Bowen v. DeMaio

District Court, E.D. New York·Decided June 3, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-02245·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK --------------------------------------------------------------- GARY BOWENS / US EQUITY HOMES,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE v. 20-CV-2245 (MKB)

FRANCES DeMAIO,

Defendant. --------------------------------------------------------------- MARGO K. BRODIE, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Gary Bowens,1 proceeding pro se, commenced the above-captioned action on May 19, 2020, against Defendant Frances DeMaio, a resident of Connecticut, alleging breach of contract concerning the parties’ agreement to buy, remodel, and resell real property located at 15 Mafre Drive, Guilford, Connecticut (“the Property”). (Compl. 1–2, Docket Entry No. 1.)2 Although Plaintiff paid the filing fee to commence this action, the Court orders him to show cause in writing within thirty (30) days, why the Court should not transfer this action to the District of Connecticut. If Plaintiff fails to show cause in writing within the time allowed or fails

1 Although Plaintiff adds “US Equity Homes” to his name, he does not otherwise reference this entity’s name in the Complaint. However, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he may only proceed on his own behalf, and cannot proceed on behalf of a business entity. See, e.g., Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[A]ppearance pro se denotes (in law latin) appearance for one’s self; so that a person ordinarily may not appear pro se in the cause of another person or entity.”). Moreover, to the extent US Equity Homes is a corporation, it cannot represent itself and Plaintiff, as a lay person, cannot represent a corporation. See Lattanzio v. COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing the rationale for requiring corporations, as “artificial entities,” to appear through counsel only (citation omitted)).

2 Because the Complaint is not consecutively paginated, the Court refers to the page numbers assigned by the Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) system. to seek an extension of time to do so, the Court will transfer this action to the District of Connecticut. I. Discussion a. Proper venue Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), the federal venue statute, a civil action may be commenced

in: (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). The Eastern District of New York is not the proper venue for this action. Although Plaintiff resides in Queens, he alleges in the Complaint that the Property is located in Connecticut, and that Defendant is a resident of Connecticut. Accordingly, the Court finds that venue is not proper in the Eastern District of New York. b. Transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) Where a case is improperly venued, district courts are to dismiss the case or, “if it be in the interest of justice, transfer [the] case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). The decision “whether to dismiss or transfer a case ‘lies within the sound discretion of the district court.’” Blakely v. Lew, 607 F. App’x 15, 18 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Minnette v. Time Warner, 997 F.2d 1023, 1026 (2d Cir. 1993)); see also Gonzalez v. Hasty, 651 F.3d 318, 324–25 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that “‘[c]ourts enjoy considerable discretion in deciding whether to transfer a case in the interest of justice’” pursuant to section 1406(a) and that courts “should abstain from transferring when the case is a ‘sure loser’” (first quoting Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 435 (2d Cir. 2005); and then quoting Moreno- Bravo v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 253, 263 (2d Cir. 2006))). In the interest of justice, the Court intends to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). c. Transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also New York Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting the district courts’ discretionary power to transfer venue “for the convenience of parties and witnesses” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a))). A district court “may sua sponte transfer an action in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).” Taite v. Colgate Univ., No. 12-CV-3435, 2012 WL 9334547, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (citations omitted); see also Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc. v. Occupational

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Bowen v. DeMaio, (E.D.N.Y. 2020).

Bowen v. DeMaio (Bowen v. DeMaio) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Gonzalez v. Hasty
651 F.3d 318 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Rita J. Minnette v. Time Warner
997 F.2d 1023 (Second Circuit, 1993)
Pridgen v. Andresen
113 F.3d 391 (Second Circuit, 1997)
Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener
462 F.3d 95 (Second Circuit, 2006)
Franklin Antonio Moreno-Bravo v. Alberto R. Gonzales
463 F.3d 253 (Second Circuit, 2006)
Lattanzio v. Comta
481 F.3d 137 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Blakely v. Lew
607 F. App'x 15 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Daniel v. American Board of Emergency Medicine
428 F.3d 408 (Second Circuit, 2005)