Bowen v. Little

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Bowen v. Little

228 S.E.2d 159, 139 Ga. App. 176, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1726

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJune 15, 1976

Docket52194

StatusPublished

Cited by18 cases

This text of 228 S.E.2d 159 (Bowen v. Little) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Bowen v. Little, 228 S.E.2d 159, 139 Ga. App. 176, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1726 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976).

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Opinions

Been, Presiding Judge.

The installation and maintenance of traffic lights is a governmental function. City of Rome v. Potts, 45 Ga. App. 406, 410 (165 SE 131); Stanley v. City of Macon, 95 Ga. App. 108 (1) (97 SE2d 330); Town of Ft. Oglethorpe v. Phillips, 224 Ga. 834, 836 (165 SE2d 141). In the same way, failure to maintain a stop sign (Arthur v. City of Albany, 98 Ga. App. 746 (106 SE2d 347)) or to put lights adjacent to an underpass (Burd v. City of Atlanta, 52 Ga. App. 681 (184 SE 412)) or maintain street lights (Williams v. Mayor &c. of Washington, 142 Ga. 281 (1) (82 SE 656)) has been held not actionable. "Where municipal corporations are not required by statute to perform an act, they may not be held liable for exercising their discretion in failing to perform the same.” Code § 69-302.

In the absence of a law or ordinance requiring the defendant City of Ocilla to erect a traffic light at an intersection named in this complaint, as a result of which the plaintiff was allegedly injured, the erection and maintenance of such a signal is discretionary, and it cannot be held liable for mere failure to perform such act. This result has been reached generally when raised in other jurisdictions. Resnik v. Michaels, 52 Ill. App. 2d 107 (201 NE2d 769) held: "The Village of Park Forest certainly would not be liable for not passing an ordinance providing for traffic signs on Tampa Street at the intersection with Talala, on the ground that it thereby failed to regulate the flow of traffic and failed to protect motorists from the dangers inherent in driving an automobile at that corner.” To the same effect see Slavin v. City of Tucson, 17 Ariz. App. 16 (495 P2d 141): "[T]here is no duty [on the city] to regulate traffic by posting signs or otherwise . . . [however] once the city undertakes to control traffic with signs or warning devices, it cannot create a dangerous condition in doing so . . . and must properly maintain the signs.” It was on this premise that liability was grounded in Town of Ft. Oglethorpe v. Phillips, 224 Ga. 834, 838, supra, where the city maintained a defective traffic light showing green in all four directions. The court held that while negligence in [177]*177discharging a governmental function is not actionable, the city may not create a situation dangerous to life and, while so maintaining it, escape liability for resulting damage. The maintenance under such circumstances becomes a nuisance.

Argued May 5, 1976 Decided June 15, 1976 Rehearing denied June 29, 1976 Jack J. Helms, Walters & Davis, J. Harvey Davis, for appellant. Mixon & Mixon, Harry Mixon, Reinhardt, Whitley & Sims, Glenn Whitley, for appellees.

This is substantially the holding in Hancock v. City of Dalton, 131 Ga. App. 178, 181 (205 SE2d 470) where it was contended that failure of the city to maintain traffic signals at a railroad crossing constituted a nuisance, and the court held that, in the absence of a provision to that effect in the contract between the municipality and the railroad there was no such duty. In Hutcheson v. City of Jesup, 132 Ga. App. 84 (207 SE2d 547) on the contrary, the city after installing the lights maintained them in a defective condition and a jury issue on nuisance resulted. Similarly, in Coppedge v. Columbus, Ga., 134 Ga. App. 5 (213 SE2d 144) where the city elects to erect a stop sign at an intersection to regulate traffic but then allows it to become obscured by foliage, the defective maintenance may itself become a nuisance. In all of these cases a clear line is drawn between a discretionary nonfeasance and the negligent maintenance of something erected by the city, in its discretion, . in such manner as to create a dangerous nuisance, and which amounts to misfeasance.

The court did not err in dismissing the City of Ocilla as a party defendant to this tort action.

Judgment affirmed.

Webb, J., concurs. Quillian, J., concurs specially.

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Been, Presiding Judge.

The installation and maintenance of traffic lights is a governmental function. City of Rome v. Potts, 45 Ga. App. 406, 410 (165 SE 131); Stanley v. City of Macon, 95 Ga. App. 108 (1) (97 SE2d 330); Town of Ft. Oglethorpe v. Phillips, 224 Ga. 834, 836 (165 SE2d 141). In the same way, failure to maintain a stop sign (Arthur v. City of Albany, 98 Ga. App. 746 (106 SE2d 347)) or to put lights adjacent to an underpass (Burd v. City of Atlanta, 52 Ga. App. 681 (184 SE 412)) or maintain street lights (Williams v. Mayor &c. of Washington, 142 Ga. 281 (1) (82 SE 656)) has been held not actionable. "Where municipal corporations are not required by statute to perform an act, they may not be held liable for exercising their discretion in failing to perform the same.” Code § 69-302.

In the absence of a law or ordinance requiring the defendant City of Ocilla to erect a traffic light at an intersection named in this complaint, as a result of which the plaintiff was allegedly injured, the erection and maintenance of such a signal is discretionary, and it cannot be held liable for mere failure to perform such act. This result has been reached generally when raised in other jurisdictions. Resnik v. Michaels, 52 Ill. App. 2d 107 (201 NE2d 769) held: "The Village of Park Forest certainly would not be liable for not passing an ordinance providing for traffic signs on Tampa Street at the intersection with Talala, on the ground that it thereby failed to regulate the flow of traffic and failed to protect motorists from the dangers inherent in driving an automobile at that corner.” To the same effect see Slavin v. City of Tucson, 17 Ariz. App. 16 (495 P2d 141): "[T]here is no duty [on the city] to regulate traffic by posting signs or otherwise . . . [however] once the city undertakes to control traffic with signs or warning devices, it cannot create a dangerous condition in doing so . . . and must properly maintain the signs.” It was on this premise that liability was grounded in Town of Ft. Oglethorpe v. Phillips, 224 Ga. 834, 838, supra, where the city maintained a defective traffic light showing green in all four directions. The court held that while negligence in [177]*177discharging a governmental function is not actionable, the city may not create a situation dangerous to life and, while so maintaining it, escape liability for resulting damage. The maintenance under such circumstances becomes a nuisance.

Argued May 5, 1976 Decided June 15, 1976 Rehearing denied June 29, 1976 Jack J. Helms, Walters & Davis, J. Harvey Davis, for appellant. Mixon & Mixon, Harry Mixon, Reinhardt, Whitley & Sims, Glenn Whitley, for appellees.

This is substantially the holding in Hancock v. City of Dalton, 131 Ga. App. 178, 181 (205 SE2d 470) where it was contended that failure of the city to maintain traffic signals at a railroad crossing constituted a nuisance, and the court held that, in the absence of a provision to that effect in the contract between the municipality and the railroad there was no such duty. In Hutcheson v. City of Jesup, 132 Ga. App. 84 (207 SE2d 547) on the contrary, the city after installing the lights maintained them in a defective condition and a jury issue on nuisance resulted. Similarly, in Coppedge v. Columbus, Ga., 134 Ga. App. 5 (213 SE2d 144) where the city elects to erect a stop sign at an intersection to regulate traffic but then allows it to become obscured by foliage, the defective maintenance may itself become a nuisance. In all of these cases a clear line is drawn between a discretionary nonfeasance and the negligent maintenance of something erected by the city, in its discretion, . in such manner as to create a dangerous nuisance, and which amounts to misfeasance.

The court did not err in dismissing the City of Ocilla as a party defendant to this tort action.

Judgment affirmed.

Webb, J., concurs. Quillian, J., concurs specially.

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228 S.E.2d 159, 139 Ga. App. 176, 1976 Ga. App. LEXIS 1726, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bowen-v-little-gactapp-1976.

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