have no admissible evidence on the issue of general causation, NTI argues, summary judgment should be granted in its favor. Before addressing the merits of NTI’s motion, the court first sets out the general principles applicable to summary judgment and the admissibility of scientific evidence.

A. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Upon proper motion, entry of summary judgment is mandated “... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard is the same as that required for a directed verdict. Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d 1507, 1510 (11th Cir.1987).

At this juncture, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. “[A] dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

Finally, all evidence and reasonable factual inferences must be viewed against the party seeking summary judgment. Jeter v. Credit Bureau, 760 F.2d 1168, 1170 (11th Cir.1985).

*1007 B. Standard for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs the admissibility of expert testimony. It provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

Fed.R.Evid. 702. This rule imposes two requirements on the admissibility of expert testimony. First, the expert must be qualified by specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to testify on the subject matter of his or her testimony. See, e.g., Faircloth v. Lamb-Grays Harbor Co., 467 F.2d 685, 694 (5th Cir.1972). Second, the testimony must concern “scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge,” which “assist[s] the trier of fact.” Fed.R.Evid. 702; see In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3rd Cir.1994). In Daubert, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2786, the Supreme Court interpreted .this language to require that expert testimony meet a threshold standard of reliability and relevance before it is admitted. The Court reasoned an expert’s opinion must be based on “methods and procedures of science,” rather than on “subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” Id.,

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905 F. Supp. 1004, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20139, 1995 WL 656739, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bowers-v-northern-telecom-inc-flnd-1995.