Arthur v. City of Albany

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Arthur v. City of Albany

106 S.E.2d 347, 98 Ga. App. 746, 1958 Ga. App. LEXIS 673

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedNovember 25, 1958

Docket37322

StatusPublished

Cited by21 cases

This text of 106 S.E.2d 347 (Arthur v. City of Albany) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Arthur v. City of Albany, 106 S.E.2d 347, 98 Ga. App. 746, 1958 Ga. App. LEXIS 673 (Ga. Ct. App. 1958).

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Opinion

Carlisle, Judge.

1. The-trial court did not err in sustaining the general demurrers. Count 1 of the petition was insufficient to set forth a cause of action on account of the maintenance of a nuisance. The allegations of the petition fail to show that the condition created' by the absence of the stop sign was injurious to the plaintiff by reason of its relationship to her home or property located in the neighborhood, or that it was expressly injurious to the plaintiff as a member of the public as constituting an obstruction to the streets or sidewalks. Stanley v. City of Macon, 95 Ga. App. 108, 112 (2b) (97 S. E. 2d 330).

2. The operation and maintenance of traffic lights and other traffic control devices is a governmental function conducted on behalf of the public safety and for the negligent performance of which municipal corporations are not liable. Code § 69-301; City of Rome v. Potts, 45 Ga. App. 406, 410 (165 S. E. 131). Such functions are not related to the maintenance of the, streets as such, and liability of a municipality for the negligent failure to maintain a stop sign after it is once erected cannot be predicated on the theory that it is a part of street maintenance.

In deciding whether to erect the stop sign in the first place *748 and in erecting it, the municipality exercises its legislative or judicial powers, and in determining whether to maintain the stop sign or traffic control device or to operate it, and in determining whether to replace it once it has been destroyed or removed, are all a part of the same exercise of legislative or fudicial power,' and the duty of erecting the device cannot be divorced from the duty of maintaining it so as. to say that the erection of the stop sign is an exercise of the legislative function, but that its maintenance or re-erection is merely ministerial. Long recognized limitations on municipal liability for the negligent performance of governmental duties- will not be abrogated by this kind of judicial legislation. City of Cumming v. Chastain, 97 Ga. App. 13 (102 S. E. 2d 97).

It follows that the petition failed to1 set forth a cause of action against the municipality in any of its counts, and the .trial court did not err in sustaining the general demurrers and in dismissing it. See Stubbs v. City of Macon, 78 Ga. App. 237 (2b) (50 S. E. 2d 866).

Judgment affirmed.

Gardner, P. J., and Townsend, J., concur.

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Carlisle, Judge.

1. The-trial court did not err in sustaining the general demurrers. Count 1 of the petition was insufficient to set forth a cause of action on account of the maintenance of a nuisance. The allegations of the petition fail to show that the condition created' by the absence of the stop sign was injurious to the plaintiff by reason of its relationship to her home or property located in the neighborhood, or that it was expressly injurious to the plaintiff as a member of the public as constituting an obstruction to the streets or sidewalks. Stanley v. City of Macon, 95 Ga. App. 108, 112 (2b) (97 S. E. 2d 330).

2. The operation and maintenance of traffic lights and other traffic control devices is a governmental function conducted on behalf of the public safety and for the negligent performance of which municipal corporations are not liable. Code § 69-301; City of Rome v. Potts, 45 Ga. App. 406, 410 (165 S. E. 131). Such functions are not related to the maintenance of the, streets as such, and liability of a municipality for the negligent failure to maintain a stop sign after it is once erected cannot be predicated on the theory that it is a part of street maintenance.

In deciding whether to erect the stop sign in the first place *748 and in erecting it, the municipality exercises its legislative or judicial powers, and in determining whether to maintain the stop sign or traffic control device or to operate it, and in determining whether to replace it once it has been destroyed or removed, are all a part of the same exercise of legislative or fudicial power,' and the duty of erecting the device cannot be divorced from the duty of maintaining it so as. to say that the erection of the stop sign is an exercise of the legislative function, but that its maintenance or re-erection is merely ministerial. Long recognized limitations on municipal liability for the negligent performance of governmental duties- will not be abrogated by this kind of judicial legislation. City of Cumming v. Chastain, 97 Ga. App. 13 (102 S. E. 2d 97).

It follows that the petition failed to1 set forth a cause of action against the municipality in any of its counts, and the .trial court did not err in sustaining the general demurrers and in dismissing it. See Stubbs v. City of Macon, 78 Ga. App. 237 (2b) (50 S. E. 2d 866).

Judgment affirmed.

Gardner, P. J., and Townsend, J., concur.

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106 S.E.2d 347, 98 Ga. App. 746, 1958 Ga. App. LEXIS 673, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arthur-v-city-of-albany-gactapp-1958.

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